IL: A “roadblock” on a river for intoxicated boaters was reasonably conducted

A “roadblock” on a river for intoxicated boaters was reasonably conducted, and defendant’s BWI conviction is affirmed. People v. Butorac, 2013 IL App (2d) 110953, 2013 Ill. App. LEXIS 923 (December 27, 2013):

[*P42] The evidence also paints a picture of a fairly mundane and friendly interaction between defendant and the officers, not of a jarring interaction characterized by concern, fear, or annoyance (Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d at 282) or by an “unsettling show of authority” (Prouse, 440 U.S. at 657). The officers’ boat did not have a siren or flashing lights, and they stopped defendant’s boat by pulling alongside it and hailing it by hand. The officers did not board defendant’s boat, which undoubtedly reduced the level of psychological intrusion generated by the stop. Defendant was able to show the officers his registration and safety equipment “pretty much from where he was seated.” According to the officers, defendant was “very friendly” and “was joking, he was happy the whole time.” Yeomans testified that the officers “were joking around with [defendant,] *** kind of like they were buddies with him or something” and that defendant “was real cooperative and just doing all the things they were asking him to do.” Again, as we stated above, the interaction occurred in daylight, which also would have tended to decrease any anxiety generated by the stop.

[*P43] At a minimum, the evidence the State presented at trial supports the conclusion that the officers were not acting arbitrarily or with unbridled discretion and, therefore, that the subjective intrusion resulting from their stop of defendant’s boat was minimal. We know from the evidence that the boat safety checks were part of a regular and systematic operation. We also know that the officers stopped defendant as part of their systematic efforts to stop every boat they saw. The procedure the officers used to hail defendant’s boat and to check his registration and safety equipment was consistent with the customary safety check procedures the officers described. Further, the official nature of the operation was apparent, and there was no indication that the officers’ stopping of defendant’s boat resulted in anything other than minimal psychological intrusion. While we do not have evidence relevant to all of the factors addressed in Bartley—such as whether the decision to conduct the boat patrol was made by supervisory personnel (Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d at 289), whether there were preestablished or written guidelines on how to conduct the boat safety checks (Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d at 289-90), or whether there was advance publicity of the boat patrol operation (Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d at 291)—such factors serve as guideposts only and do not constitute an “ironclad formula” (Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d at 289). In light of the particular facts of this case, where the officers systematically stopped every boat they saw for the purpose of conducting a limited registration and safety check, we conclude that the absence of evidence relevant to the remaining Bartley factors does not undermine our conclusion that the officers’ stop of defendant’s boat was only minimally intrusive.