Continued detention of a tractor trailer driver for a “Level III Inspection” of his potential fatigue level violated the Fourth Amendment because there was no reasonable suspicion he was fatigued or impaired. Owner-Operator Indep. Driver Ass’n v. Dunaski, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9289 (D. Minn. January 28, 2011):

1. Warrantless searches in a closely regulated industry are constitutional as long as (1) a substantial government interest is met; (2) the inspection is necessary to further the regulatory scheme; and (3) the regulatory program advises the owner of the commercial vehicle that the search is pursuant to law, defines the scope of the inspection, and adequately limits the inspecting officers’ discretion. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702-03 (1987).

2. Although Defendants were authorized to temporarily detain House on May 10, 2008, for a routine Level III Inspection, Defendants were not entitled to conduct the scope of investigation and questioning that they did. In doing so, Defendants continued the detention of House beyond what was reasonably related to the circumstances that justified House’s detention at the beginning of the weigh station stop. Defendants did not have a reasonable articulable suspicion that House was impaired, and the continued duration of the detention as well as the broad scope of questions by the Defendants constituted a seizure in violation of House’s Fourth Amendment right against an unreasonable seizure.

Defendant’s wife’s consent to seize and search his computer was general and unlimited, and not coerced. The trial court’s suppression order is reversed. State v. Trotter, 2011 Ohio 418, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 351 (8th Dist. January 27, 2011).*

Defendant counsel filed a motion to suppress which he withdrew before it was ruled on. This was not IAC because there clearly was consent for the search. State v. Cranford, 2011 Ohio 384, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 324 (2d Dist. January 28, 2011).*

A mere social guest on the premises had no standing. He had no clothing there, and he was just there for a little while when the police arrived. State v. Nevins, 2011 Ohio 389, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 329 (2d Dist. January 28, 2011).*

An officer’s training in spotting DUI drivers after they are lawfully stopped can be credited when determining reasonable suspicion for continuing the stop to investigate DUI. State v. Wiesenbach, 2011 Ohio 402, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 356 (11th Dist. January 31, 2011).*

The court has the discretion to reopen a suppression hearing, and here it rules against the defendant. There was a claim that two additional witnesses would help, but there was no affidavits from them and it isn’t clear they would change the outcome. There was also no showing of why the witnesses weren’t called in the first place. United States v. Diaz, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140776 (N.D. Ga. December 30, 2010).

Defendant’s motion to suppress showed a sufficient contention for a hearing on the scope of the search under his consent, but not on whether consent was valid in the first place. He signed a consent form that permitted a search for a gun, and he does not seem to dispute that it was by consent. United States v. Jimenez, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8888 (S.D. N.Y. January 26, 2011).*

Defendant’s vehicle was searched incident to his arrest for public intoxication, and it was [supposedly] valid at the time. Gant was decided after, and the question of search incident was never raised until appeal, so Gant can’t apply. McGhee v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 620, 701 S.E.2d 58 (2010).*

The officer received an anonymous tip that defendant had warrants for his arrest which was confirmed by dispatch; while he didn’t know whether they were for misdemeanors or felonies, that did not matter. The corroboration of a tip here would have to be applied differently than a tip of facts justifying a stop rather than existence of an arrest warrant. Sidney v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 517, 702 S.E.2d 124 (2010).*

The “right result, wrong reason” doctrine saves this search of defendant’s person because the officer actually had probable cause before the patdown. Under this doctrine, all the facts necessary to the conclusion have to have been developed in the trial court, and here they were. The court compared other cases where the rule was not applied because the facts weren’t developed. Perry v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 572, 701 S.E.2d 431 (2010).*

Following Perry then, the court of appeals erred in alternatively concluding that defendant consented to a search of his jacket when he asked for it on being arrested because the facts were not fully developed on this issue. There was a gun in the jacket, and he was a felon. Banks v. Commonwealth, 2010 Va. LEXIS 274 (November 4, 2010).* [One problem here will be “immediately apparent.” Depending on the gun, the weight of a gun in a jacket would be “immediately apparent” to anyone picking up the jacket, akin to “plain feel” under Dickerson. See where this is going? I’m not telling the prosecutors anything they probably won’t figure out on their own, even assuming they ever read this website.]

