A search warrant authorizing “the search of said location and any persons found therein and or involved in this investigation … and if the property above described is found there, to seize it and arrest all persons in the unlawful possession thereof, …” violated the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Thomas, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20119 (M.D. Fla. February 28, 2011):

Even if the Search Warrant incorporated the affidavit and the affidavit accompanied the warrant, as required by Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557-58 (2004), it would still constitute an unconstitutional general warrant. The Search Warrant purported to authorize law enforcement officers to seize and search persons who were involved in this investigation without defining in any fashion the investigation or the persons or how they were “involved,” and without even limiting the authority to “involved” persons at or near the Residence. The Search Warrant clearly constituted a general warrant as to “persons … involved in this investigation” which violated the Fourth Amendment.

Defendant’s driving gave reasonable suspicion to believe he was under the influence. United States v. Graves, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20397 (E.D. Va. March 1, 2011).*

Defendant’s § 2255 issue on failure to interview a witness that would have showed her consent to be coerced. The court does not even credit the defendant’s affidavit on this which was eight years after the fact; the affidavit looks suspicious and the signature does not look valid. United States v. Nichols, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20432 (D. Kan. March 1, 2011).*

Defendant attached an unsigned copy of a search warrant to his § 2255. Even assuming that the search warrant used in the case was unsigned, that is not a per se constitutional error because it does not prove that the judge did not consider and issue the warrant. Beard v. United States, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20161 (W.D. Mich. February 28, 2011).*

Defendant’s § 2255 argument that his defense counsel failed to renew his Fourth Amendment challenges is moot because the Fourth Amendment challenges were appealed. Pitcher v. United States, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19716 (E.D. N.Y. February 28, 2011).*

“[E]ven if the agent’s statements had been knowingly and intentionally false, that circumstance would not negate probable cause”; therefore, Franks hearing denied. United States v. Tomkins, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19793 (N.D. Ill. February 28, 2011).*

The CI’s statement provided timely information and was corroborated, so there was probable cause under Gates. United States v. Shearer, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19499 (E.D. N.C. January 21, 2011).*

Defendant had standing to challenge the entry into the apartment he was in in a housing project. He was the father of the tenant’s three children, although the record is not clear whether they were married in Cuba in 1995 or not. Nevertheless, he regularly watched their children when she was at work, and he could come and go as he pleased. The government’s reliance on Minnesota v. Carter, the drug manufacturing case, is clearly misplaced. The court finds, however, that his girlfriend consented to the entry of the police. She was not credible at all on what happened, and she clearly exaggerated facts. United States v. Romero-Leon, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101760 (D. N.M. April 19, 2010)*:

While there is no case law specifically on point, the Court finds that Defendant’s relationship with Virgen Garcia and the children combined with his regular visits to their home give Defendant a reasonable expectation of privacy in the Princess Jeanne residence. Ms. Garcia and the children clearly considered Defendant a part of their family. The evidence shows that Defendant spent a significant number of his waking hours at the Princess Jeanne address—often without Ms. Garcia present. In addition, Ms. Garcia had given Defendant a key to the home so that he could come and go freely. Taken together, all these facts suggest that Defendant subjectively treated the house as his own, even though he did not permanently reside there. Furthermore, given his familial relationship with Ms. Garcia and the children, the Court finds that Defendant’s expectation was objectively reasonable.

“[T]he warrant did authorize the seizure of ‘documents relating to the illegal trafficking of firearms and ammunition.’” Documents relating to defendant’s occupancy of the premises could be seized under the warrant. United States v. Victor, 394 Fed. Appx. 747 (2d Cir. 2010).*

An “all persons” on the premises clause in the search warrant did not make it unreasonable, and the good faith exception would save it anyway. United States v. Hicks, 395 Fed. Appx. 80 (4th Cir. 2010).*

Defendant clearly consented to the search of his computer for child pornography after he was told he did not have to consent. United States v. Murinko, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 18979 (9th Cir. September 10, 2010) (unpublished).*

