The plaintiff consented to patdown searches for IEDs to enter Tampa Buccaneers games for which he had season tickets. He checked on the policy, objected to those in charge, but he went to the games anyway, submitted to patdowns so he could see the games, and voiced his objections at the time. Nevertheless, it was apparent he voluntarily consented to the policy when he attended the games. Johnston v. Tampa Sports Auth., 490 F.3d 820 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).

Defendants’ consent to search their airplane by ICE officers was shown to be consensual. United States v. Franco-Acosta, 243 Fed. Appx. 812 (5th Cir. 2007)* (per curiam) (unpublished).

One defendant in a SWAT raid was entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds because his participation was limited to entry after the initial break-in and he left. Martinez v. McCord, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46326 (M.D. Ala. June 26, 2007):

The events about which plaintiffs complain involve the violent entry into Martinez’s home by the S.W.A.T. team. A “flash-bomb” or other explosive device was thrown through the window, exploding in front of one of the boys watching television. Officers with masks, assault garb, and drawn weapons entered the mobile home by breaking down a door. Weapons were pointed at Martinez and her minor children, and they were required to lie on the floor face-down. Nothing in Martinez’s offering of evidence suggests that Whittle personally had anything to do with the events complained of, with the exception of the search of Martinez’s home. Martinez does not contradict that Whittle did a “walk-through” and left. Her affidavit does not specify which officers conducted the thorough and allegedly damaging search.

Defendant consented to entry by police officers when he answered the door and opened it wide when they asked whether they could come in. The officers’ walk through to look for others was by consent. United States v. Patterson, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46298 (E.D. Mo. June 26, 2007).*

State search warrant in bank robbery case erroneously omitted place to be searched, but it was in the incorporated affidavit which accompanied the warrant to the premises, and that cured the error. Also, initial illegal search of premises that was done without knowledge of the officers securing a search warrant for the premises did not taint the warrant. United States v. Knill, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47327 (M.D. Pa. June 29, 2007).

Verbal consent given pre-Mirandizing supported district courts’ conclusions defendants consented. United States v. Yanez-Hernandez, 243 Fed. Appx. 234 (9th Cir. 2007)* (unpublished); United States v. Arana-Duarte, 244 Fed. Appx. 121 (9th Cir. 2007)* (unpublished). Credibility determination going to the officer supported finding of consent. State v. Bickel, 2007 Ohio 3356, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 3078 (5th Dist. June 29, 2007).*

State officer had reasonable suspicion of drug usage from defendant’s demeanor, and consent and probable cause supported the search. The fact that the search did not take place until after a drug dog came in as well, an hour later, was not relevant in light of the probable cause. United States v. Reyes-Ugarte, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47400 (E.D. Mo. June 29, 2007).*

Plaintiff in a § 1983 case was denied leave to add an illegal search claim to an excessive force claim. Plaintiff previously made such a claim in state court but did not make it when the case ended up in federal court until after discovery closed. Watson v. Trevino, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47241 (E.D. Mich. June 29, 2007).*

Police had a search warrant for defendant’s computer after obtaining information that it contained child porn. When executing the warrant, the officer discovered that the issuing magistrate accidentally dated the warrant the day after the search. They called before completing the search and were told to continue. Defendant cannot show prejudice [indeed, his prejudice argument was counter intuitive], and the search was not unconstitutional or unreasonable because there was no police misconduct to justify suppression of evidence. United States v. Butts, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52475 (D. Ariz. July 17, 2007):

When an issuing magistrate judge makes “an error of a constitutional dimension” by failing to take the steps necessary to conform a search warrant to constitutional requirements after assuring police officers that such steps would be taken, it is reasonable for the officers to rely on the magistrate judge’s assurances “that the warrant authorized the search they had requested.” Id. (citing Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 990 n. 6, 104 S.Ct. 3424, 82 L.Ed.2d 737 (1984)).

When evidence is seized pursuant to a defective search warrant, suppression under the exclusionary rule is not automatic. The “prim[ary] purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347, 107 S.Ct. 1160, 94 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In the interest of deterrence, “evidence should be suppressed ‘only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.'” Id. at 348-49 (quoting United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542 (1975)); see also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918 (1984) (“[S]uppression of evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant should be ordered only on a case-by-case basis and only in those unusual cases in which exclusion will further the purposes of the exclusionary rule.”).

By all accounts, the error of having the date on the search warrant post-dated by one day appears to have been done inadvertently by the magistrate judge. The evidence indicates that Agent Andrews had no knowledge of the incorrect date on the search warrant until the search had been nearly completed, and that Agent Andrews exercised no bad faith in executing the search warrant on October 6, 2005. Moreover, it was reasonable for Agent Andrews to rely on the magistrate judge’s willingness to issue the search warrant for the day she requested. Moreover, the search was conducted within the 10 days allowed for a valid search warrant.

Defendant claims that a prejudicial change occurred between the date on the search warrant and the following day when the search warrant was executed, which was that there was time for more evidence to accumulate. Defendant’s argument is not compelling, as it means that Defendant may have downloaded additional child pornography in the 24 hours before the search was conducted.

Finally, Krull instructs that the exclusionary rule is restricted to instances that will advance its remedial purpose–to deter future unlawful police conduct. Here, Agent Andrews always intended to conduct the search on October 6, 2005. Before initiating the search, Agent Andrews did not have knowledge that the date on the search warrant was off by a day. Furthermore, there is no evidence of unlawful police conduct. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence from Search and Derivative Evidence is denied.

Police with an arrest warrant waited for defendant to come out of the house. A protective sweep for other persons was conducted after defendant was in handcuffs. When the sole leaseholder arrived, she consented to a search of the premises without knowledge of the protective sweep, which produced 10 ounces of marijuana and a handgun in the possession of a felon. The protective sweep was not shown to be justified, but the consent without knowledge of the protective sweep was free and voluntary. United States v. Edgerson, 243 Fed. Appx. 974, 2007 FED App. 0498N (6th Cir. 2007) (unpublished):

A protective sweep of a residence, conducted after an arrest has been made outside the residence, is justified only if the officers can demonstrate an articulable basis for their reasonable belief “that someone else inside the house might pose a danger to them.” United States v. Colbert, 76 F.3d 773, 777 (6th Cir. 1996). Here, the government contends that the police had an articulable fear because one officer saw movement inside the house before Edgerson surrendered and because the tip contained information that Edgerson was armed. The dangerousness of an individual already in custody, however, “is not germane to the inquiry whether the police may conduct a protective sweep.” Id. Consequently, the government has not demonstrated any articulable facts that would lead to the rational inference of a threat after Edgerson had surrendered, unarmed. See id.; Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334 (1990). We therefore disagree with the district court’s conclusion that the initial “protective sweep” was lawful, and must consider the effect of Ms. Manley’s consent.

