LA: Judge’s arbitrarily denying or slow walking SW requests violates Canons of Judicial Conduct

A state judge who sat on search warrant requests, didn’t know the definition of probable cause despite having been a former prosecutor and defense lawyer for 15 years, and imposed unnecessary legal requirements on the state to obtain warrants violated the Canons of Judicial Conduct. He apparently erroneously rejected 27% of all search warrant requests when the local norm otherwise was <2.4%. In Re Fiffie, 2024 La. LEXIS 1581 (Oct. 25, 2024):

Judge Fiffie failed to timely review and act on warrant requests, which delayed the investigations of alleged criminal conduct. He also engaged in a pattern of requiring law enforcement to seek consent to search before issuing a search warrant and requiring the inclusion of property ownership information in warrant requests. He cited Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981) as support for these requirements. Specifically, Judge Fiffie believed Steagald and its progeny “require that when the search of a third persons’ home is involved that the officers should first request authority to search from the homeowner, unless an exception is present.”

Steagald does not support Judge Fiffie’s actions. To the contrary, his actions reflect a lack of knowledge or misunderstanding of the law. The issue in Steagald was “whether, under the Fourth Amendment, a law enforcement officer may legally search for the subject of an arrest warrant in the home of a third party without first obtaining a search warrant.” Id. at 205 (emphasis added). The court observed that a search warrant “is issued upon a showing of probable cause to believe that the legitimate object of a search is located in a particular place, and therefore safeguards an individual’s interest in the privacy of his home and possessions against the unjustified intrusion of the police,” and held that a search warrant must be obtained absent exigent circumstances or consent. Id. at 213. Thus, Steagald does not require consent before a search warrant can issue. It only recognizes there is no need for a search warrant if consent is obtained.

Contrary to Judge Fiffie’s assertion, Steagald emphasizes the importance of obtaining a search warrant. It encourages warrants, not discourages them. Judge Fiffie’s misunderstanding of the law placed an extra-legal burden on law enforcement officers that threatened both their safety and investigations. Judge Fiffie engaged in a pattern of improperly rejecting or resisting warrant requests where probable cause existed. This reflected a lack of or misunderstanding of the law, delayed timely and effective investigations of potential criminal conduct, and created an appearance of bias against law enforcement. His practices were contrary to clear and determined law on probable cause and constitute judicial misconduct. See In re Quirk, 97-1143 (La. 12/12/97), 705 So.2d 172, 180-181 (“[A] judge may be found to have violated La. Const. Art. V, Sec. 25 by a legal ruling or action made contrary to clear and determined law about which there is no confusion or question as to its interpretation and where this legal error was egregious, made in bad faith, or made as part of a pattern or practice of legal error.”).

Clear and convincing evidence shows that Judge Fiffie violated: (1) Canon 1 because he failed to personally observe a high standard of conduct so as to preserve the integrity and independence of the judiciary; (2) Canons 2 and 2A because he failed to avoid the appearance of impropriety, to respect and comply with the law, and to act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary; (3) Canon 3A(1) because he failed to be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence in it; (4) Canon 3A(4) because he manifested bias or prejudice in the performance of his judicial duties; and (5) Canon 3A(7) because he failed to dispose of all judicial matters promptly, efficiently and fairly. This constitutes willful misconduct related to his official duty and persistent and public conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, which brought his judicial office into disrepute in violation of Article V § 25(C) of the Louisiana Constitution.

(h/t to a reader)