Officers mistakenly yet reasonably believed that an armed fugitive was on the premises and they had an arrest warrant for him. His distinguishing feature was a tattoo under his eye. Officers were let in the house by one with authority to consent (the validity of consent is a given), and they said they were looking for a guy with a tattoo under his eye. While they were not in the right house, coincidentally a person upstairs had a tattoo under his eye, and they were directed upstairs. Heading up the stairs, appellant encountered them and ordered them out of the house without a search warrant. They went upstairs and found a man hiding in a closet. A search incident of the room found a silencer and three guns. The search was valid by exigent circumstances. United States v. Wilhelm, 358 Fed. Appx. 452 (4th Cir. 2009) (unpublished)*:

Here, the district court found that exigent circumstances arose based on the information provided by Christina Wilhelm and on the commotion created by Appellant. The court noted the following exigent circumstances: (1) the officers had good reason to believe that a fugitive armed robber was on the premises; (2) they had reason to believe the fugitive was aware that they were there; and (3) withdrawal from the search could have resulted in a hostage situation or posed danger to the officers. These findings are supported by the record. First, given that the man described by Christina Wilhelm matched the fugitive’s unique characteristic of having a tattoo under his left eye, the officers certainly had reason to believe the fugitive was on the premises. Secondly, given the commotion created by Appellant, the officers had reason to believe that the fugitive was aware of their presence. Finally, it is objectively reasonable to conclude that a fugitive armed robber who has just become aware that he has been discovered by police may react in a way that poses a danger for those in the immediate vicinity including occupants of the home and law enforcement officers. Therefore, we cannot say that the district court clearly erred in finding that there were exigent circumstances sufficient to justify the warrantless search.

Defendant did not reserve for appeal his search issue, so it is waived. A prior case recognized that the government can waive waiver, but it didn’t here. United States v. Are, 590 F.3d 499 (7th Cir. 2009).*

A juvenile was charged with felony shoplifting, and it was pled down to a lesser included misdemeanor. By statute, the juvenile was subject to DNA testing. DNA testing of this juvenile was not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment or the state constitution. In re M. L. M., 781 N.W.2d 381 (Minn. App. 2010).

While a motion to suppress can be denied on any ground that supports the search, the state at least has to raise the issue before the juvenile court so it can have the opportunity to decide it. Raising it for the first time on appeal is inappropriate. In re C.K., 2010 Iowa App. LEXIS 321 (April 21, 2010).*

Defendant’s parents let police search his childhood bedroom which they used for storage. Defendant lived in Chicago, and did not stay there even as an overnight guest at the time. They had apparent authority, and he lacked standing. State v. Hoosman, 2010 Iowa App. LEXIS 303 (April 21, 2010).*

Defendant went to the police station to complain about threatening text messages received on his cell phone. He slid his phone through the slot in the glass to show the officer. While it was disputed whether the phone was open or closed and whether the text message was on the screen, the officer had to fumble with the phone to get the message to show. In the process, the officer stumbled upon a child pornography picture. Defendant had no expectation of privacy in the phone when he handed it over. United States v. Coates, 685 F. Supp. 2d 551 (M.D. Pa. 2010):

Finding that the cellular phone was in a closed position when Coates handed it to Officer Persing, we cannot and do not find that Coates had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the phone. On August 13, 2008, Coates entered the Bloombsburg Police Station of his own free will and voluntarily gave control of his cellular phone to Officer Persing. Coates relinquished his phone to Officer Persing without manifesting any privacy concerns therein. Indeed, the only instruction Coates gave to Officer Persing was that the threatening message was in his text messages inbox. In rendering this instruction to Officer Persing, he did not, for example, indicate that other areas of the cellular phone were private, nor did he give Officer Persing precise instructions as to how to find the text message. Further, Coates was not compelled or forced to give Officer Persing his phone. By his own actions, Coates simply did not exhibit a reasonable expectation of prohibitions of the Fourth Amendment.

Consent to search premises for persons includes allowing officers to move a mattress. Officers have found suspects hiding in hollowed out box springs before, so it was a logical place to look. Also, failure to make a trial objection after denial of a motion to suppress is a waiver of the motion in Indiana. (Here, though, the court went to the merits, too.) Scott v. State, 924 N.E.2d 169 (Ind. App. 2010).

