Defendant did not per se legally abandon his car by parking it and running from it. He parked it in his own apartment complex parking lot. State v. Nesbitt, 305 Ga. App. 28, 699 S.E.2d 368 (2010):

[T]he facts of this case more closely resemble those of Dean and Scrivner rather than cases in which the suspects ran away from vehicles illegally parked or parked in some hazardous manner. When Nesbitt ran away, the officer had just observed him park the Altima within a parking space of an apartment complex, where lived — as was readily ascertained by the officer based upon his investigation of the car’s tag — the person to whom the Altima’s registered owner had entrusted the vehicle. In light of this evidentiary record, we cannot conclude that the trial court clearly erred in rejecting the state’s argument that Nesbitt abandoned the Altima and consequently lost any reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to the car. Under applicable standards of review, we must affirm that part of the judgment suppressing evidence found inside the Altima.

Officer learned from the victim and another that defendant had child pornography in a briefcase in his house. The officer enlisted the friend to get the briefcase and bring it to the officer. When the officer had it, he obtained a search warrant for the contents. The search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment by inevitable discovery despite using a private person to seize the briefcase. Wilder v. State, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 669 (July 8, 2010).*

Housing authority director could not consent to a police entry for “health and safety” reasons, even if the lease permitted it. Bowden v. State, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 667 (July 8, 2010):

The state nonetheless contends that the director’s consent was authorized by the terms of the tenant’s lease, which allegedly provided that the director could enter the premises in the event of a threat to the health and safety of the residents or the property. First, we note that a copy of the lease was not tendered into evidence in the trial court and is not contained in the appellate record, so the state has failed to meet its burden on this front. See OCGA § 17-5-30(b); Welchel v. State, 255 Ga. App. 556, 558 (565 SE2d 870) (2002) (the state bears the “heavy burden” of proving circumstances that justify a warrantless entry into a home). But regardless, we reject the state’s argument that the limited right of entry allegedly contained in the lease amounted to a waiver of any expectation of privacy as to all entries into the leased premises. See Arnold, 237 Ga. App. at 859 (1). The record is devoid of any evidence that the fugitive was a dangerous individual, or that the officer’s failure to immediately locate and arrest the fugitive posed a threat to the health and safety of the residents or the property. See Looney, 293 Ga. App. at 641. And contrary to the state’s argument, it is irrelevant whether the officer believed in good faith that the director possessed the power to consent to the search. See Oliver, 183 Ga. App. at 93 (“[T]he fact that the officers believed in good faith that [a landlord] had authority to consent to their search [does not] make their search and seizure without a warrant lawful.”). See also Looney, 293 Ga. App. at 642.

Oral motion to suppress ineffective in Georgia under OCGA § 17-5-30. Nelson v. State, 305 Ga. App. 65, 699 S.E.2d 66 (2010).

Officers noticed that defendant appeared to the guy wanted in an arrest warrant for domestic violence. They ran the license plate of this motorcycle, and it came up belonging to another vehicle, a crime. The plain view doctrine supported the seizure of the license plate and the towing of the vehicle, and a lawful inventory led to a gun. United States v. Sanchez, 612 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2010).*

Defendant occasionally stayed at the place searched, and officers found mail addressed to him there. He did not have to be an exclusive resident anywhere to have standing in one or more places. However, he loses on the merits because there was probable cause for issuance of the search warrant, and the GFE would save it anyway. United States v. Henry, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139164 (N.D. Ga. December 7, 2010):

The Government correctly contends that Defendant cannot show standing simply through the contentions of Government agents or the theory of the Government’s case. See United States v. Zermeno, 66 F.3d 1058, 1062 (9th Cir. 1995). However, hearsay is admissible at suppression hearings, and I am aware of no case law or rationale that would preclude Defendant’s use as evidence of statements that were procured by Government agents. Cf. United States v. Free, No. CR606-001, 2006 WL 2366430, *3 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 14, 2006) (unpublished) (finding expectation of privacy shown in part by statements given to law enforcement officer).

