The New Yorker: The Senator vs. the C.I.A. by Steve Coll:

Dianne Feinstein’s ‘grave concerns’ could finally force decisions about congressional oversight and torture.

Defendant was nervous and furtive in a high crime area having apparently done a drug deal, and that made the stop reasonable. The validity of the stop, however, doesn’t answer the question of the frisk. Here, when the officer said “I know you have a gun” (based on the fellow officer rule), defendant laid down spread eagle. That added to the reason to frisk. [If you know it’s going to happen anyway, why does that suggest a gun?] United States v. Carter, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 4878, 2014 FED App. 0194N (6th Cir. March 12, 2014)*:

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Defendant was convicted of 25 counts of having “junked motor vehicles” on his property in the city. From the street, the code enforcement officer saw the vehicles, then he entered the property to record the VINs. The court held that there was probable cause for the entry, and expressly declined to decide open fields, and thus by implication curtilage. [Thus, the court botched it, and hopefully it will be revisited on rehearing or by the state supreme court. Probable cause alone doesn’t make an entry on to a person’s property right. That’s fundamental Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The cars weren’t going anywhere. Either get a warrant or argue open fields. This is just wrong. I can’t say Mr. Meints would win, but the court shouldn’t have decided this so superficially.] City of Beatrice v. Meints, 21 Neb. App. 805, 2014 Neb. App. LEXIS 66 (March 11, 2014):

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Politico: Panel ‘close’ to killing NSA programs by Darren Samuelsohn:

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Officers coming to do a drug knock and talk saw dead ducks on defendant’s porch, so they asked how he killed them. He said that he shot them with a shotgun. Defendant, however, was a convicted felon. They asked where the gun was. He said it was inside, and he offered to go get it. Officers declined and asked for consent. He refused, so they arrested him based on his admission he was a felon in possession. They caucused amongst themselves and with a state’s attorney on the phone and decided to do a protective sweep and a search warrant, and they saw the gun. They retreated and got a search warrant. That was unreasonable because there was no justification whatsoever for a protective sweep. However, they could have gotten a search warrant based on what they knew before the protective sweep. Not only that, all the information they had about a potential meth lab on the property was good enough to get a search warrant anyway. Inevitable discovery supports the search warrant. Carter v. Commonwealth, 2014 Ky. App. LEXIS 44 (March 14, 2014):

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State officials took an infant child from the hospital because of their perceived belief that the mentally ill plaintiff was an unfit mother. The record supports that the removal of the child was objectively an emergency, and the actors also get qualified immunity. Schweitzer v. Crofton, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 4691 (2d Cir. March 13, 2014)*:

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A hotel manager complained to police that hotel housekeeping was finding drug paraphernalia in rooms. He asked police for a dog sniff of the hallways, and that led to a search warrant issued for defendant’s hotel room. The search warrant was valid, and the good faith exception applied in any event. Blankenship v. State, 2014 Ind. App. LEXIS 98 (March 12, 2014).

The affidavit for the search warrant showed probable cause to believe contraband would be found. The good faith exception then supported seizing drug paraphernalia. United States v. Scott, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31788 (N.D. W.Va. January 30, 2014), adopted 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31789 (N.D. W. Va. March 12, 2014).* [Note: What about plain view: The police are there with a search warrant, and the evidentiary value is immediately apparent? The good faith exception is not a panacea for all alleged errors.]

Defendant’s stop was based on failure to signal, and then he consented to a search of his car and house. “When they reached the residence, Ledgerwood asked ‘if it would be okay to search,’ and the Defendant affirmed ‘yes, go ahead – he kept saying, go ahead and search. Go ahead. There’s nothing.’ Tr. at 16-17. In addition to this verbal consent, Ledgerwood presented a consent form in the Defendant’s native Spanish, which Defendant signed.” United States v. Sanchez-Ruiz,, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31580 (N.D. Ga. February 14, 2014), R&R 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31581 (N.D. Ga. March 11, 2014).*

Rule 41 doesn’t apply to a state search warrant just because the state officer called the FBI for input. The affidavit was supplemented when presented to the issuing magistrate judge, and that made the affidavit both sufficient and the warrant was particular and the seizure was not overbroad. Besides, the good faith exception applies. United States v. Williams, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31835 (D. S.C. March 12, 2014).*

“The search warrant described the items to be seized with sufficient particularity, and the search warrant affidavit established probable cause to believe contraband would be found in Defendant’s apartment. Although the affidavit alone may not have established probable cause to believe that items related to drug distribution and manufacturing would be found in Defendant’s residence, exclusion is not appropriate because the Leon good faith exception applies to the facts of this case.” United States v. Scott, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31788 (N.D. Ala. January 30, 2014),* R&R 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32070 (N.D. Ala. March 11, 2014).*

Even though the government didn’t rely on it, the fact the officer knew defendant and that there was an arrest warrant for him was reason enough for the stop. Then a dog alert provided probable cause. United States v. Fonville, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31610 (E.D. Mich. March 12, 2014).*

TechDirt: Law Enforcement Agencies All Over California Have Been Secretly Using Stingray Devices by Tim Cushing:

from the fourth-amendment…-we-hardly-knew-ye dept

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Arkansas posts a rule for comment that arrest and search warrant applications may be made, and the resulting warrants may be issued, by electronic means. The comment period closes May 1. In re Arkansas Supreme Court Committee on Criminal Practice—Proposed Rule Changes, 2014 Ark. 120 (March 13, 2014).*

Defendant filed a motion to suppress the search warrant for lack of probable cause which was denied. Then, a year later, he filed a motion to suppress that the search was excessive and the police violated the terms of the warrant. “When defendant filed his second motion to suppress over a year later, defendant attempted to gain a second bite at the apple.” He should have pursued this issue in the first motion to suppress, and that makes it law of the case. State v. Falcon, 2014 La. App. LEXIS 628 (La. App. 5 Cir. March 12, 2014).

Defendant was in a fight in his barracks dorm room with his roommate and AFOSI was called. He was patted down, and a pill bottle and crusher were found with a hollowed out pen barrel. The military judge suppressed the search of the person, but not later statements. The court finds the later statements were attenuated from the prior search, and the statements were properly admitted. United States v. Milano, 2014 CCA LEXIS 162 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. March 11, 2014). [Note: A knife was found on the bed, but not within reach. Thus, a patdown and plain feel could have been issues, too, but they weren’t even discussed. The pill bottle presumably would not have been considered a weapon and not seizable at the time.]

I may only post once or twice a day through Friday the 21st, but more so on the weekend.

eff.org: Top Technologists File Brief Supporting ACLU Lawsuit Against NSA Spying

EFF Represents Computer Scientists in Explaining Why “It Is Not Just Metadata”

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