TX2: Under the Texas exclusionary rule, good faith reliance on a statute does not prevent suppression of evidence

Defendant’s BAC test should have been with a warrant under McNeely. Under the Texas exclusionary rule, good faith reliance on a statute, here the implied consent law, does not prevent suppression of evidence. Texas doesn’t follow Davis. Burks v. State, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 99 (Tex. App. – Ft. Worth January 8, 2015):
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The State alternatively argues that because the officer in this case was following the mandatory terms of the transportation code, the exclusionary rule should not apply here. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.23(a) (West 2005) (providing that “[n]o evidence obtained by an officer … in violation of any provisions of the Constitution or laws of the State of Texas, or of the Constitution or laws of the United States of America, shall be admitted in evidence against the accused on the trial of any criminal case”). But there is no exception to our statutory exclusionary rule for an officer’s good faith reliance on a statute. See id. art. 38.23(b) (providing the only exception for officers acting in good-faith reliance upon a warrant); State v. Anderson, 445 S.W.3d 895, 2014 WL 5033262, at *14 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2014, no. pet. h.) (explaining that the federal exclusionary rule, unlike Texas’s, has at least three good faith exceptions) (citing Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2427-28, 180 L. Ed. 2d 285 (2011)); Polk v. State, 704 S.W.2d 929, 934 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1986), aff’d, 738 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). Because there was no warrant in this case, the statutory exception in article 38.23(b) does not apply. See Anderson, 445 S.W.3d 895, 2014 WL 5033262, at *14; Douds v. State, 434 S.W.3d 842, 861 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. granted) (en banc).