The defendant’s car was subject to the automobile exception even though it was locked, he was in custody, and he had the only key. Coolidge did not apply because it did not involve normal exigency. United States v. Dallas, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24600 (E.D. N.C. March 23, 2009):

In this case, both requirements of the “automobile exception” are present. The Fourth Circuit has interpreted the “readily mobile” requirement of the “automobile exception” to mean that a car need only be “clearly operational.” Brookins, 345 F.3d at 238. Defendant’s car was clearly operational as defendant had been driving it just a few hours prior to the police searching it. That defendant had the keys to the car does not render the car any less “readily mobile” under the standard that guides this court’s analysis. Further, there was more than sufficient evidence to satisfy the probable cause requirement. …

First, the police knew that the defendant had been involved in an altercation that involved use of an SKS rifle that may have been in the possession of defendant. (Tr. of Dec. 15, 2008 Suppression Hr’g 30.) Second, the police knew that the car at issue was the car in which defendant and the victim began the night driving around in, and the car in which defendant fled the scene of the shooting. (See M&R 2-5 (summarizing the testimony of the officers); Tr. of Dec. 15, 2008 Suppression Hr’g 31, 42-43, 45.) Third, the car had blood splatters on the exterior that were consistent with an individual standing over the car’s trunk and dripping blood on it, as well as blood on the driver’s side door window area. (Tr. Of Dec. 15, 2008 Suppression Hr’g 48, 54-56.) The car was parked in front of Brandy Dallas’s residence, in which defendant was apprehended. (Id. at 49-51.) The police had thoroughly searched Brandy Dallas’s residence looking for the weapons at issue and had not found them. (Id. at 50, 60.) Taken together, these facts indicate that the police had probable cause to suspect that the weapons may have been hidden in the trunk of the 2000 Hyundai that they searched.

The court therefore finds that the “automobile exception” applied to the warrantless search conducted in this case. The car was readily mobile and the police had probable cause to believe that the weapon used in the shooting may have been in the car. …

Defendant could be stopped leaving a closed military base. There was a BOLO for him, and, when stopped, he was found DUI. United States v. Walton, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24906 (N.D. N.Y. March 25, 2009).*

Defendant’s actions in not minimally cooperating with the police during his traffic stop justified a patdown and protective search of the car. United States v. Sanders, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24795 (N.D. Ind. March 20, 2009):

When considering the totality of the Defendant’s conduct after the officers checked the database for warrants, driving status, and prior incidents with law enforcement and re-approached the Defendant’s vehicle, the Court finds that the totality of the circumstances created a reasonable concern for officer safety and a reasonable suspicion that the Defendant was hiding or accessing a weapon. After learning that the Defendant had prior incidents involving the carrying a handgun without a license, that he did not have a permit to carry a handgun, and that he had been assigned an alert for having been armed in prior incidents with law enforcement, the officers observed the Defendant reaching around in the passenger compartment, but they also observed him refuse repeated orders to exit the vehicle, repeatedly honk his horn to draw attention to the scene, and act very nervously. They had to remove him from the vehicle. He also maintained a rigid stance and resisted bending over against the vehicle. When viewed in the totality of the circumstances, the Defendant’s conduct caused the officers to have a reasonable concern that he might have a weapon and that their safety was threatened. Thus, the officers were lawfully authorized to conduct a protective pat down of the Defendant and a protective search of the passenger compartment. The protective search of the passenger compartment was limited to those areas in the passenger compartment (including the glove compartment and the center console) in which a weapon could be placed or hidden.

Defendant invoked his right to remain silent, but a request for consent after that is not prohibited. State v. Cummings, 188 N.C. App. 598, 656 S.E.2d 329 (2008), review denied 362 N.C. 364, 661 S.E.2d 743 (2008):

After Defendant invoked his right to counsel, interrogation ceased. Agents did not ask any further questions about the robbery or Mr. Graham’s homicide. The agents asked only whether Defendant would give his consent for his vehicle to be searched, a question to which Miranda warnings do not apply. See Frank, 284 N.C. at 142, 200 S.E.2d at 173. Because there is competent evidence to support the trial court’s finding of fact, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred in finding that Defendant’s “consent to search his vehicle was consensual.”

