IL: Gunshot victim has REP in his clothes from search in ER

Despite being a gunshot victim and gunshot injuries being reported to police, defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the emergency room from officers coming in to search his pants pockets. People v. Pearson, 2021 IL App (2d) 190833, 2021 Ill. App. LEXIS 59 (Feb. 22, 2021):

[*P41] As we have emphasized, the determination of whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy must be made on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the totality of the circumstances. Johnson, 114 Ill. 2d at 192. We thus do not hold that all hospital patients, wherever in the hospital they may be found, have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the space around them. We simply hold that, under the circumstances presented here, Pearson had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the trauma room, and thus Misiaszek’s entry into the room without a warrant or consent violated the fourth amendment.

[*P42] The State argues vigorously against this conclusion on a variety of grounds. It first notes that Rockford Memorial Hospital is a public hospital, and it argues that there can be no reasonable expectation of privacy in a public hospital, because choosing to be treated at a public hospital “instantly negate[s]” any privacy interest. The State has not offered any legal authority in support of this argument and thus has forfeited it. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Jan. 1, 2016); People ex rel. Illinois Department of Labor v. E.R.H. Enterprises, Inc., 2013 IL 115106, ¶ 56, 378 Ill. Dec. 402, 4 N.E.3d 1. Further, the case law on this point is to the contrary. See O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 718 (a physician who was a state employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his desk and files in an office within a public hospital).

[*P43] The State next asserts that Misiaszek’s presence in the trauma room was “mandated by state law,” that is, by section 3.2 of the Criminal Identification Act (Act) (20 ILCS 2630/3.2 (West 2016)). We reject this argument as well.

[*P44] To determine the intent of a statute, we begin by examining its language, which is the most reliable indicator of the legislature’s objectives in enacting a particular law. Yang v. City of Chicago, 195 Ill. 2d 96, 103, 745 N.E.2d 541, 253 Ill. Dec. 418 (2001). The statutory language must be afforded its plain and ordinary meaning, and where the language is clear and unambiguous we must apply the statute without resort to further aids of statutory construction. In re Michael D., 2015 IL 119178, ¶ 9, 410 Ill. Dec. 277, 69 N.E.3d 822. Here, the plain language of section 3.2 provides that medical personnel must “notify the local law enforcement agency” whenever someone with a gunshot wound seeks treatment. (Emphasis added.) 20 ILCS 2630/3.2 (West 2016). It does not require medical personnel to do anything else, such as admit the police to any particular area of the facility, and it certainly does not “mandate” that police be allowed to enter patient rooms at will. Even if section 3.2 could be read this broadly, the determination of whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in a particular place must be based on the totality of the circumstances, not a blanket rule. Johnson, 114 Ill. 2d at 192. And a statute could not grant the police powers beyond the bounds of the fourth amendment—a statute permitting the police to freely enter anyone’s home without a warrant would be unconstitutional. Accordingly, we find no merit to the State’s argument that section 3.2 of the Act authorized Misiaszek to enter Pearson’s room.

[*P45] On the same basis, we reject the State’s argument that the hospital staff’s notification to the police that Pearson was a gunshot victim was an implicit request or permission for the police to enter Pearson’s hospital room. The State also argues that hospital staff consented to Misiaszek’s entry into Pearson’s room by “buzzing” him into the hospital’s locked emergency area. Even if hospital staff could waive Pearson’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the room where he was being treated, however (a proposition that is far from clear; see our discussion of Bankhead (supra ¶ 40)), the record is silent on the question of how Misiaszek actually gained access to the locked emergency area in this case. There is no evidence that anyone on the hospital staff in fact intentionally admitted Misiaszek, and the mere fact that he somehow gained access does not establish that the hospital staff consented to his presence in the emergency area, much less to his entry into Pearson’s separate room.