The search of defendant’s car was with reasonable suspicion, and he had a probation search condition. The trial court and court of appeals erred in suppressing. State v. Schlechty, 926 N.E.2d 1 (Ind. 2010).*

Identified but unknown CI did not provide justification for the defendant’s stop because he merely relayed generally known information that shows no reason to believe that a crime was occurring. L.W. v. State, 926 N.E.2d 52 (Ind. App. 2010):

Here, there is no evidence in the record that law enforcement had verified Shockley’s identity or that his reliability was known prior to the investigatory stop of L.W. On this record, while Shockley identified himself, he was nonetheless a virtual stranger. Neither Officer Cantrell nor the police department knew whether he was “a concerned citizen, a prankster, or an imposter.” See Glass, 769 N.E.2d at 643. And there is no evidence that Shockley identified himself in such a way that would place his credibility at risk or subject himself to criminal penalties. See id. Nor is there any indication that the tipster indicated that he had inside knowledge about the burglary or the suspect. Shockley merely described the suspect’s general build, shirt, and shoes. That same information was available to the general public and did not provide the police with sufficient information to corroborate Shockley’s assertions. See Kellems, 842 N.E.2d at 356. This case is easily distinguishable on its facts from Kellems, where the tipster not only identified herself but was a person known to the police and accurately predicted future behavior.

The trial court’s evaluation of the evidence under the totality of circumstances was like the analysis condemned in Arvizu. The totality of circumstances here showed probable cause. State v. Christopher, 2010 Ohio 1816, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 1504 (12th Dist. April 26, 2010).*

Plaintiff’s claim he was “beaten mercilessly both before and after the officers gained custody of him” was not barred by Heck. He was proceeding pro se and had a hard time articulating his claim, but he did. Evans v. Poskin, 603 F.3d 362 (7th Cir. 2010)*:

We held in Gilbert that, under similar circumstances, a prisoner need not repudiate his allegation that he did nothing wrong in order to maintain that he was the victim of excessive force. Heck prevents such a person from prevailing in the §1983 action on a position incompatible with the conviction, but the plaintiff need not adopt the defendants’ view of what occurred in order to contest the degree of force used.

Defense counsel could not be ineffective for not challenging part of the affidavit for the search warrant under Franks because his argument would not undermine any probable cause. Miller v. United States, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36968 (N.D. Ind. April 13, 2010).*

Officers were found not to have entered the defendant’s property before the warrant was issued. The court finds that the “14:00” that was written in one report should have been “4 p.m.,” and that officer was mistaken. United States v. Glass, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36677 (W.D. Ky. April 13, 2010).*

The police received a 911 call that a man with a backpack climbed over a neighbor’s fence and might be a burglar. The police came, kicked open the gate and stopped the defendant, who matched the description and had a backpack in hand. They searched the backpack finding a gun, and he was a former felon. It turned out he lived there. The officers lacked probable cause to believe that he was committing a burglary because he had not attempted to enter the house. Viewing his presence as at least a trespass, the police were doing what we objectively expect of them. They did have at least reasonable suspicion, but not probable cause, and they could have asked him his name since he was posing no threat when they drew down on him. The government’s stretch to apply exigent circumstances to their conduct was rejected. [This is an interesting analysis of exigency and entry into the curtilage.] United States v. Struckman, 603 F.3d 731 (9th Cir. 2010):

In a case closely analogous to this one, the Sixth Circuit concluded that “[t]here is simply no legal support for holding that an ongoing criminal trespass, on its own, constitutes an exigency that overrides the warrant requirement.” United States v. Washington, 573 F.3d 279, 287 (6th Cir. 2009). We agree. The risk from an ongoing crime can sometimes make a critical difference in determining the reasonableness of police conduct. See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 126 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring) (discussing instances of domestic abuse); see also United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 228 (1985). But in the absence of any “immediate and serious consequences,” McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 460 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring), resulting from the commission of a crime, the “overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic,” Payton, 445 U.S. at 601, militates against warrantless entry.

