Defendant was a recent occupant of the car, so a search incident of the passenger compartment was valid under Thornton. The result of that search provided justification for a search of the trunk under the automobile exception. United States v. Dryden, 567 F. Supp. 2d 643 (D. Del. 2008).*

Affidavit provided detailed current information, and it was reasonable to find probable cause. Accordingly, the good faith exception would apply as well. United States v. Mitchell, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57815 (D. Del. July 29, 2008).*

Plaintiff’s specific excessive force claim was not clearly established at the time of the shooting, so qualified immunity defeats it. Plaintiff escaped from home detention and the USMS was looking for him. The case law plaintiff relied upon was a shooting after the threat had passed, and this case involved an ongoing threat. Pethtel v. W. Va. State Police, 568 F. Supp. 2d 658 (N.D. W.Va. 2008).*

In another strip search case, plaintiffs granted summary judgment on claims that after being acquitted in court they were strip searched on out-processing at the jail. Bullock v. Sheahan, 568 F. Supp. 2d 965 (N.D. Ill. 2008).*

Plaintiff’s claim of on-the-street strip search survives summary judgment. False arrest claim fails under Heck. Jean-Laurent v. Hennessy, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59478 (E.D. N.Y. August 1, 2008).*

Defense counsel could not be ineffective for not filing a losing motion to suppress. Wall v. United States, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59491 (N.D. N.Y. August 1, 2008).*

E.D. Va. considers a search claim on the merits under AEDPA rather than dismissing it under Stone and finds that the decision of the state courts was supported by the evidence and legally correct. Vines v. Johnson, 569 F. Supp. 2d 579 (E.D. Va. 2008).*

Police came with a search warrant to look on defendant’s computer for child porn, and the warrant was for number 68. After they got in number 68, they found that it was not defendant’s place, and there was another unit number 68A. They retreated and sought a search warrant for 68A. While they were there, they would not let defendant into his place, but defendant was not restrained and was free to leave. It took seven hours, and this was not unreasonable under McArthur. United States v. Christie, 570 F. Supp. 2d 657 (D. N.J. 2008).

Plaintiff’s claim that defendant gave false information to the police which was used by the police to get a search warrant did not state a triable claim. It was conclusory and unsupported. Ultimately, however, the real issue was the fact that the police acted on their own to get a search warrant, and this does not state a claim for relief under § 1983. Adams v. McDonald, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62418 (D. Nev. August 15, 2008).*

Police got consent to enter defendant’s apartment on a claim to the defendant that they had a report of a dead body being dragged rolled up in a carpet. Once inside, they did a search for drugs, and this was illegal. State v. Bartling, 989 So. 2d 757 (Fla. App. 4DCA 2008):

Based upon the reasoning of the supreme court in Wyche, we conclude that the trial court in the instant case was correct in granting the motion to suppress based upon the totality of the circumstances. As in McCord, the trial court in the instant case concluded that “the level of trickery went far beyond what law enforcement officers should utilize when trying to gain entry into a citizen’s home in the wee hours of the morning.” As the supreme court noted in Wyche, we recognize that Bartling’s understandable desire to clear his name of the stigma of a murder accusation is a circumstance to consider. Additionally, the search clearly exceeded the scope of consent when the police searched for a dead body in a cigarette pack. As such, we conclude that, based upon the totality of the circumstances, the trial court was correct in granting the motion to suppress.

Murder defendant was arrested for a murder and a search of a motel room produced evidence against him. He was not the registered guest in the room, and there was no showing connecting him to the room other than mere presence at some time, not that he was a guest of the registered guest. So, he lacked standing. Evidence of the murder was found in the room. [In any event, there appeared to have been consent.] Smith v. State, 284 Ga. 17, 663 S.E.2d 142 (2008).

Defendant was on probation and he was staying at a house with two others, sleeping on the couch. Police responded to a “concerned citizen’s” call about drug activity. One of the people at the house let the police in, and defendant was recognized from a prior arrest and being on probation for drugs. The officers searched the room of another and found drugs. They searched a closet and found a safe which everybody disavowed. The safe was opened and the contents were linked to defendant. His probation search waiver was binding on him, and the search of the common area closet was valid. Anderson v. State, 292 Ga. App. 826, 666 S.E.2d 70 (2008).*

Fulton County Jail strip search case en banc: Powell v. Barrett, 541 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2008) (en banc), panel opinion Powell v. Barrett, 496 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2007). Analyzing Bell v. Wolfish in detail, the court concludes that reasonable suspicion is not always required before putting arrestees into general population.

