A probation officer is not a “stalking horse” for the police just because a police officer comes along for the probation home visit. Also, the fact the PO that came was not defendant’s regular PO does not make it unreasonable, either. State v. Reichert, 158 Wn. App. 374, 242 P.3d 44 (2010).*

Defendant showed up at a storage building under surveillance, and he used a unique passcode for the unit under surveillance. That was reasonable suspicion. When the police moved in, he tried to flee, and it ripened then to probable cause. United States v. Monyoukaye, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116440 (M.D. Pa. November 2, 2010).*

When a person is surreptitiously recording another in violation of that other person’s privacy, her reasonable expectation of privacy in this context was not the same as the one that had been developed under Fourth Amendment. People v Schreier, 29 Misc. 3d 1191, 909 N.Y.S.2d 885 (2010).*

A coffee filter sticking up from defendant’s pocket during a stop justified his frisk because, in the Eighth Circuit, knowledge of drugs equals dangerousness. United States v. Crippen, 627 F.3d 1056 (8th Cir. 2010):

A suspicion on the part of police that a person is involved in a drug transaction supports a reasonable belief that the person may be armed and dangerous because weapons and violence are frequently associated with drug transactions. United States v. Bustos-Torres, 396 F.3d 935, 943 (8th Cir. 2005). The district court found that because Officer Palmer remembered Crippen from the October 2008 search of Conroy’s house and knew coffee filters are used as part of the methamphetamine manufacturing process, he suspected Crippen was involved in a drug transaction and thus had reasonable suspicion Crippen was armed and dangerous. Accordingly, the pat-down search and seizure of the coffee filter was valid.

Defendant had a MySpace account that was suggestive to others of his being a pedofile and his online “friends” were all young boys. A search warrant was ultimately issued for defendant’s property. The USMJ concluded that the warrant did not authorize seizure of defendant’s computer, but the USDJ disagreed and overruled. Also, inevitable discovery would apply, as would the good faith exception. United States v. Underwood, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134092 (W.D. Ky. December 17, 2010).*

The drug dog arrived while the traffic stop was still going on within eight minutes. The stop was only “as long as necessary.” United States v. McDowell, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134010 (D. Kan. December 16, 2010).*

Defendant could not challenge the search of a computer of a person he was communicating with by instant messaging over the internet. United States v. Haffner, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134460 (M.D. Fla. August 31, 2010), adopted 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134453 (M.D. Fla. December 20, 2010).*

The police were waiting for a search warrant to issue in a child pornography case, but they entered before it was signed. Images were seen on the screen. The seizure had an independent source from the warrantless entry, and the affidavit for the search warrant showed probable cause without the judge abandoning his judicial role. The failure to tell the magistrate about the unwarranted entry “may be criticized generally, but it did not mislead the issuing judge as to the content of the materials at issue. Thus, even if we were to conclude that probable cause requires a more particularized showing of lewdness than was made here, the police’s failure to reveal information not relevant to that issue does not preclude application of the good-faith exception.” United States v. Bonczek, 391 Fed. Appx. 21 (2d Cir. 2010).*

Officers received a tip about a man drinking in a car at a little league ball park. The officer arrived and talked to the identified informant about 30 seconds when the car drove off. The stop was still justified by the report even though the driver committed no traffic offenses in her presence. Schneider v. State, 3 A.3d 1098 (Del. 2010).*

Consent was found voluntary because defendant was arrested by plain clothes officers who did not pull any weapons, he knew some of them, he was cooperative, and he was told of his right to refuse. United States v. Alexander, 391 Fed. Appx. 274 (4th Cir. 2010), cert. denied 2011 U.S. LEXIS 98 (U.S., Jan. 10, 2011).*

The officer did not unreasonably prolong the stop. Defendant consented to a search of his person producing $3,000 in cash and he was nervous. That was reasonable suspicion for calling in a drug dog. United States v. Whitney, 391 Fed. Appx. 277 (4th Cir. 2010).*

Based on multiple intercepted telephone calls, the officers had probable cause to search defendant’s vehicle when he was found. United States v. Verdugo, 617 F.3d 565 (1st Cir. 2010).*

The smell of marijuana, which the court credits, was not only reasonable suspicion, it is probable cause. United States v. Ortega, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85154 (E.D. Pa. July 22, 2010).*

The officer here developed information from a CI which was corroborated and rose to the level of probable cause. The officer called in the defendant’s probation officer for the search. United States v. Lish, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85138 (D. Idaho August 12, 2010).*

