No standing to challenge subpoenas to third party records custodian, and any violation of the statute would not lead to exclusion

The defendant did not have standing to challenge the admission of business records held by third parties that were obtained through improperly issued subpoenas. Moreover, exclusion would not be the proper remedy. People v. Gadomski, 274 Mich. App. 174, 731 N.W.2d 466 (2007):

Two of the subpoenas in question were directed at pawnshops and sought transaction records involving defendant. Another subpoena was directed at a retailer and sought purchase records of defendant. The last subpoena was directed to a credit-reporting agency and sought defendant’s credit report.

We conclude that, in regard to records held by third parties relating to business transactions, defendant lacks standing to challenge the admission of evidence obtained through the subpoenas on constitutional grounds. Specifically, defendant has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information that he or others had exposed to third parties, such as banks and vendors. [citing Miller]

. . .

Further, and most importantly, the text of MCL 767A.1 et seq., does not allude to the exclusionary rule as a remedy for noncompliance. n4 Our Supreme Court has expressly “decline[d] to expand the use of [the exclusionary] rule in the absence of an explicit constitutional or legislative requirement.” Id. at 500, n 9.” Hawkins, supra. Here, MCL 767A.1 et seq., does not contain an explicit legislative requirement that excludes evidence obtained from noncompliant subpoenas, and we decline to expand the use of the exclusionary rule to do so. For similar reasons, we reject the trial court’s conclusion that the Legislature, in enacting MCL 767A.1 et seq, intended to protect financial records consistent with the FRPA. MCL 767A.1 et seq does not refer to either the FRPA or financial records. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court erred in applying the exclusionary rule to remedy a violation of MCL 767A.1 et seq.

Suspicionless parole search in California was permitted under Samson. United States v. Lopez, 474 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. February 5, 2007):

The Court explained that for inmates who elect parole, the California parole-search statute mandates that a parolee “submit to suspicionless searches by a parole officer or other peace officer ‘at any time.'” Id. (citing CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 3067(a)). This statute, reasoned the Court, served California’s interest in reducing recidivism, promoting public safety, and reintegrating parolees into productive society. Id. at 2200-01 n.4. Because the petitioner in Samson signed a parole order submitting to suspicionless search conditions, the Court held that “the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a police officer from conducting a suspicionless search of a parolee.” Id. at 2202.

The protective sweep and parole search at issue in Lopez’s motion to suppress must be viewed in light of Samson. Like the petitioner in Samson, Lopez signed a parole condition allowing him, his residence, and any property under his control to be “searched without a warrant” by any law enforcement officer. Under Samson, the officers had authority to conduct a full parole search at the moment they knocked on Lopez’s front door to arrest him. Because a protective sweep is a less extensive search than a parole search, Samson necessarily makes both the protective sweep, and the parole search, lawful.

Reasonable suspicion came from victim who was threatened by defendant with a gun. That was sufficient cause for a stop. United States v. Hodges, 215 Fed. Appx. 737 (10th Cir. 2007)* (unpublished).

Defendant’s argument that the police could not enter his home under an arrest warrant because they did not have reason to believe that he was there was belied by the record. Even so, the gun he was charged with having possessed came from the later execution of a search warrant that he did not contest. United States v. Trzeciak, 215 Fed. Appx. 519 (7th Cir. 2007).*