. . . Although the protective sweep was unlawful, Ms. Manley was not aware that it had occurred when she gave her consent, and she was not facing arrest herself. Moreover, the district court expressly found that the drugs and the gun were “discovered without reference to the police error or misconduct,” and “there is no nexus sufficient to provide a taint.” See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 448 (1984). Edgerson has failed to demonstrate clear error.

Comment: The opinion never says that the protective sweep revealed the marijuana, so what difference does it make? Consent is consent, and there was no showing that anything was found by the protective sweep. The opinion is trying to show that the consent was not coerced by the protective sweep.

Officer’s testimony that the defendant was walking in a park masturbating rather than walking while urinating was credited by the district court and was “virtually unreviewable on appeal,” quoting United States v. Hernandez, 281 F.3d 746, 748 (8th Cir. 2001) The police officer that came upon defendant and found him stopped him and asked about what was in his backpack. “[Officer] Ihde asked, ‘Are they naughty pictures?’ When Boston replied ‘Yes,’ Ihde told him to step away from the backpack. Ihde opened the bag and saw an 8″ x 10″ computer printout of a 12 or 13 year old boy with his genitals exposed.” The search of the backpack and seizure of 163 Polaroid pictures of young boys and a production of child porn count was affirmed once the boy in a picture was identified. United States v. Boston, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS ____ (8th Cir. July 16, 2007).

Defendant officer had probable cause for plaintiff’s arrest for DUI finding him stuck on a concrete barrier, with bloodshot and watery eyes, slurring his words. Biehl v. Salina Police Dep’t., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52473 (D. Kan. July 18, 2007).*

The Third Circuit held in two cases that parole searches conducted on defendants’ houses while they were in jail were valid under the Pennsylvania parole search statute and the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Strickland, 237 Fed. Appx. 773 (3d Cir. 2007) (unpublished); United States v. Eggleston, 243 Fed. Appx. 715 (3d Cir. 2007) (unpublished).

Search incident seizure of a cellphone was justified by probable cause. Obtaining the number of the cellphone was not argued below, but the court finds that it was valid under inevitable discovery. United States v. Diaz, 494 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2007).*

Search warrant described 1731 but the entry had to be through 1735 and the warrant described 1735. Once inside, the officers discovered the difference, and they sought an amended warrant. The misdescription did not violate the particularity clause of the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Wade, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51763 (E.D. Wis. July 11, 2007):

Even if the court were to conclude that the search warrant did not meet the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment, the officers did not conduct a warrantless search of the defendant’s residence as the defendant contends. The evidence at the hearing established that Officer Bandt sought an amended search warrant once the officers were inside the building. Officer Bandt testified that the officers had made so much noise when initially attempting to enter the building that he was concerned that evidence would be removed before the officers could obtain a warrant with the correct address. He was also concerned for the safety of the officers. Therefore, the officers secured the residence. The officers ultimately obtained an amended warrant listing the address of the place to be searched as 1731-1735 W. Atkinson Avenue, Unit 1.

Denying plaintiff’s brother federal prison visitation because he failed a drug test was within the prison’s authority. “Because plaintiff challenges the search of other individuals, where he could not conceivably have an expectation of privacy, this claim must be dismissed for failure to state a claim.” Vaughn v. Adams, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51725 (E.D. Va. March 5, 2007).*

Report of gasoline fumes by neighbors brought the fire marshal who smelled gas around an apartment building. Seeing an open window, he looked inside and saw an open gas can and a stronger odor of gas. He got a key from the apartment manager and entered and found the accouterments of crude bomb making which he photographed and removed. Defendant was indicted for possession of a destructive device. The motion to suppress was denied; the entry was justified by the emergency doctrine. Officers got a search warrant to look at defendant’s computer for evidence of bomb making searches and documents, and they found child porn which led to another search warrant. United States v. Dean, 243 Fed. Appx. 780 (4th Cir. 2007), certiorari denied by Dean v. United States, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 12411 (U.S., Nov. 26, 2007) (unpublished).

Government created exigent circumstances argument was waived by not mentioning it in any of the three suppression motions he filed in the district court, and it was never mentioned during the hearings. United States v. Summers, 234 Fed. Appx. 315 (5th Cir. 2007) (unpublished).*

The fact the officer waited 8 minutes into a traffic stop to run the driver’s and vehicle license numbers did not make the detention unreasonable, despite the officer’s testimony that he usually drags it out. United States v. Campos, 237 Fed. Appx. 949 (5th Cir. 2007) (unpublished):

Although in the district court Campos challenged the validity of the initial traffic stop, he no longer argues that the stop of his vehicle for speeding was improper. Rather, Campos argues that the stop was unlawfully prolonged because Officer Flores did not run the records checks until eight minutes into the stop, rendering his detention unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

Officer Flores’s actions are plainly permissible under our case law. An officer may request a driver’s license, insurance papers, vehicle registration, run a computer check, issue a citation, and ask about the purpose and itinerary of a driver’s trip. An officer may also undertake similar questioning of the vehicle’s occupants to verify the information provided by the driver. In addition, we have specifically held that records checks need not be initiated prior to an officer’s initial questioning of a vehicle’s occupants.

In United States v. Brigham, [382 F.3d 500, 506 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc)], the officer did not initiate records checks until eight minutes into the initial stop. Prior to running the records checks, the officer asked the driver for his license, insurance papers, questioned him about his travel plans, and sought to verify the driver’s story with the car’s three passengers. We concluded that the officer’s actions were reasonable.

