No cases received Monday. Good thing; I’m in trial again, and Friday, and next Monday-Wednesday.

After plaintiff had been arrested, he was in custody and he asked to call his lawyer. The officers recorded the conversation, and it became a part of suit over his arrest. Plaintiff was granted summary judgment on his claim that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by their recording a conversation between him and his lawyer. Sherbrooke v. City of Pelican Rapids, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81730 (D. Minn. November 6, 2006):

Summary judgment is granted in Sherbrooke’s favor as to this claim. He had a clearly established right of privacy in his conversation with his attorney. This right was violated by the unconsented search performed by the officers, who should have known that their conduct violated Sherbrooke’s Fourth Amendment rights. As to Defendants’ argument that Sherbrooke failed to make efforts to protect the privacy of his call, there was nothing he could do while in a situation controlled by the officers. As in Jaras, consent cannot be reasonably implied from Sherbrooke’s failure to object where Sachs did not ask for his consent to execute the search. Accordingly, Sherbrooke is entitled to summary judgment as to his claim that the Individual Defendants violated his Fourth Amendment right by recording his conversation with his attorney.

Two trucks were driving apparently in tandem too closely in Kentucky. One truck was suspicious because the fifth wheel was rusty and the sign on the side appeared hastily affixed. A full truck safety inspection was conducted, and the paperwork seemed odd. Finally, consent was sought and granted, and heroin was found by a drug dog. United States v. Garrido, 467 F.3d 971 (6th Cir. November 9, 2006).

Officer concerned by furtive movements in vehicle during traffic stop justified ordering defendant out of the car under Mimms. United States v. Steplight, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81712 (E.D. Pa. November 8, 2006).*

A prisoner lawsuit was dismissed on filing as frivolous. Plaintiff attempted suicide by overdose in hoarding lithium pills. He claimed that his suicidal intentions were laughed off by the guards. He sued alleging various constitutional violations, including a Fourth Amendment claim that he should have been searched more often. Anderson v. Pollard, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81960 (E.D. Wis. November 7, 2006)*:

In this case, the plaintiff does not contend that his cell was illegally searched. Rather, he claims that it was not searched frequently enough (on a twice weekly basis). Based on the foregoing, the plaintiff has failed to state a claim under the Fourth Amendment.

Comment: I cannot even fathom how a reverse Fourth Amendment claim would even exist. Maybe as a due process violation or a reckless disregard of a known risk, but that is about it. The “right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures” cannot really include a right to be continually subjected to searches and seizures. It just does not follow. This isn’t even a remotely creative argument–it is just typical jail house lawyer thinking.

A similarly strange prisoner case was a claim rejected in the District of Nevada in an internet child solicitation case that the e-mail sent to the plaintiff’s computer was an unlawful entry. Cherer v. Flaherty, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81920 (D. Nev. November 1, 2006)*:

Entry into a person’s home to obtain evidence is a search that should bring into play all the protections of the Fourth Amendment. Osborne v. U.S., 385 U.S. 323, 345 (1966). However, the submission of an email to an individual’s personal computer, which may or may not be opened and read, does not constitute entry. Plaintiff admits that he could have ignored the email or “deleted it as junk mail.” Complaint, p. 5. In fact, he states that is what he did, although the complaint is inconsistent on this point. Thus, either no actual entry was made or the entry requested by the email was granted. In either case, no invasion of his right to privacy occurred.

The defendant did not have to be told he was free to leave to make a stop consensual. United States v. Chavira, 467 F.3d 1286 (10th Cir. November 9, 2006):

Considering the totality of the circumstances, the district court’s factual findings do not suggest a coercive show of authority. It is true that more than one officer was present and that Mr. Chavira was not told that he was free to leave. However, the other officer stayed in his patrol car until after the trooper obtained consent to search and the other officer’s presence alone would not indicate to a reasonable person that he was not free to leave. Advising a defendant that he is free to leave is not an essential prerequisite for a consensual encounter, let alone a voluntary consent to search. See, e.g., Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39-40, 117 S. Ct. 417, 136 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1996); United States v. Bradford, 423 F.3d 1149, 1158 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. Elliott, 107 F.3d 810, 814 (10th Cir. 1997). Significantly, from the time the trooper resumed questioning Mr. Chavira about his travel plans until the time he obtained consent to search, Mr. Chavira’s path to his vehicle was unobstructed and the trooper was separated from him by the open patrol car door. On this record, we must hold that Mr. Chavira had no objectively reasonable belief that he was not free to leave, and thus his subsequent consent to search was not the product of an unlawful detention.

