Two on qualified immunity

“The Anders point to no case holding that officers violated the Fourth Amendment in the process of levying property pursuant to a valid writ of execution. ‘For search and seizure claims, the Supreme Court has cautioned that “courts should define the clearly established right at issue on the basis of the specific context of the case.’” … Even defined at a level of generality inappropriate for qualified immunity, the Anders cannot show that the law is clearly established in this Fourth Amendment context for entry, search, or seizure of property.” [Indeed, a judicial authorized order to execute on property would usually satisfy the Fourth Amendment.] Anders v. Rumfield, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 6614 (5th Cir. Mar. 5, 2026).*

On qualified immunity: “This case, however, is a he-said, she-said type of matter arising out of a domestic violence protection order. The officer was not at the marital residence at the time the alleged PFA violation occurred. Consequently, in her complaint, plaintiff pled the factual basis upon which the arrest was made, or, as she asserts, the lack of factual basis to support probable cause. Therefore, the complaint’s own allegations define the universe of information available to the officer at the time of arrest (and prosecution) for an evaluation of qualified immunity. That same universe of facts informs whether existing precedent put the officer on notice that his conduct was unlawful. Unlike most cases where qualified immunity is raised on a 12(b)(6) motion, the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient for the court to define the right with specificity and to assess whether existing precedent clearly established that those facts were insufficient to support probable cause.” Hontz v. Bednarski, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45688 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 2026).*