Campos argues that his case is distinguishable from Brigham because Officer Flores’s testimony indicates that he purposefully engages in delays in initiating records checks so as to extend the amount of time he has for investigation. We reject this argument. “[T]he touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is reasonableness,” and “[r]easonableness is measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances.” Therefore, as long as Officer Flores’s investigative methods were objectively reasonable, his subjective motives are irrelevant. (bracketed material added)

Defendant was stopped as a potential suspect in a bank robbery, and, when the car door opened, the officer smelled burnt marijuana. The officer quickly determined that defendant was not involved in the robbery, but a search of the trunk was justified on the smell alone. United States v. Jennings, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 18007 (8th Cir. July 27, 2007) (unpublished):

Jennings then argues that even if the officers had probable cause to conduct the search, they were not entitled to search the compartment in the cargo area of the vehicle because their detection of the odor of burnt marijuana only permitted them to search areas where burnt marijuana may be found. However, since the officers had probable cause to search for drugs, Officer Wylie properly searched the compartment within the cargo area of the vehicle. See Caves, 890 F.2d at 90 (stating that an officer “may examine the contents of all containers, packages and compartments located in the vehicle, provided that there is probable cause to believe that the object of the search will be found there”); Neumann, 183 F.3d at 756 (stating that the “smell of burnt marijuana … gave [the officer] probable cause to search the entire vehicle for drugs”) (emphasis added).

Since the officers had probable cause to search the vehicle for drugs based on the odor of burnt marijuana, we find no merit in Jennings’s argument about his continued detention. See United States v. Gipp, 147 F.3d 680, 685 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding that a continued stop based on an officer’s detection of the odor of burnt marijuana on a person is not unlawful because the odor gives the officer a “particularized and objective basis for suspecting [the person] was or had recently engaged in criminal activity”) (internal quotation omitted). Therefore, the officers did not unlawfully detain Jennings while they searched the vehicle for drugs.

Comment: The smell of burnt marijuana to me is probable cause to believe that only a small quantity is in the car, and it would only permit a search where something that small could logically be found. For instance, what if the defendant got into the car with one joint or a blunt and was smoking it alone or with friends and he gets stopped. What is the probable cause to believe that there is a larger quantity in the trunk? This is a bright line rule because courts don’t want to have to think about it.

The defendant’s consent was found voluntary on the totality and not clearly erroneous. “Mr. Johnson is 48 years of age and of at least average intelligence. He testified at the suppression hearing that he understood the consent form, that he never felt coerced or threatened and that he understood he was waiving his Fourth Amendment rights. The interview was calm and professional at all times.” Inevitable discovery also would apply because the officers already had probable cause and were pursuing the investigation, and certainly had probable cause to obtain a search warrant. “This information would more than suffice to establish probable cause upon which to issue a search warrant. Therefore, the deterrence rationale of the exclusionary rule would not apply, and the evidence would be admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine.” United States v. Johnson, 495 F.3d 536 (7th Cir. 2007).* Comment: Defendant’s argument was “buyer’s remorse” where he realized when it was too late that he should not have consented, and it really was not worth pursuing on appeal, in my opinion.

Defendant was stopped at an immigration checkpoint, and was diverted for a secondary inspection because of reasonable suspicion. The entire stop took 2-3 minutes and was reasonable, and the cocaine found was admissible. United States v. Reyes, 243 Fed. Appx. 858 (5th Cir. 2007)* (per curiam).

Police corroborated only innocent details of the informant’s tale and no criminality. It was otherwise conclusory: “While the amount of detail contained in Nicholson is not always necessary for a valid search warrant, it is preferable to only the blanket claim here, that the sources have been ‘proven reliable through independent investigation.'” The officer here, with 19 years experience, could have no reasonable basis for concluding that there was probable cause, and the good faith exception should not be applied. State v. Williams, 2007 Ohio 4472, 173 Ohio App. 3d 119, 877 N.E.2d 717 (6th Dist. 2007):

We find that the affidavit is “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.” The affiant himself states that he has been a police officer for more than 19 years, a narcotics investigator for more than ten years, received extensive training and has extensive experience. There is no question that this officer is more than reasonably well-trained and certainly has more than the minimum level of knowledge. He would have known, and should have known, that this affidavit was not sufficient. Therefore, we find that the “good faith” test does not apply.

Comment: Officers almost always mention their experience in search warrant applications to support why they think the issuing judge should find the officers’ assessment of probable cause reasonable. Here, ironically, the officers’ experience was used as support for why he should have known there was no probable cause.

Paper temporary tag in back window of SUV was not “conspicuously displayed” as required by state law because the numbers were not readily visible, and that supported the stop of the defendant and the consent he gave. Gonzales v. State, 963 So. 2d 1138 (Miss. 2007).*

The defendant was not actually stopped because officers followed him from a drug house for which a warrant was in the process of issuing to a darkened private residence. When defendant got out of the car, officers had reasonable suspicion. Crack was in plain view on the driver’s seat. State v. Birky, 2007 Ohio 4470, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 4035 (6th Dist. August 31, 2007).*

Supreme Court’s consent after a valid traffic stop jurisprudence is criticized. “The factually driven inquiry means that the test is difficult to apply.” State v. Thompson, 184 Kan. 763, 166 P.3d 1015 (2007):

As the parties suggest, this divergence of opinion reflects the inherently factual nature of the inquiry. The factually driven inquiry means that the test is difficult to apply. This difficulty leads to imprecision which has led commentators to criticize the United States Supreme Court’s consent search jurisprudence. Commentators, in addition to noting the difficulty in applying the case law relating to consensual searches to specific fact situations, argue that the Court’s analysis utilizes an ill-crafted paradigm. See, e.g., Williams, Misplaced Angst: Another Look At Consent-Search Jurisprudence, 82 Ind. L.J. 69, 69-71 (2007) (“No one seems to have a good word to say about consent-search jurisprudence”; it is a “problematic realm of Fourth Amendment law.”); Note, The Fourth Amendment and Antidilution: Confronting the Overlooked Function of the Consent Search Doctrine, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 2187, 2188 (2006) (“Most commentators agree that the Court’s current approach is flawed, and even those commentators who defend the Court’s holdings criticize its reasoning.”); Simmons, Not “Voluntary” But Still Reasonable: A New Paradigm for Understanding the Consent Searches Doctrine, 80 Ind. L.J. 773, 773 (2005) (consent-search paradigm is a “triple inconsistency: the Court claims to be applying one test, but in reality is applying a different test-and neither test fully comports with the real-life confrontations”); Comment, “People, Not Places”: The Fiction of Consent, The Force of the Public Interest, and the Fallacy of Objectivity in Police Encounters with Passengers During Traffic Stops, 7 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1071, 1095 (2005) (because “[t]here is no such thing as a consensual encounter during a traffic stop,” author argues “courts need a new standard”); LaFave, The “Routine Traffic Stop” from Start to Finish: Too Much “Routine,” Not Enough Fourth Amendment, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 1843, 1898 (2004) (argues officers can “obviate any and all time and scope limitations” by performing “the well-known Lt. Columbo gambit [‘one more thing …’]” despite the reality that “any person who has been detained for a traffic violation is unlikely to so perceive the situation”); Chanenson, Get the Facts, Jack! Empirical Research and the Changing Constitutional Landscape of Consent Searches, 71 Tenn. L. Rev. 399, 402 (2004) (“[A]lthough scholars have criticized the consent search doctrine for years, the Supreme Court has steadfastly defended it and sided with a pro-law enforcement approach.”); Whorf, Consent Searches Following Routine Traffic Stops: The Troubled Jurisprudence of a Doomed Drug Interdiction Technique, 28 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 1, 7 (2001) (“coercion inherent” in consent searches after routine traffic stop “must be addressed in some way”); Butterfoss, Bright Line Seizures: The Need for Clarity in Determining When Fourth Amendment Activity Begins, 79 J. Crim. L. and Criminology 437, 481-82 (1988) (argues test utilized by United States Supreme Court is unworkable because outcomes of cases turn on subtle factual distinctions that make it difficult for police officers to apply the standard in the field and adjust their conduct accordingly).