The officer here saw the defendant parking in a handicapped spot without a sticker, and then drove off. That justified the stop, and defendant was driving with his DL forfeited for life, and that’s a felony. Haynes v. State, 937 N.E.2d 1248 (Ind. App. 2010).*

Different recollections of the police officers as to “the time and place that consent” did not go to the voluntariness and was insufficient to find the trial court’s finding erroneous. Clemmons v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 810, 2010 Ark. App. LEXIS 856 (December 8, 2010).*

Police bike officers saw a middle aged couple in a park talking, and they seemed unusual for the park because of their age. So, the officers came up and asked for ID but said that they were not in any trouble. It turned out the man was under a restraining order to stay away from the woman, and he was arrested for it. One officer asked the woman in an after thought whether she had anything in her purse that was illegal, and she said no, and then consented to a search of her purse. A reasonable person would not have concluded that she was seized at the time she consented. State v. Ashbaugh, 349 Ore. 297, 244 P.3d 360 (),* revg State v. Ashbaugh, 225 Ore. App. 16, 200 P.3d 149 (2008):

Considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that [Officer] Schaer’s actions in asking defendant the questions that he did under the circumstances that existed did not “intentionally and significantly” restrict or interfere with her liberty. We further conclude that an objectively reasonable person in defendant’s circumstances would not believe that Schaer had done so. Accordingly, we reject defendant’s contention that, in light of the surrounding circumstances, Schaer’s questions about the contents of her purse and his request for consent to search the purse amounted to a seizure for purposes of Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. It follows that, whatever connection there might be between those questions and defendant’s consent to the search of her purse, the consent was not the product of an unlawful seizure.

Officers conducting a protective sweep looked up and saw a lactose bottle on a shelf, pulled it down, looked at it, and seized it. This was unreasonable under the protective sweep doctrine. United States v. Guzman, 724 F. Supp. 2d 434 (S.D. N.Y. 2010).

Opening an unmarked pill bottle during an inventory was reasonable. State v. Escoto, 2010 La. LEXIS 1664 (July 6, 2010).

While the case law is divided on whether a person not listed on the rental agreement has standing to contest a search of the car, in this case, the defendant made no effort to show standing, so he had none. State v. Jackson, 42 So. 3d 368 (La. 2010).*

Defendant failed to show standing in a hallway closet in his apartment building. State v. Harris, 122 Conn. App. 521, 3 A.3d 82 (2010).*

The trial court ordered home visits by a probation officer as a condition of probation. Statute also said that courts could order entries. Home visits do not require a court order, and the probation search here satisfied Griffin. People v Pagan, 2010 NY Slip Op 6351, 76 A.D.3d 414, 906 N.Y.S.2d 37 (1st Dept. 2010).*

Defendant was stopped for crossing the fog line a few times, and the officer asked for and received a general consent to search, which the defendant did not dispute. The scope of that consent was broad, and the officer could look in kitty litter containers. United States v. Guajardo, 388 Fed. Appx. 483 (6th Cir. 2010).*

The issue of defendant’s stop for traffic offenses leaving a known drug house under surveillance was deemed frivolous on this record by defense counsel, and it was. United States v. Hayden, 389 Fed. Appx. 544 (7th Cir. 2010).*

In an invasion of privacy suit, appellant is a worker’s compensation claimant who was videotaped from the street in a mosque praying for 45 minutes in front of a window. He had no expectation of privacy in front of a window. Tagouma v. Investigative Consultant Servs., 2010 PA Super 147, 4 A.3d 170 (2010).*

Probable cause was found: “The magistrate judge identified several ‘suspicious circumstances’ giving the troopers probable cause to believe drug contraband would be found in the minivan: (1) Braiske’s signs of nervousness, including shaking hands, labored breathing, a visible pulse in his neck, and the development of red blotches on his face; (2) Mayo’s extreme nervousness, including heavy breathing, sweating, a visible pulse in his neck, and avoidance of eye contact; (3) Braiske and Mayo’s contradictory statements about their travel history; (4) Braiske’s significant criminal history of drug related offenses; and (5) trooper Andrews’s discovery of two bindles consistent with drug packaging in plain view. The district court agreed and concluded that ‘the items recovered during the search are admissible under the automobile exception.’” This is supported by the evidence. United States v. Mayo, 627 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 2010):

In United States v. Ferrer-Montoya, we held that when a defendant gives his consent to search a vehicle, officers may “search containers within that car which might bear drugs, probe underneath the vehicle, and open compartments that appear to be false, or puncture such compartments in a minimally intrusive manner.” 483 F.3d 565, 568 (8th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (citations omitted). Though Braiske initially only consented to a “real quick” search of the minivan, he then clarified his answer by telling Andrews that, “yes,” he could “go ahead” and search the minivan. As we held in Ferrer-Montoya, we conclude that a “typical reasonable person” would have understood Andrews to be asking to search the entire minivan for drugs, including behind the door’s interior panels, and that Braiske’s answer authorized such a search. Because Andrews and his colleagues opened those panels in a minimally intrusive manner and because Braiske at no time objected or attempted to withdraw his consent, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the officers’ search of the minivan did not exceed the scope of Braiske’s consent.

