Crawford v. Washington does not apply to suppression hearings. “A district court is not bound by the rules of evidence in suppression hearings.” State v. Woinarowicz, 2006 ND 179, 720 N.W.2d 635(August 16, 2006).

PC on possession of drugs does not require a field test first. The officer can make the arrest based on his or her observation and experience. Id.

Failure to use a turn signal did not violate NC law where it affected no other vehicle. Therefore, the stop lacked PC. State v. Ivey, 360 N.C. 562, 633 S.E.2d 459 (August 18, 2006).

Under Idaho law, the fact a gun was unloaded made it not a concealed weapon, and the officer’s observation that it was unloaded dispelled RS on that score. Nevertheless, defendant’s lethargy and confusion warranted detaining him to figure out what was wrong with him. State v. Cutler, 141 P.3d 1166 (Ida. App. July 14, 2006).

Fresh marks and scratches around gas tank and filler near the border was RS. United States v. Estrada, 459 F.3d 627 (5th Cir. August 8, 2006).*

Collective knowledge of officers justified stop because the believed that defendant had purchased a gun as a felon. United States v. Rogers, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 20234 (5th Cir. August 7, 2006)* (unpublished).

MSJ granted defendant’s on collateral estoppel because the issue in the civil case was the same that underlied plaintiff’s indictment and conviction which had been affirmed on appeal by the Third Circuit. Goodrich v. Wilcox, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54291 (M.D. Pa. August 4, 2006).

Rule 41(f)(3) is satisfied by either reading the SW to the occupant or giving them a copy. United States v. Bacon, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54466 (D. Ore. August 3, 2006).

Liquor control officers did not need RS to enter permitted premises; just to open closed cabinets. Loom v. Ohio Liquor Control Comm’n, 2006 Ohio 4072, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 3993 (10th Dist. August 8, 2006).*

Defendant was arrested on an arrest warrant and the officers validly conducted a complete inventory, including under the hood. The fact the arrest warrant was not produced at the suppression hearing was not prejudicial where it was put in evidence at the trial. Brooks v. State, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 6973 (Tex. App. – Dallas August 8, 2006).*

Defendant computer supervisor had a REP in office and computer areas. “Hylton’s use of the supervisor’s area, Costin’s office, and the Server Room to store personal items demonstrates his subjective expectation of privacy in these areas. This expectation was also objectively reasonable, because the supervisor’s area was extremely close to his private desk and was clearly separated from the general shared work areas in the office, and only he and Costin had access to her office and the Server Room. Even if Hylton did not have a traditional property interest in the office, his high-ranking supervisory position also suggests that he reasonably expected privacy in those areas that were exclusively for his use and the use of the owner of the corporation with whom he worked closely. [¶] Although Hylton has demonstrated a legitimate expectation of privacy in the supervisors’ area and Costin’s office, he has not demonstrated a similar expectation with respect to any other parts of the DataUSA office.” United States v. Costin, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52051 (D. Conn. July 31, 2006).

Tampa federal court reaffirms injunction against suspicionless patdowns at NFL games. “BEFORE THE COURT is Defendants’ Motion to Reconsider, Vacate, and Dissolve the Preliminary Injunction (Dkt. 7) and Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition (Dkt. 23). Argument on Defendant’s motion was heard on July 13, 2006. After careful consideration of the parties’ briefs and the record before the state court, Defendants’ Motion to Reconsider, Vacate and Dissolve the Preliminary Injunction is DENIED. The mass suspicionless pat-downs implemented by the Tampa Sports Authority (‘TSA’) for NFL games at Raymond James Stadium (‘Stadium’) constitute unreasonable searches under the Florida Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” Johnston v. Saavedra, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52173 (M.D. Fla. July 28, 2006).

While defendant did not show a sufficient possessory interest in the truck he was driving to have standing, he still had standing to contest his own seizure. When license came back “not on file,” that was reason enough for a stop to inquire. United States v. Hernandez-Velasco, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52220 (D. Utah July 28, 2006).