This criticism is valid in many respects. Because of the valid arguments raised, if we were to write on a clean slate, we would consider a different paradigm. We do not have this opportunity, however, because we are obligated to follow the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation and application of the Fourth Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-57, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081, 81 S. Ct. 1684, reh. denied 368 U.S. 871 (1961).

Later:

The facts of this case present circumstances somewhere in between these cited cases. The lights remained activated, a traffic warning was given, and Thompson was told to have a nice day, but there was no unequivocal signal that he was free to go. Also, the nighttime stop means the lights could have been left on for safety purposes. Given the ambiguity of the situation, the flashing emergency lights could be a factor in the totality of the circumstances relevant to a determination of whether an encounter with a law enforcement officer is consensual.

But, the subjective state of mind of the motorist is not determinative.

Here, some of these circumstances existed. The lights remained activated. We note, however, as previously discussed, the dark of night and the end of the traffic stop make the display of lights ambiguous and not a clear show of authority. In addition, Thompson pulled over in an alley, and two officers were present. Like Guerrero, 472 F.3d at 789, where the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found the presence of an additional officer a factor “only in the mildest of forms” because the officer was a distance away and had no contact with the defendant, in this case the trial court made the factual finding that Thompson was unaware of the back-up officer’s presence. The back-up officer did not approach Thompson or Thompson’s vehicle and had no contact with Thompson.

On the other hand, there was no application of force, no intimidating movement, no overwhelming show of force, no brandishing of weapons, no threat, no command, not even an authoritative tone of voice. Officer Weinbrenner did nothing to “convey a message that compliance with [his] requests [was] required.” Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 435, 115 L. Ed. 2d 389, 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991). No factor would indicate that Thompson’s will was “overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired.” See Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 225. Nothing about the encounter indicated duress or coercion. We conclude that under the totality of the circumstances a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officer’s requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.

The trial court correctly determined the detention was consensual.

Defendant was in the process of moving in with deceased, but he admittedly had moved out a couple of days before. He said he had filled out a rental application but had not fully moved in before the break up. He had no standing to challenge the search. He also failed to show he qualified as a guest for standing. Dunn v. State, 2007 Ark. LEXIS 528 (October 4, 2007).*

Defendant’s 15 year old son consented to an entry for the police to talk to defendant in a knock and talk. Defendant was asleep in his bedroom, and his son led the police to the bedroom, saying “He’s in here.” The knock and talk was not invalid, and the son could consent to this limited entry to talk to defendant. Perkins v. Commonwealth, 237 S.W.3d 215 (Ky. App. 2007).*

State implied consent law was complied with, and defendant could not revoke implied consent. State v. Cochran, 2007 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 785 (October 1, 2007):

We note that to allow a defendant to consult with his attorney and revoke his consent to testing hours, days, or even weeks after a breath or blood sample is collected would essentially circumvent the firmly established rule in this state that a defendant has no right to consult with counsel before he submits to the test. See State v. Frasier, 914 S.W.2d 467, 471 (Tenn. 1996). The appellant is not entitled to relief.

Dog sniff during the pendency of a traffic stop checking records was not invalid, and reasonable suspicion was developing anyway. State v. Kempa, 235 S.W.3d 54 (Mo. App. 2007).*

Furtive movements in the back seat of a vehicle during a traffic stop in Massachusetts led the officer to conduct a “protective sweep” [actually it should be called a “vehicle frisk under Long” but the former is taking on a broader meaning] of the back seat area and found severed hand in a plastic bag. All four in the vehicle were taken in for questioning, and two were not involved in the murders but talked about the others bragging about it. The seizure was governed by Massaschusetts law but the search was governed by Rhode Island law. The stop was based on stuff hanging from the rearview mirror which made the stop valid under Massachusetts law. State v. Quinlan, 921 A.2d 96 (R.I. 2007):

The trial justice held and both parties agree that the lawfulness of the stop is governed by Massachusetts law, but the subsequent search and motion to suppress will be analyzed under Rhode Island law. We agree. See Briggs, 756 A.2d at 739-40 (applying an interest-weighing approach and determining that Rhode Island law applied to “constitutional validity of the police seizure” that occurred in a different state).

The trial justice determined that the initial stop was lawful and that defendants lacked the requisite standing to challenge the automobile search. Even though he found that the parties had no expectation of privacy in the Jeep, the trial justice went on to find that the search of the vehicle was lawful. Our review of the record in this case leads us to the same conclusion–the vehicle was lawfully stopped, and defendants have no standing to challenge the subsequent search.

