Medical records are an exception to the staleness of probable cause: “Medical records fall under the exception for evidence that is perpetuated over a period of time.” United States v. Hindman, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60451 (E.D. Wash. July 25, 2008).*

Court credits that defendant was stopped for speeding on a motorcycle, even though it was not the real reason for the stop (Whren) and that he consented to a search of his person, finding drugs. United States v. Nickerson, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60148 (E.D. Tex. July 24, 2008).*

Police responded to a domestic violence call to a payphone and found a screaming man accompanied by defendant. As the officer approached, defendant tried to leave, but he was grabbed by the officer. Detaining a potential witness was reasonable. State v. Topps, 2008 Ohio 4021, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 3400 (2d Dist. August 8, 2008):

[*P30] We conclude that these standards for a constitutionally reasonable stop of a potential witness to a crime are both practical and sensible. We also find that the stop of Topps meets all three requirements. With regard to the first prong, police were recently dispatched to the area around where Topps was arrested in order to investigate a possible violent crime or accident. That fact, combined with a man screaming in public could reasonably have made police believe that a misdemeanor or felony involving danger or forcible injury was occurring or had just occurred.

[*P31] Topps’s proximity to the screaming man supports the second requirement. Common sense would suggest that if one is standing within an arm’s length of a screaming man in the early morning hours, one may have some knowledge of material aid to the police, such as why he is screaming or who he is. As it happens, this may not have been the case here, but a police officer could reasonably have concluded that Topps would likely have had knowledge of circumstances that would have been useful to the investigation of the matter.

[*P32] Lastly, fulfilling the third requirement, the stop of Topps was a reasonable measure for police to take in order for the police to assess the situation with the screaming man. All that deputies knew when they arrived was that there had been reports of a crime in the area and that a man was screaming. A grown man screaming in public in the wee hours of the morning would be an odd and alarming sight. Saylor testified that he felt something was “very, very” wrong. The white male may have been in hysterics. Topps could have appeared to police to be the one person who was most capable of explaining the situation to police. It was reasonable to momentarily detain Topps in order to determine whether he knew the screaming man, and whether he had any information about what crime, if any, had just occurred.

[*P33] In conclusion, given the totality of the circumstances, including the ongoing police investigation near the Dixie Lounge, the screaming man, and Topps’s arm’s-length proximity to the screaming man, police acted reasonably in stopping him as a potential witness to a serious crime under the standards defined both in Brown v. Texas, supra, and the Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure [§ 110.2(1)(b) (1975)].

Defendant did not abandon apartment just because he was behind in rent and was sleeping elsewhere because his stuff was still there. Officers reasonably believed, with a mistake of fact and not of law, that the landlord with a judgment of eviction could consent to a seizure of his belongings, but not a search of the computer. Obtaining a search warrant for defendant’s computer for child porn purged any taint. United States v. Barefoot, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59797 (W.D. Pa. August 5, 2008):

12. The Court finds that Detectives Matthews and Mayer reasonably believed that Beley had apparent authority to consent to their search of defendant’s apartment and their seizure of his computer and related equipment. Any mistake made by the detectives as to whether defendant had vacated the apartment was a mistake of fact, not one of law. United States v. Elliott, 50 F.3d 180, 187 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1050 (1996); Brazel, 102 F.3d at 1148-49 (search constitutional even though landlord misinformed officer that apartment was vacant); see also United States v. Green, 102 F.Supp.2d 904, 911-12 (S.D.Ohio 2000) (police relied on owner, who was mistaken about whether apartment was vacant). Beley had not completed the eviction process but he told the detectives that he had. The “standard of reasonableness is governed by what the law enforcement officers know, not what the consenting party knows.” United States v. James, 353 F.3d 606, 615 (8th Cir. 2003). What these detectives knew on August 28, 2007, came from Beley’s statements and their own observations of the premises. Beley told them that he had obtained what he described as a “judgment for eviction” for non-payment of rent, that defendant had not paid rent in six months and that he had removed defendant’s belongings from the apartment and placed them in boxes on the porch. Beley also confirmed that he had hired Lukotich to work in the apartment to prepare it to be rented again.