Missing inspection sticker was reason enough to stop defendant’s vehicle. Open container led to defendant denying it was his but a former passenger’s, and he consented to entry into car to get it which produced odor or marijuana and a more intensive search. United States v. Washington, 439 F. Supp. 2d 589 (E.D. Va. July 24, 2006).*

Informant’s information was too thin to support trash seizure by RS in Indiana. Membres v. State, 851 N.E.2d 990 (Ind. App. 2d Dist. July 31, 2006).

Officers obtained a search warrant for counterfeiting and theft and they seized a locked black box from defendant’s house. They later learned that a gun might be in the box, so they retrieved it from the evidence room and forced it open. That search was unlawful because the police needed a warrant. United States v. Ferry, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69349 (D. Utah September 25, 2006).

Seizure of laptop stated by witnesses to be involved in counterfeiting was seizable because it was forfeitable. A search warrant was later obtained to get into it. United States v. Dorr, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69161 (W.D. Pa. September 26, 2006).*

Suit over search that led to conviction was barred by Heck because it necessarily implicates the validity of the finding of the drugs and that was the basis for the conviction. Zimmerman v. Chadbourne, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69207 (D. Colo. September 26, 2006).*

Defendant argued his flight in a high crime area from an unmarked black car was not reasonable suspicion, but the district court disagreed. United States v. Afonso, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69282 (D. Mass. September 26, 2006).*

The American Civil Liberties Union issued a press release entitled ACLU Slams Senate Judiciary Committee’s Approval of NSA Spying Bills on Sen. Specter’s (R-PA) bill permitting domestic spying. The bill passed out of committee on a 10-8 vote.

The American Civil Liberties Union today strongly rebuked the Senate Judiciary Committee for adopting legislation that approves warrantless spying on Americans by the National Security Agency. The move follows a recent court decision finding the surveillance both illegal and unconstitutional. The Bush administration has thus far stonewalled efforts by the committee to conduct meaningful oversight over the program.

“Today, the Senate Judiciary Committee acted as a rubber stamp for the administration’s abuse of power,” said Caroline Fredrickson, Director of the ACLU Washington Legislative Office. “Congress has a right and obligation to conduct meaningful oversight on the unlawful actions of the president. But instead of investigating lawbreaking, the Senate Judiciary Committee wants to make it legal. We urge the full Senate to reject any attempts to ratify this illegal program.”

School strip search after small bomb exploded in hallway and a suspect was ID’ed, whose hands smelled of explosives, was reasonable. Cases involving strip searches for stolen money and small quantities of drugs are distinguishable. Richardson v. Board of Educ. of Jefferson County, Kentucky, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68748 (W.D Ky. September 22, 2006):

Like the searches in issue in Reynolds and Williams, the search in the present case involved a search for an item that posed a threat to health or safety, namely an explosive device. Also like the searches in these cases, the search was conducted by someone of the same sex and was only visible to members of the same sex. Richardson was also of a similar age as the plaintiffs in these cases. Therefore, this Court finds that the measures adopted for the search, a brief visual inspection for concealed explosives or related items, were reasonably related to the objectives of the search. This Court also finds that the search was not excessively intrusive in light of Richardson’s age, the fact that the search was conducted and only visible to other males, and that the search was for an explosive device which posed a threat to the safety to others within the school.

Just because the warrant says that the place to be searched is “the residence of John Doe” does not preclude the officers from seizing evidence of Richard Roe that they find. “The residence of John Doe” is as much an identifier as an address. United States v. Bergman, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68724 (W.D. N.Y. September 25, 2006).

The fact a lawful trailer hitch blocked the view of the license plate was still PC for a stop. United States v. Ratcliff, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68910 (E.D. Tenn. September 25, 2006).*

New crime during alleged illegal arrest would not be suppressed. United States v. Mattiex, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68630 (S.D. N.Y. September 21, 2006):

“There is a strong policy reason for holding that a new and distinct crime, even if triggered by an illegal [stop], is a sufficient intervening event to provide independent grounds for arrest.” As recognized by the Bailey court, “[a] contrary rule would virtually immunize a defendant from prosecution for all crimes he might commit that have a sufficient causal connection to the police misconduct.” Furthermore, “[w]hen a defendant commits a new and distinct crime during an unlawful detention, the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule does not bar evidence of the new crime.”