Comment: This rule has a lot to commend it for its ease of use, although it could sometimes lead to a search being sustained in the state of trial where the evidence might have been suppressed in the state of seizure. Thus, it literally could make an invalid seizure valid because it located evidence used elsewhere. If the law is different in state of seizure, it would seem that the courts of that state should be the ones determining the lawfulness of the search under its own law. If the other state’s rule is clear, however, there would be no interpretation problems. As a practical matter, this will not happen much, and will usually be limited to situations of search incident where Thornton is rejected, inventory searches where courts do not indulge in fictions, or some states where the good faith exception is not a magic bullet that cures all police mistakes. So, the same outcome will occur at least 95+% of the time, no matter which law is applied. The really interesting cases will be where the search was valid in the law of the state of seizure, but invalid where it was admitted. Then, the court has to look at the question of what value exclusion has, which could have happened here in the abstract, where the police in, say, Massachusetts acted lawfully but have no knowledge of some quirk in Rhode Island law that would make the search invalid there, and they had no knowledge that the search and seizure implicated a crime in another state. In that situation, it is safe to say that the exclusionary rule should not be applied because there was nothing to deter.

Defendant was a suspect in a murder, and he was standing about 15 feet from his vehicle and officers took the keys from him. Before an entry could occur, the officer looked in with a flashlight and, in plain view, was a gun. The court sustained the search on plain view and did not decide on the lawfulness of a search incident because the record was unclear on the question of whether defendant was a “recent occupant” of the vehicle and the parties did not raise it in the trial court. State v. Reffegee, 2007 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 499 (June 27, 2007).*

Emergency entry justified because of open door and person inside not responding to repeated calls for him. “Deputy Williamson testified that it is not normal for a person to leave the door wide open, and both officers stated that, based on their experience, open-door calls to residences can involve assault victims or persons otherwise injured inside. … As such, under these circumstances, we find the facts known to the officers could establish a reasonable belief that someone inside appellant’s residence needed immediate aid.” Shepherd v. State, 230 S.W.3d 738 (Tex. App. — Houston (14th Dist.) 2007).*

Defendant’s conduct may have been innocuous in isolation, but, to a trained law enforcement officer, it was more than a mere hunch that something illegal was going on. State v. Cook, 38 Kan. App. 2d 20, 161 P.3d 779 (2007):

Cook’s conduct, to an untrained eye, may have raised no suspicion whatsoever or, at most, a mere hunch that something funny was going on. The average citizen of Johnson County, familiar with the scene, more likely would look upon the general area as a popular shopping destination with upscale stores such as Nordstrom’s nearby, rather than a center for drug activity. The conduct that justified Officer McFadden’s detention of the defendant in Terry was not on its face illegal and could have been innocent. Similarly, Cook’s conduct could have been entirely innocent. It is certainly not illegal to engage in a meeting late at night at a gas station. When stopped by Honglso, Brown and Cook each provided different but certainly possible innocent scenarios. One had to do with getting some clothes, the other with getting a job. Conduct that is susceptible of an innocent explanation, such as the explanations Brown and Cook later tried to use on Hongslo, may nevertheless cause an officer, trained in drug enforcement having a familiarity with the drug history of the area, to harbor a reasonable and specific suspicion of illegal drug activity that needs further investigation.

State could rely on Franks on appeal. Although it did not cite it in the trial court, it clearly stated the premise of Franks. Applying Franks and purging the information from the affidavit for the warrant still left probable cause. State v. Garcia, 2007 UT App 228, 164 P.3d 1264, 581 Utah Adv. Rep. 19 (2007).*

Commonwealth v. Valerio, 449 Mass. 562, 870 N.E.2d 46 (2007):

The target of a search present at the scene has no right under the Fourth Amendment to actual service of the search warrant or to see it before the warrant is executed:

The Fourth Amendment does not require that an individual be given a copy of the warrant before the commencement of a search of his or her property. See United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 98-99 (2006), citing Groh v. Ramirez, supra at 562 n.5. Although it is established that art. 14 does require police officers to have a copy of a search warrant with them at the time they conduct a search, see Commonwealth v. Guaba, 417 Mass. 746, 754 (1994), we have never required that the entire warrant be shown, read to, or understood by an individual who may be present and whose property is about to be searched. See Commonwealth v. Mullane, 445 Mass. 702, 707 (2006) (police entered lobby of building, quickly displayed warrant through glass sliding window, and used battering ram to enter internal door; this court held that “the officers’ actions were proper”). As we observed in Commonwealth v. Gauthier, 425 Mass. 37 (1997), “[t]he warrant procedure does not contemplate that the person to whom the warrant is presented should be able to judge from that presentation at the time of execution its full legality and perhaps to decide on that basis whether or not to comply. Rather, it is intended to notify that person that the officers have been authorized to be in that particular place and to search for that particular thing.” Id. at 43, citing Matter of the Application of Lafayette Academy, Inc., 610 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1979).

Also, the particularity requirement of the search warrant in this case was defective, but it was saved by the incorporated and attached affidavit:

3. There is no question that the search warrant in the instant case failed, on its face, to meet the demands of particularity required by G. L. c. 276, § 2, art. 14, and the Fourth Amendment. The eight-page affidavit, however, which was stamped on every page by the assistant clerk-magistrate, incorporated by reference into the warrant, and attached to the warrant at the time it was issued, was more than sufficiently detailed. The affidavit remained attached to the warrant as it was brought to the premises and was available during the execution of the search to inform the defendant of the limits of the search. We conclude that the warrant, while technically defective, met the substantive requirements of particularity under G. L. c. 276, § 2, art. 14, and the Fourth Amendment. Despite the technical violation, the search of the apartment was not an unlawful general search. See Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 394 Mass. 381, 390-391 (1985).

Defendant’s challenge to search did not include an earlier warrantless entry that he should have challenged. Thus, the trial court did not err in considering the first entry as a part of the probable cause calculus. Exigent circumstances were lacking from an entry to seize a non-working meth lab in a gym bag that had been reported by the defendant’s adult daughter; defendant was in jail and no true emergency existed. The later search warrant, however, was validly issued. State v. Geraghty, 38 Kan. App. 2d 114, 163 P.3d 350 (2007).

Patdown for weapons went into defendant’s tight pants into his butt crack for crack. The scope of the frisk was unlawful, and the search is suppressed because there could not possibly have been a weapon there. State v. Barnett, 2007 Ohio 3694, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 3364 (2d Dist. July 20, 2007):

[*P20] Here the testimony reflected that Barnett’s pants were so tight that they could not even pat down the area of his buttocks from outside his clothing, and that it was necessary to pull his pants up and unbutton them in order to get into the area to retrieve the baggie of cocaine. And, Detective House gave no testimony that would establish that he might expect to find a weapon secreted there. In fact, an abstract of cases in this district would indicate that it is, instead, very common that crack cocaine is kept in such location, rather than weapons. Therefore, there is no evidence before the court that would tend to establish that a search of that area was necessary to discover a hidden weapon.