Omission from child porn affidavit that website that defendant visited “guaranteed” images were of adults was not material to the showing of probable cause where the officer actually viewed the images on the computer which were of minors. United States v. Gatherum, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96137 (S.D. W.Va. December 27, 2007).*

Handing over car keys to an officer who said that he was going to search defendant’s car was not consent. That was acquiescence to a claim of authority. Hollenback v. State, 289 Ga. App. 516, 657 S.E.2d 884 (2008).*

Even assuming the entry into defendant’s house was a violation of the Fourth Amendment, the assault on the officers was not subject to the exclusionary rule. State v. Parker, 655 S.E.2d 860 (N.C. App. 2008).*

Search warrant for defendant’s blood was based on probable cause that he was driving under the influence. State v. Matus, 2008 Ohio 377, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 336 (6th Dist. February 1, 2008).*

A comment by the prosecutor about defendant’s refusing to give a DNA sample would violate the Fourth Amendment. Smith v. State, 2009 WY 2, 199 P.3d 1052 n.1 (2009) (recognizing rule, but finding it waived):

The State candidly admits that eliciting testimony and commenting about a suspect’s refusal to give a sample for DNA testing may violate a defendant’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. See, e.g., United States v. Dozal, 173 F.3d 787, 794 (10th Cir. 1999) (ruling that asking the jury to draw adverse inferences from a refusal to consent to a search may be impermissible under the Fourth Amendment); Deno v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 177 S.W.3d 753, 762 (Ky. 2005) (stating that a defendant’s pre-arrest refusal to provide a sample for DNA testing could not be used as evidence of his guilt under the Fourth Amendment).

A warrant check during a limited stop is not a seizure. Wilson v. State, 2009 WY 1, 199 P.3d 517 (2009).

Police entry into defendant’s apartment was unjustified once the officer determined that defendant was not involved in a robbery. Also, there were no sounds from inside that would justify an entry to determine who they were if they were the robbers. State v. Culpepper, 295 Ga. App. 525, 672 S.E.2d 494 (2009).*

Defendant’s consent was voluntary even though she was handcuffed. The initial tension of the arrest had dissipated, and the situation was calmer by the time of the consent. United States v. Merritt, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24227 (S.D. W.Va. March 24, 2009).*

USMJ who issued a search warrant hears a Franks challenge and concludes that statements were erroneous, but they did not rise to the level of recklessness. Even if the wrong information is excluded, PC remains. United States v. Henry, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23627 (E.D. Mo. March 23, 2009):

Information was being gathered by third parties as in Stevens supra, and relayed to Wicks. If indeed a mistake was made as to the location of the tractor, there is no evidence that it was willful or reckless, but at the most negligent. In addition, the undersigned has observed the demeanor of Deputy Wicks while testifying on the stand, and observed him to be forthcoming and candid in his responses to questions asked by the Defendant’s attorney and the prosecutor. The undersigned concludes that Wicks was a very credible witness, and that Wicks believed that the affidavit was truthful at the time he swore to it, and to this date believes that he saw the tractor at 266 Woods Road. Therefore, the Defendant’s Franks challenge must fail.

Defendant’s 2255 challenge fails because his conditional plea omitted search and seizure claims. However, defense counsel did not challenge the search, but it would have failed as a matter of law because defendant, as a passenger in the car, could be detained with it, and he was asked to remain with the car, and then a gun was found abandoned near the car. No Fourth Amendment rights of the defendant were violated, so defense counsel could not be ineffective. Derrick v. United States, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23697 (E.D. Mo. March 20, 2009).*

Defendant had to be present to object to invoke Randolph. United States v. Megahed, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24441 (M.D. Fla. March 18, 2009)*:

[T]he defendant’s absence (which was not procured by the agents who obtained Samir Megahed’s consent or by the agents who conducted the search) renders inapplicable the narrow exception to Matlock and Rodriguez recognized in Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 120 (2006) (holding that “a warrantless search of a shared dwelling for evidence over the express refusal of consent by a physically present resident cannot be justified as reasonable as to him on the basis of consent given to the police by another resident”) (emphasis added); see also Randolph, 547 U.S. at 126 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“The Court’s opinion does not apply where the objector is not present ‘and object[ing].’) (emphasis added); ….

