Flight from potentially invalid investigatory stop broke the chain of any illegality

Defendant’s “resistance and flight, which amounted to obstruction, broke the link in the chain between the initial unconstitutional investigatory stop and the later seizure of the handgun. Under such circumstances, suppression of the evidence is not warranted by the exclusionary rule.” State v. Williams, 192 N.J. 1, 926 A.2d 340 (2007).

Confession at school to police officer by 12 year old to sex offense involving his three year old sister was not custodial so Miranda did not apply. In re J.H., 928 A.2d 643 (D.C. App. 2007)* (per curiam):

Appellant, who was twelve years old at the time, was interrogated by a police officer at his school and confessed to a sexual offense involving his three-year-old sister. No Miranda 1 warnings were given by the police officer. Concluding that appellant had not been in “custody,” the trial court declined to suppress the confession, which constituted the primary evidence against the youth. Applying the proper standard of review to the record presented, “we cannot conclude as a matter of law that [appellant] was in custody when the police interrogated [him], i.e., that [his] freedom of action was curtailed to a degree associated with a formal arrest.” Morales v. United States, 866 A.2d 67, 74 (D.C. 2005). We therefore uphold the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress.

The New Mexico Court of Appeals refuses to overrule cases, using the word “constrained” [bad sign], requiring a separate showing of exigency in automobile searches. State v. Bomboy, 2007 NMCA 81, 141 N.M. 853, 161 P.3d 898 (2007), cert. granted, No. 30,381, June 4, 2007:

[*4] In Garcia and Gomez, our Supreme Court rejected the federal bright-line automobile exception in search and seizure cases that permits a vehicle search without a particularized showing of exigent circumstances. See Garcia, 2005 NMSC 17, P 29; Gomez, 1997 NMSC 6, PP 35, 39, 44. Under Article II, Section 10 of our New Mexico Constitution, a warrantless search of a vehicle or warrantless seizure of an object from within a vehicle requires a particularized showing of exigent circumstances or some other recognized exception to the warrant requirement. See Garcia, 2005 NMSC 17, P 29; Gomez, 1997 NMSC 6, PP 35, 39; Jones, 2002 NMCA 19, PP 12, 15; see also State v. Duffy, 1998 NMSC 14, P 61, 126 N.M. 132, 967 P.2d 807 (stating that “[a]mong the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement are exigent circumstances, consent, searches incident to arrest, plain view, inventory searches, open field, and hot pursuit”).

[*5] The State does not contend that exigent circumstances or any other exception to the warrant requirement is applicable. The State’s arguments center solely on its contention that the circumstances of this case should not come within the reach of Garcia, Gomez, or Jones. The State argues that the seizure was lawful based on the existence of obviously illegal, incriminating evidence in plain view in a vehicle, giving rise to reasonable inferences of criminal activity on the part of Defendant. The State also argues that the seizure was lawful because it was based on Defendant’s lack of any lawful possessory interest in the inherently unlawful drugs and of any legitimate expectation of privacy, and also based on the de minimis nature of the intrusion. The State’s arguments raise a valid question whether, under the circumstances, the officer’s seizure of the methamphetamine should be considered unlawful. The State makes an arguable point, but it is insufficient to override the Garcia, Gomez, and Jones trio that forbids a warrantless seizure of an object in a vehicle unless an exception to the warrant requirement applies.