OR: Third-party business records not to be treated the same as electronic records as in Carpenter

A third-party company’s records aren’t as detailed as electronic records (as in Carpenter), and they are not subject to the same standards for a warrant. State v. Hargrove, 327 Ore. App. 437 (Aug. 16, 2023) (at least not yet and not without a really developed record):

On appeal, defendant renews his argument that the standard for particularity of warrants set forth in Mansor for searching digital devices should also apply to warranted searches of records maintained by third-party companies. He asserts that banking and social media accounts can reveal information about a wide variety of private subject matters in the same way that a search of a digital device does. However, defendant has not sufficiently developed this argument. Defendant fails to explain with any specificity how these third-party account records are analogous to the “unprecedented capacity” of electronic devices to “collect and store a diverse and vast array of personal information,” as identified in Mansor, 363 Ore. at 208. The extent of defendant’s argument is that courts “should” treat this kind of information similarly. Without further development of the argument, we decline to take such a significant step in expanding the reach of Mansor.

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