A school official who heard a rumor that minor plaintiff was pregnant and made her give a urine sample for a pregnancy test stated a Fourth Amendment claim. The right was clearly established, so no qualified immunity. Villanueva v. San Marcos Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68280 (W.D. Tex. September 7, 2006), relying on Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 301 (3rd Cir. 2000) (student athlete):

The Court agrees with that conclusion insofar as it is plain that a pregnancy test administered in a coercive environment such that the student felt compelled to submit to the school official’s wishes would constitute an unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. A urinalysis test, like the one conducted for drugs in Vernonia, is clearly intrusive because it reveals personal information. See Veronia at 658. While there may be extreme circumstances where a school could require a student to take a pregnancy test, an “official cannot . . . require a student to submit to this intrusion merely to satisfy his curiosity.” Gruenke, 225 F.3d at 301.

911 call was basis for police entry into plaintiff’s property because of suspected overdose, and defendants were entitled to SJ. Snowden v. Peacock, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68406 (N.D. Fla. September 22, 2006).*

Plaintiff cannot bring a Fourth Amendment claim in federal court after state court had already ruled on the issue because of issue preclusion. There is no preference for federal jurisdiction to adjudicate federal constitutional rights. Birkholz v. County of Macomb, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68398 (E.D. Mich. September 12, 2006).

In one judicial district in Utah, the courts did not keep copies of search warrants that were issued, and the target of the search was unable to get copies of the warrant or supporting papers for its issuance. He sued in state court (also under § 1983) and won. The Utah Supreme Court found no basis for withholding the records under state law and held that its inherent authority over the lower courts would be exercised to make them public. Anderson v. Taylor, 2006 UT 55, 2006 Utah LEXIS 149 (September 22, 2006):

[*P20] Finally, regardless of the statutory requiements, we conclude that the practice followed by the Fourth District Court is sufficiently troubling to warrant the imposition of this court’s “inherent supervisory authority over all courts of this state.” State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1266 (Utah 1993); see also State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 965 (Utah 1989) (invoking supreme court’s supervisory power to require bifurcation in the context of criminal trials); In re Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 633, 642 (Utah 1988) (recognizing that “[t]he courts’ inherent supervisory power is that which is necessary to protect the fundamental integrity of the judicial branch”). The policy of the Fourth District Court is sound only if we may confidently assume that law enforcement always acts with complete honesty, integrity, and competence. Unfortunately, it is much more likely that even the most honest and well-intentioned officer will occasionally make mistakes in handling, preserving, and filing the warrant documents. Were it not so, there would be no need for a warrant requirement at all.

[*P21] The issues raised by this petition are similar to those that confronted this court in In re Criminal Investigation. In that case, this court faced myriad challenges to the constitutionality of the Subpoena Powers Act. In re Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 633 at 636. Among those challenges was the claim that the Act failed to provide for adequate records of subpoenas issued pursuant to the Act. Id. at 644. While acknowledging that the Act did not include a provision expressly requiring the maintenance of investigatory records, the court relied on various provisions of the Act suggesting that the legislature had anticipated detailed record-keeping. Id. at 653. The court further noted that adequate records were necessary in order for the courts to fulfill their constitutional role of protecting against abuse of subpoenas issued under their authority. Id. The court then called upon its inherent supervisory authority to require that all investigations under the Act be fully documented and that “such documentation . . . be maintained by the district court authorizing the investigation.” Id.

