In a drug-homicide death penalty case, three informative Fourth Amendment opinions on standing and nexus [the court has an “opinions” page [also here]; check back to see if posted]:
1. Whether an organizer has standing in the “office” of this DTO is a close question, and this defendant might actually have it. Moreover, the government makes many contentions of this defendant’s control over and presence at the place then argues he still doesn’t have standing. So, assuming standing, he loses on the merits of staleness, lack of probable cause, and a Franks issue. United States v. Savage, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9360 (E.D. Pa. January 24, 2013).* As to standing, which is all dicta:
Defendant’s classification of 3510 Palmetto as his “office” also bolsters his claim to standing. See, e.g., United States v. Chaves, 169 F.3d 687, 690-91 (11th Cir. 1999) (defendant had legitimate expectation of privacy in warehouse despite lack of formal ownership and maintenance of a different “principal place of business,” because he conducted business and kept personal possessions there). The fact that Defendant was employed in the business of narcotics distribution does not negate the legitimate expectation of privacy in a place of business under his control.
The Government contends that management of a criminal enterprise dedicated to narcotics distribution is not a privacy interest that society is prepared to recognize as legitimate. It is true that an “interest in possessing contraband cannot be deemed ‘legitimate.'” Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005). At stake for Defendant here was not merely an interest in possessing contraband that could justify, as in Caballes, a cursory dog sniff of a vehicle. Much of Defendant’s business operations were conducted from the 3510 Palmetto warehouse.
We will assume that Defendant has standing to challenge this search, even as we have reservations about 3510 Palmetto’s status as an “office.” Accordingly, we will proceed to Defendant’s substantive Fourth Amendment claims.
2. “Defendant’s use of an alias in renting Apartment 46C and registering the Villager does not negate his standing to challenge this search.” Defendant’s car was sufficiently connected to drug activity and was where he was found, and it was named in the warrant. Its search was proper, and, if it wasn’t, the good faith exception clearly applies. United States v. Savage, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9354 (E.D. Pa. January 24, 2013):
Defendant’s use of an alias in renting Apartment 46C and registering the Villager does not negate his standing to challenge this search. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 950 F.2d 505, 508 (8th Cir. 1991) (defendant had standing to challenge search when he had rented home under alias); United States v. Pitts, 322 F.3d 449, 459 (7th Cir. 2003) (defendant had standing to challenge search of mail sent to alias); United States v. Newbern, 731 F.2d 744, 748 (11th Cir. 1984) (defendant had standing to challenge search of hotel room rented to alias). Defendant had rented Apartment 46C several weeks prior to his arrest and the subsequent search of the apartment. (Notice of Occupancy.) Defendant was, by all accounts, residing in Apartment 46C at the time of his arrest. Similarly, the Villager was registered to Defendant’s alias and was sitting in front of the apartment. Accordingly, Defendant has standing to challenge the search of Apartment 46C and the Villager.
3. Sufficient nexus was shown to search defendant’s storage locker based on the facts and the affiant officer’s assertion of knowledge of where drug traffickers keep their stuff. United States v. Savage, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9362 (E.D. Pa. January 24, 2013):
Defendant also argues that “the information provided within the four corners of the affidavit fails to establish a sufficient nexus between the alleged criminal activity and the storage locker.” (Def.’s Mot. 20.) Courts may inquire into whether there is probable cause as to “the nexus between the crime and the place to be searched.” United States v. Jones, 994 F.2d 1051, 1054 (3d Cir. 1993). Such a nexus can “be established by direct observation or by normal inferences.” United States v. Martinson, 811 F. Supp. 1097, 1102 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (citations omitted).
Special Agent Lewis’s Affidavit was more than sufficient to establish probable cause to believe that Unit #105 was linked to the drug trafficking crimes in which Defendant was a suspect at the time. The Affidavit notes that the receipt was seized from Defendant’s vehicle. (Affidavit ¶ 9.) It notes that the search of Apartment 46C—in front of which the Villager was parked—yielded illicit controlled substances and equipment used for processing cocaine. (Id. at ¶ 8.) It further describes conversations with Anne Ketterer at Devon, which yielded evidence that Defendant, using his alias, had rented Unit #105. Finally, the Affidavit notes, based on Special Agent Lewis’s training and experience, that “individuals who distribute controlled substances frequently use storage facilities” for illegal purposes. (Id. at ¶ 13.) The experience of an affiant can assist a magistrate in determining that probable cause exists. See, e.g., United States v. Price, 558 F.3d 270, 282-83 (3d Cir. 2009) (finding probable cause to search defendant’s home where the affiant stated in the affidavit that based on his experience, individuals who engage in drug trafficking often keep drugs, money and other contraband in their homes). The Affidavit clearly establishes that Defendant was connected to illegal drug activities, and that Defendant was connected to Unit #105. We are satisfied that Judge Smith had more than a sufficient basis upon which to determine that there existed probable cause to issue the Devon search warrant.
