After the case was transferred to a different judge after denial of a motion to suppress, defendant sought reconsideration of denial of his suppression motion. He didn’t show that there was justification for reconsideration because of new evidence or other justification. State v. Reed, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 620 (Sept. 18, 2020):
Here, Reed maintains that if the trial court had agreed to reconsider his motion to suppress, then it would have reached a different result regarding the suppression motion. The record shows that at the motion for new trial hearing following Reed’s second trial, the trial court allowed Reed to present proof about his claimed privacy interest in the room at his parent’s home and the right to exclude his parents and others from this room. However, the trial court ultimately held that no extraordinary circumstances existed that would cause it to reconsider the suppression ruling made by the prior judge assigned to Reed’s first trial.
The appellate record from Reed’s first appeal shows that the parties had a “pretrial suppression hearing” concerning Reed’s claim that he “paid rent and therefore his mother could not voluntarily consent” to a search of his room. Accordingly, this record clearly establishes that Reed raised these same suppression issues prior to his first trial but failed to include them in his first appeal. See Rouse v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 300 F.3d 711, 715 (6th Cir. 2002) (noting that the law of the case doctrine, which generally prevents reconsideration of claims that have been decided at a previous stage in the same litigation, “also bars challenges to a decision made at a previous stage of the litigation which could have been challenged in a prior appeal, but were not”). Although Reed was hopeful that the successor judge assigned to his second trial would be more inclined to suppress this evidence than the prior judge had been, the successor judge had no obligation to do so. See Christianson, 486 U.S. at 817 (“A court has the power to revisit prior decisions of its own or of a coordinate court in any circumstance, although as a rule courts should be loathe to do so in the absence of extraordinary circumstances such as where the initial decision was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Memphis Publ’g Co. v. Tenn. PetroleumUnderground Storage Tank Bd. , 975 S.W.2d 303, 306 (Tenn. 1998) (recognizing that the law of the case doctrine “is not a constitutional mandate nor a limitation on the power of a court” but “is a longstanding discretionary rule of judicial practice which is based on the common sense recognition that issues previously litigated and decided by a court of competent jurisdiction ordinarily need not be revisited”).
After considering the proof presented in conjunction with the Talley factors, we conclude that Reed has failed to establish that this proof would have caused the successor judge to reach a different result as to his suppression motion. The record indicates that Reed’s mother, who lived with her husband at the home on East Stump Street, had common authority over the premises and had the authority to consent to the search of Reed’s bedroom. “Common authority is defined as the ‘mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control … so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-habitants has the right to permit [an] inspection … and that the others have assumed the risk ….” Talley, 307 S.W.3d at 734 (quoting United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974)); see State v. Ellis, 89 S.W.3d 584, 593 (Tenn. 2000) (“The State may satisfy its burden of proof in this regard either by demonstrating that the third party in fact possessed common authority as defined above or, alternatively, by demonstrating that the facts available to the searching police officers would have warranted a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the consenting party had authority over the premises.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). After considering this case law, it is evident that no injustice occurred in this case. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to reconsider Reed’s suppression motion.
by John Wesley Hall
Criminal Defense Lawyer and
Search and seizure law consultant
Little Rock, Arkansas
Contact: forhall @ aol.com / The Book www.johnwesleyhall.com
"If it was easy, everybody would be doing it. It isn't, and they don't." —Me
"Life is not a matter of holding good cards, but of playing a poor hand well." –Josh Billings (pseudonym of Henry Wheeler Shaw), Josh Billings on Ice, and Other Things (1868) (erroneously attributed to Robert Louis Stevenson, among others)
“I am still learning.” —Domenico Giuntalodi (but misattributed to Michelangelo Buonarroti (common phrase throughout 1500's)).
"Love work; hate mastery over others; and avoid intimacy with the government."
—Shemaya, in the Thalmud
"It is a pleasant world we live in, sir, a very pleasant world. There are bad people in it, Mr. Richard, but if there were no bad people, there would be no good lawyers."
—Charles Dickens, “The Old Curiosity Shop ... With a Frontispiece. From a Painting by Geo. Cattermole, Etc.” 255 (1848)
"A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect results, especially if one's attention is confined to the particular case at bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced."
—Williams
v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold,
J.), rev'd Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).
"The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws,
or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." —Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
"Any costs the exclusionary rule are costs imposed directly by the Fourth Amendment."
—Yale Kamisar, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 36 n. 151 (1987).
"There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that
bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the
police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater
than it is today."
— Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their
property."
—Entick
v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)
"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have
frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And
so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his
case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth
Amendment."
—United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated
here, has not–to put it mildly–run smooth."
—Chapman
v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the
bottom of a turntable."
—Arizona
v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)
"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in
an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."
—Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)
“Experience should teach us to be most on guard to
protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born
to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded
rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men
of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.”
—United
States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
“Liberty—the freedom from unwarranted
intrusion by government—is as easily lost through insistent nibbles by
government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose
it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark.”
—United
States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)
"You can't always get what you want /
But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need."
—Mick Jagger & Keith Richards
"In Germany, they first came for the communists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for
the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Catholic. Then they came
for me–and by that time there was nobody left to speak up."
—Martin Niemöller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration
camp]
“You know, most men would get discouraged by
now. Fortunately for you, I am not most men!”
---Pepé Le Pew
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers,
is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which
reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that
those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting
out crime."
—Johnson
v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)