The threat to get a search warrant if defendant did not consent was not an “empty threat” because the officers had probable cause. Therefore, it was not unlawful coercion. United States v. Jones, 614 F.3d 423 (7th Cir. 2010):

In addition, Jones argues that Joseph was coerced into consenting based on Arnold’s “empty threat” that a search warrant would eventually be obtained. Jones is correct in asserting that baseless threats to obtain a search warrant may indeed render a consent to search involuntary. United States v. Hicks, 539 F.3d 566, 571 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. White, 979 F.2d 539, 542 (7th Cir. 1992). The appropriate focus, then, is on whether the police had a genuine intention to seek such a warrant, and more specifically, whether they had a reasonable factual basis to believe they had probable cause to obtain a warrant. Hicks, 539 F.3d at 572. [¶] The officers in this case had a reasonable factual basis to believe that there was sufficient probable cause to obtain a warrant.

Although defendant was in custody, he consented to letting a police officer search his cell phone for child pornography. His “low mental functioning” defense to consent is rejected because his actions showed he knew what he was doing when he was trying to hide the cell phone and his responses to questions about what was on the phone. The erect penis in the photograph, in context of other pictures on the phone, was probable cause to believe it was of a minor, although it could not be discerned with certainty. United States v. McGlothlin, 391 Fed. Appx. 542 (7th Cir. 2010)* (Anders brief, but the issue is fully discussed.)

A probationer was detained for investigation of theft from her employer and returned to prison. After a few days it was determined that she was not a thief and she was released. She sued the Alaska DOC for her seizure, and the court found that her “seizure” did not violate the Fourth Amendment because she was actually still in their custody. Diaz v. State, Department of Corrections, 239 P.3d 723 (Alas. 2010)*:

We affirm the superior court’s decision because: (1) Diaz’s officer-escorted trip to and interrogation at the travel agency did not implicate her Fourth Amendment rights as she was already in DOC custody when the DOC officers “seized” her; (2) the DOC officers’ actions, although disturbing, did not “shock the conscience” as required for a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; (3) Diaz’s return to prison, her day of segregation from the general population, and the two days of telephone restrictions did not deprive her of a liberty interest in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment because her freedom was not restrained in excess of her sentence and she did not experience an atypical or significant hardship in comparison to ordinary prison life; and (4) the private detective and his agency are not liable for conspiring with state officials to violate Diaz’s constitutional rights because no such violation occurred.

The officer’s mistake of law as to defendant’s use of the turn signal made the stop without reasonable suspicion, so the trial court suppression order is affirmed. State v. Ruelas, 327 S.W.3d 321 (Tex. App. – El Paso 2010).*

A particularity clause for evidence of ATV thefts was sufficiently particular. “The universe of responsive items reasonably finds a limit in the subject matter of the designated crime, which in this case presents a logical and discernible limit and thus confines officer discretion. See, e.g., Sanders v. Parrish, 141 F. App’x 412, 417 (6th Cir. 2005) (referencing materials in the search warrant affidavit to remedy a deficient description of items to be seized).” United States v. Taylor, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81617 (E.D. Ky. July 26, 2010) (R&R), adopted United States v. Taylor, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81769 (E.D. Ky. August 11, 2010) (“While multiple items could fall within the warrant’s terms, this by no means dooms the warrant’s particularity. … Other courts have held that warrants with language similar to the warrant issued in this case are sufficiently particularized.”).*

“James Cameron moves to suppress evidence obtained by Yahoo! during its search of photo albums located on the Yahoo! Network. The Court rejects the Defendant’s contention that in searching for and reporting to the Government that one of its customers was committing a crime against children, Yahoo! acted as an agent of the Government for Fourth Amendment purposes.” Yahoo! was acting as a citizen informant in turning the evidence over to the government. United States v. Cameron, 729 F. Supp. 2d 418 (D. Me. 2010).*

U.S. Park Ranger stopped the defendant outside a park for an offense seen in the park. While the stop was extraterritorial under his statutory authority, it did not violate the Fourth Amendment under Virginia v. Moore. United States v. Ryan, 729 F. Supp. 2d 479 (D. Mass. 2010).*

Defendant’s traffic stop was lawful, and the officer saw a Vicodin pill bottle in plain view, the subject of the investigation. United States v. Adams, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78535 (E.D. Mich. August 4, 2010).*