A person may have an expectation of privacy in a home even though it is not his exclusive residence. In Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98 (1990), the Supreme Court held that an overnight guest in someone else’s home had a legitimate expectation of privacy, and could therefore challenge a warrantless entry into the host’s home to execute an arrest warrant. Here, Defendant established that he had even more of an expectation of privacy in the 168 Rocky Ford Road residence than an occasional overnight guest. Two other residents of the house told agents that Defendant lived there, and Defendant’s belongings and recent mail addressed to him were found in a room in the house. Cf. United States v. Sangineto-Miranda, 859 F.2d 1501, 1510 (6th Cir. 1988) (finding that individual who had key to apartment, was afforded unrestricted access, kept clothes in the apartment and stayed there at least eight times in a one-month period had an expectation of privacy). Therefore, Defendant has met his burden of proof on standing. However, Defendant’s motions fail for other reasons.

Note: Zermeno does not quite hold that the government’s theory can create standing. The mere fact somebody had a possessory interest in drugs in a drug house hardly confers standing, anyway. And, the law never said that mere possession creates standing. From Zermeno:

The district court concluded that Zermeno had met his burden of establishing standing. As to Silva-Sosa, the district court stated “[h]e has been charged with possession in these matters, and he’s entitled to standing.”

Silva-Sosa concedes that a mere possessory interest in the item seized does not by itself confer standing to challenge the search of the place in which the item was found. Legal “possession of a seized good [is not] a substitute for a factual finding that the owner of the good had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched.” United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 92, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 2553, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980). Thus, Silva-Sosa did not have standing simply because he was charged with a possessory crime.

Silva-Sosa contends, however, that he is entitled to standing based on a theory of estoppel. He contends the government’s theory of the case was that he frequented the Adrienne Street house and stored contraband there. He argues the government should not now be permitted to take the contradictory position that he lacks standing to challenge the search of the premises. We reject this argument. There is no contradiction in the government’s positions. The mere fact that Silva-Sosa stored contraband at the Adrienne Street residence is insufficient to establish that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy there. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143, 99 S.Ct. at 430.

Officers found drugs while executing a search warrant for defendant’s property, but defendant wasn’t there. He was seen shortly thereafter as a passenger in a car. The product of the search of his house was reasonable suspicion for his stop. United States v. Howard, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93872 (W.D. N.Y. May 10, 2010).*

Defendant was stopped on reasonable suspicion of DWI after a citizen informant called in that he and his companion were apparently under the influence and got into a car in a shopping center parking lot with an unsecured child inside and started to drive off. The make and model and location of the car were given. The officer saw the car right after that on the parking lot and made the stop. It was with reasonable suspicion. Guilfoil v. State, 3 A.3d 1097 (Del. 2010).*

Defendant’s wife had actual and apparent authority to consent to a search of their computer for child pornography. She accidently found it there, and called the police. While great importance was placed by the defendant in the computer being password protected, it certainly wasn’t on the day in question. United States v. Marandola, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93876 (W.D. N.Y. May 3, 2010).*

The affidavit for the search warrant had misstatements, but they dealt with the caliber and make of a gun and they were hardly material to the issuance of the search warrant. Also, inclusion of some omitted information was not material either. State v. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d 320 (Minn. 2010).*

The issue about whether a search warrant application was public or not was not material to the alibi defense in the case, so it could not be ineffective assistance to not raise it. Staunton v. State, 784 N.W.2d 289 (Minn. 2010).*

Search of defendant’s purse and clothing was justified by her conduct fleeing the police prior to her crash. State v. Gates, 2010 Iowa App. LEXIS 667 (June 30, 2010).*

While the officer did not have reasonable suspicion for entry into the house [or probable cause?], there was still consent from a person with apparent authority. He was also on probation. State v. Cosie, 44 So. 3d 314 (5th Cir. 2010).*

Reckless driving arrest gave “unqualified” right in the officer to search defendant’s wallet under Robinson. The officer also had probable cause to search the vehicle for evidence of drug possession based on a story from a CI. [There was also a jurisdictional argument that was rejected on state law grounds without citing Virginia v. Moore since the case was in federal court.] United States v. Popplewell, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46964 (W.D. Ky. May 12, 2010).*