Defendant failed in a nitpicking Franks challenge. The affiant is not required to make every conceivable explanation of the facts and circumstances. Informant’s alleged false statement to the police was not subject to Franks, even if the defense could prove it. United States v. Lyles, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23382 (N.D. Cal. March 11, 2009)*:

Lyles points to several statements or omissions that he claims entitle him to a Franks hearing. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171-72 (1978). First, he contends that prior to concluding that there was “excessive electrical usage” at his residence, the affiant should have specified that his house runs solely on electrical power. However, because the affiant was not required to list every possible explanation in the affidavit regarding the excessive electrical usage, this argument fails. See United States v. Burnes, 816 F.2d 1354, 1358 (9th Cir. 1987) (“The mere fact that the affiant did not list every conceivable conclusion does not taint the validity of the affidavit.”).

Second, Lyles contends that the allegation regarding a confidential informant’s (“CI”) previous reliability is false because the affiant did not clarify that any past successes were based only “in part” on the CI’s role. Again, the court finds that the challenged allegation is neither false, nor does it demonstrate a “reckless disregard for the truth.” United States v. Kiser, 716 F.2d 1268, 1271 (9th Cir. 1983).

Third, Lyles asserts that one of the sources named in the affidavit, the Ukiah police officer, lied about smelling marijuana emanating from his residence. In support, Lyles has submitted information regarding wind patterns that his counsel printed off of the Internet and photos of his house, which he claims demonstrate the falsity of the officer’s statements. This challenge fails for two reasons. First, to demonstrate entitlement to a Franks hearing, it is the affiant’s veracity — and not that of his informant — that the defendant must challenge. United States v. Staves, 383 F.3d 977, 983 (9th Cir. 2004). Here, Lyles has not demonstrated that the affiant misreported what the officer told him. Second, even if the court were to reach the officer’s underlying statements, it does not find that the photos or wind pattern evidence establish the falsity of the statements.

Fourth and finally, Lyles argues that the affidavit contained several misrepresentations regarding the Hells Angels and Lyles’ affiliation with the club, as set forth in his counsel’s prior declaration in support of his motion to revoke the detention order. However, because the court concludes that the allegations related to the Hells Angels are superfluous and unnecessary to a determination of probable cause, it declines to reach this issue.

Technically inaccurate warrant was not constitutionally deficient where the affiant was also one of the executing officers and they clearly found the right place. United States v. Johnson, 558 F. Supp. 2d 807 (E.D. Tenn. 2008):

The test for determining whether a search warrant describes the premises to be searched with sufficient particularity “is not whether the description is technically accurate in every detail,” Prout, 526 F.2d at 387-88, but rather whether the description is sufficient “to enable the executing officer to locate and identify the premises with reasonable effort, and whether there is any reasonable probability that another premises might be mistakenly searched.” United States v. Gahagan, 865 F.2d 1490, 1496 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 918, 109 S. Ct. 3242, 106 L. Ed. 2d 590 (1989) (quoting United States v. Gitcho, 601 F.2d 369, 371 (8th Cir.1979)); and United States v. Pelayo-Landero, 285 F.3d 491, 495 -496 (6th Cir. 2002) quoting United States v. Dorrough, 927 F.2d 498, 500 (10th Cir.1991) (that the “requisite specificity of the description … depends heavily on the facts of each case”).

Defendant’s sticking closed fist into a police car which caused officer to grab his arm justified opening his hand for officer safety. United States v. Solomon, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86607 (W.D. Pa. August 29, 2008).*

A knock-and-talk at the back door permitted the officer to look in a garbage can from which the smell of meth was coming. Then, a person coming out of the house could be detained. People v. Redman, 386 Ill. App. 3d 409, 326 Ill. Dec. 899, 900 N.E.2d 1146 (2008):

Therefore, when Officer Brown approached the back door and smelled the strong odor, consistent with methamphetamine manufacturing, emanating from the open garbage can, he lawfully peered inside the open garbage can. Such action constituted neither a search nor a seizure. Specifically, defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of the garbage can because the lid was pushed down, perpendicular to the ground, into the garbage can, exposing the contents to anyone who passed by the garbage can on his or her way to the back door.

