CA6: State court’s failure to remand for more factfinding was still a “full and fair opportunity to litigate” his 4A claim

Habeas petitioner’s CoA request is denied. His claim that he was denied a “full and fair opportunity to litigate” his Fourth Amendment claim because the state appellate court didn’t remand for fact finding is rejected. He had the opportunity to present the claim and did, and it was rejected. Sieng v. Warden, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 37310 (6th Cir. Nov. 25, 2020):

To the extent that a petitioner seeks to challenge the adequacy of the state’s procedure for resolving a Fourth Amendment claim, the federal courts do not conduct such an inquiry. See Goodv. Berghuis, 729 F.3d 636, 639 (6th Cir. 2013). Rather, an ‘”opportunity for full and fair consideration’ means an available avenue for the prisoner to present his claim to the state courts, not an inquiry into the adequacy of the procedure actually used to resolve that particular claim.” Id. (quoting Stone, 428 U.S. at 489).

Reasonable jurists would not debate the district court’s denial of Sieng’s petition on the basis that he had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claim in state court. The circumstances in Sieng’s case, contrary to his argument, are not similar to those in Riley. In Riley, as Sieng recounts, Riley challenged the search of his home and the trial court denied his motion to suppress; on direct appeal, the Ohio Court of Appeals sua sponte raised the issue of standing and concluded that Riley lacked standing to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim. On federal habeas review, this court concluded that the state court frustrated Riley’s opportunity to litigate his claim because it did not remand the case to the trial court to allow Riley to establish standing. Riley, 674 F.2d at 527.

Here, Sieng challenged the search of his residence on multiple grounds and the trial court denied his motion to suppress, finding that his traffic stop was not improper and that he consented to the search of his residence. In Sieng’s direct appeal, unlike in Riley, the state appellate court did not sua sponte affirm the trial court’s denial of Sieng’s motion to suppress on grounds not argued in the court below. Rather, the Ohio Court of Appeals resolved Sieng’s challenge to the trial court’s decision-including the argument that Sieng was coerced into consenting to the search as the result of a threat by a detective that officers would tear up Sieng’s parents’ house if they had to obtain a warrant. The state appellate court noted that the detective denied making any such threat and concluded that the trial court’s determination of voluntariness was not clearly erroneous.