Defendants were dropped at a safe house for illegal aliens. While he spent the night, he did not show that he was an authorized guest of the host for Olson. United States v. Vasquez, 706 F. Supp. 2d 1015 (C.D. Cal. 2010).*

Defendant was arrested for alien smuggling in a hotel room that was not his and the hotel key he had on him did not work on the door, and a duffle bag was seized with him. The Border Patrol agents took the bag to the station and inventoried it there. It was reasonable to take the bag with them to search later. United States v. Ramirez, 378 Fed. Appx. 727 (9th Cir. 2010) (unpublished).*

Fourth Amendment challenge to plaintiffs’ arrests failed because there was probable cause. Dickerson v. Napolitano, 604 F.3d 732 (2d Cir. 2010).*

The seizure of defendant’s laptop computer in this child pornography case was reasonable under the plain view doctrine. The child’s information said that there was child pornography on the computer and it needed to be seized rather than left behind because defendant could alter it if he learned about the investigation before the search warrant was issued. Also, the child had free access to the computer, and she could consent to its search and seizure. There was a little bit of plain view search of the computer too, but it was not outcome determinative. United States v. Vallimont, 378 Fed. Appx. 972 (11th Cir. 2010) (unpublished):

First, we reject Vallimont’s claim that the seizure of his computer was unconstitutional. Seizure of a container, pending issuance of a warrant to examine its contents, is permitted where there is (1) probable cause to believe that it holds contraband or evidence of a crime and (2) if the “exigencies of the circumstances demand it or some other recognized exception to the warrant requirement is present.” United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701, 103 S. Ct. 2637, 77 L. Ed. 2d 110 (1983). …

Coincidentally, today’s The Legal Intelligencer: Do Computer Searches Distort the ‘Plain View’ Doctrine? by Leonard Deutchman, analyzing four computer search cases:

But application of the plain view exception when computers are being searched poses challenges to the doctrine.

The requirement that the viewer must be near what is being viewed imposed physical restrictions to the doctrine, but with a computer search, those physical limitations disappear.

The officer who has stopped the driver for ignoring the stop sign could view only the area immediately around the car, posing no worry to the courts later reviewing the officer’s conduct that the officer could have somehow easily segued into searching the driver’s bedroom miles away, for example. Given, however, the hundreds of thousands of files that can easily be stored on a computer, and the manner in which a computer search is conducted — looking for keywords, for example, across all files — a computer search is akin to an officer walking into the foyer of a mansion and being able to see in plain view every person and object in the entire structure. Under those circumstances, a search for files pertaining to one crime will often, and easily, yield evidence of wholly unrelated crimes.

How, then, should the plain view doctrine apply to computer searches?

Different courts have provided different answers.

On reconsideration from Kindhearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev. v. Geithner, 647 F. Supp. 2d 857 (N.D. Ohio 2009), posted here, the indefinite asset seizure by Office of Foreign Asset Control is not a reasonable seizure, and the plaintiff must have a Fourth Amendment remedy, and this is a difficult question. Giving a post-deprivation remedy satisfies the Fourth Amendment. Kindhearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev. v. Geithner, 710 F. Supp. 2d 637 (N.D. Ohio 2010):

It is the role of the judiciary, however, to ensure the protection of individual rights. E.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 103 (1958) (“The Judiciary has the duty of implementing the constitutional safeguards that protect individual rights. When the Government acts to take away [fundamental rights] …, the safeguards of the Constitution should be examined with special diligence.”); accord Brill v. Hedges, 783 F. Supp. 340, 346 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (“[T]he judiciary’s role [is to serve] as a protector of individual rights and freedoms.”).

This is true in even the most dire of circumstances. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) (plurality opinion) (“We have long since made clear that a state of war is not a blank check for the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation’s citizens.”); see also Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934) (holding that “even the war power does not remove constitutional limitations safeguarding essential liberties”).

This tension between assuring security and protecting liberty is never-ending, and has been present since the founding of our Republic: “Emergency does not increase granted power or remove or diminish the restrictions imposed upon power granted or reserved. The Constitution was adopted in a period of grave emergency.” Blaisdell, supra, 290 U.S. at 425.