[*P22] We adopt a similar approach here. Giving law enforcement sole custody of all affidavits and warrants up through the point where the warrant has been executed and a return filed is inherently problematic for at least two reasons. First, it leaves the court without any record of the subpoena or the materials supporting its issuance until after the subpoena is executed and a return filed. Second, it allows for the possibility that affidavits and other court records may be mishandled or even altered without detection. When the records upon which the magistrate acts in issuing a warrant are handled by persons other than court personnel prior to being filed with the court, the court has no basis for confidence in the accuracy, authenticity, or completeness of those documents. In the matter of warrants for the search and seizure of persons or property, more is required. We accordingly require that magistrates issuing search warrants retain in their custody copies of all search warrants issued, as well as the material supporting search warrant applications, rather than surrendering to law enforcement the only copies of such material.

[*P23] To ensure the integrity of our court records, we have concluded that the courts of this state must retain copies of all search warrants and supporting material. Nevertheless, we are without the information necessary to prescribe the particular procedures to be followed in maintaining and disclosing such records. n7 Those particulars are best addressed by study and examination in the context of our rule-making process. We therefore refer those particulars to our Advisory Committee on the Rules of Criminal Procedure for further consideration.

…

CONCLUSION

[*P26] Utah statutes governing the issuance of search warrants contemplate that the issuing court will maintain reliable records of the warrants and the documents supporting them. We accordingly grant in part Anderson’s petition for extraordinary writ and call upon our supervisory power over the courts of this state to require that they retain copies of all warrants issued and the documents supporting the requests for such warrants. We leave to our rule-making process the particular mechanisms for implementing this requirement and managing these records.

This year, the oral argument transcripts of the Supreme Court will appear online the same day as the argument. The oral argument link is here.

Officers had a SW for a DNA sample from the defendant, and he was believed to be at his girlfriend’s home. They entered and talking to him and got the DNA sample and left. He was a mere guest, not an overnight guest, and he lacked standing to complain of the police entry into his girlfriend’s house to get his DNA sample. State v. Browning, 2006 Ohio 3980, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 3964 (6th Dist. August 4, 2006).*

Defendant’s girlfriend’s roommate conducted a private search of defendant’s property to get child porn and turned it over to the police. State v. Purkhiser, 2006 Ohio 4014, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 3969 (2d Dist. August 4, 2006).*

The overnight guest of a motel guest has standing to challenge a search of the room. Brown v. State, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 6916 (Tex. App. – Houston (1st Dist.) August 3, 2006) (but this was with consent).

Conflict of laws: While Washington requires both parties consent to a recording and Oregon is a single party consent state, a telephone call recorded in Oregon is admissible in Washington. The legality of the recording is determined by the place where the recording occurred (citing cases). State v. Fowler, 157 Wn.2d 387, 139 P.3d 342 (August 3, 2006).

“If we don’t win your case for you, your next meal is free.”

Arkansas being a jury sentencing state, with the jury informed of parole eligibility, we beat the plea offer by a third, or fourth, depending on how you do the math. The offer was 40, the jury gave 31. With credit for time served, he’ll be out in 4 years and 9 months or so. Sometimes, beating the plea offer is a win, particularly when you tried to plead guilty and the victim would only permit the DA to recommend the max. So, we have a trial. More like a slow guilty plea to a jury, but with a stellar cross examination, not that it mattered. It seemed like it was going really badly when the jury took a mere 21 minutes to convict on four counts. Then, in punishment phase, they didn’t max him (maximum was 56).

21 minutes may be a record for me. Like they say, quick verdicts usually go for the prosecution. But, not always so. I had a 3 minute acquittal once (I was standing at a urinal when the bailiff came for me), and a 30 minute acquittal in a week long murder case.

And, we have reversible error on denial of a defense jury instruction, aside from another possible issue to take out a 6 year count on sufficiency of the evidence. So, we lost. We expected to. But we came out OK. Not a bad day after all, ending at 7:30, then the 30 minute drive home.

Postings continue in the A.M. I’m crashing.

The U.S. Judicial Conference has proposed an esoteric addition to Rule 41(b)(5) to abrogate a case holding that a U.S. Magistrate Judge could not issue a warrant for evidence held in a U.S. Embassy outside the country, a problem that seldom arises in our everyday practices. The main link to the current rule changes is here.