Police had a search warrant for defendant’s premises and cut holes in the walls looking for evidence. They started in a logical place, and defendant argued that some were random and arbitrary, but nothing was found there. So, in a criminal case, there was nothing to suppress from those holes. United States v. Whisnant, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54418 (E.D. Tenn. July 26, 2007):

While executing the search, the police came across a piece of framed artwork (“Artwork”) mounted on a wall in the Premises. Photographs of the Artwork were admitted into evidence during the May 29, 2007, suppression hearing. [Defendant’s Collective Exhibit Five.] The photographs reveal that the area behind the Artwork had been painted in a manner that can be described as haphazard, at best. The wall the Artwork was mounted on appears to have a solid, professional looking coat of paint, but the area immediately surrounding and behind the Artwork had been painted with what were described in the R&R as “fast brush strokes.” The difference between the workmanship of the area immediately surrounding the Artwork and the remainder of the wall is striking, and certainly is sufficient to cause a reasonable police officer to believe that something might be hidden behind that portion of the wall.

Additionally, Detective Anderson testified at the hearing that the Artwork was the only piece of mounted art in the entire Premises. [Doc. 20 at 3.] Detective Anderson also noted that the Artwork was mounted in an unusual manner, it had been attached to the wall with four screws rather than hung on the wall. [Id.] Accordingly, based upon the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that it was reasonable for the police to believe that something might be hidden in the wall behind the Artwork. The Court further finds that it was reasonable, and permissible, for the police to cut a hole in the wall behind the Artwork while executing the search warrant. It is true that, under Bonds, the police may have effectively seized the wall by cutting holes in it, but that seizure was not unreasonable under the totality of the circumstances and did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

Probable cause was shown for the search warrant for defendant’s premises. The affidavit is reviewed as a whole: “The validity of a warrant is not determined by ‘nit-picking’ discreet portions of the application. Rather, the test is whether, under the totality of the circumstances presented in the affidavit, the issuing judge had a ‘substantial basis’ for determining that probable cause existed.” United States v. Campbell, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54357 (D. Kan. July 25, 2007).*

Probable cause was shown on the totality from the traffic to and from the premises, a trash pull, and massive purchases of matches. State v. Wilkinson, 2007 SD 79, 739 N.W.2d 254 (2007):

[*P21] Looking at the totality of the circumstances, the affidavit contained substantial evidence supporting probable cause. This is not a bare-bones affidavit that states only speculation. The affidavit contains numerous police observations including traffic flow indicating drug activity, frequent visits from individuals with known drug involvement, massive match book purchases, Herding’s vehicles at Bordwell’s residence, criminal histories and evidence from four trash pulls. These trash pulls yielded evidence of drug activities ranging from “owe sheets” to items with methamphetamine residue. Considering the totality of the circumstances, examination of the affidavit indicates a substantial basis for the issuing court’s determination of probable cause.

Consent to search defendant’s car on the side of an interstate highway was valid, but the officer decided that it was unsafe there and mentioned it would be removed to another location for search. “Thompson did not object. Given the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would have understood that Thompson’s consent was not limited to searching the car on the side of the highway, but that it extended to searching the car in a safer location.” United States v. Thompson, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54346 (E.D. Mo. July 24, 2007).*

Officers put in the affidavit for the search warrant that others might be present and they should be subject to search, too. Ybarra is distinguishable because there was no known connection between the bartender who was the target of the search there and the mere customers. United States v. White, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54364 (D. Or. July 23, 2007):

The law does not require exclusion of evidence found while officers are rightfully searching a location under a properly issued warrant, even if the evidence supports charges for a related crime or against a suspect “not expressly contemplated in the warrant.” United States v. Adjani, 452 F.3d 1140, 1151 (no need to exclude evidence implicating a woman when the evidence was found on her computer and the woman lived with the primary suspect but was only mentioned in the warrant’s affidavit as participating with the suspect in possibly innocuous activities) (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 568 (2006). That is what happened here. The warrant provides probable cause to search other people found at the residence as well as all parts of the residence.

“We reverse because the record reveals that the officers were engaged in a valid community caretaking function when, after receiving a telephone complaint about a car, they approached it after finding it parked on a dead-end road, at night, its lights switched off, windows fogged, and an unknown number of people inside. When the windows were rolled down and the officers smelled the odor of burnt marijuana coming from the car, they had probable cause to search the vehicle, and a reasonable search and seizure of apparent contraband followed.” In re J.M.E., 38 Kan. App. 2d 229, 162 P.3d 835 (2007).*

Defendant’s computer was seized on his wife’s consent and defendant was later arrested. The computer, however, had not been searched. The defendant was Mirandized on his arrest, and he invoked his right to counsel. Shortly thereafter, the police asked for consent to search his computer and told him that he had a right to refuse. He consented. The consent after Miranda warnings and invoking the right to counsel was still valid. State v. Norkeveck, 214 Ore. App. 553, 168 P.3d 265 (2007):

At trial, defendant’s principal argument on the motion was that his consent was not voluntary, because he was in custody and had invoked his right to counsel, and the request for consent violated his right to counsel. In State v. Baumeister, 80 Ore. App. 626, 628-29, 723 P.2d 1049, rev den, 302 Ore. 299 (1986), we rejected the argument that an officer was foreclosed from asking an accused for consent to search after the invocation of the right to counsel or to remain silent. See also State v. Bradbury, 80 Ore. App. 613, 615, 723 P.2d 1051, rev den, 302 Ore. 342 (1986).

On appeal, defendant accepts that body of law, but argues that his custody status, as well as his prior invocation of his right to counsel, are important factors in judging the voluntariness of his consent. Even considering those two identified facts as part of the totality of circumstances bearing on the issue, we conclude that the trial court’s implicit finding that the consent was voluntary is supported by the evidence. Defendant’s consent to seize and search his computer was valid.