The question is probable cause to believe that the OFAC laws are being violated, not evidence of a crime, and a post-deprivation finding of probable cause as a remedy would satisfy reasonableness:

I conclude that the government need not show probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime will be found. The government must instead show that, at the time of the original seizure, it had probable cause — that is, a reasonable ground — to believe that KindHearts, specifically, was subject to designation under E.O. 13224 § 1.

I further find that if the government can show probable cause for the original seizure, even at this very late date, the post-hoc judicial finding of such cause remedies the Fourth Amendment violation.

. . .

If the government shows probable cause for the seizure, even at this very late date, then the Fourth Amendment violation will be remedied and thus harmless, and the government can retain the plaintiff’s assets pending completion of the administrative SDGT process.

During defendant’s stop for failing to use a turn signal, the officer spent 19 minutes on a warning ticket and then said “I am done,” but, when defendant tried to leave, the officer kept asking questions and trying to get consent. This made the stop unreasonable and without reasonable suspicion. State v. Passerini, 18 Neb. App. 552, 789 N.W.2d 60 (2010)*:

In sum, the circumstances which we view collectively consist of Passerini’s lawfully operating a rental vehicle properly registered in his name, abruptly exiting the interstate, nervousness upon being detained and questioned, and prior drug-related contacts. Based upon our de novo review and considering the totality of the circumstances set forth above, we conclude that law enforcement did not have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Passerini was involved in unlawful drug activity which would have been sufficient to justify the prolonged detention once the traffic stop had concluded. Thus, while law enforcement’s premonitions about Passerini may have eventually amounted to more than a “hunch,” the fact that the “hunch” proved to be correct does not legitimize the circumstances. See State v. Anderson, 258 Neb. 627, 605 N.W.2d 124 (2000), overruled on other grounds, State v. McCulloch, 274 Neb. 636, 724 N.W.2d 727 (2007). Therefore, the district court erred in denying Passerini’s motion to suppress, receiving evidence obtained in that search, and convicting Passerini of the offense of possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver. As such, we reverse the order of the district court and remand the cause with directions to set aside the judgment of conviction and remand for a new trial.

A landlord has standing to challenge city housing code violations even though he was not in possession of the property. Also, a search warrant could not be issued for property because the vehicles outside have different surnames as owners as tending to show two families reside in a single family dwelling. People v. All State Properties, LLC, 2010 NY Slip Op 20275, 29 Misc. 3d 201, 907 N.Y.S.2d 549 (Nassau Co. 2010):

The defendant’s motion also seeks to have evidence suppressed because evidence in the form of observations was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The prosecution argues that the defendant lacks standing to seek suppression of evidence because the defendant had no expectation of privacy. The defendant is the owner of the property but is not in possession. The property is occupied by tenants. The prosecution further argues that property ownership is only one factor to be considered when examining whether Fourth Amendment rights have been violated and that the defendant must also demonstrate a reasonable expectation of privacy in the searched premises.

Even though the defendant is a limited liability corporation, the protections of the Fourth Amendment apply. Hale v. Henkel 201 U.S. 43, 26 S. Ct. 370, 50 L. Ed. 652 (Sup.Ct. 1906). The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution states, “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” A corporation is an association of individuals with a distinct name and legal entity, and in organizing itself as a collective body it does not waive appropriate constitutional immunities. Id. at 76.

The violations charged against the defendant could ultimately result in fines, penalties and liens imposed against the property. These pecuniary interests demonstrate a direct proprietary interest in the property.

Parent of adult child living at home had apparent authority to consent under the “My house, my rules” doctrine [my words] of third party consent. United States v. Zarabozo, 378 Fed. Appx. 939 (11th Cir. 2010) (unpublished):

We conclude the district court did not err in ruling the evidence taken from Zarabozo’s bedroom was admissible, because Zarabozo’s mother had apparent authority to consent to the search of his room that led FBI agents to the probable cause they used to obtain a warrant. Zarabozo’s mother told FBI agents she was the head of the house and that by living in her house, Zarabozo had agreed he would abide by her rules and let her be “in his business.”