As currently written, Rule 41(b) does not provide magistrate judges with the authority to issue warrants for such locations. See, e.g., United States v. Wharton, 153 F. Supp. 2d 878, 882 (W.D. La. 2001) (“clearly, Rule 41 did not empower any United States District Court to issue a search warrant for the defendant’s property when it was located at the United States Embassy in Port-au-Prince, Haiti.”). Although the USA PATRIOT Act amended Rule 41(b) to provide magistrate judges with the authority to issue warrants outside the magistrate’s district, this authority is applicable only in cases involving certain terrorism offenses. See Rule 41(b)(3).

The language of the proposed amendment was based upon Rule 41(b)(3), which was added by the USA PATRIOT Act, and upon the definition of the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States contained in 18 U.S.C. § 7, which includes U.S. consulates and embassies. The proposed amendment provides for jurisdiction in any district in which activities related to the crime under investigation may have occurred, or in the District of Columbia, which is the default jurisdiction for venue under 18 U.S.C. § 3238.

Defendant filed a motion in limine to keep out evidence at trial of his consent to search. The District Court finds it admissible to show how the police ended up inside his premises. United States v. Murphy, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62842 (D. Kan. September 1, 2006):

Defendant contends that evidence related to the issue of consent to search is inadmissible pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 402 because it is irrelevant, has already been decided by this court, and would needlessly distract the jury’s attention from the material evidence. No other basis for exclusion is alleged.

Defendant alludes to the fact that during the previous suppression hearing in this case, the primary issue was whether officers illegally entered and searched the house in which defendant resided. The court found, based upon the credibility of the witnesses, that consent was validly given. Various items of clothing incriminatory to the defendant were found in the residence.

This motion is denied. Evidence of consent, which provided the sole justification for the officers’ entry into the home, is a necessary part of the government’s proof of how they came to be in the residence where they found various items linking defendant to the marijuana plot. Such evidence is necessary to complete the story of the alleged crime and is thus relevant to the charged offense.

Defendant’s consent was invalid, but irrelevant. The police had probable cause on the totality of circumstances to search the defendant’s car. Also, the police were not required to search the vehicle immediately hereafter if it is impounded. United States v. Gonzales, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62747 (W.D. Tex. August 30, 2006):

If probable cause justifies an immediate warrantless automobile search, a search of the same vehicle soon thereafter is permissible without a warrant. U.S. v. McSween, 53 F.3d 684, 689 (5th Cir. 1995); see Ross, 456 U.S. at 807 n. 9 (“[I]f an immediate search on the street is permissible without a warrant, a search soon thereafter at the police station is permissible if the vehicle is impounded.”).

Another case received today reaches the same conclusion: State v. Page-Bryant, 2006 N.C. App. LEXIS 1873 (September 5, 2006).

Defendant filed, pursuant to Rule 41(g), a pro se motion for return of cash taken from him at the time of his arrest. The government did not respond, and the motion was granted. United States v. Fossis, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62760 (E.D. Tenn. August 15, 2006).

According to an article in the NY Times, Oil Industry-Lawmaker Link Is Focus of an Alaskan Inquiry, six members of the Alaska legislature have had their offices searched by the FBI and IRS with search warrants.

Ms. Lesch would not say how many lawmakers could eventually be part of the investigation nor would she discuss the raids. But lawmakers and their aides in Alaska said the search warrants and the interviews focused on interaction between lawmakers and the VECO Corporation, a large support contractor for oil and energy businesses whose executives give generously to campaigns.

The Associated Press in Alaska reported on Friday that it had obtained a copy of a search warrant that stated that investigators were seeking “from the period of October 2005 to the present, any and all documents concerning, reflecting or relating to proposed legislation in the state of Alaska involving either the creation of a natural gas pipeline or the petroleum production tax.”

. . .

The A.P. said the warrant sought information about possible payments to lawmakers by VECO executives. The warrant also said investigators were seeking hats or other items bearing the phrases “CBC,” “Corrupt Bastards Club” or “Corrupt Bastards Caucus.” Details about the supposed group were unavailable.