The arrest warrant justified the entry into defendant’s residence to look for him. The proffered alternative justification by the government of protective sweep is rejected because there is no clear showing that it was necessary. The entry satisfied knock-and-announce. United States v. Watson, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78620 (D. Md. August 3, 2010).*

Officers violated the Fourth Amendment with a warrant for business premises when they were really on notice two weeks before the search that there were two nearby offices that were separate (Suite 218 & Suite 218A). Garrison is instructive because there the officers discovered that there were two apartments and discontinued the search when they did. United States v. Muse, 729 F. Supp. 2d 905 (E.D. Mich. August 2, 2010):

Rather, the point of distinction of these cases is the information available to the officers at the time they conducted their search. There is no proper way a reasonable person could conclude that Suites 218 and 218A were part of the same unit on May 2, 2006. Suite 218A was distinct, different, separate, discrete, and clearly identified as such. There was no access from one suite to the other. Entry to Suite 218A was restricted by a separate lock and key. The signage was distinct. The name on the door identified a business that was not the focus of the investigation or even mentioned in the search warrant affidavit. The record shows that the agents were not only on constructive notice of the separateness of the units, they had actual notice, which prompted a call to the AUSA.

Unlike the officers in Garrison, the agents in this case did not discontinue their search of Suite 218A when they discovered it was a separate unit. They went ahead anyway, when they could have easily sought and likely obtained judicial authorization to search the separate unit, simply by providing some additional information to the magistrate judge who had issued the search warrant only hours earlier. The search warrant issued in this case did not authorize the search of Suite 218A.

Because the search of Suite 218A was beyond the plain terms of the search warrant, that search was, by definition, warrantless. The Supreme Court has consistently held that in the criminal context, warrantless searches are per se unreasonable unless they fall within a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions. Payton v. New York, …, Mincey v. Arizona, …. Those exceptions include the seizure of a fleeing suspect, …, prevention of the imminent destruction of evidence, …, searches incident to a lawful arrest, …, and consent, …. The government offers no evidence of any such circumstances and the records suggests none. The search of Suite 218A, therefore, must be deemed unreasonable.

Defendant was stopped and detained for jaywalking and was asked for consent. The consent was the product of an illegal detention when he would not have felt free to leave, and his search violated the Fourth Amendment. State v. Spain, 2011 Ohio 322, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 296 (10th Dist. January 27, 2011).*

Defendant’s admission that there was a marijuana pipe in the car justified a search under the automobile exception. The state’s reliance also on the search incident doctrine was misplaced because the search occurred before arrest. State v. Runyon, 2011 Ohio 263, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 218 (12th Dist. January 24, 2011).*

Defendant’s indecisive and erratic driving and smell of alcohol when stopped justified arrest for DUI. State v. Slates, 2011 Ohio 295, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 245 (9th Dist. January 26, 2011).*

The court punts a forfeiture case because the state turned money over to the federal government. Defense counsel’s argument is called “rambling” by the majority, and “anything but” by a concurring judge. The dissent says that the state cannot avoid suit for taking money by giving it to the feds. State v. Primm, 2011 Ohio 328, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 275 (8th Dist. January 27, 2011).*

The evidence of defendant’s traffic violation from the officer was clear and concise, credited by the trial court, and was binding on appeal. State v. Forkland, 2011 Ohio 337, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 284 (8th Dist. January 27, 2011).*

Defendant’s letting the CI into his house was a waiver of any Fourth Amendment claim about the CI. United States v. Johnson, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7156 (M.D. Tenn. January 25, 2011).*

The car defendant was in was stopped, and they were removed from the car and detained for a while. The driver’s consent to search the car was not relevant to the finding of the gun in defendant’s pocket since consent did not lead to it. Brendlin does not alter Rakas. United States v. McColley, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7181 (M.D. Tenn. January 25, 2011).*

The search was valid and the defendant did not even challenge the consent of the third party. And that’s assuming that he had standing. United States v. Hancock, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7591 (E.D. N.C. January 25, 2011).*

Defendant’s business was submitting monthly false statements to the FDIC and seemingly all a fraud, and that justified a broad search warrant, which the court does not find unconstitutionally overbroad. Still, the good faith exception would save the warrant anyway. United States v. Hergert, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140470 (D. Neb. December 30, 2010).*

A search warrant was issued for the remains of Jane Doe #1 under the concrete basement floor of a Brooklyn house. The affidavit was 24 pages long and clearly showed probable cause. However, entry into a file cabinet and seizure of a pair of women’s panties off from the floor was outside the warrant. The officers testified they were looking for human remains in the file cabinet, too. United States v. Yakovlev, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6537 (E.D. N.Y. January 21, 2011).*