To summarize, the officers’ decision to approach the house and manner in which they did so were reasonable. Officer Shutter noticed the odor associated with methamphetamine production while driving in his vehicle with his windows rolled up, thus indicating the odor was very strong. Defendant’s vehicle was in the driveway of the home, and Officer Shutter knew defendant was involved with using, selling, and manufacturing methamphetamine. Approaching the home from the front and the back for safety purposes was also reasonable and proper. …

Evidence supports the conclusion that there was at least reasonable suspicion for the stop and removal of defendant from vehicle at gunpoint, something clearly a seizure. United States v. Carver, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3375 (W.D. Ky. January 15, 2009):

Sgt. Hill was never asked whether he had “placed Carver under arrest” at the time he removed him at gunpoint from the vehicle, handcuffed him, and removed him from the immediate vicinity of the vehicle. We think that such action quite clearly amounted to a Fourth Amendment seizure as, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983), quoting, U.S. v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980), (and noting that the subjective intent of the officer was not relevant); Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968)(Harlan, J. concurring). As the encounter developed, the officers’ initial thoughts about what might occur were rapidly replaced with what actually occurred.

The search warrant authorized a search of defendant’s vehicle parked on the curtilage. United States v. Silva, 593 F. Supp. 2d 316 (D. Mass. 2009).*

Defendant who admitted to ownership of crack and gun seized from an apartment that was not his did not show standing to contest the search of the apartment. United States v. Morgan, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3812 (N.D. N.Y. January 21, 2009).*

The exclusionary rule would not be applied to exclude evidence of a father’s drug use in a dependency proceeding because it was a civil case and he had an insufficient liberty interest involved. State ex rel. HHS v. W.P. (In re W. L. P), 345 Ore. 657, 202 P.3d 167 (2009):

We turn to a consideration of the nature of father’s liberty interest in this juvenile dependency proceeding. Obviously, this is not a criminal proceeding. See Geist, 310 Ore. at 188 (holding that proceeding to terminate parental rights, which is one possible outcome of a juvenile dependency proceeding, is not a criminal prosecution). Neither is it like the probation revocation proceeding in Rogers, because father does not face incarceration or similar criminal law sanctions as a result of this proceeding. The proceeding does not involve any effort by the state to punish the parent for wrongdoing. Rather, in a juvenile dependency proceeding, the welfare of the child is the court’s primary consideration, and the state’s purpose in initiating such a proceeding is to intervene as necessary to protect the child. See ORS 419B.100(1)(c) (child found to be within jurisdiction of court if child’s condition or circumstances “endanger the welfare” of child); ORS 419B.331 (permitting court to place child under protective supervision “[w]hen the court determines it would be in the best interest and welfare of a ward”); ORS 419B.476 (requiring that court “consider the ward’s health and safety the paramount concerns” at permanency hearing). Because this case does not implicate father’s liberty interest in remaining free from state custody, Rogers does not require the court to exclude the evidence based on father’s motion, even if the evidence was unlawfully seized.

Defense counsel was not ineffective for not filing a motion to suppress. Defendant had standing, but there was consent. Robertson v. State, 2009 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 88 (February 5, 2009).*

Defendant could not claim Randolph was new law where it was decided a year before the suppression hearing. Jackson v. State, 2009 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 72 (February 4, 2009).*

Knock-and-talk in the evening was valid, and officer saw drugs in plain view when the door was opened. Defendant who was a visitor abandoned drugs when he saw the officer. State v. Patton, 2009 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 68 (February 2, 2009).*

In Oregon there are two components to a stop: Objective and subjective. What would the defendant have believed, and was it reasonable what he actually believed. State v. Parker, 225 Ore. App. 610, 202 P.3d 205 (2009):

Thus, a Holmes type (b) inquiry implicates conjunctive subjective and objective components–viz., the defendant subjectively believed that he or she was significantly restrained and that belief was objectively reasonable. Consequently, as the party bearing the burden of demonstrating the lawfulness of the search, the state can prevail against a Holmes type (b)-based motion to suppress if it disproves either of those conjunctive components. That is, the state can prevail either (1) by proving that the defendant did not believe that the officer had significantly restrained or interfered with the defendant’s freedom of movement or (2) if such a belief would not be objectively reasonable. Id. at , 2008 Ore. App. LEXIS 1918 at *13. In assessing whether “such a belief is objectively reasonable under the circumstances,” the operative inquiry is whether “‘a reasonable person in defendant’s position could have believed that the officers significantly had restricted [his or her] liberty or freedom of movement.'” Id. at , 2008 Ore. App. LEXIS 1918 at *15 (quoting Toevs, 327 Ore at 535-36) (first emphasis in Toevs; second emphasis in Ashbaugh).