A person with the keys to the business came and opened it in the morning and turned off the alarm. Officers came in the unlocked door and talked to him, and he consented to the search. Because he had the keys and alarm code, he had apparent authority to consent. The fact the business was not “open for business” is not dispositive. United States v. King, 627 F.3d 641 (7th Cir. 2010):

The district judge concluded that Cabrera-Lopez had apparent authority to consent to the search. We agree. Cabrera-Lopez had keys to the restaurant and the code to deactivate the alarm. He also opened the restaurant alone, and it was a small establishment. Cabrera-Lopez’s actions clearly justified the officers’ belief that he had full control over the premises, including the authority to grant access to others. See United States v. Pineda-Buenaventura, 622 F.3d 761, 777 (7th Cir. 2010) (stating that officers have a duty to inquire further as to a third party’s authority only “when the circumstances make the authority questionable in the first place”). And the fact that the officers knew that Cabrera-Lopez was not the owner does not invalidate his authority. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974) (“The authority which justifies the third-party consent does not rest upon the law of property … but rests rather on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes.”).

Officers had a search warrant for drugs on defendant’s person, and they had information that he kept drugs hidden in his buttocks. When defendant was apprehended, he “forcibly” resisted moving his pants by tangling his ankles and struggling saying they could not “stick a finger up [his] ass.” That reinforced the belief that drugs would be found in his buttocks, and drugs were found there. That search was reasonable. United States v. McGhee, 627 F.3d 454 (1st Cir. 2010).*

Defendant’s affidavit from motel room renter that he was an invited guest for three weeks to have standing was rejected as untimely, and then the appellate brief did not address it, so defendant failed to show standing in the motel room. United States v. Rios, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 24935 (10th Cir. December 7, 2010) (unpublished).*

Defense counsel is credited that a motion to suppress would have been frivolous, defense counsel was not ineffective. United States v. Laverde-Gutierrez, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128941 (S.D. Tex. December 7, 2010).*

Defendant’s stop by an off-duty law enforcement officer driving home who was outside her jurisdiction was valid under Virginia v. Moore. She called for assistance in handling a DWI, and a state trooper told her to stop the car. There is a sliding scale of exigency in DWI cases. State v. Stapa, 46 So. 3d 264 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2010):

In Virginia v. Harris, 130 S. Ct. 10 (2009) Chief Justice Roberts, with whom Justice Scalia joined, dissented from the denial of certiorari. Justice Roberts observed:

There is no question that drunk driving is a serious and potentially deadly crime, as our cases have repeatedly emphasized. See, e.g., Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1990) (“No one can seriously dispute the magnitude of the drunken driving problem or the States’ interest in eradicating it. Media reports of alcohol-related death and mutilation on the Nation’s roads are legion”). The imminence of the danger posed by drunk drivers exceeds that at issue in other types of cases. In a case like (Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266) the police can often observe the subject of a tip and step in before actual harm occurs; with drunk driving, such a wait-and-see approach may prove fatal. Drunk driving is always dangerous, as it is occurring. This Court has in fact recognized that the dangers posed by drunk drivers are unique, frequently upholding anti-drunk-driving policies that might be constitutionally problematic in other, less exigent circumstances.

Considering the especially grave and imminent dangers posed by drunk driving; the enhanced reliability and training of the Greenwood officer; that she was in a marked police vehicle; that she was driving behind defendant and observed his driving; that she contacted a state trooper with jurisdiction and was told to stop defendant; that there were exigent circumstances; that the trooper was at the stop within seconds; that traffic stops are typically less invasive than searches or seizures of individuals on foot; and the diminished expectation of privacy enjoyed by individuals driving their cars on public roads, we find that the stop by the Greenwood officer did not violate the constitutional protections against unreasonable seizures.

[Well, then, what about murder and rape? Really big drug cases? Meth labs? Firearms?]