Smelling and seeing marijuana during a traffic stop was probable cause, so the consent issue was moot. United States v. Mosby, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 18913 (7th Cir. September 4, 2008).*

Defendant’s actions in loitering in an apartment complex known for open drug deals was suspicious. Add to it his standing around [isn’t that loitering] and looking for others and refusing to remove his hands from his pockets when confronted is reasonable suspicion. United States v. Johnson, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66836 (D. Kan. July 31, 2008)* (Comment: This is really thin.)

Officers’ entry into defendant’s apartment was not justified by hot pursuit because the officers had not seen defendant in 40 minutes (United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895, 908 (9th Cir. 2001) (30 minutes not hot pursuit)) and they were going door to door at 4 a.m. looking for him. Consent obtained from defendant’s wife based on officers’ threat to get a warrant was valid because the officers by then had enough probable cause to get a warrant. The subsequent consents were valid, too. State v. Ballou, 2008 Ida. App. LEXIS 50 (May 22, 2008).

Defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in files on a computer somebody else let him use in the other person’s house, and that person could consent to a search of the computer. As for password protected files, the police had no duty to inquire into whether some files might have been password protected by defendant on another person’s computer before EnCase was used to make a mirror image of the hard drive. People v. Brown, 279 Mich. App. 116, 755 N.W.2d 664 (2008).*

Placing a paper temporary plate in the rear window was not a violation of state law, so defendant’s stop was invalid, and the inventory search thereafter was unreasonable. Young v. State, 886 N.E.2d 636 (Ind. App. 2008).*

Under these facts, a casino employee in Michigan ousting a patron is a state actor because they are licensed by Michigan law. Moore v. Detroit Entm’t, LLC, 279 Mich. App. 195, 755 N.W.2d 686 (2008).*

Officers surrounded defendant’s house looking for a shooting suspect. They knocked on the door and, when it was opened, they smell burning marijuana. The defendant consented to an entry to recover the marijuana. The officer’s guns were not drawn. State v. Nelson, 2008 Ohio 2530, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 2130 (9th Dist. May 28, 2008).*

Defendant’s live-in girlfriend did not have to have a key to have apparent authority to consent where the officers knew that she had been living with him for 7-8 months and apparently did not even need a key. United States v. Ables, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 12472, 2008 FED App. 0321N (6th Cir. June 5, 2008) (unpublished).*

The automobile exception supported seizure of a car that was used to transport the defendant and the money to the scene of a drug buy which would have been used to transport the drugs back if he had not been arrested. United States v. Abulaban, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45322 (E.D. Va. June 10, 2008).*

Civil Franks violation stated no claim for relief where the omitted thing would have provided even more probable cause. Smolicz v. Borough/Town of Naugatuck, 281 Fed. Appx. 32 (2d Cir. 2008) (unpublished).*

Border search of a cruise cabin intrudes into an expectation of privacy, and it requires reasonable suspicion. [Following the weight of authority, but analyzing in detail on its own.] United States v. Whitted, 541 F.3d 480 (3d Cir. 2008):

We believe that these courts correctly recognize that the search of private living quarters aboard a ship at the functional equivalent of a border is a nonroutine border search and must be supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct. The cruise ship cabin is both living quarters and located at the national border. As a result, one principle underlying the caselaw on border searches–namely, that “a port of entry is not a traveler’s home,” United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971)–runs headlong into the “overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic,” foremost in our nation’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 (1980) (quoting United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 429 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring)). We find that requiring reasonable suspicion strikes the proper balance between the interests of the government and the privacy rights of the individual. It also best comports with the case law, which treats border searches permissively but gives special protection to an individual’s dwelling place, however temporary. We, therefore, join those courts that require reasonable suspicion to search of a passenger cabin aboard a ship.