Police were called to a domestic disturbance where defendant’s father believed his son was high and wanted him out. The defendant was arrested and removed, and the father consented to a search of the house which was otherwise shown to be valid. The defendant could not show that he was removed merely to avoid his objection because he was arrested for legitimate reasons. His argument that he would have objected if still there was unavailing because people do consent even when it is not in their best interest to do so. State v. Chilson, 38 Kan. App. 2d 338, 165 P.3d 304 (2007):

The facts of this case fall somewhere along the continuum of reasonableness established by Matlock and Randolph. Here, the co-occupant defendant was not absent, as was the defendant in Matlock. But, unlike the co-occupant defendant in Randolph, he did not stand at the door and object to the search. However, the district court did not find the officers removed the defendant “for the sake of avoiding a possible objection”; rather, they removed him pursuant to protocol. Nor did the evidence indicate the defendant voiced an objection despite the officers’ failure to inquire. Moreover, if the defendant had been asked for his consent to search, it is not a foregone conclusion that he would have refused: suspects often consent, albeit imprudently. See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 122; ….

In determining where this case falls on the continuum, we find guidance in recent post-Randolph cases from other jurisdictions with similar factual circumstances.

For instance, in United States v. DiModica, 468 F.3d 495, 497-98 (7th Cir. 2006), a wife, who was not present at the home, reported a domestic assault and told police her husband, DiModica, was a felon who possessed guns and drugs. She gave police a key to their house and consent to search. Armed with an arrest warrant, officers knocked on the door, confirmed DiModica’s identity, arrested him, and removed him from the home. They did not ask his permission to search. The wife met officers at the home afterward, and police discovered items that formed the basis of charges unrelated to the domestic abuse. DiModica argued that had he not been arrested and removed from the scene, he would have refused to allow the police to search his home. The Seventh Circuit distinguished the case from Randolph, noting that unlike the defendant and his wife in Randolph, DiModica and his wife were not standing together at the doorway, one consenting to the search while the other refused. The officers did not ask DiModica for permission to search, and DiModica did not advise the officers they could not do so.

The Seventh Circuit found Dimodica’s case was not materially distinguishable from Matlock. The officers did not remove DiModica to avoid his objection; they legally arrested DiModica based on probable cause he had committed domestic abuse. Once DiModica was arrested and removed from the scene, the wife’s consent alone was valid and permitted the officers to legally search the residence.

Warrant checks during any traffic stop are permissible under the Fourth Amendment. People v. Bailey, 375 Ill. App. 3d 1055, 314 Ill. Dec. 575, 874 N.E.2d 940 (1st Dist. 2007), relying on People v. Roberson, 367 Ill. App. 3d 193, 201, 304 Ill. Dec. 975, 854 N.E.2d 317 (1st Dist. 2006).

A DNA sample obtained by warrant for one investigation can be used in another without violating the particularity clause of the warrant. State v. Glynn, 38 Kan. App. 2d 437, 166 P.3d 1075 (2007).

Claimant had standing to challenge a forfeiture when the funds were removed from him. United States v. United States Currency in the Amount of Five Hundred Ninety-Eight Thousand Eight Hundred Twenty Six Dollars, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67938 (E.D. N.Y. September 13, 2007):

It is undisputed that Cardona was in possession of both the $50,000 in the plastic bag he was carrying on the street, and the $468,826 stored in a duffle bag in a closet of his apartment. See Pl. Rule 56.1 Stat. P61 and P64.

The court finds that possession and injury from being denied the funds is sufficient to allow Cardona to assert Article III standing.

Defendant’s live-in girlfriend had common authority to consent, and defendant did not show that his duffle bag and a box were exclusively his such that she could not consent to a search of them as well. United States v. Eastom, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67899 (N.D. Okla. September 12, 2007).*

Defendant was validly frisked for his ID card under T.L.O. by school security despite the defendant’s admission that he did not have it on him. The increasing threat of school violence justified it. Also, citing Indiana constitution requires a separate analysis of why it should be interpreted differently in that case. D.L. v. State, 877 N.E.2d 500 (Ind. App. 2007):

We believe that in this post-9/11, post-Columbine age of increasing school violence, a public school police officer’s determination that she must identify the individuals with whom she is in contact similarly warrants our endorsement. See, e.g., Cochran v. State, 843 N.E.2d 980, 983-84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (recognizing that it is an essential police function for an officer to ask individuals for identification and that doing so does not by itself raise a Fourth Amendment issue), trans. denied, cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 943 (2007). Indeed, the presence of an unidentified individual on school grounds has greater potential safety implications than does the mere scent of cigarette smoke as in D.B. or the fact of hearsay allegations regarding a student’s sale of marijuana as in Berry. D.L. was on school grounds during a non-passing period and was unable to present identification when asked. In our estimation, it was not unreasonable for Officer Lambert to respond to this situation by conducting a relatively limited pat-down search of D.L.’s pocket in search of his identification. We are unpersuaded that D.L.’s admission to being in violation of school rules somehow obviates the officer’s need to confirm this violation, or her accompanying need to identify him via any identification card potentially on his person. Given the circumstances of the unidentified individuals in a school setting, Officer Lambert’s clear need to determine their identities, and this court’s generally finding school searches to be reasonable under the circumstances, the limited pat-down search for identification in this case was justified at its inception.

Comment: This is one of those potentially dangerous “timebomb opinions” waiting to go off later in another context. Here, the court of appeals, incidentally hearing this case at a high school (fn.3), Giulianiistically invokes “9/11” and “Columbine,” the latter of which alone semi attempts to make the point. But, the Columbine shooters were students at the same school, as are almost all school shootings. I bet this oral argument at Lawrence North High School sure got the attention of the students when the questioning at argument essentially left them with the impression that they have no rights against search and seizure of their persons at school if there is now a “Columbine risk” exception to T.L.O. Under “post Columbine” rationale, anything is possible. The court succumbed to a spurious public safety argument without factual or logical basis to support a search for an ID?

Double hearsay from citizen informants was a valid basis for a stop. Two carnival workers in town reported to the City Superintendent at the grounds that the defendant attempted to sell them meth. That person called and talked with the police. The basis of knowledge of the carnival workers was not relayed to the police officer, but he could rely on hearsay from others. Defendant’s stop and frisk only escalated when defendant refused to be frisked. State v. Bishop, 2007 Ida. App. LEXIS 108 (December 4, 2007).*

Exclusionary rule did not apply to a revocation proceeding, except where there was bad faith, which was not evident on this record. Police were responding to a domestic disturbance call called in by a neighbor who reported that defendant was standing over his wife threatening her with a crowbar. Stephens v. State, 2007 Ark. App. LEXIS 863 (December 5, 2007)* (unpublished).

