The defendant was seen operating a vehicle with an expired tag, and he has ticketed. The vehicle was not towed, and the officer “advised Morris that he had to make arrangements to get his vehicle out of the area because it could not be driven on the roadways.” Two weeks later the vehicle was seen again, still with an expired tag, and this time it was parked on a vacant lot. Impounding the car was unnecessary. The inventory produced drugs which were suppressed. Morris v. State, 958 So. 2d 598 (Fla. App. 4th Dist. 2007):
If Flemming was concerned that Morris would operate the vehicle on the public roadways without a valid registration, then she could have immobilized the vehicle or given Morris the option to make his own arrangements to have his vehicle towed. We can find no basis or justification for the impounding of Morris’s vehicle. Flemming’s action of impounding the vehicle and conducting a warrantless inventory search constituted an unreasonable search and seizure. We therefore reverse the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress and because the motion to suppress is dispositive, we remand, and direct the trial court to vacate Morris’s conviction.
Defendant’s opening his garage door was analogous to opening his front door. He had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the closed area. State v. Jenkins, 2007 Ida. App. LEXIS 65 (February 21, 2007):
The State’s argument unnecessarily expands Santana. Jenkins opened an otherwise enclosed garage to gain access to his home. His exposure of the garage to public view was temporary and is more analogous to the opening of a door to a private home than to the continued, knowing display of a walkway, driveway, or open porch where visitors are expected to go. See State v. Wren, 115 Idaho 618, 623, 768 P.2d 1351, 1356 (1989) (differentiating between a “public” unenclosed porch and an enclosed porch indistinguishable from the attached home). A garage with a large door that exposes much of a garage’s interior when open is admittedly different from a house; nevertheless, an attached, enclosed garage is typically an area where people expect privacy and expect to secure their possessions and perform private activities away from public view. While it is true that there can be no reasonable expectation of privacy as to observations which can be made from a driveway impliedly open to public use, this is limited by the principle that police officers without a warrant are only permitted the same level of intrusion as one would expect from a reasonably respectful citizen. See Christensen, 131 Idaho at 147, 953 P.2d at 587. Moreover, a privacy interest is not destroyed simply because an officer has open view into an area. See State v. Clark, 124 Idaho 308, 313, 859 P.2d 344, 349 (Ct. App. 1993) citing Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 738 n. 4, 103 S. Ct. 1535, 1541 n. 4 (1983) (“An open view observation alone, absent exigent circumstances or other Fourth Amendment justification, does not authorize a warrantless seizure or entry into an area where a privacy interest does exist. However, what is seen in open view may furnish probable cause for obtaining a warrant.”) Jenkins’ garage was part and parcel of the structure constituting his home, and was secured with a door closed at the time police arrived at the home. On the facts of this case, Jenkins had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his temporarily opened attached garage, and this space was subject to Fourth Amendment protection.
Comment about the defendant’s exercise of Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights in a DUI arrest was here subject to plain error analysis, but it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in light of all the other evidence in the case. United States v. Moran, 2007 CAAF LEXIS 827 (C.A. A.F. June 22, 2007).*
The AFOSI had probable cause for issuance of a search warrant for defendant’s computer. His roommate bumped the computer table, and the screen lit up, and Windows Media Player was open. He clicked on recent files opened and saw “14 year old Filipino girl.” Defendant’s claim that it could be innocuous was insufficient to overcome a showing of probable cause. United States v. Leedy, 2007 CAAF LEXIS 828 (C.A. A.F. June 22, 2007):
From a Constitutional perspective, the shortcoming in Appellant’s argument is that he focuses almost exclusively on the title “14 year old Filipino girl” as the predicate for probable cause. It is evident that as is the case with many digital file titles found on the Internet or on one’s personal computer, the title could be innocent. Consider the file name “Lolita,” which on its own could as easily reference an English term paper, a discussion of teacher-student relations, or contain adult or child pornography. Likewise, in a vacuum, the title “Teen Angel” could as likely reference a popular 1960s song as it could be a video file containing child pornography. Similarly, a listing of any number of rap song titles might suggest images of violence and pornography, but not in fact visually convey those images when played. The point certainly is made.
However, in the current case, Appellant’s file title “14 year old Filipino girl,” does not appear in isolation. Consequently, the title alone is not the sole predicate fact. As an initial factor, it is included on a sequential play list alongside titles that A1C Winkler understood to identify sex acts and which the military judge concluded referenced sex acts.
Moreover, and critically, none of these facts are abstract pieces of evidence, but rather are properly viewed in context, through the professional lens in which they were presented to the magistrate. The magistrate had the benefit of the affiant’s professional experience in investigating child pornography, a background which usefully “illuminated” the facts provided. Gates, 462 U.S. at 230.