Comment: Two police cars have the defendant pulled over and he is objectively “free to leave”? This is intellectual dishonesty of the worst sort. What person in his right mind would think he actually was free to leave? None. Perhaps if federal appellate judges spent a while detained on the side of the highway, they might come to appreciate that this argument is pure fiction.

In the case where two brothers, one of whom was a police officer, read about bank robberies in Illinois and determined that their father was the robber, the brothers conducted a search of their father’s house for evidence of the bank robberies. They were determined to be acting as private citizens for the purpose of the search, even though the officer brother came with a bulletproof vest and badge. United States v. Ginglen, 467 F.3d 1071 (7th Cir. November 6, 2006).

Reasonable suspicion not required for a knock and talk. Consent was not coerced. Officers asked for ID and returned it before asking for consent. United States v. Cruz-Mendez, 467 F.3d 1260 (10th Cir. November 6, 2006).

Having been told he was free to leave, the defendant voluntarily consented to further discussion with the officer that [apparently was a stall to keep them there long enough and] led to a dog sniff. United States v. Farrior, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80560 (W.D. Va. November 3, 2006)* (it’s a close question):

The court finds that the defendant’s initial consent to search the vehicle was voluntarily given. The fact that Officer Morris returned Farrior’s license and explicitly told Farrior that he was free to go before asking the defendant to consent to a search of his vehicle strongly indicates that no seizure occurred at that point within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Weaver, 282 F.3d 302, 311 (4th Cir. 2002). That fact alone, however, is not dispositive. The voluntariness of Farrior’s consent is also supported by the circumstances surrounding Officer Morris’ request and Farrior’s response. Officer Morris testified that after telling the defendant that he was free to go, he asked Farrior if he would step out of the car. Farrior responded that he could talk from inside the car. Officer Morris proceeded to do so. Officer Morris testified that he explained to Farrior that the Town of Pulaski was having a lot of drug problems in that area. Officer Morris next asked Farrior if he had any drugs or guns, to which Farrior replied in the negative. Officer Morris then asked Farrior if he could search his car. Farrior consented and stepped out of the car. The court believes that these circumstances indicate that Farrior was not intimidated and that a reasonable person in his position would believe that he had a choice to exercise. Therefore, the court finds and concludes that a reasonable person in Farrior’s position would have felt free to decline Officer Morris’ request.

Apparent overseizure of computer equipment was reasonable. Warrant specified one document, in paper or electronic form, and the police seized 16 computers for off-site analysis. United States v. Cook, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80557 (W.D. Wash. November 3, 2006):

The object of the search was a document titled “Secured Promissory Note,” and all copies of the document, whether in hard-copy or electronic form. Id. at 23. The warrant authorized the seizure and removal of computer systems and components for off-site forensic analysis. Id. at 24. The search took place on June 29, 2005, and included both a hand search for documents and the removal of sixteen computer systems with seventeen hard drives and various removable storage media. See Johnson Decl., docket no. 126, P 3. Special Agent Kim Young, a computer forensic examiner, took control of the sixteen computers and spent approximately 21 hours imaging their seventeen hard drives. Id. P 4. Agent Young completed her imaging on June 30, 2005. Id. Twelve computers were returned to the Cooks on July 5, 2005, and the remaining four computers were returned on August 22, 2005. Id.