“The CI here was new; thus, his past reliability was something that Agent Belcher could not assess. However, Agent Belcher took several precautions to insure that the CI was not simply sacrificing an innocent person to satisfy his obligations to the DTF.” The court then details what the officer did to corroborate the CI. United States v. Chitwood, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140299 (N.D. Ga. December 22, 2010).*

The protective sweep of defendant’s house was justified under the circumstances. United States v. Rodriguez, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140267 (D. Nev. October 22, 2010)*:

Here, HPD officers had specific and articulable facts supporting the belief that other persons posing a potential danger to them may be in the home. Both Rodriguez and McKenna made conflicting statements about whether anyone else was in the home, and McKenna’s demeanor changed when she was questioned on the matter. Rodriguez initially stated to both Officer VanBeveren and Officer Sage that his twin brother had shot the BB/pellet gun before he confessed he did it. He also stated that his best friend might be in the house. McKenna initially denied knowing whether anyone else was in the house then stated that her boyfriend might be in the home. When VanBeveren asked whether anyone else was in the home, McKenna hesitated and looked over her shoulder to the stairway. Officers speaking to McKenna heard a “rustling noise” in the house which McKenna said were her dogs. McKenna said her son often had sleepovers, and she did not know if any of his friends were there. Sage testified McKenna’s demeanor changed, and she became visibly nervous, sweating on her upper lip, when asked whether anyone else was in the house. Only after she was removed from the home did she claim no one else was in the home.

Defendant’s stop was converted from a stop to a de facto arrest. He was handcuffed before the frisk, the frisk came up empty, and he was not then unhandcuffed. United States v. Polanco, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6341 (S.D. N.Y. January 18, 2011):

Once Officer Bakraqi checked Polanco for weapons, and found none, however, his stated safety concerns no longer justified the maximal intrusion of handcuffing. Polanco had complied with all of Officer Bakraqi’s instructions by turning off his engine, surrendering his keys, and exiting his vehicle without objection, and when the Officer’s search of Polanco yielded no weapon, the safety concerns which once justified Polanco’s handcuffing, had, by this point, been allayed. At that moment, the moment in which Officer Bakraqi did not remove Polanco from handcuffs after finding no weapons on his body, the stop was converted into a de facto arrest because the maximal intrusion of handcuffing, a hallmark of formal arrest, was no long justified by “legitimate safety concerns.”

The person who consented to the search of the car defendant was in had apparent authority to do so. It is highly unlikely that defendant even had standing in the first place, but that is not decided. United States v. Young, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6389 (S.D. Ga. January 20, 2011).*

Off-duty officer seeing one person in a parking area giving the finger to another person did not form reasonable suspicion for a stop as a “possible road rage incident.” Jones v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 61 (January 26, 2011).*

Orin Kerr: An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, noted on Volokh Conspiracy.

Abstract:

Fourth Amendment law is often considered a theoretical embarrassment. The law consists of dozens of rules for very specific situations that seem to lack a coherent explanation. Constitutional protection varies dramatically based on seemingly arcane distinctions.

This Article introduces a new theory that explains and justifies both the structure and content of Fourth Amendment rules: The theory of equilibrium-adjustment. The theory of equilibrium-adjustment posits that the Supreme Court adjusts the scope of protection in response to new facts in order to restore the status quo level of protection. When changing technology or social practice expands government power, the Supreme Court tightens Fourth Amendment protection; when it threatens government power, the Supreme Court loosens constitutional protection. Existing Fourth Amendment law therefore reflects many decades of equilibrium-adjustment as facts change. This simple argument explains a wide range of puzzling Fourth Amendment doctrines including the automobile exception; rules on using sense-enhancing devices; the decline of the “mere evidence” rule; how the Fourth Amendment applies to the telephone network; undercover investigations; the law of aerial surveillance; rules for subpoenas; and the special Fourth Amendment protection for the home.

The Article then offers a normative defense of equilibrium-adjustment. Equilibrium-adjustment maintains interpretive fidelity while permitting Fourth Amendment law to respond to changing facts. Its wide appeal and focus on deviations from the status quo facilitates coherent decisionmaking amidst empirical uncertainty and yet also gives Fourth Amendment law significant stability. The Article concludes by arguing that judicial delay is an important precondition to successful equilibrium-adjustment.