We begin with the objective component because–for reasons that will become apparent shortly–if the state were to prevail on that component, that would obviate the need for a remand. We conclude for the following reasons that, in the totality of the circumstances in this case, “a reasonable person in defendant’s position could have believed” that he was not free to go. Toevs, 327 Ore at 536. In that regard, we emphasize that the controlling inquiry is not whether every reasonable person would have so believed, but, instead, whether a reasonable person could have so believed. Cf. Ashbaugh, 225 Ore App at , 2008 Ore. App. LEXIS 1918 at *24-29 (Brewer, C. J., concurring).

Search warrant for evidence of forgery permitted a search of defendant’s closet which revealed drugs. State v. Hawkins, 225 Ore. App. 355, 201 P.3d 239 (2009).*

Consent to search for weapons did not include consent to open a tinfoil packet in his pocket because it could not possibly contain a weapon. State v. Quale, 225 Ore. App. 470, 202 P.3d 187 (2009).*

While defendant’s stop was illegal, the fact that defendant was told that he did not have to consent to a search and the officer told him he was not telling him that he could not put his hands in his pocket in the cold mitigated it all, and it made the ensuing consent valid. State v. Hinds, 2009 Ore. App. LEXIS 56 (January 28, 2009).*

Police received a domestic disturbance call. At the scene, they were told that the defendant had people held inside against their will. When he finally came out, the police were permitted by exigent circumstances to enter to check for others who might have been held or other suspects. Plain view supported the seizure. United States v. Adkins, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97934 (W.D. Mo. December 2, 2008).*

Defendant’s arrest for a drug offense while on parole justified this parole search. (Application of Samson saved for another day.) United States v. Watts, 301 Fed. Appx. 39 (2d Cir. 2008)* (unpublished).

Deputy sheriff who did not enter during raid was still liable because he organized the raid and did not read the warrant. Hunt v. Tomplait, 301 Fed. Appx. 355 (5th Cir. 2008)* (unpublished):

Deputy Tomplait was not a mere bystander in the execution of the search warrant. He actively led the search team at Chief Hunter’s request to the only “Hunt residence” that he was aware of, without reading the search warrant or pursuing additional information about the residence described in the search warrant. The fact that Deputy Tomplait did not enter the house does not relieve him of liability as a matter of law; his identification of the Hunt residence as the residence to be searched–and subsequent leadership of the search team to the residence–was a direct cause of the Fourth Amendment violation.

Defendant’s consent after an illegal entry into his home was coerced. United States v. Long, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99762 (E.D. Pa. December 9, 2008):

When Agent Curran asked for permission to enter Long’s residence, Long reasonably believed his only choice was to cooperate. The officers did not attempt to obtain Long’s written consent. Agent Curran, in demanding to seize the contraband, implied Long had no right to refuse. The officers remained inside Long’s residence for approximately two hours and subjected him to prolonged questioning. Long’s consent was the product of the officers’ show of authority, not his free will. The government has not met its burden of proving that Long’s consent was voluntary. If anything, the events following Long’s admissions outside the residence suggest his consent was coerced, not voluntary. The presence of coercion rendered Long’s abandonment of the contraband firearms involuntary.

Probable cause was shown, but even if it wasn’t, it was close enough for the good faith exception to apply. United States v. Garcia, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23192 (E.D. Wash. March 10, 2009):

Moreover, even if the search warrant lacked probable cause, the officers executing the search warrant were entitled to rely, in good faith, on the search warrant. See United States v. Crews, 502 F.3d 1130, 1136 (9th Cir. 2007). For the good faith reliance exception to apply, the officers must have relied on the search warrant in an objectively reasonable manner. Id. The affidavit “must establish at least a colorable argument for probable cause” for the exception to apply.” Id.