As an initial matter, we have little trouble concluding that a passenger cabin is more like an individual’s home than an automobile. Whereas the “dignity and privacy interests of the person” do not carry over to border searches of an automobile, Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152, the privacy interests of an individual in his or her living quarters are significantly greater and compel more rigorous Fourth Amendment protection. The sanctity of private dwellings, whether temporary or permanent, ordinarily gives rise to “the most stringent Fourth Amendment protection.” United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976); see also Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (acknowledging that “in some circumstances a person may have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the house of someone else”); Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98-99 (1990) (holding that overnight guests in the house of someone else have a reasonable expectation of privacy); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964) (hotel room); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1946) (living quarters in rooming house). We believe that “one’s expectation of privacy in an automobile and of freedom in its operation are significantly different from the traditional expectation of privacy and freedom in one’s residence,” Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 561, even where one’s residence is aboard a ship.

The New Mexico Court of Appeals suppressed a search despite the district court’s finding that there was no deterrence because the constitutional right is personal. A de facto good faith exception in a warrantless search (a la DeFillippo), is rejected based on 2001’s Wagoner case. State v. Lujan, 2008 NMCA 3, 143 N.M. 233, 175 P.3d 327 (2007):

[*15] In deciding not to suppress the drug evidence in the present case, the district court in its letter ruling relied on a deterrence analysis, asking: “What deterrence value is served now by declaring the execution of a properly issued arrest warrant[] illegal?” The district court further stated as follows: “The deterrence value of suppression perhaps can be imagined but absent evidence of bad faith or other wrongful conduct, the likelihood of deterrence seems extremely remote.” The district court cited Wagoner as authority for this analysis. Wagoner, however, discusses the deterrence effect of the exclusionary rule in the course of contrasting the federal and New Mexico approaches to the independent source exception to the exclusionary rule. As discussed above, under Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution, the exclusionary rule “is a constitutional right belonging to the individual.” Wagoner, 2001 NMCA 14, P 29, 130 N.M. 274, 24 P.3d 306. Thus, while the district court may well be correct in its conclusions about deterrence in this case, under Gutierrez II, the relevant question is not the degree of deterrence; it is whether a defendant’s right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures has been violated. Our Supreme Court explained as follows: “Denying the government the fruits of unconstitutional conduct at trial best effectuates the constitutional proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures by preserving the rights of the accused to the same extent as if the government’s officers had stayed within the law.” 116 N.M. at 446, 863 P.2d at 1067.

Remaining silent when police officers at a bus asked about who owned what bags does not constitute an abandonment. State v. McNeal, 2008 NMCA 4, 143 N.M. 239, 175 P.3d 333 (2007):

[*16] … Several courts have held that a refusal to comply with an officer’s direction to identify bags on a bus does not constitute abandonment of the bags. See Stanberry v. State, 343 Md. 720, 684 A.2d 823, 832-35 (Md. 1996) (holding that police officers’ belief that bag on a bus was abandoned based on silence in the face of their inquiries about its ownership was unreasonable where all passengers on the bus had a right to refuse to answer any questions about the bag); see also United States v. Garzon, 119 F.3d 1446, 1452-53 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that a defendant did not abandon the bags he left on the bus when all bus passengers were asked to take their bags off the bus and defendant got off with one of his bags, but left two of his bags on the bus); United States v. Cuevas-Ceja, 58 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1190 (D. Or. 1999) (holding that a defendant did not abandon her bag when she did not claim it when directed to do so by officers).

[*17] We are aware that some courts have indicated that refusing to claim a bag when directed to do so by law enforcement constitutes abandonment, see, e.g., United States v. Fulani, 368 F.3d 351, 354 (3d Cir. 2004) (stating that silence in the face of bus-wide questioning regarding ownership of a bag constitutes abandonment); Garzon, 119 F.3d at 1452 (noting in dictum that the failure to respond to a direct question from a police officer might be construed as a disclaimer of ownership). We believe that such a conclusion is in conflict not only with the Supreme Court’s statements regarding a person’s rights when interacting with a police officer who has no reason to believe that he has done anything illegal, but also with the general rule that abandonment for Fourth Amendment purposes must be shown by “clear, unequivocal and decisive evidence,” see State v. Celusniak, 2004 NMCA 70, P 26, 135 N.M. 728, 93 P.3d 10 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