13. It is a closer question whether it was reasonable for the detectives to believe that Beley could consent to their removal of defendant’s computer. While the facts indicate that Beley believed that he had taken possession of the apartment, he also stated that he was in the process of disposing of defendant’s belongings. Beley told detectives that he had tried to contact defendant “several times,” but there is no evidence that Beley told them that he had actually spoken to the defendant about the apartment and its contents.

14. Police officers may not always accept a person’s invitation to enter premises and seize personal property therein. “Even when the invitation is accompanied by an explicit assertion that the person [has authority to consent], the surrounding circumstances could conceivably be such that a reasonable person would doubt its truth and not act upon it without further inquiry.” Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188. While it may have been reasonable, though mistaken, for the detectives to believe that Beley had taken possession of the apartment, it was unreasonable to assume that Beley could consent to the seizure of defendant’s computer.

Stop “became non-consensual when Sergeant Dimitry told Middlebrooks that a drug dog was coming to run his vehicle.” Middlebrooks v. Commonwealth, 2008 Va. App. LEXIS 376 (August 5, 2008):

We need not resolve whether Officer D’Orio seized Middlebrooks when he asked Middlebrooks to step out of his vehicle because no evidence was obtained from Middlebrooks at that time. However, it is clear that once Sergeant Dimitry told Middlebrooks, “I just want to let you know I’m going to call the drug dog out. I’m going to have him run your car,” no reasonable person would have felt free to leave.

The facts of this case are similar to Deer v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 730, 441 S.E.2d 33 (1994). In Deer, appellant was pulled over by a police officer and given a citation for speeding. Id. at 732, 441 S.E.2d at 34-35. Appellant’s nervous behavior made the officer suspicious, and he asked permission to search appellant’s vehicle. Id. After appellant declined consent to search, “[the officer] said he would detain the vehicle and call for a K-9 drug unit … [and] that [appellant] might have to wait for up to an hour for the unit to arrive.” Id. Once the officer stated his intention to call in a drug dog, appellant consented to the search. Id.

We held that although the initial seizure was properly based on probable cause that appellant had committed a traffic offense, “the continued detention of [appellant] and the vehicle [after the officer issued the citation for speeding] required additional justification to satisfy the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 736, 441 S.E.2d at 37. “[The officer] effected a seizure by stating that he would detain the vehicle for up to an hour to await the arrival of a K-9 unit. If that seizure was not based upon an articulable suspicion that [appellant] was involved in criminal activity, [appellant]’s further detention was illegal.” Id. (emphasis added). We concluded the officer failed to have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that appellant was engaged in criminal activity and, therefore, the seizure violated the Fourth Amendment. Id.

Some of the Ivins Anthrax investigation search warrant materials are posted on the DOJ website within the last hour. http://www.usdoj.gov/amerithrax/. There’s a lot of stuff.

For news stories, see: CNN, NYTimes, WaPo, LATimes.

Consent to search included a container which was discovered to have a false bottom. Defendant cites no authority that this search went beyond the scope of consent. United States v. Duncan, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57792 (S.D. Fla. July 15, 2008).*

Officers came upon a group of men in a high crime area known for years from drug dealing, and they could smell marijuana. Defendant separated himself from the group and left, and they had reasonable suspicion for his stop. United States v. Walters, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58727 (D. V.I. August 4, 2008):

Moreover, while the officers did not specifically observe Walters smoking marijuana or throwing marijuana paraphernalia to the ground, the Court is convinced that Walters’ unilateral separation from the group by walking away and spontaneous statements, discussed below, gave the officers whatever particularized suspicion Walters urges is necessary.

Customs adopted July 16th its Policy Regarding Border Search of Information, on the CBP website. This document memorializes the case law on searches of laptop computers, electronic media, and information except that it reaches into attorney-client privileged information, ostensibly only searchable if there is reason to believe that it is evidence of a crime. And then the USAO gets involved in the privilege issue.