There are four circumstances in which the good faith exception does not apply because reliance is per se unreasonable: …

Defendant had been arrested and handcuffed, and her purse was seized and validly searched incident to her arrest. State v. Schwab, 2009 Ohio 1312, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 1108 (7th Dist. March 19, 2009)* (“[*P22] A review of the foregoing case law demonstrates that the “search incident to arrest” exception has been broadly interpreted to insulate searches conducted after the defendant has been arrested from constitutional challenge. Appellant has failed to distinguish the facts of the case sub judice from the facts in the foregoing cases.”).

“Because defendant’s wrongdoing in concealing his search condition from the officer by misrepresenting his identity estops him from contesting the search’s validity as a probation search, we do not reach the question whether it was also a valid search incident to arrest.” People v. Watkins, 170 Cal. App. 4th 1403, 89 Cal. Rptr. 3d 135 (3d Dist. 2009):

The equitable principle “No one can take advantage of his own wrong” (Civ. Code, § 3517) applies in criminal law (People v. Concepcion (2008) 45 Cal.4th 77, 82 [84 Cal. Rptr. 3d 418, 193 P.3d 1172] (Concepcion); People v. Pearson (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 740, 742 [81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 234] (Pearson)). Thus, a criminal defendant who obtains a benefit in a judicial proceeding by intentionally concealing key information about his case is estopped to argue, when that information comes to light, that the court cannot use it against him. (Pearson, at pp. 744–747; People v. Level (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1208, 1213–1214 [119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 551].) Similarly, a defendant who absconds from custody during trial is estopped to argue that the court violated his constitutional right to be present at trial by proceeding in his absence. (Concepcion, at pp. 81–82.)

Here, as in the cited cases, defendant committed a wrong and then tried to profit from it. As did the courts in those cases, we conclude that this misconduct results in an estoppel.

The detention of defendant for an hour was reasonable under the circumstances. He was on probation, and he gave the officers a far-fetched story about the limits of his probation. The defendant argued that he was not free to leave and he was subjected to a dog sniff. The facts for the defendant were strong, but the court disagreed. United States v. Dingle-Jones, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8969 (D. Me. January 30, 2009):

I see no evidence in this case that the agents were dilatory in investigating the defendant’s probation status once he asserted that the only condition of his probation was that he report in to his probation officer, an obviously incorrect statement to the two experienced law enforcement officers. These are circumstances that developed during the course of the stop, from the defendant’s responses to unobjectionable questions. Flowers, 359 F.3d at 30. Clifford reasonably believed that the fastest way to contact the probation officer, for whom he had only a name and a state, was to use the internet to which he had access at the nearby police station. The agents’ reasons for choosing not to continue standing with the defendant on the street in a high-crime area while Clifford did so are eminently reasonable.

I also fail to see any evidence that the agents were dilatory in investigating the initial information that had been given to them about the defendant’s sale of crack cocaine. Clifford had felt what he reasonably believed to be packets of cash in the defendant’s pockets during his pat-down. The defendant had admitted that he was carrying an unusually large amount of cash, while giving a weak explanation for the fact that he was doing so. It was certainly reasonable for the agents to try to get a drug dog to sniff the defendant, who had already corroborated much of what the SOIs had told Clifford and Dumond. The SOIs would not have any apparent means of learning those facts other than those which they related to the agents: that they had purchased crack cocaine from the defendant that day. Much longer delays waiting for a drug-sniffing dog than that which occurred here have been held not to convert an investigative stop into a de facto arrest.

Fifteen minute traffic stop where officer had ID of passenger too was not unreasonable. United States v. Wolfe, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9117 (N.D. Tex. January 30, 2009).*

Defendant’s consent was valid, and his claim that the officers altered the video of the stop is rejected. “Ramirez claims that all of the officers are lying. The video belies Ramirez’s claims. The video shows clearly that Ramirez confirmed that he had given his consent to the search. He consented to the search in hopes that the officer would not bother to search. Ramirez claims that the Government falsified the video tape.” United States v. Ramirez, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23049 (C.D. Ill. March 23, 2009).*

(There have only been a handful of cases so far this week. Some days it takes two hours to read them all; some days, minutes. Maybe they are backing up and will get dumped on me this weekend. By the way, this version 2.0 of this website passed the 3,000 post mark last week.)