Officer had probable cause to search for weapons at a farm house after gunshots were fired at young men hunting near defendant’s land. In the course of the investigation, the officer had heard that there might also be explosives in the premises, but he omitted any reference to what was essentially a rumor from the affidavit. The warrant, however, sought firearms and explosives. At the hearing, the officer explained the omission because he believed he lacked probable cause for explosives. It was clear from the totality of the evidence in the affidavit that, even if the officer included the omitted information, the issuing magistrate would have still signed off on the warrant because there was probable cause with or without it. United States v. Leeper, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87193 (D. Kan. November 29, 2006):

Under the evidence presented, the court finds the agent did not attempt to mislead the Judge by including explosives among the items to be searched for. Moreover, the court finds the Judge was aware of this particular language in the warrant request. At any rate, whatever the reason for the inclusion of “explosives” among the items to be sought, the defendant has failed to show that any omission by the agent was material to the issuance of the warrant. In order for the fruits of a search to be suppressed, the omission must be “necessary to the finding of probable cause.” Franks, 438 U.S. at 155. Even had the agent’s admittedly flimsy information about explosives been included in this affidavit, the Judge undoubtedly would have still determined there was probable cause to search the farmstead for firearms that were used in the shooting on November 5, 2005. And for the reasons set forth herein, the court concludes that the evidence challenged by the defendant was discovered lawfully within the scope of a search for firearms. Accordingly, the failure to include the agent’s information about explosives in the affidavit does not constitute a material omission.

Defendant’s actions while under surveillance in participating in hand-to-hand drug buy and carrying what was consistent with packaged heroin to his vehicle was reasonable suspicion. Discounting both that putting on the seatbelt might have been seen by the police as a furtive movement and his using a cellphone were innocuous, the hand-to-hand buy was enough for reasonable suspicion. United States v. Clark, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87055 (D. N.J. December 1, 2006).*

Two controlled buys from the premises in the previous 96 hours is probable cause. The defendant failed in making a Franks showing of undefined factual discrepancies, but the court suggests that the two buys eliminates a Franks violation as a viable issue. United States v. Schwab, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87059 (S.D. Tex. December 1, 2006).*

Officer pulling up in unmarked car with headlights pointing at occupants, with no blue lights on, evolved into a nonconsensual encounter with a “show of authority” in which the defendants were not free to leave, so motion to suppress is granted. United States v. Wright, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86975 (N.D. Fla. November 30, 2006):

As a threshold matter, the court is unpersuaded by the government’s contention that the interaction between Coverdale and Wright constituted only a consensual encounter. It is true that Coverdale did not initiate a traffic stop or pull Wright’s vehicle over but rather simply approached Wright and Key as they sat in the parked car. In addition, Coverdale did not activate his siren or blue lights prior to approaching the vehicle, display his weapon, or use his vehicle to block the path of the Monte Carlo. Nevertheless, the court concludes that considering the totality of circumstances present on the evening in question, in making contact with Wright Coverdale exhibited a show of authority sufficient to make a reasonable person conclude that he was not free to leave.

First, while Coverdale may have stopped his marked patrol car as far as twenty feet away from the Monte Carlo, parking the cruiser at an angle to Wright’s vehicle with the headlights still illuminated and directed at the Monte Carlo — rather than simply pulling into a parking place and extinguishing the lights — was a show of authority over the Monte Carlo’s occupants, even if a moderate one. In addition, however, almost simultaneously Coverdale brightly illuminated the Monte Carlo with his cruiser’s high intensity spot light. Taken together, these actions constituted a show of authority which would have been intimidating, at least to a degree, to a reasonable person. Furthermore, especially given that Wright was in the process of exiting the Monte Carlo under these conditions when Coverdale first spoke to him, a reasonable person would have felt compelled to comply with the directive to remain seated, even if Coverdale’s precise words and tone of voice were not overtly coercive. The belief that Wright was not free to leave would have been reinforced when, despite Wright’s immediate compliance with the directive to remain in the vehicle, Coverdale (who was wearing official attire which clearly identified him as a law enforcement officer) proceeded directly to the driver’s door and began questioning Wright about his driver’s license. Moreover, Coverdale testified that he preferred that Wright remain in the vehicle for officer safety reasons because “if he’s in the vehicle, he’s somewhat contained.” The evidence thus reflects that Coverdale intended to convey to Wright that his freedom of movement was restricted — and in effect he did convey that instruction. In short, considering the totality of the circumstances present on the evening in question, the court concludes that Coverdale exhibited a “show of authority” sufficient to make a reasonable person believe that he was not free to terminate the encounter. Therefore, the court finds that the encounter between Coverdale and Wright was not consensual in nature but rather amounted to an investigatory detention.

