Sending a car at a border crossing to a secondary inspection area did not require reasonable suspicion. Here, the officer noticed the carpet of the car had been tampered with, and that was reason enough. United States v. Morales, 489 F. Supp. 2d 1250 (D. N.M. 2007):
Border patrol agents have virtually unlimited discretion to refer cars to the secondary inspection area and may do so in the absence of individualized suspicion. Id. (internal quotations omitted). This is “because the public has a substantial interest in protecting the integrity of our national borders, and the intrusion upon one’s right to privacy and personal security by a routine border inspection is minimal ….” United States v. Rascon-Ortiz, 994 F.2d 749, 752 (10th Cir. 1993). Agents’ “virtually unlimited discretion” is, however, limited in one important respect–the overall detention cannot exceed a routine checkpoint stop if probable cause, consent, or reasonable suspicion does not exist. Rascon-Ortiz, 994 F.2d at 753. Such a limit is necessitated by the Fourth Amendment’s key principle of reasonableness and the Supreme Court’s analysis in Martinez-Fuerte. But “[w]hether the routine checkpoint stop is conducted at primary, secondary, or both is irrelevant to Fourth Amendment concerns.”
Id. Instead, the true focus is the reasonable suspicion that must exist when a detention is prolonged beyond the scope of a routine checkpoint stop. Id. As the Tenth Circuit has stated,
“[o]bviously, if a secondary inspection area is such that it causes the detention to exceed a routine checkpoint stop because it is overly intrusive or lengthy, the secondary inspection becomes relevant in a Fourth Amendment analysis; however, the relevancy would still be based upon the reasonableness of the detention as determined by balancing Fourth Amendment interests, and not merely because the detention occurred at secondary.”
Id. n.8 (emphasis added). Or, as the Fifth Circuit has phrased it, “[t]he constitutionality of a seizure at a checkpoint stop depends on its duration, not its location.” United States v. Machuca-Barrera, 261 F.3d 425, 435 n.35 (5th Cir. 2001).
The government failed in its burden to show consent to search because the situation involved coercion. The search, however, was alternatively valid under the automobile exception because there was probable cause. United States v. Cabrera, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39656 (M.D. Pa. May 31, 2007).*
Plaintiff’s decedent was suicidal and potentially homicidal, and police officers entered to arrest him and ended up shooting him. There was cause to enter, and the use of force was reasonable under the circumstances. [This opinion was 100 pages long.] Estate of Bennett v. Wainwright, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39631 (D. Me. May 30, 2007).*
Agreeing to get one’s ID is a “thin reed” on which the government can support an entry by the police to follow the person to get it. However, the totality of the circumstances showed consent. As the officers kept walking with her, they could smell raw marijuana. They asked if they could sit down, and she agreed, and scales and paraphernalia were laying around. United States v. Nelson, 489 F. Supp. 2d 309 (S.D. N.Y. 2007):
The facts also do not support any purported claims of coercion. Madden testified that she was “nervous” and “frightened” when she signed the consent-to-search form. (Tr. 142). While such an emotional state is understandable given the events occurring in Madden’s home at the time, it does not rise to coercion and does not place the consent provided by way of her signature into question. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424 (1976) (finding consent to search voluntarily offered despite formal arrest); see also United States v. Marin, 669 F.2d 73, 82 (2d Cir. 1982) (same); Garcia, 56 F.3d at 423 (finding that the presence of three law enforcement officers does not lend significant support to a claim of coercion). Madden does not claim that she was threatened, physically restrained, or otherwise forced to sign the document; hence, her consent cannot be challenged on the basis of coercion. See United States v. Lavan, 10 F. Supp. 2d 377, 384 (S.D. N.Y. 1998) (listing show of force, use of handcuffs, previous refusal to consent, and threat of more expansive search warrant as factors in determining the voluntariness of consent).
Finally, the Court finds that the timeline [of the consent and the search] put forth by Madden is not credible.