[*18] Courts have found unequivocal evidence of abandonment when a person expressly states that he is not the owner of a bag. See, e.g., United States v. Ojeda-Ramos, 455 F.3d 1178, 1187 (10th Cir. 2006); see also State v. Villanueva, 110 N.M. 359, 365, 796 P.2d 252, 258 (Ct. App. 1990) (holding that a defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in a bag when he expressly denied having any luggage on the bus). We have no such evidence here. Although both Agent Flores and Agent Hyland testified that Agent Flores asked everyone on the bus about his or her luggage, neither agent testified as to Defendant’s response. Where the State presented no evidence that Defendant expressly disclaimed ownership of the duffel bag, and where Defendant had a constitutional right to refuse to respond at all, we find unreasonable the agents’ conclusion that the duffel bag was abandoned.

Officers actively assisting a bailbondsman in apprehending the defendant made the entry one governed by the Fourth Amendment. The state was also held to have waived standing by not asserting it in the trial court. State v. Gutierrez, 2008 NMCA 18, 143 N.M. 422, 176 P.3d 1154 (N.M. App. 2007), certiorari granted, 176 P.3d 1130 (N.M. 2008):

[*19] When we consider Defendant’s argument, we find persuasive the reasoning of the Maryland Court of Special Appeals and Court of Appeals that when an officer’s “stand by service” to assist a bail bondsman in apprehending a fugitive becomes “more than mere presence,” the officer’s participation converts the bail bondsman into a state actor such that the requirements of the Fourth Amendment apply to all participants. See Collins v. State, 138 Md. App. 300, 771 A.2d 478, 484-85 & n.3 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001), aff’d, 367 Md. 700, 790 A.2d 660, 670-72 (Md. 2002); see also Ryon, 2005 NMSC 5, P 23, 137 N.M. 174, 108 P.3d 1032 (“Warrantless searches and seizures [by government actors] inside a home are presumptively unreasonable, subject only to a few specific, narrowly defined exceptions.”). We have recently stated that “[r]ecognized exceptions to the warrant requirement include exigent circumstances, searches incident to arrest, inventory searches, consent, hot pursuit, open field, and plain view.” Weidner, 2007 NMCA 63, P 6, 141 N.M. 582, 158 P.3d 1025. As discussed above, none of these exceptions applies in the present case. We see no reason to create a new exception that would allow police officers to circumvent the warrant requirement by “piggybacking” on any arguable authority of a bail bondsman to enter a private home to arrest a principal. Moreover, we note, as was the case in Collins, 771 A.2d at 485 n.3, the record does not reflect that the residence in which Defendant was found was his residence, thereby decreasing the arguability of the bail bondsman’s authority to enter this particular home. See State v. Lopez, 105 N.M. 538, 543, 734 P.2d 778, 783 (Ct. App. 1986). We therefore hold that, absent a warrant or the existence of a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, merely accompanying a bail bondsman to apprehend a bonded accused does not automatically give police officers constitutional authority to enter private homes.

[*20] In reaching this conclusion, however, we note that we do not discourage officer assistance in apprehending a bonded accused. An officer may respond to a request for assistance by a bail bondsman, but the response must be limited to actions that are lawful under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution. For example, when an officer, without either a search warrant or the existence of an exception to the warrant requirement, is asked to remain present outside of or near a home in order to ensure the safety of a private citizen, the officer’s actions constitute “benign attendance” and “mere acquiescence … to `stand by in case of trouble.'” United States v. Coleman, 628 F.2d 961, 964 & n.1 (6th Cir. 1980) (reversing the suppression of evidence that was obtained when police officers, standing by while a private citizen repossessed a vehicle, remained in their police unit about a block away from the debtor’s home, were engaged in “passive surveillance,” and did not actively participate in the repossession of the vehicle). In such a case, the officer would merely be protecting the safety of the public, and the Fourth Amendment would not be implicated. See id. The officer’s presence outside the home would allow him or her to monitor the situation and to spring into action when appropriate. In contrast, the officers in the present case aggressively participated in the entry and search of the home to apprehend Defendant without either a warrant or the existence of an exception to the warrant requirement. The fact that the bail bondsman might have legitimately feared for his safety did not serve to allow the officers to ignore the requirements of the Fourth Amendment and Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution by unconstitutionally assisting him in arresting Defendant in the third party’s home.