The state procured a valid search warrant to put a GPS on defendant’s car while investigating him for stalking. The issue of whether this was a search does not have to be decided. State v. Sveum, 2010 WI 92, 328 Wis. 2d 369, 787 N.W.2d 317 (2010), affg 2009 WI App 81, 319 Wis. 2d 498, 769 N.W.2d 53 (Ct. App. 2009), 178 L. Ed. 2d 537 (U.S. Dec. 6, 2010)
:

¶2 Sveum and the State have briefed two issues for purposes of our review: (1) whether the installation of a GPS tracking device to Sveum’s car while his car was parked in the driveway of his home and the subsequent electronic monitoring of Sveum’s car using the GPS constituted a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution; and (2) whether the court order authorizing the installation and monitoring of a GPS tracking device on Sveum’s vehicle constituted a valid warrant and, if so, whether the police reasonably executed the warrant.

¶3 We elect not to resolve the first issue, and assume, without deciding, that a search or seizure occurred in this case that required authorization by a warrant. We therefore decide only the second issue, concluding that the order authorizing law enforcement to install and monitor a GPS tracking device on Sveum’s vehicle constituted a valid warrant and that the officers’ execution of the warrant was reasonable. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.

Indeed, the best a privacy advocate could hope for is a search warrant before placing a GPS, like Kyllo’s thermal imaging of a house. No court will ever hold that a GPS with a search warrant on a car is unreasonable.

Defendant was a college professor found to have 13,000 images of child pornography on his college owned computer. There was a college wide upgrade of computers and all the files on his old hard drive were copied to the new one. Two years later, he complained to the IT department that the computer was not working right, and they came to check it out. They found the child porn, some dating back to five years before the upgrade, and reported it. Defense counsel never moved to suppress it, and this was not ineffective assistance because the defendant could not show a reasonable expectation of privacy in the college’s computer, even though it was used only by him. He called IT to look at it. (The record was silent on anything about the computer policy, but that doesn’t seem to matter.) People v. Kent, 2010 NY Slip Op 7364, 2010 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7405 (2d Dept. October 12, 2010):

Here, the record establishes that the computer was the property of the College, but contains no further evidence regarding the terms of the College’s computer policy or user agreement with the defendant, if any. The defendant cannot show on this record that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his personal files stored on the office computer. Absent additional facts, we cannot conclude that counsel’s actions lacked any legitimate explanation. … To the extent that the defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim is premised upon matter dehors the record, we are unable to review such a claim on direct appeal. …

This defendant was the passenger in a car stopped for a traffic violation, and the driver almost immediately consented before the DL information came back from dispatch. The driver had authority to consent to the search against the passenger. In the back hatch area was a brick of marijuana that the officer could smell before it was found. Hall v. State, 306 Ga. App. 484, 702 S.E.2d 483 (2010).*

Even if defendant’s arrest was illegal, the exclusionary rule does not bar testimony of defendant assaulting the officer during the arrest. People v. Corr, 287 Mich. App. 499, 788 N.W.2d 860 (2010), ordered published March 9, 2010.*

Defendant’s “false friend” argument [my words] that he did not consent to an undercover officer’s entry failed. He let in the officer for a drug deal, and that was consent. State v. Allison, 326 S.W.3d 81 (Mo. App. 2010).*

Defendant’s co-tenant consented to a search of the premises, and defendant was there and did not object. Woolverton v. State, 324 S.W.3d 794 (Tex. App. – Texarkana 2010).*

In a Garrison-type situation where officers arrived with a search warrant for one apartment and discovered two, they withdrew to determine what do to. Before the question of getting another search warrant was resolved, they got valid consent for the apartment at issue. United States v. Pineda-Buenaventura, 622 F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 2010).*

Defendant was a suspect in a cold case murder from 1991. After DNA of someone other than the victim was recovered from the crime scene evidence in 2006, the police had renewed interest in him, and they followed him, picking up a discarded cigarette butt from the sidewalk. Seizure of the cigarette butt was valid and did not violate the Fourth Amendment because it was abandoned property. People v. Gallego, 190 Cal. App. 4th 388, 117 Cal. Rptr. 3d 907 (3d Dist. 2010).