Cocaine found in the defendant’s car was in plain view and two officers saw it differently, but that did not make them unreliable. What was found on his person was thus the product of a search incident. United States v. Shakur, 394 Fed. Appx. 974 (4th Cir. 2010) (unpublished).*

Gant was decided after defendant’s conviction and before he was sentenced. He could not benefit from Gant because he did not have standing in the car that was subjected to the search incident. United States v. Ferguson, 395 Fed. Appx. 77 (4th Cir. 2010).*

The district court erred in finding that the owner of property who three years earlier signed a no trespass letter had common authority over the property at the time of consent. “Furthermore, it goes without saying that even a party with authority over the premises at the time of a search cannot grant consent retroactively.” The officers had no consent from anyone with actual or apparent authority. As to the government’s alternative basis for the search, a lack of standing, the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy at least as an overnight guest. The District Court erred in not suppressing the search. United States v. Kimber, 395 Fed. Appx. 237 (6th Cir. 2010)*:

Further, we have no doubt that society would recognize Kimber’s subjective expectation of privacy as reasonable. The Anglo-American tradition has long regarded the forcing open of locked doors by law enforcement officials with special disapproval (even where, unlike here, the police have a warrant supported by probable cause). See Semayne’s Case, 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 91b, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195-96 (K.B. 1603) (“[T]he law … abhors the destruction or breaking of any house (which is for the habitation and safety of man) by which great damage and inconvenience might ensue ….”); see also Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931-34 & n.2 (1995) (discussing common-law and colonial authorities). Accordingly, we cannot affirm on this alternative basis, either.

[Clearly an illegal search with four theories of the government accepted by the district court and rejected by the Sixth Circuit, and it goes down unpublished and per curiam. This is somewhat remarkable because the district court did not suppress in the first place because it is so obvious.]

Money in defendant’s vehicle had to be inventoried because he gave inconsistent versions of how much he had. The inventory policy was reasonable. United States v. Lewis, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134801 (S.D. Tex. December 21, 2010).*

Defense counsel was not ineffective for not challenging the search in this case because defendant lacked standing to challenge the search. United States v. Washington, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134991 (M.D. Pa. December 21, 2010).*

During a traffic stop, defendant’s refusal to keep his hands in sight in his car justified a frisk for a weapon. State v. Latson, 2010 Ohio 6297, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 5262 (10th Dist. December 21, 2010).*

Random weapons searches of probationers were justified by state law and this one was reasonable. Commonwealth v. Wilson, 2010 PA Super 233, 11 A.3d 519 (2010).*

The search of defendant’s car was valid under Belton, but not Gant, so the Gant good faith exception applies. Alternatively, inevitable discovery applied because the vehicle would be inventoried. United States v. Ethingor, 388 Fed. Appx. 858 (11th Cir. 2010).*

The defendant was stopped at a roadblock which had some defects in its establishment, but it was not unconstitutional because it was apparent what it was. When the officers saw defendant’s vehicle stop, a flashlight was shined in, and a bag of marijuana was seen in plain view. The use of the flashlight was not a search. United States v. Cole, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82822 (N.D. Ga. August 11, 2010),* adopting 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82737 (N.D. Ga. May 12, 2010).*

A second entry without a warrant did not require suppression of a search warrant because nothing additional was seen or taken that had not already been found. United States v. Bergin, 732 F. Supp. 2d 1235 (M.D. Fla. 2010).*

A certificate of appealability (COA) from denial of habeas relief for failing to pursue a motion to suppress based on the smell of marijuana was denied because the case raises no issue for appeal that reasonable jurists would differ on. Mosby v. United States, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83373 (C.D. Ill. August 12, 2010).*

[posted 8/18/10]

When the officer asked C.C. for the marijuana he had, the officer did not know that it was in C.D.M.’s possession. Thus, C.C. was not enlisted as an agent of the police. State v. C.D.M., 50 So. 3d 659 (Fla. App. 2d DCA 2010):

