MD: Failure to train on difference between Payton and Steagald was a jury question

Failure to train on the difference between a Payton entry on an arrest warrant of the arrestee’s home and a Steagald entry with a search warrant in the premises of a third person was a jury question on this record. “[A] jury could infer from the testimony of Prince George’s County Sheriff’s Department’s deputies that the State trained law enforcement officers to execute arrest warrants in a manner inconsistent with the rules of Payton and Steagald. There was, therefore, sufficient evidence to allow the question of whether the State breached its duty to train officers in a manner consistent with Fourth Amendment principles to reach the jury.” Jones v. State, 425 Md. 1, 38 A.3d 333 (2012).*

Officers were in a crack house responding to a wounded person call. Defendant was more concerned about an open drawer than the person wounded, and an officer went to look and found cocaine. The defendant consented to a search of the premises. Commonwealth v. Carlton, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 294 (February 16, 2012).*

“Does a lawful stop of a motor vehicle for moving violations, the observation of a noticeable odor of freshly-burnt marijuana in the passenger compartment, and the recovery of two packages of marijuana from the driver authorize a police officer to do more than was permitted in Commonwealth v. Cruz, 459 Mass. 459, 945 N.E.2d 899 (2011)? We believe so.” Commonwealth v. Daniel, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 306, 962 N.E.2d 213 (2012),* Review granted by Commonwealth v. Daniel, 462 Mass. 1101, 967 N.E.2d 634, 2012 Mass. LEXIS 373 (Mass., May 3, 2012).