Comment: New Mexico cases are not released until after state cert is granted or denied. Here, it was granted.

Randolph applies to a storage unit. A person using the storage unit with the permission of the renter was asked for consent and refused, so the renter was asked. The target’s refusal was binding. United States v. Murphy, 516 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2008).

Defendant did not show standing in the place to be searched to challenge the search. Alternatively, there was probable cause for the search shown to support the warrant. United States v. Morrison, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11752 (E.D. Mo. February 15, 2008).*

Illinois holds that its parolees are in the same position as California’s in Samson. Here, police received an anonymous unsupported tip that appellant was in possession, so they conducted a search. Trial court suppressed, but the court of appeals reversed (People v. Wilson, 364 Ill. App. 3d 762, 301 Ill. Dec. 743, 847 N.E.2d 753 (1st Dist. 2006). The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and affirmed the trial court. People v. Wilson, 228 Ill. 2d 35 (2008).

Pulling a gun on the defendant is a detention subject to constitutional safeguards. “Defendant was detained when Agent Ballou drew his gun, asked him whether he was carrying any weapons, and caused him to submit to the officers’ display of authority.” State v. Gutierrez, 2008 NMCA 15, 143 N.M. 522, 177 P.3d 1096 (2007), certiorari granted, 176 P.3d 1130 (N.M. 2008). The court added that nervousness and stepping back might support reasonable suspicion [but, pray tell, who would not be nervous with a .40 S&W pointed at their chest?], but here it did not:

[*21] Viewing all of the foregoing facts and circumstances collectively and in the light most favorable to the State, see State v. Graham, 2005 NMSC 4, P 13, 137 N.M. 197, 109 P.3d 285, Defendant displayed nothing more than a nervous and possibly furtive demeanor before he was detained. We conclude that his actions were not enough to create reasonable suspicion to detain him, particularly in light of Agent Edmondson’s acknowledgment that he had no objective reason to believe that Defendant was either engaged in criminal activity or concealing a firearm.

Stop of defendant on a bicycle just out of curiosity at 2:30 a.m. led to him dropping something and covering it with his foot. The stop and continued detention were unlawful. State v. Soto, 2008 NMCA 32, 143 N.M. 631, 179 P.3d 1238 (2008), certiorari granted, 180 P.3d 674 (N.M. 2008):

[*1] The State appeals the district court’s order suppressing methamphetamine discarded by Defendant after he was stopped by police. Two police officers in a patrol vehicle observed Defendant riding his bicycle on a road near a racetrack’s secured area around 2:30 a.m., and the officers decided to “see where he was headed.” When the patrol vehicle pulled up next to Defendant’s bicycle, Defendant stopped, something dropped out of his hand, and he placed his foot on it. The officers introduced themselves and asked Defendant several questions about where he was going and where he lived and then asked for Defendant’s identification. Defendant produced his driver’s license, whereupon the officers ran a warrant check and discovered that there was a felony warrant for Defendant. The officers placed Defendant under arrest and seized the object Defendant had discarded, which tested positive for methamphetamine. We conclude that Defendant was seized without reasonable individualized suspicion in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We affirm the district court’s suppression of the methamphetamine.

. . .

[*27] The circumstances in the present case are strikingly similar to those in Mitchell. In this case, as in Mitchell, police stopped Defendant on the basis of nothing other than the vague notion that they would obtain Defendant’s personal information from him, and without any further suspicion, they ran a warrant check on him. The purpose of the stop-to obtain information from Defendant–was directly related to Defendant’s ultimate arrest. “While the harm to citizens from such conduct may not be terribly high, the complete disregard of citizens’ rights to be secure in their person is clear.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Excluding the evidence obtained under such circumstances is “the only way to deter the police from randomly stopping citizens for the purpose of running warrant checks.” Id. at 650.