Finally, the fact that C.C. testified that he felt obligated to cooperate with Deputy Vinson did not transform him into an agent of the police. In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 488, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1971), the Supreme Court held that, even though a witness may have felt obliged to cooperate, “it is no[t] part of the policy underlying the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to discourage citizens from aiding to the utmost of their ability in the apprehension of criminals.” In holding that the witness was not acting as an agent of the police in that case, even though she may have felt obliged to cooperate, the Court stated that the evidence could only be excluded if “some type of unconstitutional police conduct occurred.” Id. We conclude that Deputy Vinson’s conduct in asking C.C. if he was “willing to voluntarily give” up the marijuana was proper and in no way coercive. See State v. Martissa, 18 So. 3d 49, 52 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (“During a traffic stop an officer may ask if a person is in possession of a weapon or drugs.”).

Defendant was on probation with a search condition, so the search of his place was valid. Brown v. State, 307 Ga. App. 99, 704 S.E.2d 227 (2010).*

Defendant’s patdown was justified by a stop based on reasonable suspicion from a radio broadcast of a fellow officer. Thomas v. State, 8 A.3d 1195 (Del. 2010).*

In a money laundering case, the government satisfied the “all record” exception to particularity of “pervaded” with fraud. United States v. D’Amico, 734 F. Supp. 2d 321 (S.D. N.Y. 2010):

When there is probable cause to believe that an entire business is “pervaded” or “permeated” with fraud, seizure of all records of the business is appropriate, and broad language used in a search warrant will not offend the particularity requirement. See U.S. Postal Serv. v. C.E.C. Servs., 869 F.2d 184, 187 (2d Cir. 1989); Nat’l City Trading Corp. v. United States, 635 F.2d 1020, 1024-25 (2d Cir. 1980); see also United States v. Smith, No. 05-CR-293A. 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52377, at *8 (W.D.N.Y. July 19, 2007) (“Although the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment creates a general presumption against ‘general’ or ‘all-records’ warrants, courts, including the Second Circuit, have recognized an exception where there is probable cause to believe that criminal activity permeates the business to be searched.”). This is known as the “‘all-records’ exception” to the particularly requirement, United States v. Burke, 718 F. Supp. 1130, 1139 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), although “[t]he principle is not so much an ‘exception’ to the particularity requirement… as a recognition that a warrant–no matter how broad–is, nonetheless, legitimate if its scope does not exceed the probable cause upon which it is based,” United States v. Bowen, 689 F. Supp. 2d 675, 683 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

In order to trigger the all-records exception, “it is not necessary that the affidavit supporting the search warrant set forth specific factual evidence demonstrating that every part of the enterprise in question is engaged in fraud.” Burke, 718 F. Supp. at 1139. “Rather, the affidavit need contain only sufficient factual evidence of fraudulent activity from which a magistrate could infer that those activities are ‘just the tip of the iceberg.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Offices Known as 50 State Distributing Co., 708 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1021, 104 S. Ct. 1271, 104 S. Ct. 1272, 79 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984)).

Oklahoma refuses to apply a Gant good faith exception. Baxter v. State, 2010 OK CR 20, 238 P.3d 934 (2010)*:

[*P12] The State argues that application of the law here would have no deterrent effect. Given the requirement, discussed above, that Gant must be applied to cases pending on direct appeal when it was decided, this argument is misplaced. In addition, applying Gant will have a deterrent effect. It will confirm to law enforcement officers in Oklahoma the change in the law and serve as an example and an explanation of the reason law enforcement agencies must adapt their vehicle search practice to conform to the law in Gant.

A gun found underneath the seat cushion where defendant was seated when he was arrested was within his immediate area of control and was properly the subject of a search incident. State v. Harrell, 2010 WI App 132, 329 Wis. 2d 480, 791 N.W.2d 677 (2010).*

Defendant’s claim that he did not consent was not properly preserved at trial. United States v. Strother, 387 Fed. Appx. 508 (5th Cir. August 18, 2010) (unpublished).