A. Purpose

CBP is responsible for ensuring compliance with customs, immigration, and other Federal laws at the border. To that end, officers may examine documents, books, pamphlets, and other printed material, as well as computers, disks, hard drives, and other electronic or digital storage devices. These examinations are part of CBP’s long-standing practice and are essential to uncovering vital law enforcement information. For example, examinations of documents and electronic devices are a crucial tool for detecting information concerning terrorism, narcotics smuggling, and other national security matters; alien admissibility; contraband including child pornography, monetary instruments, and information in violation of copyright or trademark laws; and evidence of embargo violations or other import or export control laws.

Notwithstanding this law enforcement mission, in the course of every border search, CBP will protect the rights of individuals against unreasonable search and seizure. Each operational office will maintain appropriate mechanisms for internal audit and review of compliance with the procedures outlined in this policy.

B. Review of Information in the Course of Border Search

Border searches must be performed by an officer or otherwise properly authorized officer with border search authority, such as an ICE Special Agent. In the course of a border search, and absent individualized suspicion, officers can review and analyze the information transported by any individual attempting to enter, reenter, depart, pass through, or reside in the United States, subject to the requirements and limitations provided herein. Nothing in this policy limits the authority of an officer to make written notes or reports or to document impressions relating to a border encounter.

. . .

E. Review and Handling of Certain Types of Information

. . .

(3) Attorney-Client Privileged Material. Occasionally, an individual claims that the attorney-client privilege prevents the search of his or her information at the border. Although legal materials are not necessarily exempt from a border search, they may be subject to special handling procedures. Correspondence, court documents, and other legal documents may be covered by attorney-client privilege. If an officer suspects that the content of such a document may constitute evidence of a crime or otherwise pertain to a determination within the jurisdiction of CBP, the officer must seek advice from the Associate/Assistant Chief Counsel or the appropriate U.S. Attorney’s office before conducting a search of the document.

So, how does the last sentence relate to “may be covered by attorney-client privilege”? Is privilege protected, except where there is reason to believe it is evidence of a crime? Don’t they have to read it to determine that?

Washington Post for Wednesday, Aug. 6th has the story of P.G. County’s Berwyn Heights Mayor Cheye Calvo being the target of a no-knock search warrant, except that the police didn’t have one like they thought: Pr. George’s Officers Lacked ‘No-Knock’ Warrant in Raid.

Prince George’s County authorities did not have a “no-knock” warrant when they burst into the home of a mayor July 29, shooting and killing his two dogs — contrary to what police said after the incident.

Judges in Maryland can grant police the right to enter a building and serve a search warrant without knocking if the judge finds there is reasonable suspicion to think evidence might be destroyed or the officers’ safety might be endangered in announcing themselves.

A Prince George’s police spokesman said last week that a Sheriff’s Office SWAT team and county police narcotics officers were operating under such a warrant when they broke down the door of Berwyn Heights Mayor Cheye Calvo, shooting and killing his black Labrador retrievers.

But a review of the warrant indicates that police neither sought nor received permission from Circuit Court Judge Albert W. Northrup to enter without knocking. Northrup found probable cause to suspect that drugs might be in the house and granted police a standard search warrant.

“There’s nothing in the four corners of the warrant saying anything about the Calvos being a threat to law enforcement,” said Calvo’s attorney, Timothy Maloney. “This was a lawless act by law enforcement.”

The Department of Homeland Security has now made it clear that they will search laptops at the border. See today’s WaPo: Travelers’ Laptops May Be Detained At Border / No Suspicion Required Under DHS Policies:

Federal agents may take a traveler’s laptop computer or other electronic device to an off-site location for an unspecified period of time without any suspicion of wrongdoing, as part of border search policies the Department of Homeland Security recently disclosed.

Also, officials may share copies of the laptop’s contents with other agencies and private entities for language translation, data decryption or other reasons, according to the policies, dated July 16 and issued by two DHS agencies, U.S. Customs and Border Protection and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement.

“The policies … are truly alarming,” said Sen. Russell Feingold (D-Wis.), who is probing the government’s border search practices. He said he intends to introduce legislation soon that would require reasonable suspicion for border searches, as well as prohibit profiling on race, religion or national origin.

DHS officials said the newly disclosed policies — which apply to anyone entering the country, including U.S. citizens — are reasonable and necessary to prevent terrorism. Officials said such procedures have long been in place but were disclosed last month because of public interest in the matter.