USA Today on Friday has, via AP, an article about the controversial body scanner with “backscatter” technology that reveals everything about your body, in an effort to see what an airline passenger may be carrying on his or her body. Don’t want to be seen nude on a computer screen? Then you can be subjected to a patdown instead.

Sky Harbor International Airport here will test a new federal screening system that takes X-rays of passenger’s bodies to detect concealed explosives and other weapons.

The technology, called backscatter, has been around for several years but has not been widely used in the U.S. as an anti-terrorism tool because of privacy concerns.

The Transportation Security Administration said it has found a way to refine the machine’s images so that the normally graphic pictures can be blurred in certain areas while still being effective in detecting bombs and other threats.

The agency is expected to provide more information about the technology later this month but said one machine will be up and running at Sky Harbor’s Terminal 4 by Christmas.

The security agency’s website indicates that the technology will be used initially as a secondary screening measure, meaning that only those passengers who first fail the standard screening process will be directed to the X-ray area.

Even then, passengers will have the option of choosing the backscatter or a traditional pat-down search.

A handful of other U.S. airports will have the X-rays machines in place by early 2007 as part of a nationwide pilot program, TSA officials said.

From the Electronic Privacy Information Center website:

The backscatter machines use high-energy X-rays that are more likely to scatter than penetrate materials as compared to lower-energy X-rays used in medical applications. Although this type of X-ray is said to be harmless, it can move through other materials, such as clothing. When being screened, a passenger is scanned by high-energy X-ray beam moving rapidly over her body. The signal strength of detected backscattered X-rays from a known position then allows a highly realistic image to be reconstructed. In the case of airline-passenger screening, the image is of the traveler’s nude form. The image resolution of the technology is high, so the picture of the body presented to screeners is detailed enough to show genitalia. These images are not necessarily temporary – screeners can save the body images to the system’s hard disk or floppy disk for subsequent viewing on either “the system monitor or on any IBM compatible personal computer with color graphics.”

What does TSA have to say about patdowns and backscatter technology?

Question: What are TSA’s policies regarding pat-downs and how are they serving a security need?

Answer: TSA expanded its pat down procedures to strengthen its ability to detect explosives at the security checkpoints. Transportation security officers (TSOs) use the front of the hand to screen a passenger’s entire back and abdomen, the arms from shoulder to wrist and legs from mid-thigh to ankle. TSOs communicate with the passenger and explain the process prior to conducting the search. Pat-downs are conducted by TSOs of the same gender whenever possible and private screenings are available at the passenger’s request. Patting down the chest area may be conducted if there is an alarm from a hand-held metal detector or an irregularity in the person’s clothing outline. TSOs conduct the inspections in a professional, respectful manner, while maintaining the highest security standards.

Question: How has TSA addressed the issues of privacy while piloting Backscatter technology?

Answer: TSA met with privacy advocates to incorporate privacy concerns into the development of Backscatter Technology. In response to those concerns, TSA required that the companies responsible for developing Backscatter technology incorporate a privacy algorithm into their technology. This privacy algorithm would eliminate much of the detail shown in the images of the individual while still being effective from a security standpoint. Further, Backscatter images will not be retained in the system, will not be capable of being printed, and will be deleted as each individual steps away from the machine to allow a new individual to be screened.

One of these days, you’ll have to either strip naked to get on an airplane or be subjected to a virtual voyeur looking at your naked body on a computer screen. Apparently “those days” are not that far away.

Saturday’s Atlanta Journal-Constitution has this article, by Bill Torpy and Rhonda Cook: Few results from no-knock warrants, critics say. The Atlanta PD even raided the house next door to Mrs. Johnston’s house about 18 months ago, finding no drugs, but the raid was eight days after the buy (which is the point of the staleness requirement, maybe?).

In March 2005, a team of Atlanta narcotics officers, armed with a “no-knock” search warrant, arrived at a northwest Atlanta home looking for a marijuana dealer known only as “Black.”

The door was open so the officers didn’t have to smash it down; they simply walked in and searched the home, said a resident of the house who was confronted in his living room by armed officers.