The officer’s twenty years experience supported reasonable suspicion for defendant’s detention based on the strange movements of his car as he was apparently casing the neighborhood at 3 a.m. with out-of-state license plates. State v. Staton, 120 Conn. App. 497, 992 A.2d 348 (2010).*

Defendant was being arrested in his underwear in a common area of his apartment. The officers asked him about getting clothes, and he wanted to, so they could go with him. [This would be governed at least partly by Washington v. Chrisman, but] the court found consent for the entry. State v. Moore, 120 Conn. App. 512, 992 A.2d 357 (2010).*

Defendant did not receive IAC where defense counsel did not pursue a motion to suppress the frisk of his person where drugs were found hidden in his groin. The defense would have lost the motion in any event. Williams v. Comm’r of Corr., 120 Conn. App. 412, 991 A.2d 705 (2010).*

Defendant was arrested for driving on a suspended license and his car was searched incident to the arrest. The search incident was invalid under Gant, decided two years later, and it was even invalid under other cases. Therefore, the good faith exception recognized by another panel of the court would not be applied. State v. Scalara, 155 Wn. App. 236, 229 P.3d 889 (2010).*

Defense counsel told the trial court that the search was not an issue in the case, so it was waived for appeal. Hernandez v. State, 2010 WY 33, 127 P.3d 315 (2010).*

The officer who stopped defendant’s car was killed on the job shortly thereafter, and another officer continued the investigation. At defendant’s suppression hearing, the dead officer’s reports were admissible, and Crawford and the confrontation clause did not apply. On the merits, during a traffic stop, a plastic cup was thrown from the car. The defendant was arrested for giving alcohol to a minor and felon in possession, and the officer found from a passenger that the defendant had videotaped her underage having sex years ago and was going to again, but now she was of age. There was evidence of pornography in the car. The search of defendant’s car was valid as an inventory search, and there was probable cause shown for the search of defendant’s house. Graves v. State, 307 S.W.3d 483 (Tex. App. – Texarkana 2010):

With the exception of privileges, the Rules of Evidence do not apply to suppression hearings because they involve the determination of preliminary questions. Vennus v. State, 282 S.W.3d 70, 72 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Granados v. State, 85 S.W.3d 217, 227 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Campbell v. State, 910 S.W.2d 475, 480 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (hearsay is admissible at suppression hearings to demonstrate probable cause to arrest). Further, this Court has held that the right of confrontation does not attach until trial. Ford v. State, 268 S.W.3d 620, 621 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 2008), overruled on other grounds, No. 06-08-00046-CR, 2009 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1440, 2009 WL 3365661, at *3 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 21, 2009) (“The prosecutor obviously understood appellant’s objection because she responded appropriately: Hearsay is admissible in a pretrial suppression hearing; the Confrontation Clause does not apply to a pre-trial suppression hearing.”). This was also the holding of the Dallas Court of Appeals in Vanmeter v. State, 165 S.W.3d 68, 74 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2005, pet. ref’d). Many other jurisdictions have held that the federal Confrontation Clause does not apply to preliminary hearings. People v. Felder, 129 P.3d 1072, 1074 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005); Gresham v. Edwards, 281 Ga. 881, 644 S.E.2d 122, 124 (Ga. 2007); State v. Rivera, 2008 NMSC 56, 144 N.M. 836, 192 P.3d 1213, 1218 (N.M. 2008); Sheriff v. Witzenburg, 122 Nev. 1056, 145 P.3d 1002, 1003 (Nev. 2006); State v. Woinarowicz, 2006 ND 179, 720 N.W.2d 635, 641 (N.D. 2006). Thus, Graves’ first complaint–that the trial court erroneously denied his objections to the affidavit, reports, and recording of Burns because they constituted hearsay and violated his fundamental right of confrontation and cross-examination under Crawford v. Washington fails.

The officer lacked reasonable suspicion to keep detaining defendant as long as he did until a drug dog could arrive at the scene. The defendant was followed by another officer for 16 miles who saw no traffic offense, so he called ahead to this officer who ultimately stopped him. United States v. Bonilla, 357 Fed. Appx. 693, 2009 FED App. 0816N (6th Cir. 2009) (unpublished) (2-1)*:

The instant case lacks any strong indicators of criminal conduct other than minor actions by Bonilla that are generally present when a driver is pulled over. Bonilla’s failure to promptly provide the officer with his passenger’s correct information was not particularly indicative of criminal activity. Thus, the totality of the circumstances did not give rise to a reasonable suspicion that Bonilla was transporting drugs in his vehicle at the moment when Bemis stopped writing the traffic citation and placed Bonilla and his passenger in police cruisers.

Since we conclude that no reasonable suspicion was present at the inception of the detention on suspicion of transporting drugs, the detention was an unlawful seizure and we do not need to address the second part of the Terry analysis, whether the time and intrusiveness of the stop were reasonable. See Davis, 430 F.3d at 354. The fact that Bemis only detained Bonilla for a short period of time when he ceased writing the ticket and placed Bonilla and his passenger in police cruisers is irrelevant since Bemis lacked reasonable suspicion to do so. Thus, the district court erred in determining Bemis’s detainment of Bonilla for a short period of time was reasonable.