Amy Menard, a lawyer for VECO, said that a search warrant had been issued seeking information from VECO and that the company “has information to suggest that federal agents may have been to the offices of VECO Corporation.”

This is not the first time that the feds have searched state lawmakers’ offices. Remember, the search of Congressman Jefferson’s office in May raised issues more significant because of the Congressional Speech and Debate Clause, but they were rejected.

A confined sexually violent predator’s confinement under Florida law was no different than the confinement of a jail inmate for Fourth Amendment purposes. Marsh v. Department of Children & Families, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60349 (M.D. Fla. August 25, 2006).

Officer saw a group of youths standing around an illegally parked car, and, when they saw the officer, they disbursed. The officer drove around to head them off, showed his badge and said, “[H]ang on a second; Boston Police, can I talk to you?” This was not a seizure. Defendant had something clenched in his fist and was favoring one leg, which made the officer suspect he was armed. When the officer grabbed the defendant’s arm, that was a seizure, but it was without reasonable suspicion. Commonwealth v. Nestor N., 67 Mass. App. Ct. 225, 852 N.E.2d 1132 (August 28, 2006).*

IAC claim against defense counsel for not filing a motion to suppress failed because inevitable discovery would have allowed the evidence in. While there apparently was a Randolph violation from defendant revoking consent and the police asking his wife to continue, the evidence would have come in anyway. State v. Kuhn, 2006 Ohio 4416, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 4342 (9th Dist. August 28, 2006).*

Brief detention of witnesses to a shooting incident was not contrary to clearly established law, so QI granted officers. There is no fixed time limit in any of the cases. Walker v. City of Orem, 451 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. June 27, 2006).

United States v. Irving, 432 F.3d 401 (2d Cir. Dec. 23, 2005), holding that a border search at DFW revealing computer disks of child porn was valid was reheard on other grounds on the government’s petition for rehearing, and a subsituted opinion is entered. The search issue is unaltered. United States v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. June 23, 2006) (this case was first argued in Dec. 2004).

“We consider here whether officers who reasonably believe that they have valid grounds for pulling over a vehicle, but then realize once the vehicle is stopped that they acted on the basis of a mistake of fact, violate the Fourth Amendment rights of the occupants of the vehicle simply by walking up to the vehicle. We conclude that in such circumstances the officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment rights of the occupants because it is reasonable for the officers to approach the vehicle to explain the situation and to inform the occupants that they are free to go. If, immediately upon coming near the vehicle, the officers learn new facts that give rise to a reasonable belief that the occupants are engaged in criminal activity, the officers may continue the detention to investigate further.” United States v. Jenkins, 452 F.3d 207 (2d Cir. June 23, 2006, as amended August 16, 2006).

Plaintiff stated a claim for false arrest and unreasonable force during his arrest for allegedly trespassing in a park at night. When officers approached, he fled thinking he was being robbed, and, during his arrest, he suffered a broken leg. When plaintiff said he thought his leg was broken, an officer said, after handcuffing him, “I don’t give a fuck about your broken leg,” and made him crawl to a park bench. The court concluded that a jury could also find that to be “force” that was excessive. Phelps v. City of New York, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42926 (S.D. N.Y. June 27, 2006).

In swearing match over consent, court sides with the defendant because of inconsistencies in the officer’s testimony finding that the government failed in its burden of proof on consent. As a part of the totality, the court finds that it would be irrational for the defendant to agree to a search when contraband was in the car [but we’ve all seen cases where that has happened; usually because they figure they have no choice]. United States v. Laughton, 437 F. Supp. 2d 665 (E.D. Mich. June 26, 2006).

Use of deadly force against driver who was mistaken for somebody else survived MSJ. Passenger who claimed psychological and emotional distress for being there when it happened did not. Schultz v. Braga, 455 F.3d 470 (4th Cir. July 31, 2006).

Video made by CI with a camera hidden in her purse did not violate the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Brathwaite, 458 F.3d 376 (5th Cir. July 31, 2006).