The officers found plastic bags and a small scale but no drugs, according to a police report, a point that the resident disputes. Police also did not find “Black” and made no arrests.

The house at 929 Neal St. is next door to and shares a driveway with the home of Kathryn Johnston, the elderly woman who was killed last week in a shootout with Atlanta narcotics officers who came to search for drugs.

The fatal raid, in which three officers were wounded, has shined a spotlight on how the narcotics officers target houses to raid and the tactics used in those raids.

According to police reports, warrant applications and search warrant inventories:

• In each of these two cases, police said a confidential informant made a single, small drug buy at the target house.

• In each case, officers had a no-knock warrant that gave permission to bust down the door.

• In each case, police were looking for a man known only by a nickname who also was not found; last year it was a man named “Black,” last week it was “Sam.”

• And in each case, members of the same narcotics team were involved.

But these aren’t the only cases in which the team served no-knock warrants and came away either empty handed, or with little to show for their effort. Though the legal standard requires police to show special circumstances — that evidence will likely be destroyed or that weapons in the house put officers at risk — these cases and others show that short, routine descriptions and the trust of a judge is all that veteran officers need to obtain such warrants.

The bottom line? It appears to me, from my Fourth Amendment litigator perspective, that these guys are not very well trained, thus proving Justice Scalia and the other four in the majority wrong in Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2168 (June 15, 2006):

Another development over the past half-century that deters civil-rights violations is the increasing professionalism of police forces, including a new emphasis on internal police discipline. Even as long ago as 1980 we felt it proper to “assume” that unlawful police behavior would “be dealt with appropriately” by the authorities, United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 733-734, n. 5, 100 S. Ct. 2439, 65 L. Ed. 2d 468 (1980), but we now have increasing evidence that police forces across the United States take the constitutional rights of citizens seriously. There have been “wide-ranging reforms in the education, training, and supervision of police officers.” S. Walker, Taming the System: The Control of Discretion in Criminal Justice 1950-1990, p 51 (1993). Numerous sources are now available to teach officers and their supervisors what is required of them under this Court’s cases, how to respect constitutional guarantees in various situations, and how to craft an effective regime for internal discipline. See, e.g., D. Waksman & D. Goodman, The Search and Seizure Handbook (2d ed. 2006); A. Stone & S. DeLuca, Police Administration: An Introduction (2d ed. 1994); E. Thibault, L. Lynch, & R. McBridge, Proactive Police Management (4th ed. 1998). Failure to teach and enforce constitutional requirements exposes municipalities to financial liability. See Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 103 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1989). Moreover, modern police forces are staffed with professionals; it is not credible to assert that internal discipline, which can limit successful careers, will not have a deterrent effect. There is also evidence that the increasing use of various forms of citizen review can enhance police accountability.

The moral to the story? When the defense proffers a reason for something in the Supreme Court, it is dismissed as unfounded, but, when the government proposes something, citing a book but without evidence in the record, the Supreme Court will seize on it and make it law. Indeed, Justice Scalia wrote that it assumes that “civil liability is an effective deterrent here.” Hudson, 126 S.Ct. at 2167-68.

They do not have a clue.

The Atlanta Journal-Constitution’s website has a link to the affidavit and search warrant in the search that led to the death of Kathryn Johnston on November 21st.

The no-knock provision was based on the alleged surveillance cameras that the informant reported to the police which showed up in the affidavit. The affidavit also described the house as having a wheelchair ramp in the front. The latter provision would tip off the police that there was somebody else in the house besides the alleged drug dealer.

Something different: The Washington Post has an editorial today about the minor discipline meted out to a Fairfax SWAT team member who accidentally shot an optometrist who they were sent to arrest for being an alleged bookie. The shooting was only tangential to the arrest, but why was the officer’s finger on the trigger and the gun pointed toward the non-violent suspect that somebody felt compelled to send the SWAT team to arrest? All dressed up with no place to go?