Defendant’s vehicle had just been registered, and it was not in the computer system. The officer was entitled to keep checking because of prior experience with false registrations, and defendant consented during that time period. United States v. Justice, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87128 (E.D. Ky. August 24, 2010).*

Collective knowledge of police doctrine applied to traffic stop for speeding where officer radioed ahead to another. United States v. Allen, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5565 (W.D. Ark. January 4, 2011)* [Note: Obviously. If not, how could a spotter in an airplane or an officer running fixed radar with somebody else doing the stopping ever work?]

Search warrant application for drug dealing to minors sought also search of defendant’s computer and cell phone. It is logical to find evidence of drug dealing on the cell phone from calls made to arrange transactions. After the warrant was issued but before it was served, the police developed information that there might be child pornography on the computer transferred from the cell phone. The computer was searched under the warrant and child pornography was found. Since defense counsel did not challenge the search on the ground that they expected to find child pornography, the search is valid. United States v. Chappell, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140051 (W.D. N.Y. October 15, 2010).*

Defendant was stopped because the officer knew that his license was suspended. Also, the officer had probable cause based on a CI’s information about drug dealing, so Gant does not apply to this search. United States v. Hambrick, 630 F.3d 742 (8th Cir. 2011).*

The impoundment of the car in this case was reasonable because the passenger/owner of the car was unlicensed and unable to drive or readily find an alternative. Failure to make a complete record of everything in the car is not a Fourth Amendment violation. United States v. Cartwright, 630 F.3d 610 (7th Cir. 2010):

Finally, Cartwright argues that Barleston did not conduct the inventory search properly, failing to make a complete list of the property he found in Golliday’s car. While Cartwright correctly points out that IMPD policy required Barleston to make such a list, Barleston’s failure to do so does not undermine the proposition that the police would inevitably have found the gun through a lawful inventory search. In determining whether the inevitable discovery doctrine applies, the court considers a hypothetical situation. Of course, by the time Barleston conducted the actual inventory search here, the gun had already been seized, and Cartwright was already under arrest. But the district court found, based on the evidence and the IMPD policy, that an inventory search would have been conducted and that the gun would have been found pursuant to such a search. The evidence supports that conclusion. In any event, we have held that minor deviations from department policy do not render an inventory search unreasonable. See United States v. Lomeli, 76 F.3d 146, 148-49 (7th Cir. 1996).

Defendant was not asked for consent but a third party consenter was. Without an express refusal by defendant, Randolph does not apply. United States v. Smith, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136669 (E.D. Tenn. November 23, 2010), adopted 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136709 (E.D. Tenn. December 27, 2010).*

The officer’s assertion at the time of arrest that defendant was being arrested for having a Mexican driver’s license, which was a mistake of law, does not defeat the arrest because the officer also had PC to believe that the defendant was involved in drug trafficking. United States v. Baldenegro-Valdez, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136881 (W.D. Mo. November 10, 2010).*

Noting a conflict in the cases, with the majority of cases saying a mistake of law is not objective good faith, South Dakota decides that objectively unreasonable mistakes of law do not support arrests. State v. Wright, 2010 SD 91, 791 N.W.2d 791 (December 8, 2010):

[*P21] This case is thus more analogous to Webb and Washington than Martin. Trooper Biehl may have believed in good faith that Wright violated SDCL 32-17-7, “[b]ut his subjective good faith is not sufficient to justify the stop[.]” Martin, 411 F.3d at 1001. “[O]fficers have an obligation to understand the laws that they are entrusted with enforcing, at least to a level that is objectively reasonable.” Id. “Any mistake of law that results in a search or seizure, therefore, must be objectively reasonable to avoid running afoul of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. Trooper Biehl acted upon a mistake concerning a clear and unambiguous statute. Given the clear and unambiguous language of SDCL 32-17-7, Trooper Biehl’s mistake of law was not objectively reasonable. Consequently, the trial court erred by denying Wright’s motion to suppress the evidence discovered during the stop and subsequent search of his vehicle.