Dog sniff of a vehicle at a safety checkpoint was valid where the vehicle was already validly stopped and was not extended. Wright v. State, 2008 Va. App. LEXIS 347 (July 8, 2008):

However, Wright also contends that the subsequent search of her vehicle, resulting from the trained narcotics-detection dog’s alert, violated her Fourth Amendment rights. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 125 S. Ct. 834, 160 L. Ed. 2d 842 (2005), governs our inquiry. In Caballes, an officer lawfully stopped a vehicle for speeding. Id. at 406. While the vehicle was pulled over and the officer was writing a ticket, a second officer arrived at the scene and walked around the vehicle with his trained narcotics-detection dog. Id. The dog alerted on the vehicle, wherein the officers’ subsequent search revealed marijuana. Id. The Court held the Fourth Amendment does not require “reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify using a drug-detection dog to sniff a vehicle during a legitimate traffic stop … [o]fficial conduct that does not ‘compromise any legitimate interest in privacy’ is not a search subject to the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 407-08 (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 80 L. Ed. 2d 85 (1984)). Regarding the appellant’s claim that the dog sniff amounted to an unconstitutional search of his car, the Court found “any interest in possessing contraband cannot be deemed ‘legitimate,’ and thus, governmental conduct that only reveals the possession of contraband ‘compromises no legitimate privacy interest.'” Id. at 408 (quoting Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 123). Therefore, the Court ruled, “the use of a well-trained narcotics-detection dog–one that ‘does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise would have remained hidden from public view,’ during a lawful traffic stop, generally does not implicate legitimate privacy interests.” Id. at 409 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707, 103 S. Ct. 2637, 77 L. Ed. 2d 110 (1983)); see also City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40, 121 S. Ct. 447, 148 L. Ed. 2d 333 (2000) (“The fact that officers walk a narcotics-detection dog around the exterior of each car at the Indianapolis checkpoints does not transform the seizure into a search.” (citing Place, 462 U.S. at 707)); Brown v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 1, 6, 421 S.E.2d 877, 880-81, 9 Va. Law Rep. 167 (1992) (en banc) (“Nothing in the Fourth Amendment prohibits a law enforcement officer from using trained canines to augment the sensory faculties bestowed on the officer at birth.” (citing United States v. Lewis, 708 F.2d 1078, 1080 (6th Cir. 1983))).

Wright’s Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches was not violated because the trained narcotics-detection dog’s sniff was not a search. The checkpoint was operated in a constitutionally valid manner, and all vehicles subject to the checkpoint were legally stopped. The seizure of Wright by Officer Jones was based on probable cause that she had committed a traffic infraction, and Wright’s counsel conceded during appellate argument that the seizure was lawful. In accordance with Caballes, the subsequent canine sniff of Wright’s vehicle did not prolong the time reasonably required by Officer Jones to write a summons due to the defective brake light. Additionally, we uphold the trial court’s finding that the narcotics-detection dog’s sniff and subsequent alert for drugs was sufficiently reliable to create the requisite probable cause necessary to permit a search of the vehicle and its passengers. Therefore, the narcotics-detection dog legally sniffed Wright’s vehicle and the resulting search that uncovered the crack-cocaine pipe was constitutional.

Comment: And this court seems oblivious to the fact that the use of the dog converts the checkpoint into a safety-drug checkpoint, and a drug checkpoint is not valid. Apparently if it is valid for one purpose (e.g., also a DUI or area entry checkpoint (such as an airport)), it is valid for all, as long as the motorist was not otherwise detained.

Search incident of a cellphone as a closed container was valid. The phone could be searched later [like clothing] under Edwards, and only the cellphone numbers and text messages between the defendant and informant were admitted. State v. Smith, 2008 Ohio 3717, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 3139 (2d Dist. July 25, 2008):

[*P37] The trial court overruled Smith’s motion upon the authority of United States v. Finley (C.A.5, 2007), 477 F.3d 250, certiorari denied (2007), 127 S. Ct. 2065, 167 L. Ed. 2d 790. In Finley, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the warrantless search of the defendant’s cell phone on facts that closely resemble those in the present matter. The police in Finley used a cooperating source to set up a drug buy. The defendant drove the seller, Mark Brown, to the appointed location, and the drug sale was completed with the seller who was seated in the front passenger seat. Finley drove away and was stopped by police who recovered drugs with Finley’s name on a pill bottle and marked money used to purchase the drugs. Finley and Brown were both arrested, and Finley’s cell phone was seized. Finley and Brown were then transported to Brown’s residence where police were conducting a search pursuant to a warrant. At that location, police searched Finley’s cell phone call records and messages, along with several of the text messages, which referred to narcotics trafficking.