Plaintiff’s daughter’s strip search at school was justified under T.L.O. criteria because the school officials had reasonable suspicion she was in possession of drugs, and a less intrusive search first of her backpack produced nothing. Redding v. Safford Unified School District #1, 504 F.3d 828 (9th Cir. 2007).*

Defendant’s consent was voluntary. While he was yelled at by a mall security officer a half hour earlier, that person was not present when the consent was granted, and there was no indication that it was otherwise involuntary. [Stated in the facts, but not in the discussion is the fact that defendant was taking the blame so others would not be implicated in his own conduct.] United States v. Brown, 243 Fed. Appx. 544 (11th Cir. 2007).*

Plaintiff’s Bivens action fails for a First and Fourth Amendment retaliation conspiracy when he could not show that the search warrant issued for him lacked probable cause. O’Neil v. Kiser, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69368 (E.D. Mich. September 20, 2007).*

Search warrant application provided a substantial basis for concluding that there was probable cause to believe that evidence would be found in the place to be searched and adequate nexus was shown. Thus, the good faith exception would save the search, too. United States v. Jackson, 508 F. Supp. 2d 422 (M.D. Pa. 2007).*

The owner of a car can consent to a search of it over the objection of a bailee who just borrowed it. The bailee’s rights are subordinate. Grigsby v. Commonwealth, 2007 Ky. App. LEXIS 429 (November 9, 2007):

“An owner who allows another person to use his automobile retains ownership and the right to reclaim possession of the vehicle at will. While a bailee may have an expectation of privacy in the borrowed vehicle, that privacy interest is subordinate to the owner’s right to his vehicle and right to reclaim possession of the vehicle at any time.” quoting Hardy v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 677, 681, 440 S.E.2d 434, 437, 10 Va. Law Rep. 871 (1994).

The state failed to prove theft, and the property confiscated it refused to return. The defendant was entitled to its return. State v. Agee, 274 Neb. 445, 741 N.W.2d 161 (2007):

In this case, the State argued to the district court that much of the property was stolen. We agree that stolen property should be returned to its rightful owner. In most cases, the theft of the property will be substantiated by the findings underlying a criminal conviction. But here, the charges had been dismissed. The State had seized property from Agee, and he was presumably entitled to its return once the proceedings were concluded, but the State did not overcome that presumption by presenting evidence of a cognizable claim or right of possession adverse to Agee’s. Nor was the property contraband per se, which may not be returned because its possession is inherently unlawful. Nor did the State present evidence of any of the other grounds that have been used to justify the government’s retention of property, such as an ongoing investigation, a tax lien, an imposed fine, or an order of restitution.

Defendants conceded that they had no probable cause for plaintiff’s detention at gunpoint and handcuffing for suspicion of bank robbery that ended up on local television. After a prompt showup, it was determined that plaintiff was not the person wanted, and she was released. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment denied. Mitchell v. Anchorage Police Dep’t & Anchorage, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81372 (D. Alaska October 30, 2007).*

Plaintiff was the target of an investigation in his prison after it was determined that a false allegation had been made that the Clerk’s Office of the Ninth Circuit had ordered something. It turned out that the plaintiff had developed a relationship with a deputy clerk, and there had been 243 telephone calls in six months and visits at the prison. A cell search was conducted, things copied and returned. The plaintiff’s motion for return of property was denied because it had been returned. The plaintiff had no expectation of privacy in his cell. Moore v. Daniels, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81374 (D. Or. October 26, 2007).*

The record, including the videotape of the petitioner’s stop and field sobriety test, support the conclusion that there was at least reasonable suspicion for defendant’s stop and determination that he was likely DWI. Batten v. Wyo. DOT Drivers’ License Div., 2007 WY 173, 170 P.3d 1236 (2007).*

Male officer’s patdown of a woman using his cupped hand to touch her groin area, if true, stated a claim and overcame qualified immunity. Cherney v. City of Burnsville, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1345 (D. Minn. January 8, 2008).*

Three hand-to-hand transactions on the street was probable cause to believe defendant was dealing drugs. United States v. McGeth, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1154 (E.D. Pa. January 7, 2008).*

The affidavit for the search warrant was so conclusory that it did not provide probable cause, but it was not so conclusory that it was not at least sustained by the good faith exception. United States v. Medina-Rodriguez, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95490 (D. Minn. December 4, 2007)* (Comment: The only problem is that the court states all this conclusorily, which is only fitting, I suppose.)

Defendant’s contact with three law enforcement officers was not coercive. “As long as the person being questioned is free to ignore the questions and walk away, the Constitution is not implicated. … In this instance, while there were three officers present, their presence cannot be characterized as threatening-they were in plain clothes and at no time displayed their weapons or used harsh, threatening or coercive language. There was no evidence of any physical contact. And there was no evidence that any of the officers indicated compliance with their requests might be compelled.” United States v. Luken, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95494 (D. S.D. April 20, 2007).*

Lima, OH police shot and kill a woman holding her baby during a drug raid, also wounding the child. See the Toledo Blade: Lima on edge after police kill woman, wound 1-year-old child in drug raid / Black community, city officials clash over search, published yesterday:

LIMA, Ohio — Darla Jennings walked through the streets of south Lima last night sobbing as hundreds of people behind her called for justice after the shooting of her daughter, who was killed by police as she held her baby.

Tarika Wilson, 26, was shot and her 1-year-old son was wounded when Lima police conducted a drug raid on their home Friday night, prompting members of the black community to organize a candlelight vigil and demand answers from police.

“They shot my daughter and her baby,” Ms. Jennings said through tears while being consoled by other family members. “The police have to pay for what they did. They went in that home shooting and killed her.”

Police were there to arrest Ms. Wilson’s boyfriend, Anthony Terry, 31, who was suspected of selling drugs from the house; he was arrested Friday night at the residence. Marijuana and crack cocaine were found in the house.

Ms. Wilson, the mother of six children, ages 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 8, was pronounced dead at 218 East Third St., where SWAT team police officers executed a search warrant at 8:15 p.m. Ms. Wilson’s youngest child, Sincere Wilson, was shot during the drug raid as she held him.

Life is cheap to the narcs who execute these self-styled “high risk warrants.” So much for the background check on the premises before the raid, I guess. The informant would have told them about the kids.