Nervousness is not enough to extend a traffic stop because it is not reasonable suspicion. State v. Sewell, 2008 NMCA 26, 143 N.M. 485, 177 P.3d 536 (2008), certiorari granted, 180 P.3d 674 (N.M. 2008):

[*30] We also have to consider the government’s justification when considering whether the detention was unreasonable. Robbs, 2006 NMCA 61, AP 21. In doing so, we note that we agree with Justice Marshall’s concurring opinion in Sharpe.

Regardless how efficient it may be for law enforcement officials to engage in prolonged questioning to investigate a crime, or how reasonable in light of law enforcement objectives it may be to detain a suspect until various inquiries can be made and answered, a seizure that in duration, scope, or means goes beyond the bounds of Terry cannot be reconciled with the Fourth Amendment in the absence of probable cause.

Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 691 (Marshall, J., concurring). This case is the portrayal of what Justice Marshall was talking about: a detention based on reasonable suspicion for legitimate government purposes. However, as further indicated by Justice Marshall, Fourth Amendment rights are too sacred to be dismissed solely on the basis of a Fourth Amendment exception: the Terry stop. Id. at 691-92. “A stop can also be unduly intrusive if the individual is moved or asked to move more than a short distance, if a search is more extensive than necessary to protect the police from an objective fear of danger, or if tactics amounting to custodial interrogation are used.” Id. at 692 n.2. We believe that the stop in this case exceeded the government’s interests and purposes.

[*31] To further detain the subjects of the investigation was to extend the government’s intrusion beyond the permissible limits imposed by the Constitution. Even viewing the totality of the circumstances in the light most favorable to the district court’s findings, further detention was not warranted under the circumstances, and the evidence is the “fruit of the poisonous tree.”

Mall security gaurds were considered state actors for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment for their arrest of the defendant. State v. Santiago, 2008 NMCA 41, 143 N.M. 756, 182 P.3d 137 (2008), certiorari granted, 180 P.3d 1181 (N.M., 2008):

[*17] The mall security guards exceeded their private duties or authorization. They were not protecting their employer’s property, nor did they execute a lawful citizen’s arrest. If the mall security guards had been off-duty police officers, they would be deemed to be acting as an instrument or agent of the Government, and their conduct would be subject to the Fourth Amendment under Murillo.

B. State Action Under the Public Function and Government Agent Tests

[*18] The conduct of private security guards who are not off-duty police officers may also be measured under Fourth Amendment constitutional standards in appropriate cases. “When they perform a public function or act as agents of a government investigation, their activities may therefore become state action for constitutional purposes.” Murillo, 113 N.M. at 189, 824 P.2d at 329. Whether the private officers are performing a public function or are acting as agents of the government is determined as a question of fact. See id. at 190, 824 P.2d at 330 (“The general rule appears to be that whether a ‘private’ person is acting as an agent of the government is determined as a question of fact in light of all the circumstances.”).

1. The Mall Security Guards Exercised Public, Police Functions

[*19] We conclude the evidence supports a finding that the mall security guards were performing public, police functions in this case. It is evident that “[s]ecurity personnel hired to protect private business premises are performing traditional police functions when they arrest, question, and search for evidence against criminal suspects.” Murillo, 113 N.M. at 189, 824 P.2d at 329.

[*20] We have recognized, as have other courts, that the use of private security forces is expanding in the United States. Id. at 190, 824 P.2d at 330. See Zelinski, 594 P.2d at 1005 (“We are mindful, however, of the increasing reliance placed upon private security personnel by local law enforcement authorities for the prevention of crime and enforcement of the criminal law and the increasing threat to privacy rights posed thereby.”); People v. Elliott, 131 Misc. 2d 611, 501 N.Y.S.2d 265, 267-68 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986) (noting the increasing number of businesses, governmental agencies, neighborhoods, and individuals that are giving private security entities a new role that spills over into public law enforcement areas). The Zelinski court notes from a report prepared by the Private Security Advisory Council to the United States Department of Justice, that “the private security sector has become the largest single group in the country engaged in the prevention of crime.” Zelinski, 594 P.2d at 1005 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). One study of private policing has recently concluded that today, “private police participate in much of the policing work that their public counterparts do.” Elizabeth E. Joh, The Paradox of Private Policing, 95 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 49, 51 (2004).

