MA: Emergency aid exception applies to animals in distress

The emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement applies to life-threatening emergencies involving animals. The legislature has made it clear that animal abuse is against the law. “In addition to promoting life-saving measures, the ability to render such assistance vindicates the legislative framework for preventing cruelty to animals ….” Commonwealth v. Duncan, 467 Mass. 746, 7 N.E.3d 469 (2014):

A web of other statutes also regulates human interaction with animals, for example, by prohibiting certain means of putting animals to death; imposing restrictions on railroad corporations that transport animals; and restricting the use of animals in scientific experimentation. See G. L. c. 272, §§ 80E, 80G, 81. As part of the 2012 act, the Legislature authorized judges to consider the welfare of household pets when issuing protective orders; judges “may make a finding, based upon the totality of the circumstances, as to whether there exists an imminent threat of bodily injury to” a pet, and shall notify law enforcement officials if such a finding is made. G. L. c. 209A, § 11. This public policy promoting the humane treatment of animals, as reflected in the statutes of the Commonwealth, “is a basic source of law when no previous decision or rule of law is applicable.” Commonwealth v. Yee, 361 Mass. 533, 538 (1972).

In light of the public policy in favor of minimizing animal suffering in a wide variety of contexts, permitting warrantless searches to protect nonhuman animal life fits coherently within the existing emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement, intended to facilitate official response to an “immediate need for assistance for the protection of life or property” (emphasis supplied). Commonwealth v. Snell, supra at 774, quoting Commonwealth v. Bates, 28 Mass. App. Ct. 217, 219 (1990). It is therefore reasonable “to render aid to relatively vulnerable and helpless animals when faced with people willing or even anxious to mistreat them.” State v. Bauer, 127 Wis. 2d 401, 409 (Ct. App. 1985). See Commonwealth v. Entwistle, supra at 213, quoting Commonwealth v. Townsend, 453 Mass. 413, 425 (2009) (“the ‘ultimate touchstone’ of both the Fourth Amendment and art. 14 is reasonableness”).

In addition to promoting life-saving measures, the ability to render such assistance vindicates the legislative framework for preventing cruelty to animals, particularly the provision regulating the conditions under which dogs may be kept outside. See G. L. c. 140, § 174E. Indeed, it would be illogical and inconsistent to permit the prosecution of dog owners for exposing their dogs to conditions that “could injure or kill [them]” in ill-equipped yards, G. L. c. 140, § 174E (f) (1), only after the harm to animal life has taken place, while hindering the ability of police proactively to prevent such injury. Furthermore, the inclusion of animals within the ambit of the emergency aid exception enables trained personnel, such as police or animal control officers, to respond to animal emergencies, rather than lay people. In the absence of such trained professionals rendering care and assistance, untrained citizens may attempt to intervene, potentially causing further harm to the animal, to themselves, or to other members of the community, should an injured animal end up loose on public streets.

We therefore conclude that our prior formulations of the emergency aid exception encompass warrantless searches to protect nonhuman animal life. Thus, under both the Fourth Amendment and art. 14, the exception permits the police in certain circumstances “to enter a home without a warrant when they have an objectively reasonable basis to believe that there may be [an animal] inside who is injured or in imminent danger of physical harm.” Commonwealth v. Peters, supra at 819. Accordingly, we answer the reported question in the affirmative.