[*P38] The court of appeals found the trial court properly denied Finley’s motion to suppress the cell phone evidence. The court wrote as follows:

[*P39] “Although Finley has standing to challenge the retrieval of the call records and text messages from his cell phone, we conclude that the search was lawful. It is well settled that ‘in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a “reasonable” search under that Amendment.’ United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973). Police officers are not constrained to search only for weapons or instruments of escape on the arrestee’s person; they may also, without any additional justification, look for evidence of the arrestee’s crime on his person in order to preserve it for use at trial. See id. at 233-34, 94 S.Ct. 467. The permissible scope of a search incident to a lawful arrest extends to containers found on the arrestee’s person. United States v. Johnson, 846 F.2d 279, 282 (5th Cir.1988) (per curiam); see, also, New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460-61, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981) (holding that police may search containers, whether open or closed, located within arrestee’s reach); Robinson, 414 U.S. at 223-24, 94 S.Ct. 467 (upholding search of closed cigarette package on arrestee’s person).

Defendant’s talking to another in a parking lot was not reasonable suspicion that he was engaged in a drug deal, so his stop was invalid. State v. Nieters, 2008 Ohio 3727, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 3146 (12th Dist. July 28, 2008).*

Defendant’s boyfriend’s search of computer disks was a private search, but the police expanded the private search by asking him to keep looking. People v. Wilkinson, 163 Cal. App. 4th 1554, 78 Cal. Rptr. 3d 501 (3d Dist. 2008):

Although we find no California case on point, federal case law has held that police officers exceed the scope of a private search when they fail to confine their examination of the contents of computer discs to the discs the private searcher examined. (U.S. v. Runyan (5th Cir. 2001) 275 F.3d 449; see generally, Annot., Validity of Search or Seizure of Computer, Computer Disk, or Computer Peripheral Equipment (2000) 84 A.L.R.5th 1; Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World (2005) 119 Harv. L.Rev. 531.)

Though not cited by the parties and not binding on us, Runyan provides a thoughtful and persuasive analysis of the issues we confront in this case. There, a defendant in a child pornography case argued the police violated the Fourth Amendment by a warrantless examination of tangible materials, including computer discs, taken from his property by his wife (from whom he was separated). (U.S. v. Runyan, supra, 275 F.3d at pp. 452–453, 456.) The police looked at the contents of a greater number of discs than the wife did during her private search. (Id. at p. 460.) The appellate court accepted the parties’ stipulation that the computer discs were closed containers. (Id. at p. 458.) The court recognized that a police viewing of items following a search by a private citizen does not constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment as long as the view is confined to the scope and product of the initial private search. (Id. at pp. 458–459.)

Under CAFRA, successful claimant could recover attorneys fees in successfully defending the criminal case and the forfeiture case. Claimant had to be aggressive to keep its business open. United States v. Certain Real Property, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46710 (N.D. Ala. May 29, 2008).*

The defendant sufficiently showed by affidavit that the CI in this case saw the arrest and search of defendant go down, so he gets a hearing to see if the CI is a witness to the case on the validity of the search. McNair v. State, 947 A.2d 1122 (Del. 2008).

The search of defendant’s car was valid as an inventory. He was removed from the car and arrested, and handcuffed while on the ground. He was asked about whether he had a gun, and he said he did. The statement violated Miranda, but the gun comes in under the inventory exception. United States v. Campbell, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4707 (S.D. Fla. January 22, 2008).*

Officer had probable cause to believe that defendant had a gun in the car after seeing him pull one out of his waistband and conceal it in the car, and that was justification for an automobile search. State v. Hollingshead, 974 So. 2d 1123 (Fla. 3DCA 2008).*

An Idaho police officer had authority to require a drug test of a probationer without reasonable suspicion. Dicta: A search of his home, however, would require a probation officer to participate, but that is not an issue here. State v. Purdum, 2008 Ida. App. LEXIS 8 (January 23, 2008).*

A 14 year old properly allowed police to enter, but an older occupant signed consent to search the premises. State v. Veals, 977 So. 2d 1030 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2008), released for publication April 4, 2008.