The fact the officer arrested defendant with probable cause but contrary to a Sheriff’s directive or in violation of statute was not a Fourth Amendment issue. State v. Talbot, 2010 UT App 352, 246 P.3d 112, 671 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 (2010):

[*P10] For purposes of this appeal, we accept Talbot’s assertion that the Deputy’s initial encounter with Talbot was an arrest rather than a detention. Talbot makes no claim that the Deputy’s inherent authority as a serving peace officer to arrest malefactors was constrained by anything other than the Sheriff’s instructions and constitutional boundaries. Applying the reasoning of Harker, we conclude that so long as Talbot’s arrest was justified by probable cause, the fact that the Deputy may have exceeded the instructions given to him by the Sheriff has no bearing on whether Talbot’s arrest was “lawful” under the Constitution. If an arrest in violation of a statutory restriction does not itself raise constitutional issues, then, a fortiori, an arrest that exceeds a superior’s immediate directive in a particular circumstance does not do so. Therefore, the pivotal question in determining whether Talbot’s arrest was constitutional is whether the arrest was supported by probable cause.

Entry onto the curtilage is presumptively a trespass, and the state could not justify it. State v. Olinger, 240 Ore. App. 215, 246 P.3d 20 (2010):

Entry onto the property for purposes other than to contact persons at the front door, however, is a different matter. Such intrusions onto a home’s curtilage are presumptively trespasses, unless the circumstances so strongly evince an invitation to the public that it can be said that the homeowner has implicitly invited entry. State v. Pierce, 226 Ore. App. 336, 343-45, 203 P.3d 343 (2009); Somfleth, 168 Ore. App. at 425; State v. Glines, 134 Ore. App. 21, 25, 894 P.2d 516, rev den, 321 Ore. 512, 900 P.2d 509 (1995).

In this case, the state argues that it is no less common or acceptable for the public (and thus the police) to be in an offshoot of a driveway with a parked car in it than it is for the public to be in the driveway itself, at least absent any evidence of the resident’s intent to exclude the public from that area. Thus, in the state’s view, we must presume that defendant implicitly consented to public entry into that area unless there is evidence that defendant intended to exclude the public, which, the state contends, there is not.

We disagree that that is the appropriate analysis. The presumption of implied consent to enter does not necessarily extend to all portions of a driveway. See Pierce, 226 Ore. App. at 345-46 (police did not have implied consent to walk up a driveway that extended along the side of the defendant’s house and look in the backyard). The mere fact that the “offshoot” on which the car was parked may have been connected to, or part of, the driveway, is not dispositive. Rather, it is the location of the offshoot that matters. The uncontroverted evidence in the record here shows that the portion of the offshoot where the car was parked was on the side of the house—beyond the area in which implied consent is presumed.

Thus, Brown’s entry into the area on the side of the house is presumptively a trespass unless there is evidence in the record of circumstances that evince implied invitation to the public to enter that area. The state points to no such evidence, and our review of the record reveals none.

Defendant rented the car, so he had standing. The warrant for his house did not describe vehicles, and the rental car was parked three doors down, so it was not within the warrant. The motion to suppress should have been granted. United States v. Spencer, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18639 (W.D. N.Y. January 26, 2011), adopted and motion to reconsider denied United States v. Spencer, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18641 (W.D. N.Y. February 25, 2011):

Defendant’s rental car, however, was parked down the street from that address, approximately three doors down. That vehicle’s location is beyond the scope of the warrant, which does not describe any particular vehicle to be searched. The police thus needed either a warrant expressly identifying that vehicle, the present warrant expressly including such vehicles as are in defendant’s possession (regardless of whether they were on 509 North Fifth Street) or consent by defendant or other exception from the warrant requirement to search it. A warrantless search of an automobile has been found to be reasonable, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982), provided that this search is supported by probable cause. As discussed above, there is not a sufficient record to determine if there was probable cause to issue the warrant, much less to search a vehicle doors away from defendant’s property without an assertion that defendant concealed contraband in that vehicle. It is not clear from this record that defendant (or anyone else) consented to the search of the vehicle. On this basis, defendant’s motion to suppress should be granted.

