Strip search was unconstitutional as a matter of law; $5 compensatory, $25,000 punitive verdict affirmed

The N.D. N.Y. at Syracuse held that the strip search of plaintiff was unconstitutional as a matter of law, and this was not error. He was searched twice, finding nothing, handcuffed, and then strip searched. There simply was no reason to believe that plaintiff had drugs on his person. Also, the defendants lost on qualified immunity. Plaintiff’s verdict was $5 compensatory and $25,000 punitive. The punitive award was justified based on the way plaintiff was treated before and during the strip search because the jury obviously credited the plaintiff. Derrick v. Aquino, 233 Fed. Appx. 73 (2d Cir. 2007)* (unpublished):

Defendants’ sufficiency challenge to the punitive damages award merits little discussion. Despite the verdict in defendants’ favor on Wilson’s false arrest and excessive force claims, the jury could reasonably have found that defendants’ illegal strip search was conducted out of evil motive or intent, or that defendants acted recklessly or callously. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. at 56. Wilson testified that (1) he was familiar with the defendants prior to the incident; (2) defendants verbally abused him with obscenities suggesting that they were strip searching him because he was a drug dealer without regard to any belief that he was then in possession of drugs; (3) each defendant participated in punching and kicking him in the course of forcibly removing his clothes; and (4) at least one defendant physically taunted Wilson during the strip search. Drawing all inferences in Wilson’s favor as we are obliged to do in reviewing a sufficiency challenge, this evidence was sufficient to support a jury finding that the defendants, individually and as a group, acted with evil motive or intent, or at least recklessly or callously, in conducting the strip search.

Comment: Clients always tell me that they were told all kinds of bad things were going to happen to them in jail and that they were verbally abused by the police. Here, the jury credited the plaintiff on malice and whacked the defendants, at least comparing the compensatory and punitive damages.

While the Fourth Amendment claim of the officers’ entry into plaintiff’s house was a close call, the court instead moved to the qualified immunity question which it found not close at all. The officers acted reasonably in responding to a 911 call and entering based on the information they had. Dockery v. Doyle, 237 Fed. Appx. 426 (11th Cir. 2007)* (unpublished):

In Holloway, F.3d at 1338, this court held that, based on the exigent circumstances of a 911 call reporting arguing and gunshots, “police officers in this case did not violate the Fourth Amendment when they conducted a warrantless search of Appellant’s home.” In Burgos, F.2d at 1526, we held that although agents conducted a warrantless search of defendant’s home, the “threat of injury to the neighborhood and arresting officers justified the avoidance of delay involved in obtaining a warrant.” Nothing in these decisions establishes that Patterson’s conduct violated the Fourth Amendment.

Defendant’s flight on being questioned by the officer gave reasonable suspicion, and the district court erred in holding to the contrary. There was reasonable susicion on the totality. United States v. Lawson, 233 Fed. Appx. 367 (5th Cir. 2007)* (unpublished):

Lawson claims, however, and the district court held: the Officer had “no right to detain him and stop him” after Lawson refused to talk to him; and, indeed, the Officer’s actions “caused” Lawson’s flight. An attempt to initiate a consensual encounter on the street does not constitute provocation; to the contrary, “law enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely approaching an individual on the street or in another public place [and] by asking him if he is willing to answer some questions”. Royer, 460 U.S. at 497.

Lawson’s “unprovoked flight” upon seeing the Officer was “not going about one’s business; in fact, it [was] just the opposite”. See Wardlaw, 528 U.S. at 125. It, along with other factors, discussed below, gave the Officer reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop. Id.

Lawson also contends the other factors cited by the Officer in justifying the Terry stop do not establish reasonable suspicion: for example, the general description of the robbery suspect as a “tall, large-built black male” has de minimis value in a predominantly black neighborhood; and the Officer’s conclusion that Lawson was in a high-crime neighborhood does not mean Lawson was the suspect. Each factor by itself may not justify a Terry stop; but, the totality of these factors, along with Lawson’s unprovoked flight, provided the Officer with reasonable suspicion to detain him. E.g., Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7-8.