Court determines that a passenger in a validly stopped rented SUV had no standing to challenge the search of the vehicle which led to finding interior panels that had been tampered with, which, when opened, revealed meth. United States v. Resa, 552 F. Supp. 2d 720 (E.D. Tenn. 2008):

In Smith, the Sixth Circuit considered five factors which it found to militate, under the facts of that case, against application of the general rule depriving an unauthorized driver of a rental vehicle from asserting a privacy interest in the vehicle. Those factors were: (1) whether the defendant was a properly licensed driver, who could legally drive the vehicle in question; (2) whether the defendant was able to present the officer with a rental agreement and provide the officer with sufficient information regarding the vehicle; (3) whether the driver can identify some related individual who gave him possession of the vehicle (in Smith, it was the defendant’s wife) or whether the purported authorized driver is “some unrelated third party;” (4) whether the defendant’s related party had given him permission to drive the vehicle; and (5) most significantly, whether the defendant had a business relationship with the rental company such as having made a reservation, or presented it with a credit card number. Smith, 263 F.3d at 586.

Applying the factors identified in Smith in the order enumerated in the preceding paragraph against the facts of the instant case, only the first clearly militates in favor of according to Mr. Resa standing to challenge the search of the vehicle. Analysis of the second, third and fourth factors requires the Court to weigh the testimony of Officer Choate regarding his assessment of the adequacy of the Defendants’ responses to his questions against the sufficiency of those responses as suggested by Mr. Resa’s counsel on cross-examination. The fifth factor, which the Sixth Circuit identified as the most significant, clearly militates against Mr. Resa being accorded standing to challenge the search.

In balancing Officer Choate’s testimony regarding the second, third, and fourth factors against defense counsel’s suggestions, the Court is left with the fact that Officer Choate’s evaluation of the Defendants’ responses, was reasonable, if not clearly beyond question. This being the case, and given that the Smith court makes clear that a defendant seeking to suppress a search bears the evidentiary burden of establishing his standing to challenge the search, the Court is left to the conclusion that Mr. Resa has not sustained his evidentiary burden of establishing that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the subject rental vehicle so as to afford him what has been referred to as “standing” to challenge its search.

Execution of a writ of attachment which led to an entry to seize children was not unreasonable. Cooper v. Upshur County Constable’s Office, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38516 (E.D. Tex. May 12, 2008).*

“The police were justified in their attempt to stop Defendant on Second Street, as discussed above, and thus to pursue him when he fled. In addition, Defendant has no expectation of privacy in any property he abandoned while being pursued by the police.” United States v. Vanhoesen, 552 F. Supp. 2d 335 (N.D. N.Y. 2008).*

Defendant was seen riding a bicycle without a headlight, and this was cause for a stop and he fled. United States v. Warren, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38849 (D. Del. May 9, 2008).*

Officer said he was stopping defendant for a turn signal violation, and that was justification for the stop. United States v. Ewell, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38854 (D. Del. May 9, 2008).*

Generalized consent to search premises includes consent to open locked doors. United States v. Pikyavit, 527 F.3d 1126 (10th Cir. 2008):

The police had no obligation in the circumstances here to ask Pikyavit what they should do if they found the door locked, as it was up to Pikyavit to limit or condition the search if that was his intent. See Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 252 (“A suspect may of course delimit as he chooses the scope of the search to which he consents. But if his consent would reasonably be understood to extend to a particular container, the Fourth Amendment provides no grounds for requiring a more explicit authorization.”); United States v. West, 219 F.3d 1171, 1177 (10th Cir. 2000) (“The scope of the consent to search is limited by the breadth of the consent given.”); United States v. Kim, 27 F.3d 947, 957 (3d Cir. 1994) (“Of course [defendant] could have limited his consent to certain items, but he had the burden to express that limitation ….”). It was reasonable for the police to conclude that Pikyavit would have wanted them to enter the home if it could be done quickly and without damaging the premises. And, in fact, the police were able to slip the lock without damaging either the lock or the door itself.