Defendant failed to show that this FPD was ineffective for not pursuing a motion to suppress. The court finds that the defendant got half the sentence from his plea he risked by trial, and the FPD talked to him about the motion to suppress and it was a considered decision to waive the motion to suppress. United States v. Louie, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18647 (E.D. February 25, 2011).*

Defendant was staying in a hotel room with his mother, and the police had no basis for concluding that she had apparent authority to consent to a search of the hotel room. All their information going in was that the defendant was in control and they had no information that gave her apparent authority. State v. Nicholas, 51 So. 3d 98 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2010)*:

Moreover, in marked contrast to Gettridge, Molette, and even Brown, the State presented no testimony indicating that Ms. Jones ever represented to Det. Stovall that she had the authority to consent to a search of her adult son’s residence, which she happened to own. The only testimony was to the effect that she was asked to give consent and did so, not that the detective was in possession of any facts upon which he could rely to find that she had any authority. Instead, it appears that Det. Stovall simply believed that a hotel owner can give valid consent to the search of a hotel room. Considering the jurisprudence, such a belief is not reasonable nor does it justify the failure to seek a warrant before searching.

Defendant had no standing in a car as a passenger. It was rented by his girlfriend’s father and driven by her. His subjective expectation of privacy in his gun in the car was not one that society would recognize as reasonable. United States v. Thompson, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113279 (D. Me. October 21, 2010).*

Defendant’s 2255 that included a claim that defense counsel did not challenge a search failed to show prejudice because of the overwhelming proof against him. United States v. Ruelas, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113157 (C.D. Cal. October 12, 2010).*

Defendant’s Rule 41(g) motion was improperly denied without a hearing. The government said that the property was destroyed after the case was over, but defendant had the right to seek return and have a hearing if she made a sufficient showing. United States v. Melquiades, 394 Fed. Appx. 578 (11th Cir. 2010):

Similarly, in this case, Melquiades needed only to allege facts sufficient to demonstrate his possessory interest in the seized goods. Despite the government’s arguments to the contrary, he was not burdened with “show[ing] that the United States ever had seized the asserted property, most of which he described in extremely vague terms,” or “that the asserted property belonged to him.” Rather, when evaluating whether the district court correctly denied Melquiades’s motion based solely on the party’s pleadings, “we are concerned only with the allegations contained in [the motion] and not with actual evidence.” See Rodriguez-Aguirre, 264 F.3d at 1206. To hold otherwise and “[r]equir[e] evidence of ownership, as opposed to allegations of ownership, [would be] antithetical to the standards for reviewing 12(b)(1) motions to dismiss for lack of facial standing.” Id.

Construing Melquiades’s Rule 41(g) motion—the functional equivalent of a civil complaint—in Melquiades’s favor, and interpreting his pro se filings liberally, Melquiades alleged that when federal law enforcement agents searched his home on January 13, 2003, they confiscated certain, specifically listed items. Melquiades clearly stated that, “in this case the Movant is the owner of the property.” He also asserted entitlement to its return. Thus, Melquiades has alleged facts sufficient to show that he has a possessory interest in some property, that the government seized these items, and that they were not returned. Accordingly, it was error to deny Melquiades’s motion without collecting evidence to resolve the parties’ factual disputes. See Potes Ramirez, 260 F.3d at 1314.

