CO: Domestic violence call is exigency; no “domestic violence exception,” but almost

A 911 domestic violence call from a child who left the home to call from nearby was exigency for entry. [Responding to domestic violence cases are where a significant number of cops get killed.] The female let the police in and consented to a search. While “there is no ‘domestic violence’ exception” to the warrant requirement, almost. (The court suggests the 911 call can also provide probable cause.) People v. Chavez, 240 P.3d 448 (Colo. App. 2010), cert. denied 2010 Colo. LEXIS 642 (Colo., Aug. 30, 2010):

A warrantless entry may be justified by investigative exigencies or emergencies. Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403. The “exigent circumstances” and “emergency” exceptions are technically distinct: for example, the former requires traditional probable cause while the latter requires an objectively reasonable basis for believing immediate aid is required inside. … Ultimately, however, “[t]he ’emergency doctrine’ exception to the warrant requirement is but a specific example of the exigent circumstances doctrine.” People v. Thompson, 770 P.2d 1282, 1285 (Colo. 1989). And “[i]n domestic violence cases, the distinction between the two doctrines often collapses because the same facts that give rise to the exigency also provide probable cause of a suspected crime.” Amanda Jane Proctor, Breaking into the Marital Home to Break Up Domestic Violence: Fourth Amendment Analysis of “Disputed Permission”, 17 Am. U.J. Gender Soc. Pol’y & Law 139, 142 (2009).

In evaluating reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment, courts have “‘accorded great latitude'” to officers responding to emergency reports of ongoing domestic violence. … Case law recognizes that “[w]hen officers respond to a domestic abuse call, they understand that ‘violence may be lurking and explode with little warning.'” … Another reason “[d]eference” to officers’ “[o]n the spot reasonable judgments” is “particularly warranted in domestic disputes” is that “[t]he signs of danger may be masked” by a battered victim’s fear or dependence. …

. . .

Defendant argues — and we agree — “there is no ‘domestic violence’ exception to the Fourth Amendment.” See United States v. Black, 482 F.3d 1035, 1040 (9th Cir. 2007) (“we have stopped short of holding that ‘domestic abuse cases create a per se exigent need for warrantless entry'”) (quoting Brooks, 367 F.3d at 1136); United States v. Davis, 290 F.3d 1239, 1244 (10th Cir. 2002) (declining to “grant[] unfettered permission to officers to enter homes, based only upon a general assumption domestic calls are always dangerous”) (emphasis in original). But in reviewing police responses to emergency reports of ongoing domestic violence, courts must be cognizant of the difficulties such cases present for officers.