Routine Greyhound bus stop in Tulsa led to dog sniff of a suitcase, and officers got Greyhound to use a ruse to get passengers to identify their bags. Defendant first claimed bag and then repeatedly denied it was his when asked about it. His name was on the name tag. It was treated as abandoned. United States v. Ojeda-Ramos, 455 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. July 31, 2006).*

Stop of plaintiff for whom there was RS, but it turned out he was the wrong man, was reasonable, and plaintiff refused officers’ commands and resisted them leading to an altercation. The entire matter, from interview with victim to the arrest, was videotaped for “COPS” and the tape showed the police conduct was reasonable. Hansen v. Pierce County, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51754 (W.D. Wash. July 28, 2006).*

The police do not have to completely investigate and find all they can before seeking a search warrant. The question is always whether they showed PC on the totality of circumstances on what they presented. United States v. Shields, 458 F.3d 269 (3d Cir. August 16, 2006):

Whether the FBI could have provided more information is not the benchmark, and other courts of appeals have rejected similar arguments. Gourde, 440 F.3d at 1073 n.5 (“[T]he benchmark is not what the FBI ‘could have’ done. HN8An affidavit may support probable cause even if the government fails to obtain potentially dispositive information.”); United States v. Ozar, 50 F.3d 1440, 1446 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that trial court “erred in focusing [its] Franks v. Delaware analysis on what the FBI could have learned with more investigation.”). For purposes of our analysis, it is of no import that the FBI could have discovered more corroborating evidence, such as actual downloads, so long as the valid information it supplies satisfies the “fair probability” standard articulated in Gates. 462 U.S. at 238-39, 103 S. Ct. at 2332.

Defendant during traffic stop was giving inconsistent answers to questions, and he was asked for consent and he agreed. He was also told he could ask questions at any time during the search. United States v. Macedo, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56501 (D. Neb. August 11, 2006).*

Officer had RS for investigative detention of the defendant from nervousness, being on a drug route, did not know the name of the owner of the vehicle he was driving, too much luggage for the trip, didn’t know where he was staying when he got to Kansas City, and had to make a call when he got there to know where to go. United States v. Olivares-Campos, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56621 (D. Kan. July 31, 2006).*

Where the allegations in a motion to suppress attack the search warrant as lacking probable cause, no hearing is required to consider the issue. United States v. Evans, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56564 (D. Nev. July 10, 2006) (“Because the issues raised in the motion concern only the contents of the affidavit and search warrant, no factual issues need be resolved. Accordingly, an evidentiary hearing is unnecessary.”).

Citizen informant who was eyewitness and gave a 33 minute taped interview was credible. The fact that he could be prosecuted for providing false information in a police investigation supports his credibility. Id.

Defendant stayed at the premises searched for two nights before the search, so he had standing. The warrantless entry, however, was based on exigent circumstances as found by the magistrate [about which we are not told]. United States v. Louisuis, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53344 (M.D. Fla. August 2, 2006).*

Off duty police officer was found by neighbors wandering the streets in long underwear, and they called the police. They found him, and he was obviously either having a psychotic break or on drugs. Officers went into his house over his objection because the door was open, and they retrieved his prescription drugs for the doctors to determine whether he was under the influence. Questions remain on SJ, so defendants’ MSJ denied. Ripley v. City of Lake City, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53346 (M.D. Fla. August 2, 2006).*

There was a substantial basis for crediting the CI after corroboration. Alternatively, there the GFE exception relies because the affidavit is obviously not so bare bones that it could not be objectively relied upon. United States v. Bradshaw, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53414 (W.D. Mich. August 2, 2006).*

Where there was a sign warning that telephone calls were recorded, defendant has no REP in telephone calls from a jail cell area that were routinely recorded. United States v. Plummer, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53479 (W.D. Pa. August 2, 2006).*

AZ DPS racial and ethnic profile class action settlement approved prohibiting profile stops. Arnold v. Arizona Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53315 (D. Ariz. July 31, 2006).*

IAC claim for failure to file a motion to suppress fails because defendant does not even allege that consent was coerced. United States v. Sandoval, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53176 (D. Neb. July 31, 2006).