TN: 911 shooting call was exigency that included EMTs and CSIs

911 call about a shooting at 1:23 am, and “He’s in here” when they arrive justifies an emergency entry. [Certainly sounds like consent, too.] The real issue, however, is whether that also includes EMTs who follow and CSIs, and the answer is yet. This is not really a murder scene exception: It’s responding to the 911 call and the bleeding victim. The CSIs are not precluded from entering on the original call. State v. Hutchison, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 346 (April 11, 2014):

The question remains whether the subsequent officers were likewise justified in entering the house and whether the evidence seized was justifiable. Appellant argues that no exception to the warrant requirement applied to the officers, particularly the crime scene technicians, arriving after Officer Shaffer. He further argues that the processing of the crime scene, including taking video and photographs, and the seizure of evidence were outside the scope of the exigent circumstances search. He contends that even if this court were to apply the plain view doctrine to the seizure of the evidence, some of the evidence was not in plain view and should have been suppressed. In particular, appellant protests the seizure of the knife handle, the blue sweatshirt, and the gold nugget ring.

Appellant’s argument relies in part on the United States Supreme Court’s rulings that a homicide does not justify a warrantless search of a residence. The United States Supreme Court in Mincey v. Arizona declined to recognize a “murder scene exception” to the warrant requirement. 437 U.S. 385, 395 (1978); see also Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11, 14 (1999); Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 21 (1984) (per curiam). However, the Court also acknowledged the continuing viability of the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement and the application of the plain view doctrine to the seizure of evidence discovered in the course of law enforcement officers’ “legitimate emergency activities.” See Mincey, 437 U.S. at 392-93 (citing Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509-10 (1978)). Nonetheless, the Court stated that “a warrantless search must be ‘strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation.'” Id. at 393 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968)).

This court has previously encountered very similar circumstances and arguments as those presented herein. For example, in Coulter, the defendant told the police that he had killed his wife. State v. Coulter, 67 S.W.3d 3, 16 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001). One officer handcuffed the defendant, drove him to the defendant’s house, entered the house, and discovered the victim’s body lying on a bed. Id. Another officer was dispatched to the defendant’s house and collected evidence, including the murder weapon found on the kitchen table and the bed linen. Id. at 16-17. After paramedics removed the victim’s body, the police discovered a spent bullet in the bed’s box springs. Id. at 17. In addition, a later-arriving officer photographed the crime scene. Id. On appeal, the defendant contested the officers’ warrantless search of his house and the seizure of evidence not in plain view, particularly the spent bullet. Id. at 40. This court ruled that the initial entry was justified under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, that the collection of the murder weapon and bed linen were justified under the plain view doctrine, and that these doctrines allowed the responding officers to photograph the scene. Id. at 43 (citing Bills v. Aseltine, 958 F.2d 697, 707 (6th Cir.1992)). Furthermore, this court concluded, after surveying decisions from other states, that the entry of the later-arriving officers presented no Fourth Amendment issue under the circumstances of the case. Id. at 43-45.

Note the parallel to the fire scene searches: Those necessary for the immediate problem and its cause are permitted in under the original exigency. It’s the later searches that are problems, as in Mincey where the search lasted for three days.