If inventory was already justified, expectation of finding drugs did not make it in bad faith

The fact that an officer has discretion in whether to conduct an inventory does not make it unconstitutional. The fact that the officer suspected he might find meth did not make the inventory unconstitutional as a bad faith inventory. United States v. Hall, 497 F.3d 846 (8th Cir. 2007):

“There must be something else; something to suggest the police raised ‘the inventory-search banner in an after-the-fact attempt to justify’ a simple investigatory search for incriminating evidence.” Rowland, 341 F.3d at 780 (quoting Marshall, 986 F.2d at 1175). That “something else” is not present here. The Hospital asked Officer Kasper to remove Hall’s vehicle. Officer Kasper thus had a legitimate reason to treat the case as a private-property tow, and acted accordingly. Pursuant to the Policy, Officer Kasper called a tow company and conducted an inventory search. In doing so, he completed a CRPD vehicle impounding report, cataloguing both the lawful and incriminating contents of the vehicle. Cf. Id. 341 F.3d at 782 (finding an inventory search invalid when “law enforcement sifted through the vehicle’s contents searching only for and recording only incriminating evidence”). Officer Kasper testified that he knew Hall’s vehicle was linked to the manufacture of methamphetamine and that the reason officers were securing the vehicle was because of this suspicion. As we stated above, however, provided that the search is conducted according to standard procedures, officers “may keep their eyes open for potentially incriminating items that they might discover in the course of an inventory search, as long as their sole purpose is not to investigate crime.” Marshall, 986 F.2d at 1176. The search here was conducted pursuant to the Policy, and, looking at the totality of the circumstances, we find no evidence that the searching officers acted in bad faith.

ATF agents executing a search warrant for illegal firearms did not violate any possessory interest or the Fourth Amendment by picking up a gun not specified in the search warrant and taking it to another officer to look at to determine whether it was an illegal weapon. It was in plain view during the execution of a valid search warrant. United States v. Kelly, 276 Fed. Appx. 261 (4th Cir. 2007)* (unpublished).*

The BATFE agents did not unlawfully search or seize the three weapons prior to the time Vasquez determined that they were possessed unlawfully. The agents’ decision to take the guns to Vasquez, who was located on the premises, was clearly “[]related to the objectives of the authorized intrusion” and therefore not an additional or unlawful search. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325, 107 S. Ct. 1149, 94 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1987). Nor did this movement of the guns constitute an unlawful seizure because the agents did not “meaningfully interfere” with Kelly’s possessory interest in the guns. Id. at 324; cf. Garces, 133 F.3d at 74 (“[W]e find neither search nor seizure in [the agents’] carrying the key about the house to determine its evidentiary value.”); United States v. Menon, 24 F.3d 550, 560 (3d Cir. 1994) (stating that agent executing a search warrant did not seize documents when she moved them to another room for a fellow officer to inspect). Thus, we conclude that the agents’ seizure of the three guns was lawful pursuant to the plain view doctrine.