Officers received a tip that the car defendant was in had cocaine in it. They stopped the car and searched it finding nothing. Then they searched the defendant passenger finding drugs. The district court suppressed the search because the police justification of officer safety was belied by the fact they waited 45 minutes after the stop and searches of the car. There was no probable cause for the search of defendant’s person during the stop. United States v. Moore, 390 Fed. Appx. 503 (6th Cir. 2010).*

Officers were in defendant’s house for 50 minutes talking to him about child pornography on his computer, and that counseled in favor of consent. The district court credited that the officers warned him of his right to refuse consent. Defendant knew exactly what the officers were looking for. United States v. Bach, 388 Fed. Appx. 2 (1st Cir. 2010).*

The driveway of a private residence is not private within the curtilage. Officers could enter to investigate what they saw there. United States v. Alvin, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129433 (S.D. Ga. January 12, 2009).*

Sole exigency here was that cocaine was being cooked up in defendant’s house and sold (thus “removed”) quickly, and that was sufficient to overcome not getting a search warrant before the entry. United States v. Walker, 390 Fed. Appx. 854 (11th Cir. 2010)*:

Walker argues that the government failed to establish an objective basis supporting the detectives’ fear that the evidence would quickly be sold. However, the district court credited the detectives’ combined training and experience, together with their personal experience buying crack from Walker’s home, and found that the detectives had a sufficient, objective basis for believing that the drugs would likely be removed from the home before they could obtain a search warrant. This finding was not clearly erroneous. Reid requires nothing more, since “[t]he test for whether or not exigent circumstances exist is whether the facts would lead a reasonable, experienced agent to believe that evidence might be destroyed or removed before a warrant could be secured.” Reid, 69 F.3d at 1113.

Defendant’s stop for a traffic offense led to seeing she wore no seatbelt and had an unrestrained child. A joint was seen, and that was probable cause for more of a search. United States v. Smith, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76423 (E.D. Ky. July 28, 2010).*

Knock-and-announce at defendant’s house was not required under the “useless gesture” exception since defendant was in custody and nobody was home. United States v. May, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76266 (S.D. Ala. July 26, 2010).*

Plaintiff’s arrest for disorderly conduct did not justify his strip search. Stearns v. Clarkson, 615 F.3d 1278 (10th Cir. 2010).*

Plaintiff attorney’s supposed First and Fourth Amendment claims against the Pennsylvania Supreme Court for a disciplinary action for her actions in federal court was patently frivolous and was properly dismissed with sanctions. Her ad hominem attacks against one of the judges requires she be referred to the disciplinary committee. Haagensen v. Supreme Court of Pa., 390 Fed. Appx. 94 (3d Cir. 2010) (unpublished).*

Defendant was encountered in a high crime area in the rain, without a coat, carrying a duffle bag. The officer talked to him and got identifying information and let him go. He checked that information and found it was false. He reencountered the defendant and the defendant abandoned the bag. Searching the bag gave PC for a search for his house. United States v. Labelle, 390 Fed. Appx. 539 (6th Cir. 2010).*

Handcuffed suspect could have still reached car such that a search incident of the car was valid. [!] Johnson v. State, 49 So. 3d 130 (Miss. App. 2010)*:

P12. Further, in rejecting Johnson’s motion to suppress, the circuit court also observed that there are many instances where a handcuffed suspect may still “obtain weaponry or other items to the detriment and danger” of law enforcement. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit also has noted this danger, stating:

Handcuffs are a temporary restraining device; they limit but do not eliminate a person’s ability to perform various acts. They obviously do not impair a person’s ability to use his legs and feet, whether to walk, run, or kick. Handcuffs do limit a person’s ability to use his hands and arms, but the degree of the effectiveness of handcuffs in this role depends on a variety of factors, including the handcuffed person’s size, strength, bone and joint structure, flexibility, and tolerance of pain. Albeit difficult, it is by no means impossible for a handcuffed person to obtain and use a weapon concealed on his person or within lunge reach, and in so doing to cause injury to his intended victim, to a bystander, or even to himself. Finally, like any mechanical device, handcuffs can and do fail on occasion.

United States v. Sanders, 994 F.2d 200, 209 (5th Cir. 1993) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). The circuit judge, sitting as the fact-finder, was in the best position to evaluate the evidence, such as Johnson’s height and build and his proximity to the vehicle, based on the totality of the circumstances. Thus, we agree with the circuit court’s finding that it was reasonable for law enforcement to search the front area of the car in order to ensure officer safety. We find that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Johnson’s motion to suppress as credible evidence existed to support the ruling. This issue is without merit.

