D.R.I. Handcuffing here unjustified and turned Terry stop into arrest

Defendant’s handcuffing here was not justified for officer safety and turned a Terry stop into an arrest. United States v. Mayen-Munoz, 844 F. Supp. 2d 251 (D. R.I. 2012):

The government’s argument boils down to this: the Defendant’s detention was a valid Terry stop from the time of the initial encounter at 7:22 or 7:23 to the point when Officer Metfooney drove him to the station at 7:27 p.m. It is true that a number of the typical factors cut against de facto arrest: the duration was short (no more than five minutes); there was no use of force; Defendant was not told he was under arrest, nor was he Mirandized; there were only two officers at the scene; no weapons were brandished; and the encounter took place in a public, neutral location.

Defendant was, however, handcuffed almost immediately — no later than 7:23 p.m. Although “traditionally associated with an arrest,” United States v. Mohamed, 630 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2010), the use of handcuffs “does not automatically convert the encounter into a de facto arrest.” Acosta-Colon, 157 F.3d at 18. Nonetheless, the use of handcuffs, “being one of the most recognizable indicia of a traditional arrest, substantially aggravates the intrusiveness of a putative Terry stop,” id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), and the burden of showing the necessity of their use falls squarely on the government:

[I]t must be able to point to some specific fact or circumstance that could have supported a reasonable belief that the use of such restraints was necessary to carry out the legitimate purposes of the stop without exposing law enforcement officers, the public, or the suspect himself to undue risk of harm.

Acosta-Colon, 157 F.3d at 19 (emphasis in original); see also Mohamed, 630 F.3d at 6-7. Factors include whether the suspect was “uncooperative, belligerent, or showed any perceptible inclination to put up resistance or become violent” and whether the officers “harbored an actual suspicion” that the suspect was armed. Acosta-Colon, 157 F.3d at 19 (emphasis in original); see also United States v. Meadows, 571 F.3d 131, 141 (1st Cir. 2009).

In this case, the Government has not met its burden. Defendant did not resist his detention — he was cooperative, compliant, and placed into custody without incident. Furthermore, that Defendant was suspected of drug trafficking is not enough to justify a belief that he was armed; such a “factually unanchored justification … is generalizable to virtually every investigatory stop involving a drug suspect.” See Acosta-Colon, 157 F.3d at 19 (emphasis in original). And while the officers’ belief that Defendant had fled from the scene of the traffic stop is a relevant consideration, no evidence was offered that would support a belief or suspicion that Defendant was armed. See Meadows, 571 F.3d at 142-43.

The same can be said for the relocation of Defendant to a patrol car. The government must “point to some specific fact or circumstance that could have permitted law enforcement officers reasonably to believe that relocating the suspect . . . was necessary to effectuate a safe investigation,” and cannot rely on “bald assertions” for its justification. Acosta-Colon, 157 F.3d at 17 (emphasis in original). The government has offered no evidence to suggest Defendant’s relocation was motivated by safety concerns.

Finally, even if the government could show that the use of these arrest-like measures was justified, wholly absent from Defendant’s initial detention was any sort of investigation, questioning, or confirming or dispelling of suspicions — the very purposes for which these lesser-intrusions are permitted under the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Trueber, 238 F.3d 79, 91-92 (1st Cir. 2001) (“[Terry] permits officers to ‘stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes’ and ‘diligently pursue[] a means of investigation … likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly.'” (emphases added) (internal citation omitted)); see also Pontoo, 2011 WL 6016141, at *5, *8.

For all of these reasons, as of 7:23 p.m., when Defendant was handcuffed, his detention amounted to an arrest.