Putting a truant into a police car for transportation to school did not justify a search of her pockets. L.C. v. State, 23 So. 3d 1215 (Fla. App. 3d DCA 2009):

The uniqueness of this case lies in the fact Officer Quintas did not pat-down L.C. prior to directly searching her pockets. Although we appreciate the concern of officer safety, we are aware of no case that stands for the proposition officers can search an individual without having performed a pat-down simply because the individual is being placed in a police vehicle.

Defendant admitted having a gun in a vehicle, and the officer asked for consent to retrieve it, which was granted. Marijuana was found “within inches” of the gun. United States v. Bell, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105712 (M.D. Ga. November 12, 2009).*

Defendant was suspected of DUI on VA property, and she worked there. Investigating officers went to her work area and talked to her and touched her in directing her to come with them. That was a seizure, but it was a reasonable investigative detention on this record. United States v. Hawley, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105640 (N.D. Ga. October 30, 2009).*

Failure to raise hands and comply with the officers’ commands with their guns drawn was not submission to a show of authority at that moment. Plummer v. United States, 983 A.2d 323 (D.C. App. 2009).*

Consent to search the person does not include the anal cavity. The officer had reasonable suspicion to believe defendant had drugs on his person, but he did not find any. State v. Crumpton, 302 Ga. App. 602 (2010).

A search warrant for safes bought at Home Depot with a forged check was valid because the safes were described in the attached affidavit. Also, because the interest in the safes was possessory and not a privacy interest, the exclusionary rule would not be applied. State v. Powell, 306 S.W.3d 761 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).*

Defendant was in a high crime area having just left a nightclub, and the security guard told the officer to “watch him,” making the officer believe that something happened inside the club. The officer saw the defendant go to a car and put something in his waistband. “After being asked by Lt. Kitchen, ‘Hey, man, what is going on?’ Defendant grabbed his waistband area.” That justified the officer pulling his gun. United States v. Baker, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125476 (M.D. Fla. November 21, 2009).*

Looking in the yard and seeing fresh dirt and digging up a stash of cocaine was within the scope of a search warrant for the premises. Commonwealth v. Perez, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 439, 922 N.E.2d 855 (2010):

There is no merit in the defendant’s further assertion that he had a privacy interest in burying the drugs. Here, it is apparent that the drugs were secreted to escape detection, and the search conducted within the curtilage was proper. The police were not required to establish independent probable cause for that portion of the search. Compare Commonwealth v. Signorine, 404 Mass. 400, 405, 535 N.E.2d 601 (1989).

Police went to defendant’s home because a runaway underage female was reportedly there. They knocked and no one answered. Finally, they said they were coming in if he didn’t answer so he did. Inside the female was found hiding in a closet. He was accused of aggravated child molestation after admitting he had sex with the girl, which she also admitted. Her being in the closet should have been suppressed, but there was sufficient evidence to convict if it had been excluded. Her statement was attenuated from finding her there. Watson v. State, 302 Ga. App. 619, 691 S.E.2d 378 (2010).*

Knock-and-talk was conducted without determining who lived in the house and whether the person who answered the door could consent to entry. Consent by a visitor was invalid since he lacked common authority over the premises. The plain view from inside the house after the illegal entry was unreasonable. Hunt v. State, 302 Ga. App. 578, 691 S.E.2d 368 (2010).

Defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in an AA meeting where the police arrested him for DUI. The court of appeals faults the record for not showing whether he had a subjective expectation of privacy [, but that does not seem to be necessary on the facts in the opinion because there was none]. State v. Ashworth, 2010 Ida. App. LEXIS 13 (March 3, 2010).*

“The trial court correctly concluded that the blood draw was administered in a medically acceptable manner without unreasonable force. The person that drew Wheeler’s blood was part of an ambulance crew and stated he was authorized to draw blood.” State v. Wheeler, 2010 Ida. App. LEXIS 12 (February 26, 2010),* substituted opinion State v. Wheeler, 2010 Ida. App. LEXIS 28 (April 9, 2010), reposted April 13.*

Vehicle seizure for valid asset forfeiture was reasonable, as was the subsequent search. United States v. Carter, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18162 (W.D. Mo. January 27, 2010).*

Search warrant for cell phone was based on probable cause. United States v. Borromeo, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18191 (D. Minn. January 4, 2010).*