[*21] It is clear that, like the public police, private security guards have the potential to violate citizens’ constitutional rights. Murillo, 113 N.M. at 189, 824 P.2d at 329. It is also evident that a serious danger to constitutional liberties would result if private security guards were allowed to perform these traditional police functions such as arresting, questioning, and searching for evidence, without applying any constitutional protections. See 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 1.8(a), at 260 & n.29 (4th ed. 2004) (“[T]he grave danger exists that the general admissibility of such evidence may create an atmosphere encouraging government officials to act in clandestine concert with private persons; while concerted activity would undoubtedly taint such evidence and require its exclusion in a criminal action, the problems of proof are obvious.” (quoting Note, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 168, 174-75 (1963))); David Alan Sklansky, Private Police and Democracy, 43 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 89 (2006) (expressing concerns about privatized policing for American democracy).

Failing only one part of a field sobriety test did not give probable cause to arrest for DUI. PBT was suppressed as unreliable evidence. State v. Derov, 176 Ohio App. 3d 43, 2008 Ohio 1672, 889 N.E.2d 1057 (7th Dist. 2008).*

Defendant refused to submit to arrest and was fumbling in his pockets making officer fear he had a weapon, was pepper sprayed, and continued to try to walk away from the officer. He then dropped something which was a baggie of drugs that was abandoned. His state constitutional law claim was not presented to the trial court so it was not preserved [not that it would win anyway]. State v. Garcia, 2008 NMCA 44, 143 N.M. 765, 182 P.3d 146 (2008), certiorari denied, 180 P.3d 1181 (N.M. 2008).*

Stop and frisk was valid because of defendant’s movements and pulling something black from his wasteband. United States v. Williams, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28573 (W.D. Pa. March 24, 2008).*

Officer had reasonable suspicion based on believing defendant was sitting in her car smoking a joint in a high crime area and then speeding off when seeing the officer. State v. Bolling, 2008 Ohio 1704, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 1469 (8th Dist. April 10, 2008).*

“Applying the applicable jurisprudence we find defendant’s unprovoked flight from the officers in a high-crime area provided the requisite reasonable suspicion to justify the investigatory stop. Once defendant was lawfully stopped, a Terry pat down was conducted and marijuana was discovered on his person. Additionally, the discarded gun was properly seized as abandoned property.” State v. Warmack, 973 So. 2d 104 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2007), released for publication February 6, 2008.

An upside down license plate is a violation of the California Vehicle Code justifying a stop. People v. Duncan, 160 Cal. App. 4th 1014, 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d 264 (4th Dist. 2008).*

Twenty second wait after knock is sufficient for officers to conclude that they were denied entry. State v. Hand, 2008 NMSC 14, 143 N.M. 530, 178 P.3d 165 (2008).*

On a valid traffic stop, the officer approached on the passenger side and directed the occupants to roll down the windows because they were tinted too dark, and the smell of marijuana wafted out, and this was probable cause. People v. Hernandez, 2008 NY Slip Op 28075, 19 Misc. 3d 527, 854 N.Y.S.2d 282 (Albany Co. 2008).*

Police knock at the door without announcement resulted in the door being opened, and, when the police were seen, the occupant tried to close the door. This was an exigent circumstance (futility) permitting dispensing with announcement of purpose for the entry since the occupant obviously knew. State v. Vargas, 2008 NMSC 19, 143 N.M. 692, 181 P.3d 684 (2008).

Police officers turning on their blue lights when approaching two cars parked in a city park did not constitute a seizure of the appellant who did not even see them. Thus, to be seized, the defendant had to know it. The officer decided to stop to investigate what 6-7 people standing between two cars were doing in a park area known for drug use. G.M. v. State, 981 So. 2d 529 (Fla. App. 3 DCA 2008).*

Defendant’s probation search was with reasonable suspicion and was valid. The police developed the reasonable suspicion and called the probation officer for the search. Benya v. State, 985 So. 2d 578 (Fla. App. 4 DCA 2008).*