For months before this egregious shooting, an undercover police detective had been placing bets with Mr. Culosi, who had no criminal record; had never owned a firearm; and presented no threat of violence, flight or resisting arrest. It is still unclear, 10 months after the fact, why despite that profile police decided to arrest Mr. Culosi with a SWAT team, which is trained and equipped for use in dangerous situations. After Mr. Culosi’s death, the police department said it would conduct a review of policies and procedures involving the use of such teams. But if there was such a review, its results have not been made public. One wonders if the SWAT team in Fairfax, lacking frequent opportunities to respond to situations involving imminent danger and threats, is deployed simply to give its officers something to do. If so, that’s bad policy and bad policing.

Mr. Bullock, a 17-year veteran of the police force, was trained in firearms and tactics. He well knew that during a routine arrest, his finger should not have been on the trigger and his gun should not have been pointed at the suspect. So it is no real excuse that, in jumping from his car, the car door bounced back, striking him in the side and causing him to pull the trigger. Like people in other lines of work who make disastrous mistakes, Mr. Bullock should be held accountable for his actions, even though they were unintentional. The chief prosecutor in Fairfax, Robert F. Horan Jr., already declined to prosecute Mr. Bullock or refer the case to a grand jury, yet now police union officials howl that even a three-week suspension is unfair. It’s not. It is in fact little more than symbolic discipline. But in such a case symbolism is important and well placed.

Is this the kind of “professional” police and internal discipline that Justice Scalia was referring to in Hudson v. Michigan? What a farce.

A Michigan District Judge holds that Summers does not grant carte blanche to detain every person who wanders into a search warrant being executed. United States v. Davenport, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85965 (E.D. Mich. November 28, 2006):

Although the law, as set forth above, allows non-resident, non-occupant individuals that arrive at a residence that is the target of a search warrant to be detained while the search is being completed, the Court does not believe that the mere presence of a search warrant amounts to an unfettered blanket authorization to detain anyone the police may have a chance to encounter during their execution of the search warrant. In each of the cases extending the holding of Michigan v. Summers, the Sixth Circuit has carefully recognized the particular facts and circumstances that substantiate the legitimate law enforcement interests that support the warrantless seizure. See Fountain, 2 F.3d at 663 (Officers faced “a confined, unfamiliar environment that was likely to be dangerous.”); Bohannon, 225 F.3d at 617 (Given defendant’s intention to walk into house being searched, safety of officers and defendant was at risk.); United States v. Ridge, 329 F.3d 535, (6th Cir. 2003) (Officers who were searching a methamphetamine laboratory and received information that an armed third-party would soon be arriving at that location were justified in seizing the defendant without a warrant, when he arrived at the residence.).

In the instant case, because evidentiary testimony was not presented at the initial hearing on Defendant’s motion, an articulable basis for the legitimate detention of Defendant pursuant to Summers, Fountain, and Bohanon has not yet been presented. Accordingly, because testimonial evidence and oral arguments could elucidate the officers’ legitimate interests in Defendant’s risk of flight, the risk of harm he presented to the officers, and whether Defendant could have, in any way, assisted in the orderly completion of the authorized search of the residence, the Court will set this matter for an evidentiary hearing.

Nexus for search warrant of Custom’s officer’s house was shown by fact that a shipment of evidence was received at his house. United States v. Schofield, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85343 (E.D. Va. November 22, 2006):

The affidavit issued by Officer Izzard provided, inter alia, facts alleging shipment of a package by Defendant to a residence used to make payments for immigration stamps, testimony of an alien that had traveled to the residence in order to obtain false papers, and phone records indicating calls from the residence to suspected co-conspirators. The affidavit also included a determination by the affiant, based on experience of the officer, that evidence related to the crime would likely be found at Defendant’s residence. All of this evidence provides an ample nexus between the alleged crimes and the residence to satisfy the criteria of Anderson and Gates.

Officers had reasonable suspicion for detention of defendant. “Based on hundreds of hours of physical surveillance, wire intercepts, statements of informants, and controlled narcotics transactions, DEA had a substantial basis to believe that [his passenger] was trafficking narcotics. Indeed, Defendant acknowledged that DEA had probable cause to believe [the passenger] was a drug trafficker.” United States v. Rios-Ruiz, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85780 (D. Ore. November 22, 2006).*

Entry on a federal arrest warrant led to a protective sweep and a plain view. United States v. Cantrell, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85623 (W.D. Mo. November 21, 2006).