Zarabozo shared the bedroom with his thirteen-year-old stepsister. Zarabozo’s mother told the FBI agents she often went into the room to clean and straighten it. He kept the door to the room ajar. His mother repeatedly entered and exited Zarabozo’s bedroom, retrieving and replacing various items, during her interview with the FBI agents. Zarabozo’s mother opened Zarabozo’s mail and told FBI agents Zarabozo gave her the code to the lockbox for his gun, which he kept in his room. His mother made no mention that Zarabozo paid her $ 300 per month in rent. The district court found Zarabozo’s mother’s voluntarily showed the FBI agents into Zarabozo’s room and opened the lockbox for them without being asked. All of these events made it appear that Zarabozo’s mother exercised authority over Zarabozo’s space and belongings.

El Paso officers had a reliable tip that a van had a large quantity of marijuana in it. Officers followed the van from ground and air to a house that had all the appearances of a stash house. The unladen van left and was lost, so the officers returned to the house to make a knock-and-talk, and the smell of marijuana was powerful from the front yard. A knock at the door led to potential flight inside, and officers went to the back door to cut off an escape route and prevent access to potential weapons. The defendant then consented. The entry into the back yard had an independent source. United States v. Trejo, 378 Fed. Appx. 441 (5th Cir. 2010) (unpublished)*:

Even if we purge from the warrant affidavit any information officers obtained as a result of the intrusion of Trejo’s backyard, under the independent source doctrine, sufficient facts remain to constitute probable cause. See United States v. Hassan, 83 F.3d 693, 697 (5th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). This includes the corroborated tip about the van, the van appearing to deliver a cargo to Trejo’s house, the appearance of the house, the smell of marijuana and masking agents, the boxes observed during the protective sweep, and the canine’s positive alert for the presence of narcotics. See United States v. Pierre, 958 F.2d 1304, 1310 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (reasoning that the smell of marijuana can give rise to probable cause). Garza testified that he believed the officers had probable cause to seek a warrant after the officers smelled marijuana and the canine confirmed this observation. In light of these facts, we easily conclude that the officers would have sought a search warrant even had they not observed boxes through the back windows of Trejo’s house. See Hassan, 83 F.3d at 697.

The district court’s findings on consent were not overcome by defendant’s arguments on appeal. United States v. Toledo, No. 09-4103 (10th Cir. May 18, 2010) (unpublished).*

The government could not prove that defendant unequivocally intended to abandon his place because he might be coming back to it. However, the other person living there had apparent and actual authority to consent to the search and seizure. United States v. McKnight, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94353 (E.D. Pa. September 10, 2010)*:

Paige testified he left the apartment with no specific intent to return. The Government, however, did not meet its burden to show by clear and unequivocal evidence that Paige abandoned the apartment and all his property therein. Although Paige did not return to the apartment while he was staying at friends’ houses, and although his rent payments were significantly overdue, there is no evidence formal eviction proceedings had been commenced. His co-tenant, Walker, stated Paige continued to live in the apartment after she left the residence on December 20, 2009. Moreover, when asked whether he planned to never return to the apartment, Paige responded it was possible he would not return. Such an answer is too equivocal to provide clear proof Paige intended to abandon his property.

Officer responding to a shooting call at an apartment complex right after the call stopped the first car coming out, and that was with reasonable suspicion. The fact that there was another exit that the assailant could have been going out did not mean this stop was without reasonable suspicion. United States v. Williams, 619 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2010)*:

When Officer Hunt saw a lone vehicle hurriedly pulling out of a high-crime housing project in the middle of the night within seconds of a gunshot, it was eminently reasonable of him to suspect that the car’s occupants might have committed a crime. Accord United States v. Bolden, 508 F.3d 204, 206 (5th Cir. 2007) (“[W]hen an officer sees a solitary vehicle … leaving the precise spot where that officer has good reason to believe that multiple persons were shooting less than a minute before, it is more than a ‘hunch’ that those in the vehicle may be involved in the shooting.”); United States v. Henning, 906 F.2d 1392, 1396 (10th Cir. 1990) (concluding that reasonable suspicion justified the stop of a lone car, moving quickly, that “emerged from the general area of an early morning gunshot heard by officers only seconds earlier” in a high-crime area).