Search warrant was overbroad as to financial records for a lack of a time frame to be seized, but not as to other things. United States v. Tomkins, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51059 (N.D. Ill. March 6, 2009):

The Court finds that the search warrants for defendant’s home and storage units were overbroad in one limited respect: they failed to impose a time limitation for the financial records, postal receipts, and telecommunications records to be seized. Although the government argues that time limitations as to the telecommunications records are implied by the supporting affidavits to be the time period relevant to the complaint, there is no evidence that the affidavits were incorporated into, or attached to, the warrants. The Court also finds unpersuasive the government’s argument that the time period was limited as a practical matter because people typically do not retain telephone records for extended periods of time. Since the government could have limited its request for these categories of items to a period of time more closely related to the events at issue in this case, the failure to do so rendered the warrants overbroad as to those categories.

The Court finds that the remainder of the warrants satisfies the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement, however, and that the lack of particularity discussed above did not transform the warrants into impermissible general warrants. The lists attached to the warrants are over three single-spaced pages long, and identify numerous detailed categories of evidence. These warrants were supported by lengthy and thorough affidavits that incorporated the criminal complaint. The items listed in the warrants clearly related to the matters detailed in the affidavit; for example, the broad category of financial documents sought could show a financial motive for defendant’s crimes, while defendant’s cellular telephone records could show defendant’s general location at the times calls were made. The categories to which defendant objects are properly described with generic language, since given the broad scope of defendant’s alleged scheme, it was not possible to particularize these items in greater detail, other than to limit the financial and telecommunications records and postal receipts by time period.

Defendant’s consent to search his vehicle in this capital murder case was shown to be voluntary. Defendant’s stipulation to admit evidence at trial that had been objected to and heard pretrial preserved the issue for appeal, but it would have been better to have objected again. Goff v. State, 14 So. 3d 625 (Miss. 2009).*

Police surveillance sufficiently corroborated an anonymous tip that it could be relied upon by the police. State v. Garcia, 197 N.C. App. 522, 677 S.E.2d 555 (2009).*

Search of defendant’s cell phone four hours after his arrest was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because it only produced evidence of his intent to deliver, not actual contraband, and the defendant never contested intent to deliver. Cisneros v. State, 290 S.W.3d 457 (Tex. App.—Houston (14th Dist.) 2009).*

Officers had a search warrant for defendant’s person based on probable cause. A search of his person did not produce contraband, so he was taken to the police station for a strip search. This moving was not an arrest and was reasonable. Moore v. State, 195 Md. App. 695, 7 A.3d 617 (2010):

Here, the search warrant authorized a search of a known drug dealer’s person for illegal drugs and associated paraphernalia. It is well known in the law enforcement community, and probably to the public at large, that drug traffickers often secrete drugs in body cavities to avoid detection. In the “Probable Cause” section of the Application and Affidavit for Search and Seizure Warrant in this case, the affiants stated, generally, that they knew “through their training, knowledge and experience” that drug traffickers “[s]ecrete contraband … in secure locations within their person … for ready access and to conceal the same from law enforcement authorities.” (Emphasis added). Based on the facts of this case, and guided by Paulino and Bell, we are persuaded that the search of appellant pursuant to the warrant was reasonable, considering the nature of the items being searched for and the places in which they are often hidden.

Defendant does not get a Franks hearing here. The CI was interviewed on tape, and it supported the affidavit and showed probable cause. The defendant had standing to challenge the search because he was an overnight guest. United States v. Williams, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115046 (D. Me. October 15, 2010).*

The affidavit described “child erotica,” and the fact that the images might have been computer generated and not real was not really a factor for probable cause. United States v. Ranke, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115352 (E.D. Mich. October 29, 2010).*

A Magistrate Judge of the Western District of Texas issues an opinion summarizing five years of case law to guide applications for cellular site location information (“CSLI”). In re United States for an Order: Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device, 727 F. Supp. 2d 571 (W.D. Tex. 2010):

As technology has advanced, new investigative tools have become available that federal law does not explicitly address. The Court’s focus in the present application is on cellular site location information (“CSLI”), which is information that resides on computer servers of telecommunications providers which allows law enforcement agencies to locate a cell phone, and its user, in both real time and, by accessing historical data, in the past. A request for CSLI presents a number of legal issues, and a growing number of decisions addressing these many have been handed down by magistrate and district judges in the past few years. The primary issue presented in those cases is the standard the Government’s evidence must meet for it to obtain an order requiring the disclosure of CSLI, and whether that standard is different depending upon the type of information sought (historical v. prospective data), or the means by which the information is to be acquired (single tower, multiple towers, or GPS data).

