Affidavit as a whole corroborated informant; officer didn’t necessarily have to do it

The affidavit did not have to demonstrate that the officer independently attempted to corroborate the informant. It is sufficient that the affidavit as a whole shows that the informant was reliable. Here, the informant knew that a false statement would have repercussions with the police, and he saw a drug deal go down with the defendant [which is substantial basis of knowledge in every other case I’ve read]. United States v. Bronson, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1867 (D. Kan. January 8, 2007).*

Officers had reasonable suspicion for a stop based on what was an apparent drug deal. “The definition of an investigatory stop utilized in these cases, a brief detention which gives officers a chance to verify (or dispel) well-founded suspicions that a person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity, fits the facts of the case before us. The officers, as pointed out above, had well-founded suspicions that when the defendant met with Rocco for no more than a minute in Rocco’s car, he received a quantity of heroin from him. [In what almost sounds like classic bootstrapping:] Their stop of the defendant’s car was for the very purpose of attempting to verify those suspicions.” [brackets mine] United States v. Murray, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1705 (N.D. Ill. January 5, 2007):

Furthermore, the scope of the January 26, 2005 stop was reasonable given the circumstances. The police had a well-founded suspicion that they were stopping a narcotics dealer and they had observed him making movements with his hands around his waist and at the center console of the car as they approached and after they had instructed him to show his hands. This is more than enough justification to take the reasonable steps for their own protection that the officers took. In the course of protecting themselves, they observed the plastic bag which the defendant admitted contained heroin. At that point, there was probable cause to arrest and to seize the plastic bag containing the contraband. The officers’ actions subsequent to stopping the defendant’s automobile where reasonable and consistent with the limited objective of an investigatory stop. See United States v. Askew, 403 F.3d 496 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that stop of defendant’s car while he was driving through a parking lot on reasonable suspicion of engaging in a drug transaction was a permissible Terry stop); United States v. Fiasche, No. 05 CR 765, 2006 WL 695395, at *5-6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 10, 2006) (holding that stop of defendant’s automobile on reasonable suspicion of transporting drug proceeds based upon corroborated information from an informant was permissible under Terry). Because the stop of the defendant’s car was a proper Terry stop based upon a well-founded suspicion that the defendant was engaged in criminal activity, the Daniels’ motion to suppress his statements and the heroin recovered from his person is denied.

Officer’s knowledge that “very often” temporary tags on vehicles were forged could not be a basis for a stop without any information pointing to whether the one at issue was forged. People v. Hernandez, 146 Cal. App. 4th 773, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 66 (3d Dist. December 18, 2006, ordered published January 11, 2007):

Here, the question is whether Deputy Paonessa’s experience should lead to a different result. Deputy Paonessa testified that in his experience temporary operating permits are “very often” forged. We have no way of discerning the meaning of the statement, “very often,” because Deputy Paonessa did not say how many times he had stopped a car with a temporary operating permit or how many times the permit was valid or invalid. Absent either additional facts justifying a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, or specific experience Deputy Paonessa had to justify a suspicion that the particular operating permit displayed on defendant’s truck was invalid, we cannot say the stop was reasonable. We are unwilling to conclude it is always reasonable to stop a car that does not have any license plates but has a temporary operating permit, because that would effectively mean it is always reasonable to suspect that a temporary operating permit is invalid. Accordingly, we conclude the traffic stop was invalid and thus the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress.

Defendant next contends his convictions for resisting arrest must be reversed because Deputy Paonessa was not acting lawfully in the initial stop. Both parties agree that under California law a defendant cannot be convicted of resisting arrest if the officer was not acting lawfully at the time of the arrest. (People v. Simons (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1100, 1109 [50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 351].) Since we have already concluded the traffic stop was not justified and therefore unlawful, we agree the convictions for resisting arrest cannot stand.