Defense counsel was hardly ineffective for not challenging the police recovery of an abandoned video tape of defendant engaged in sex with a minor. Defendant moved out of an apartment and left it behind. His former roommate found it, confronted defendant with its contents, and then turned it over to the police who found the minor and confirmed the events. United States v. Meyer, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124344 (W.D. Ark. October 15, 2010).*

Defendant’s motion to suppress was properly granted because Gant did not apply; the automobile exception did. United States v. Arriaza, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 24207 (4th Cir. November 24, 2010) (unpublished).*

Wiretap seizure of telephone calls with defense counsel was unreasonable and violated the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Renzi, 722 F. Supp. 2d 1100 (D. Ariz. 2010):

Section 2518(10)(a)(i), however, provides that a defendant may move to suppress the contents of communications intercepted under that chapter on the grounds that “the communication was unlawfully intercepted.” The Supreme Court has opined that section (i) “must include some constitutional violations. Suppression for lack of probable cause, for example, is not provided for in so many words and must fall within paragraph (i) unless, as is most unlikely, the statutory suppression procedures were not intended to reach constitutional violations at all.” United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 525-26, 94 S. Ct. 1820, 40 L. Ed. 2d 341 (1974). The Court finds that the privileged communications were unlawfully intercepted, under § 2518(10)(a)(I), in violation of Renzi’s Fourth Amendment protections.

The Fourth Amendment guarantees “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. CONST. AMND. IV. Because our society recognizes a person’s legitimate expectation of privacy when consulting with counsel, see DeMassa v. Nunez, 770 F.2d 1505, 1506-07 (9th Cir. 1985), the seizure of potentially privileged communications raises serious Fourth Amendment issues. See, e.g., Klitzman, Klitzman and Gallagher v. Krut, 744 F.2d 955, 960-62 (3d Cir. 1984) (requiring special procedures to protect the attorney-client privilege during the search of a law firm).

A search is unreasonable, and thus violates the Fourth Amendment, when it is performed without proper judicial authorization, Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 562-63, 124 S. Ct. 1284, 157 L. Ed. 2d 1068 (2004), when the government seizes evidence beyond that which is authorized in the warrant, United States v. Mittelman, 999 F.2d 440, 445 (9th Cir. 1993), or when the government executes the search in an unreasonable manner. See San Jose Charter of the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club v. City of San Jose, 402 F.3d 962, 971 (9th Cir. 2005). Although the Wiretap Order did not address specifically the monitoring of privileged conversations between Congressman Renzi and his attorneys, Agent Odom specifically represented to the Supervising Court in his affidavit in support of the application for the interception of wire communications, that the government would minimize privileged calls and carefully train the monitors to recognize calls between lawyers and clients. By knowingly recording privileged calls, the government violated the Wiretap Order and seized evidence beyond that which was authorized. For these reasons, the government’s seizure of privileged calls violated the Fourth Amendment.

During a traffic stop, passengers are subject to some scrutiny. Asking questions of the passenger here led to finding drugs on him and in the car. Loper v. State, 8 A.3d 1169 (Del. 2010):

Loper’s first claim, that Officer Cancila exceeded the scope of the initial traffic stop by questioning Kennedy, runs as follows: Had Cancila not questioned Loper’s passenger, the police would have never discovered the PCP on Loper’s person or in his car. Because the police had no right to question Kennedy, the evidence ultimately seized as a result of searching Loper should have been suppressed. Loper’s argument fails, because he cannot show that by questioning Kennedy, the police exceeded the scope of the traffic stop or acted unreasonably under the circumstances. The United States Supreme Court has observed that during a routine traffic stop, all passengers are subject to some scrutiny.10 This Court has also held that during a routine traffic stop, the police may question a passenger about his or her identity, and that those questions are not beyond the scope of a reasonable investigation.11 Accordingly, the trial judge properly held that Officer Cancila did not exceed the permissible scope of a routine traffic stop by asking Loper’s passenger for identification and then running a background check.

10 Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 257, 127 S. Ct. 2400, 168 L. Ed. 2d 132 (2007) (“[E]ven when the wrongdoing is only bad driving, [a] passenger will expect to be subject to some scrutiny. …”).

11 Mills v. State, 900 A.2d 101 (Table), 2006 WL 1027202, at *2 (Del. 2006) (“[Q]uestions concerning a suspect’s identity are a routine and accepted part [of an investigatory stop].”) (quoting Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nev., Humboldt Cty., 542 U.S. 177, 186, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 159 L. Ed. 2d 292 (2004)).

CI was identified and made admissions against penal interest that she smoked marijuana with the defendant at his house. That was PC for the search warrant. Lanham v. State, 937 N.E.2d 419 (Ind. App. 2010)* [I suspect that the only reason why the police went after this defendant was selling the joint for $5 to his 14 year old CI in his house.].