“Weapon confusion” of the officer attempting to Taser a fleeing misdemeanant but accidentally drawing his gun and shooting him in the elbow was still entitled to qualified immunity. Henry v. Purnell, 619 F.3d 323 (4th Cir. 2010)*:

Thus, the specific context of this case is where a police officer, who would have acted reasonably in using the taser to apprehend Henry, draws his firearm by mistake and unintentionally shoots Henry instead. The qualified immunity inquiry thus becomes whether an officer in that “specific context” would know that an act of weapon confusion of the firearm for the taser was “clearly established” as an excessive use of force under the Fourth Amendment. The answer is that neither in 2003, nor indeed today, is there clearly established law to resolve that question for courts, much less police officers in the field. At the time of the shooting, case law did not exist that applied the Fourth Amendment to the specific context in which Deputy Purnell acted. Deputy Purnell could not have been on notice because no case gave him fair warning that such weapon confusion violated the Fourth Amendment as a use of excessive force.

We agree with the District Court in Torres v. City of Mad-era, 655 F. Supp. 2d 1109 (E.D. Cal. 2009), which considered the nearly identical question of firearm for taser weapon confusion, that the police officer is entitled to qualified immunity. “At the time of the … shooting there was no clearly established federal law on what would make an officer’s mistaken use of her gun instead of her [t]aser unreasonable.” 655 F. Supp. 2d at 1125. In that circumstance, no police officer would have “fair notice” that a mistake of weapon confusion contravened “clearly established” law.

See Courthouse News Service.

It was reasonable to believe that there would be evidence of fraud on defendant’s computer for this search warrant. In an unrelated fraud investigation, computer generated false bills were found apparently coming from defendant. That was the link to the computer, hard drives, and thumb drive. In the officer’s experience [even in common experience], computers are used in committing alleged frauds like this one. United States v. Graziola, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42903 (D. Minn. April 13, 2010).*

The officer had qualified immunity for the wrongful stop of the plaintiff for avoiding a stop sign by driving through private property. He called the State Patrol for confirmation, but they were wrong. Still, that says nothing about his use of excessive force on the plaintiff. Solis v. Oules, 378 Fed. Appx. 642 (9th Cir. 2010) (unpublished).*

General consent to search defendant’s car included a backpack in the backseat. United States v. Cruz-Castro, 378 Fed. Appx. 632 (9th Cir. 2010) (unpublished), cert. denied 2010 U.S.
LEXIS 7226 (U.S., Oct. 4, 2010), cert. denied 2010 U.S. LEXIS 7249 (U.S., Oct. 4, 2010).*

A citizen complaint that the defendant threatened him with a knife while standing in a movie line was reasonable suspicion for a patdown for the knife under Terry. Harrod v. State, 192 Md. App. 85, 993 A.2d 1113 (2010).*

The evidence supports the conclusion that the search warrant was issued before the search. Defendant’s affidavit in a motion to reconsider was of no effect. State v. Anderson, 2010 Ohio 1886, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 1564 (6th Dist. April 30, 2010).*

The officer stopped defendant’s vehicle, and he could smell marijuana. Defendant’s admission that he had marijuana justified a drug dog sniff and the alert justified a search. State v. Wright, 155 Wn. App. 537, 230 P.3d 1063 (2010).*

Reasonable suspicion supported the search of defendant’s truck on the parking lot of a school for possession of drugs. The officer verified as much detail as he could from the anonymous tip, and he saw what appeared to be marijuana when he looked through the window. People v. Perreault, 287 Mich. App. 168; 782 N.W.2d 526 (2010), revg 287 Mich. App. 168, 2010 Mich. App. LEXIS 94 (January 19, 2010).