Arrest in Indiana on a NCIC Alabama warrant that led to finding a gun was sufficient to prosecute in Indiana. There was no reason to go behind the probable cause finding in Alabama because the sole issue in Indiana is possession of the gun. Shotts v. State, 925 N.E.2d 719 (Ind. 2010):

At the outset, it is important to bear in mind what the issue in this case is and what it is not. We are addressing whether we are to suppress the evidence of Shotts’s possession of a weapon in this Indiana prosecution charging violation of Indiana’s gun laws. We are not addressing whether this evidence may be admitted in any prosecution in Alabama for the charges that gave rise to the Alabama warrant. The first issue, therefore, is whether only the reasonableness of the Indiana officers’ conduct is required for a valid arrest, or is the Alabama probable cause determination also subject to challenge. It is well settled that in extradition proceedings the receiving state is not to review the probable cause determination of the demanding state. See, e.g., Bailey v. Cox, 260 Ind. 448, 452, 296 N.E.2d 422, 425 (1973) (discussing the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, currently codified at I.C. § 35-33-10-3, and concluding that any challenge to the arrest warrant must be resolved in the demanding state). We find little direct authority addressing whether the same reasoning applies to evaluation of an arrest in a receiving state–in this case Indiana–based on a warrant issued by another state–in this case Alabama. For the reasons explained below, we conclude that it does.

Even if the Alabama warrant was defective, suppression of the discovered gun in the Indiana proceeding “is not an automatic consequence.” Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 698. Suppression of evidence under controlling Fourth Amendment precedent “turns on the culpability of the police and the potential of exclusion to deter wrongful police conduct.” Id. Specifically, invalidity of a warrant does not necessarily require exclusion of evidence seized under its authority. Id. at 701. Even if a warrant is invalid for lack of probable cause, “the exclusionary rule does not apply if the police acted ‘in objectively reasonable reliance’ on the subsequently invalidated search warrant.” Id. (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984)). “[E]vidence should be suppressed ‘only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.'” Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 348-349 (quoting United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542 (1975)). Put differently, the high cost associated with suppression is appropriate only where police acts are “sufficiently culpable” and suppression can “meaningfully deter” those acts. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 702. The “good-faith inquiry is confined to the objectively ascertainable question whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal” in light of “all of the circumstances.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 & n.23.

The trial court found that the Indiana officers acted in good-faith reliance on a warrant they reasonably presumed to be valid. This finding is fully supported in the record and disposes of Shotts’s claim under the Fourth Amendment.

Defendant juvenile was stopped for jaywalking, and, while talking to defendant, the officer was concerned because the defendant would not remove his hands from his pockets. This did not justify his patdown. D.B.P. v. State, 31 So. 3d 883 (Fla. App. 5th DCA 2010):

Here, when the officer asked the defendant to take his hands out of his pockets, the request constituted a police order given the circumstances. See Dees v. State, 564 So. 2d 1166 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). The reason for the investigatory stop or nonconsensual detainment was the officer’s concern about a pedestrian violation, specifically, the failure to use a pedestrian crosswalk. The infraction cited by the officer was noncriminal. Although the refusal by a person to remove his or her hands from pockets might well constitute part of the basis authorizing a pat down for weapons in some circumstances, under the well-established case law of this state, the facts presented here do not amount to the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify the search.

The Fourth Amendment protects citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures. It might be tempting to conclude that because the officer found a firearm when he searched D.B.P, the search was reasonable. The success of the search, however, is not now and never has been the test to be applied. Applying the established law to the facts of this case, it is clear that the search was not reasonable, and that the motion to suppress should have been granted. See § 901.151(6), Fla. Stat. (2009). Accordingly, we reverse the denial of the motion to suppress, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Defendant was not in custody when he consented to the taking of a DNA sample, and the evidence showed that it was voluntary. United States v. Pumpkin Seed, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99161 (D.S.D. September 17, 2007).*

Defendant’s stop for running a stop sign was justified, even though the officer had defendant under investigation for a controlled buy. He smelled marijuana, and he had probable cause to search for that marijuana, weapons, and evidence of the controlled buy. State v. Armstrong, 2010 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 241 (March 18, 2010).*

Defendant was not told he was free to leave when the officer called for a drug dog. There was no reasonable suspicion for continuing the stop, so the use of the drug dog here was unreasonable. Bush v. State, 925 N.E.2d 787 (Ind. App. 2010):

