Unjustified entry with guns drawn, ordering elderly man out of house first, was obviously not consensual. Later attempted consent was invalid because it was tainted by the original entry. United States v. Minnis, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79920 (S.D. Fla. November 1, 2006):
Accordingly, not having obtained valid consent to enter the residence, officers needed either a search warrant–which they did not have–or probable cause and exigent circumstances before it was legally permissible for them to enter that home. Steagald, 451 U.S. at 205; United States v. Santa, 236 F.3d 662, 668 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. Tobin, 923 F.2d 1506, 1510 (11th Cir. 1991) (en banc)). As explained in the August 28, 2006 R&R, there were neither in this case. Because none of the constitutional prerequisites for a warrantless entry without consent were present, and because the law deems this entry presumptively unconstitutional, the undersigned recommends that Defendant’s motion to suppress be granted, and that the evidence seized from Defendant’s residence and the statements Defendant made on April 25, 2006, be suppressed.n6
n6 We have, however, drawn a distinction between the initial entry – that lacked legal consent – with the consent that was later obtained, after the passage of time and after additional steps were taken by law enforcement to establish voluntariness. As explained in footnote 15 of the R&R, if a legal initial entry occurred contrary to the R&R’s conclusion, the passage of time, the use of a consent form that was later read to Ferguson and the Defendant, and their express consent at that point without any threat or show of force, all made it possible for Ferguson and Defendant to consent to a search after the protective sweep was conducted. Officers in fact obtained that consent. But for the other reasons argued in the R&R, that later consent to search (not enter) cannot save the government’s unlawful and warrantless entry into the apartment. See, e.g., Santa, 236 F.3d at 676-79 (illegal warrantless entry tainted consent to search provided immediately after illegal entry and all evidence seized thereunder).
Plaintiff’s actions gave officers reasonable suspicion to detain him. He was disheveled, smelled bad, and pacing around the front of the Cook County courthouse at 6:30 a.m. They decided to ask him for identification, and he claimed to be a “federal process server,” but he refused to identify himself. He was attempting to serve the sheriff with process at a shift change. Plaintiff’s conduct and words made them have reasonable suspicion that he was potentially dangerous, and summary judgment was properly granted. Cady v. Sheahan, 467 F.3d 1057 (7th Cir. November 3, 2006).*
Plaintiff was at a Breeder’s Cup event in Texas, and he was drawing the structure of the building with pictures of pigs in military uniforms and other references to possible religious beliefs. Security guards were notified by a patron, and they came and looked. After detaining him, they called the ATF which sniffed his van, and they looked in it in the parking lot. [“Paranoia strikes deep. Into your life it will creep.” –Stephen Stills] The detention and search were reasonable enough to qualify for qualified immunity. Govea v. ATF, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 27216 (5th Cir. November 2, 2006)* (unpublished).
Defendant was driving his girlfriend’s car with her permission, so he had standing to challenge its search. Search of the car was based on PC, and it was valid. United States v. Brown, 203 Fed. Appx. 997 (11th Cir. November 2, 2006).
The Eleventh Circuit rejected an IAC claim on grounds not related to the Fourth Amendment, but it mentioned that two defendants removed from a car with two “cookies” of crack were put in a police car and recorded where they made admissions of knowledge of the drugs in the car. United States v. Downs, 217 Fed. Appx. 841 (11th Cir. 2006)* (unpublished).