The Albany Times-Union has articles about the GPS case, previously noted here, from the day of the argument and from today: NY court hears arguments on police use of GPS. It sounds like a spirited argument:

At the center of discussion was the case of Scott Weaver, whose conviction in a Christmas Eve 2005 break-in was aided by a GPS device that state police secretly attached to his van for 65 days.

Defense lawyer Matthew Hug said the GPS device intruded on his client’s right to privacy.

“The potential for abuse is staggering,” Hug said, noting that the satellite technology tracks vehicles onto private property where police can’t routinely go.

Albany County Assistant District Attorney Christopher Horn told the judges that GPS was essentially just another way of watching a vehicle, which police routinely do without first obtaining a warrant. He doesn’t believe GPS tracking is unconstitutional.

. . .

Rulings in New York and federal courts so far say police can install the devices without getting approval from a judge.

However, state courts in Oregon and Washington have said that police use of GPS without a warrant is prohibited under their constitutions. Another case out of Maryland is pending before a federal appeals court.

The judges with New York’s Court of Appeals grilled both lawyers. They asked whether it would be lawful for people to attach GPS monitors on their neighbors’ vehicles, whether automakers could install them in all new cars so authorities could monitor movement and whether “no trespassing” stickers on bumpers would prevent a driver from being tracked by GPS.

See also News 10 in Albany.

Police did a knock-and-talk on defendant’s house, but she declined entry. After talking to her for a few minutes, they talked her into letting them in to look for a marijuana pipe for which they would only write a ticket. She wanted to go get it alone and leave them outside, but they insisted on coming along to protect against destruction of evidence [which had not yet been revealed]. In the bedroom she produced the pipe, but the officer insisted on searching the dresser drawers for marijuana. She relented. The consent was valid and not limited up to that point. State v. Allen, 2009 Mo. App. LEXIS 283 (February 5, 2009)*:

An objective observer would find that the officers entered the apartment to ensure their safety and prevent the destruction of the marijuana pipe and only asked for consent to search additional areas of the apartment as the circumstances changed. We do not, nor can we, divine an ulterior motive on the part of Officer Clawson in her request for consent to search first the drawer and then the apartment. The trial court did not err in finding the consent to be voluntarily given. After Rig was given Miranda warnings and told she had a right to refuse the consent, she gave a free and voluntary consent. The consent was not conditional or limited.

Defendant was unlawfully stopped without RS by the large number of officers that stopped him. No person would feel free to leave after being stopped by multiple police cars. State v. Acy, 2009 Ohio 1075, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 880 (8th Dist. March 12, 2009).*

The state showed apparent authority for the defendant’s girlfriend to consent to a search of their property from which he had been excluded by an order of protection. State v. Rodgers, 2009 Ohio 961, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 846 (8th Dist. March 5, 2009).*

The NY Times has an article today about Safford Unified School District #1 v. Redding, SCOTUS Wiki here, set for oral argument April 21.

Questions presented:

1. Whether the Fourth Amendment prohibits public school officials from conducting a search of a student suspected of possessing and distributing a prescription drug on campus in violation of school policy.

2. Whether the Ninth Circuit departed from established principles of qualified immunity in holding that a public school administrator may be liable in a damages lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for conducting a search of a student suspected of possessing and distributing a prescription drug on campus.

People v. Weaver is being argued Tuesday afternoon in the New York Court of Appeals and argues that warrantless GPS monitoring of a vehicle violates the New York Constitution because there is no temporal or spatial limitation on monitoring.

“By its nature, GPS is a valuable tool because it permits long-term, sustained surveillance. But its potential for abuse is staggering. To allow this kind of personal data collection without judicial oversight is an Orwellian nightmare. The minimal time required to obtain a warrant based on probable cause restores balance and cannot credibly be said to impede legitimate law enforcement objectives,” Walsh, lead counsel for the group, said in a statement.

The amicus brief is here. Perhaps in the confines of this case citizens may get some relief.