After meetings in 2005-06 with members of the United States Attorney’s office and representatives of law enforcement agencies, the magistrate judges in the Austin Division of this Court determined that a showing of probable cause would be required to obtain an order for any type of prospective CSLI. Those meetings were informal, and no written order expressing the basis for that conclusion was ever issued. In this opinion, the Court reviews the caselaw that has developed over the past five years on these issues, reviews the position of the Government, revisits the approach the Court has taken to date in these cases, and clarifies the procedures it will require when the Government wishes to obtain CSLI in the future.

. . .

V. TRACKING DEVICE PROCEDURE AND DEMONSTRATING PROBABLE CAUSE

What is the significance of the conclusion that a cell phone acts as a tracking device when it transmits information about its location? The significance is that if cell phones squarely meet the definition of “tracking devices” it is time to stop treating them as something else, at least when the Government seeks to use them to track a person’s movements. Rule 41 contains express procedures governing tracking device warrants, and those procedures need to be followed with regard to future requests for CSLI. This means several things. First, in past applications, the Government has taken the position that it has no obligation to provide notice of the tracking to the cell phone user, as its notice obligation was met by service of the order on the telecommunications provider from whom it received the CSLI. This does not meet the requirements of Rule 41, which provides that when a tracking device warrant is authorized, “the officer must serve a copy of the warrant on the person who was tracked or whose property was tracked.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(f)(2)(C). 19 Thus, warrants seeking CSLI must meet this obligation of Rule 41. Similarly, a return must be filed, as with all other warrants. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(f)(2)(B).

With defendant’s stop, he was asked if he was armed, and he reflexively reached down to the floorboard. The officer got him out of the car and searched the area for a gun finding a loaded magazine. The passengers were removed, and all were searched without finding the gun. A second patdown of the defendant produced a gun in his waistband. After finding ammunition, the second patdown was justified. Saffold v. State, 938 N.E.2d 837 (Ind. App. 2010).*

A text message photograph of marijuana from an 11 year old to his dad was justification for the officer to come to house where defendant lived with the child’s mother. Also viewing the photograph on the phone at the scene was corroboration of probable cause. Hurst v. State, 938 N.E.2d 814 (Ind. App. 2010).*

Defendant was parked in front of a drug house and drove off. Officers followed and pulled him over for not making a complete stop. He denied being at the drug house. He consented to a search of his person but not the car. Officers found nothing on him nor in a quick look in the car. His denial of being at the drug house was reason enough to look for a weapon. A search of the car found only drugs. The search was valid. State v. Johnson, 2010 Ohio 6224, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 5227 (2d Dist. December 17, 2010):

[*P14] In this case, appellant was seen leaving a well-known drug location at 1:30 A.M. Appellant subsequently implicated himself by denying this after being pulled over. Neither a pat down nor a cursory glance inside the vehicle can adequately negate the possibility that a weapon was in the vehicle. A brief protective sweep of the vehicle was necessary to ensure the safety of the officers and others. The limited, protective search was very brief. It only lasted about ten to fifteen seconds. Given the facts and circumstances, this was a legal search. The trial court did not err in admitting the crack cocaine as evidence and overruling appellant’s motion to suppress.

While a residential fire probably caused by a fuel burning appliance was being extinguished, the fire department called a building inspector to determine whether there was another such appliance in the building. Another locked apartment was found there, and they entered to look at it. [And, this court unconstitutionally put the burden of proof on the defendant as N.Y. courts chronically do: “Defendant, however, based on the testimony adduced at the hearing, failed to establish by a preponderance of evidence that the seizure was unlawful. Though the fire had been extinguished, the existence of an emergency had not been negated.” When are NY lawyers going to challenge this?] People v. Denis, 29 Misc. 3d 1150, 909 N.Y.S.2d 325 (Nassau Co. 2010).

Defendant’s motion to suppress the product of a protective sweep was reversed because the officers validly saw items in plain view and then put the observations in a search warrant application and came back for them. Commonwealth v. Matos, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 156, 935 N.E.2d 1285 (2010).*