Bush argues the purpose of the traffic stop was complete before the canine unit arrived and thus the canine sniff of his automobile unreasonably prolonged his detention. Unlike either of the above sets of cases, we are faced with a record that, as the parties agree, is silent regarding the time frame of events. Thus, the burden of proof is potentially outcome determinative. The State conceded at oral argument, and we agree, “[t]he burden is on the State to show the time for the traffic stop was not increased due to the canine sweep.” Wells, 922 N.E.2d at 700 (quoting Wilson, 847 N.E.2d at 1067); see Bannister v. State, 904 N.E.2d 1254, 1256 (Ind. 2009) (under Fourth Amendment analysis of traffic stop, “[t]he State has the burden to show that under the totality of the circumstances its intrusion was reasonable”).

Our review of the record discloses the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support a finding “that the duration of the stop in this case was entirely justified by the traffic offense and the ordinary inquiries incident to such a stop.” Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408. ….

Being stopped in a high-crime area with a person leaning in the window is not reasonable suspicion. “Even viewing all the facts asserted by the police in this matter as a whole, such facts fail ‘to eliminate a substantial portion of innocent travelers.; Mathurin, 561 F. 3d at 174 (citing Karnes, 62 F.3d at 493).” United States v. Gordon, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41811 (D. V.I. April 27, 2010).*

Officers were on the lookout for a car like defendants’, and he was seen driving in a suspicious manner, potentially the vehicle version of Terry’s walking around the jewelry store. It turned out the vehicle had the tag to another vehicle on it. The stop and continued stop, including two consent searches (the first producing nothing), were valid. Aponte v. State, 296 Ga. App. 778, 676 S.E.2d 279 (2009):

Given the officer’s knowledge that he was to be on the lookout for a car similar in description to the car Aponte was driving and his observations of Aponte’s suspicious driving before the stop, we find that the officer had such a particularized and objective basis for suspecting Aponte of criminal activity. Accordingly, the stop was authorized notwithstanding the officer only learned of the information about the tag after he stopped Aponte.

. . .

We must first note that this was not the typical traffic stop in which a motorist was pulled over for violating, or being suspected of violating, some rule of the road. Instead, we have found that this was a Terry stop of a motorist whose car resembled one the police were looking for, and who was driving suspiciously. Therefore, the purpose of this stop was not only to resolve a traffic violation. Even if it had been for that purpose, an officer may continue to detain a driver for questioning unrelated to the initial stop if he has an objectively reasonable and articulable suspicion that illegal activity has occurred or is occurring.

Officers responded to a shots fired call that described the shooter’s clothing and hat. When officers arrived at the scene, they saw a man matching the description, who moved in such a way that the outline of a gun could be seen through the shirt. That was reasonable suspicion. A courtroom demonstration of the shirt by the defendant only confirmed to the court that the gun could be seen. United States v. Nelson, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22541 (D. Mass. March 6, 2009).*

The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed by memorandum four word opinion C.R.F. v. State, 31 So. 3d 728 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009), that produced a dissent that the information used to get a search warrant after his ex-wife was under hypnosis, and the allegations involved photographing their minor daughter in 1986. This produced a dissent, which is all that is on Lexis, that the search warrant was stale.

The smell of a meth lab coming from a house justified an emergency entry into the home to look for people who could have been overcome from the fumes. A gas company worker was investigating reports of smells in the neighborhood. State v. Deneui, 2009 SD 99, 775 N.W.2d 221 (2009):

In a case of first impression, we are confronted with the question whether the community caretaker doctrine, which we previously applied to an automobile search, should also be applied to a home search. After smelling ammonia fumes outside a home, police officers entered without a warrant to see if anyone inside needed assistance. While in the home, they saw evidence of a methamphetamine lab in plain view, which later formed the basis for obtaining a search warrant. Defendant homeowner sought unsuccessfully to suppress the evidence seized in his house. … On appeal, we conclude that, under the particular circumstances of this case, the officers were justified in their community caretaking function in entering the home to make sure no one had succumbed to noxious fumes.

Three tipsters saw video of defendant and identified him, and that was basis of knowledge. State v. Richardson, 2009 Ohio 6018, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 5051 (2d Dist. November 13, 2009).

Entry into defendant’s home was not justified by any emergency theory, so the seizure of the rifle in this gun case was unreasonable. However, the handgun was not an issue on the appeal, that supports the conviction, so the unlawful search was unreasonable. United States v. Johnson, 357 Fed. Appx. 29 (9th Cir. 2009) (unpublished).*