Defendant and his cohorts pushing a wheeled city trash can down the sidewalk at 2:30 a.m. on a non-trash day was reasonable suspicion in light of a city ordinance against anybody other than the city to pick up trash. People v. Edward, 402 Ill. App. 3d 555, 341 Ill. Dec. 563, 930 N.E.2d 1077 (2010).*

Officers arrested defendant’s wife on outstanding warrants. The officers tried to find her husband to take their child. One officer went to his house looking for him, and in the car in the driveway was a modified propane tank for making meth. That led to a search warrant for the premises for meth because Mrs. Boggs had a record for making meth. Looking in the car with a flashlight was not unreasonable. Boggs v. State, 928 N.E.2d 855 (Ind. App. 2010).

There were exigent circumstances for entry into defendant’s home by the police where they received a tip that he might be inside in distress by a neighbor, they knocked repeatedly and got no answer, and then heard moaning from inside and a foul odor suggesting a death. United States v. Smith, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103324 (S.D. Fla. September 17, 2010).*

Defendant consented to a search of his barracks computer for child pornography, and that supported the conclusion that defendant should be discharged from the military for conduct prejudicial to the military. United States v. Phillips, 69 M.J. 642 (N.-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2010).*

While search incident would not support the search of defendant’s car, the automobile exception did. The officer had PC to believe that there was something in the car and a dog alerted. State v. Hobbs, 933 N.E.2d 1281 (Ind. 2010).*

A border search of defendant’s cell phone was reasonable, so there was no point in defense counsel filing a motion to suppress it. Therefore, no IAC. Cancel-Ríos v. United States, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90336 (D. P.R. August 30, 2010).*

Telling the officer detaining defendant for DUI to get a search warrant for his blood was a refusal under the implied consent law. Bender v. Dir. of Revenue, 320 S.W.3d 167 (Mo. App. 2010).*

Defendant was a passenger in a car who had no standing to contest a search of the locked glove compartment under Rakas. Brendlin doesn’t even apply. Atkins v. Commonwealth, 57 Va. App. 2, 698 S.E.2d 249 (2010).*

Defendant argued that his stop and assuming the position for a frisk was unreasonable, but he fled before the patdown could occur, and a gun fell from his waistband in flight. The dropping of the gun was unforeseeable to the officer, and the exclusionary rule would not be applied. Fitchett v. Commonwealth, 56 Va. App. 741, 697 S.E.2d 28 (2010)*:

Unlike in Smith, appellant’s handgun was not first discovered during Officer Blount’s seizure of appellant. Here, appellant ceased submitting to Officer Blount’s authority and instead began running away from the officer. During his flight on foot, appellant tripped and fell, causing the handgun to fall from his waistband, where it had been concealed, and land on the ground. The officer never observed the handgun until it fell to the ground while appellant was fleeing from him. Because “[t]he primary justification for the exclusionary rule” is “the deterrence of police conduct that violates” a defendant’s constitutional rights, Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1067 (1976), the purpose of the exclusionary rule is satisfied only by the suppression of evidence that is the “foreseeable consequence[] of the police’s illegal conduct.” State v. Washington, 585 P.2d 249, 253, 120 Ariz. 229 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978). Here, however, appellant’s counsel conceded during oral argument before this Court that appellant’s accidental dropping of the handgun was an entirely unforeseeable result of the officer’s seizure of appellant.

Defendant was detained by officers standing outside the patrol car he was seated in, and he could not feel free to leave. The stop was continued without reasonable suspicion. State v. Tindall, 388
S.C. 518, 698 S.E.2d 203 (2010)*:

The question therefore becomes whether the officer reasonably suspected a serious crime at the point at which he chose not to conclude the traffic stop, despite his stated intention to issue a warning ticket, instead opting to continue his questioning. See Sullivan, 138 F.3d at 131. At that point, the officer had ascertained the following information: (1) Tindall was driving to Durham to meet his brother; (2) Tindall was driving a rental car rented the previous day by another individual which was to be returned to Atlanta on the day of the stop; (3) Tindall did a “felony stretch” on exiting the vehicle; and (4) Tindall seemed nervous. We find these facts did not provide the officer with a “reasonable suspicion” that a serious crime was afoot. Consequently, the continued detention was illegal and the drugs discovered during the search of the vehicle must be suppressed.