Cal.3d: Probationer misrepresenting ID estops contesting probation search

“Because defendant’s wrongdoing in concealing his search condition from the officer by misrepresenting his identity estops him from contesting the search’s validity as a probation search, we do not reach the question whether it was also a valid search incident to arrest.” People v. Watkins, 170 Cal. App. 4th 1403, 89 Cal. Rptr. 3d 135 (3d Dist. 2009):

The equitable principle “No one can take advantage of his own wrong” (Civ. Code, § 3517) applies in criminal law (People v. Concepcion (2008) 45 Cal.4th 77, 82 [84 Cal. Rptr. 3d 418, 193 P.3d 1172] (Concepcion); People v. Pearson (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 740, 742 [81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 234] (Pearson)). Thus, a criminal defendant who obtains a benefit in a judicial proceeding by intentionally concealing key information about his case is estopped to argue, when that information comes to light, that the court cannot use it against him. (Pearson, at pp. 744–747; People v. Level (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1208, 1213–1214 [119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 551].) Similarly, a defendant who absconds from custody during trial is estopped to argue that the court violated his constitutional right to be present at trial by proceeding in his absence. (Concepcion, at pp. 81–82.)

Here, as in the cited cases, defendant committed a wrong and then tried to profit from it. As did the courts in those cases, we conclude that this misconduct results in an estoppel.

The detention of defendant for an hour was reasonable under the circumstances. He was on probation, and he gave the officers a far-fetched story about the limits of his probation. The defendant argued that he was not free to leave and he was subjected to a dog sniff. The facts for the defendant were strong, but the court disagreed. United States v. Dingle-Jones, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8969 (D. Me. January 30, 2009):

I see no evidence in this case that the agents were dilatory in investigating the defendant’s probation status once he asserted that the only condition of his probation was that he report in to his probation officer, an obviously incorrect statement to the two experienced law enforcement officers. These are circumstances that developed during the course of the stop, from the defendant’s responses to unobjectionable questions. Flowers, 359 F.3d at 30. Clifford reasonably believed that the fastest way to contact the probation officer, for whom he had only a name and a state, was to use the internet to which he had access at the nearby police station. The agents’ reasons for choosing not to continue standing with the defendant on the street in a high-crime area while Clifford did so are eminently reasonable.

I also fail to see any evidence that the agents were dilatory in investigating the initial information that had been given to them about the defendant’s sale of crack cocaine. Clifford had felt what he reasonably believed to be packets of cash in the defendant’s pockets during his pat-down. The defendant had admitted that he was carrying an unusually large amount of cash, while giving a weak explanation for the fact that he was doing so. It was certainly reasonable for the agents to try to get a drug dog to sniff the defendant, who had already corroborated much of what the SOIs had told Clifford and Dumond. The SOIs would not have any apparent means of learning those facts other than those which they related to the agents: that they had purchased crack cocaine from the defendant that day. Much longer delays waiting for a drug-sniffing dog than that which occurred here have been held not to convert an investigative stop into a de facto arrest.

Fifteen minute traffic stop where officer had ID of passenger too was not unreasonable. United States v. Wolfe, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9117 (N.D. Tex. January 30, 2009).*