“Four corners” rule does not apply to good faith exception

“Four corners” rule limits probable cause determination of a search warrant to the four corners of the application. In applying good faith exception, however, the court may look beyond the four corners for good faith. State v. Perandi, 2008 Ohio 168, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 143 (5th Dist. January 16, 2008) (previous post had wrong case name; sorry).

[*P45] In determining whether probable cause exists to support the issuance of a search warrant, a trial court is confined to the four corners of the affidavit and any recorded testimony made part of the affidavit pursuant to Crim.R. 41(C). See, State v. Wesseler (Feb. 17, 1998), Butler App. No. CA96-07-131, and Crim.R. 41(C). However, in determining whether the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies, numerous courts have held a trial court may look beyond the four corners of the affidavit and consider unrecorded oral testimony to determine whether the officer executing the search warrant did so in good faith reliance on the judge or magistrate’s issuance of the search warrant. See, Wesseler, supra; Moya v. State (1998), 335 Ark. 193, 202, 981 S.W.2d 521, 525-526, cited in Katz, Ohio Arrest, Search and Seizure, (2002 Ed.) 151, Section 8.2, fn. 2, and United States v. Curry (C.A.8, 1990), 911 F.2d 72, 78 (cited in Moya). The principle in cases like Wesseler, Moya, and Curry is consistent with the statement in Leon that “all of the circumstances” may be considered in determining whether a reasonably well-trained police officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate’s authorization. Leon, 468 U.S. at 922-923, fn. 23.

Plaintiff showed a sufficient question of an unreasonably applied policy on use of deadly force to survive summary judgment. The city’s policy was constitutional, but its application might be found by a jury not to be. Price v. Sery, 513 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2008).*

Dog sniff that was completed four minutes after completion of paperwork was completed was not unreasonable. [Here, the court found it all important that the stop was based on probable cause to believe that a traffic offense had occurred, and that made it possible to detain the defendant longer for the dog sniff which was otherwise without cause than the officer could on mere reasonable suspicion.] United States v. Johnson, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3920 (C.D. Ill. January 18, 2008).*

Traffic stop was supported by illegal lane change, and a gun was observed in plain view between the passenger’s legs. United States v. Holmes, 530 F. Supp. 2d 687 (D. Del. 2008).*