Reasonable suspicion is not needed for dog sniff of a UPS package in transit. It is different than a suitcase. Lindo v. State, 983 So. 2d 672 (Fla. App. 4 Dist. 2008), released for publication July 7, 2008.*

Issuance of a traffic citation is not itself a Fourth Amendment violation, and, even if it arguably was, the officer would be entitled to qualified immunity. Smith v. Garden City, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19282 (D. Idaho March 12, 2008).*

Defendant was detained, but he voluntarily consented. He was a police officer in Mexico for 20 years, and that’s a factor that weighs in favor of the government. United States v. Torres-Borunda, 269 Fed. Appx. 431 (5th Cir. 2008) (unpublished).*

The record supports the district court’s conclusion that the consent was voluntary. The fact it took three minutes off camera to get the ticket signed did not prove much of anything. United States v. Bessolo, 269 Fed. Appx. 413 (5th Cir. 2008) (unpublished).*

Defendant stayed in the house of another person and he paid rent of $100 a month. While a landlord cannot consent to a search of a tenant under Chapman, this was not a traditional landlord-tenant relationship, and he let the other person have entry into his room when he was not there. Therefore, this was a case of common authority under Matlock. United States v. Thompson, 524 F.3d 1126 (10th Cir. 2008).

Receiving permission to drive a rental car from a person who himself was an authorized driver under the rental contract confers no standing on the driver. United States v. Aispuro, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36306 (N.D. Ill. May 2, 2008).*

Defendant secreted personal property on somebody else’s property, so he had no reasonable expectation of privacy. State v. Smith, 983 So. 2d 65 (La. 2008):

Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant’s consent to search his home and vehicle did not encompass personal effects located elsewhere on or off his property, defendant surrendered any reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of the closed and locked bag containing precursor materials for the clandestine production of methamphetamine by concealing the bag, wrapped inside a plastic garbage bag, in the woods on land belonging to someone else and accessed by an unfenced footpath at the back of his own property, apparently without the knowledge and consent of his neighbor. [citations omitted]

Search of glove compartment of car after defendant’s removal from it was justified as a protective weapons search under Long. When the officers came upon defendant parked in a high crime area, he was putting something in the glove compartment, apparently to get it out of the view of the officer. State v. Wilder, 983 So. 2d 124 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2008), released for publication June 9, 2008.* (Comment: Long was decided 25 years ago, and it surprisingly finds little use in the caselaw these days. It is far easier for the prosecution to argue that a protective weapons search was required under Long on reasonable suspicion than a search incident on probable cause.)

Smell of marijuana in a common area of an apartment complex was sufficiently shown for probable cause purposes to be coming from one apartment to justify a search of that apartment. State v. Fisk, 2008 Iowa App. LEXIS 196 (March 26, 2008).*

CI’s information about meth manufacturing on defendant’s premises was sufficiently corroborated to show probable cause. The officer’s failure to knock-and-announce did not warrant suppression under Hudson. State v. Macke, 2008 Ohio 1888, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 1618 (12th Dist. April 21, 2008).*

Louisiana refuses to create broader constitutional protection for a search incident of a vehicle that would be valid under the Fourth Amendment. State v. Jerome, 983 So. 2d 214 (4th Cir. 2008), released for publication June 19, 2008.*

Defendant did not properly raise a suppression issue of physical evidence seized by consent from him in his homicide case, but it would have failed even if raised because the defendant’s statements were all voluntary, as was the seizure of evidence (inked shoe impressions, photographs of clothing, keno tickets from his wallet). Commonwealth v. Lebeau, 451 Mass. 244, 884 N.E.2d 956 (2008) (court noted that he was allowed to come and go from the police barracks to smoke and was not even watched and returned voluntarily to talk, and he even became cocky during his interviews, until he was confronted with evidence of the homicide, whereupon he said “I’m fucked.”).*