CA8: While a SW can be executed unreasonably, this one wasn’t

Plaintiffs’ farm was the site of a four day search warrant execution after probable cause was shown to search the property in 2004 for bodies missing since 1971. The cattle bolted from the arrival of the police, and plaintiffs complained that the cattle lost weight. Also, they were not permitted in the house until the police were done and the stove was left on and their cat gave birth and some kittens died. While execution of a warrant is subject to reasonableness, this was not unreasonable under these facts. Lykken v. Brady, 622 F.3d 925 (8th Cir. 2010):

Courts may properly probe the manner in which law enforcement executes a warrant to ensure compliance with the Constitution. See Hummel-Jones v. Strope, 25 F.3d 647, 650 (8th Cir. 1994) (“The manner in which a warrant is executed is always subject to judicial review to ensure that it does not traverse the general Fourth Amendment proscription against unreasonableness.”). Although the Fourth Amendment protects against unnecessarily destructive searches and seizures, see Ginter v. Stallcup, 869 F.2d 384, 388 (8th Cir. 1989) (per curiam), the execution of a search warrant does occasionally require damage to property, see Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 258, 99 S. Ct. 1682, 60 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1979). We review appellees’ conduct for objective reasonableness, ignoring appellees’ subjective intent. See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641 (applying objective standard to qualified immunity analysis).

No constitutional violation is to be found with respect to the Lykkens’ cattle. …

Similarly, denying Esther’s entry into her house to turn off the stove and check on her cat would not appear unreasonable to an officer at the scene. While we sympathize with Esther’s feelings about her cats, we cannot agree with the district court “that Brady and Devaney’s refusal to allow Esther to enter the house for the amount of time it would have taken to turn off the stove and check on her cats was unnecessary and unreasonable.” Perhaps denying Esther entry into her house could be considered unreasonable if the officers were searching only for large objects which could not be secreted within the house. But the search warrant demanded a search for more than just the missing vehicle. The warrant also identified small objects, such as a ring, a watch, photographs, and papers, which could potentially be removed, destroyed, or hidden. Moreover, in the circumstances of this case, the fact that probable cause existed for the search could lead a reasonable officer to suspect the occupants of the house might attempt to conceal the objects of the search if the Lykkens were allowed unfettered access to the house. Denying Esther access to her house during the pendency of the search was therefore not unreasonable.