The motion to suppress the stop of defendant’s tractor trailer is granted because the court does not believe the officer. United States v. Moore, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86906 (E.D. Mich. August 24, 2010)*:

It was not objectively reasonable for Corporal Bazzi to believe that the left turn signal on Moore’s semi-tractor was not illuminated. While Officer King testified that it was “a little foggy” on the night of the traffic stop, Corporal Bazzi had sufficient opportunity to determine whether the turn signal was illuminated. He had Moore’s semi-tractor and trailer under surveillance for a couple of hours, and Officer King testified that Moore was driving slow. [¶] The Court finds the stop of Moore’s semi-tractor and trailer was unlawful at its inception.

On de novo review from the USMJ’s grant of the motion to suppress for probable cause, the USDJ finds that there was, in fact, probable cause for search of the bag in defendant’s possession. The USDJ looked at the bag. United States v. Marshall, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86983 (S.D. Fla. August 24, 2010),* rejecting in part R&R 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86986 (S.D. Fla. May 28, 2010)* [another example of the government getting two bites at the apple; the hearing before the USMJ is binding on the defendant but just a dry run for the government?].

“Based on the information provided by [CI] Olmsted—particularly that he had seen the anhydrous tank in the past week or so and had witnessed meth being cooked there before—along with [Officer] Kingsley’s own experience concerning methamphetamine labs, Kingsley had specific facts to form a reasonable suspicion that there was a meth lab in the cabin.” United States v. Barttelt, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86786 (W.D. Wis. August 23, 2010).*

Weaving and driving too slow justified defendant’s stop because he might have been impaired, rejecting the R&R. United States v. Skutley, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86643 (D. Utah August 19, 2010).*

In February 2009, defendant finally consented to an entry of his house so the police could look for another person. Inside, they saw a gun case and they knew defendant was a felon. They felt the gun case and told him to get rid of the gun. In December 2009, the police came back to serve an eviction notice on the defendant, and the gun was seen again. The second entry was valid. United States v. Preston, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87098 (W.D. Mich. July 20, 2010).*

Corroboration of a 911 call was reasonable suspicion. United States v. Sanders, 394 Fed. Appx. 547 (11th Cir. 2010).*

Stopping at a drug house under surveillance at 3:20 a.m., staying for two minutes, and then driving way was not reason for a stop. The officer then found the DL suspended and arrested and conducted a search of the car. There was no informant tip or anything to associate this defendant with drug purchasing or possession except his presence at the house under surveillance. State v. Doughty, 170 Wn. 2d 57, 239 P.3d 573 (2010).*

The police did not exceed the scope of the private search of the defendant’s computer by the computer technician that worked on it, tested a video file, and found child pornography. That search broadened to other files. The tech called the police who viewed the same files. The police did not exceed the scope of the private search. People v. Clendenin, 238 Ill. 2d 302, 939 N.E.2d 310, 345 Ill. Dec. 467 (2010)* [The number of cases where computer techs find child porn is astounding. The offender sends the computer out of his possession into the hands of somebody who is going to look at the whole computer. What do they expect?]

Defendants’ truck was stopped because it was behind a business with a large amount of wire in the bed that the officer thought was stolen. The defendants did not show a connection to the truck to have standing. Even so, they consented to the search. State v. Graziani, 2010 Ohio 3550, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 3017 (3d Dist. August 2, 2010).*

The officer’s detailing of alleged drug transactions in the affidavit for the search warrant showed probable cause. State v. Tinsley, 2010 Ohio 3535, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 3035 (2d Dist. July 30, 2010).*

The trial court considered the totality of circumstances in determining that defendant did not consent to the search, so the order granting the suppression motion is granted. State v. Wilburn, 2010 Ohio 3536, 188 Ohio App. 3d 384, 935 N.E.2d 509 (2d Dist. 2010).*

The video supports the defendant’s consent. State v. Stepp, 2010 Ohio 3540, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 3038 (4th Dist. July 20, 2010).*

Being placed in the patrol car was not a Fourth Amendment seizure. The dog sniff did not take too long. State v. Kelly, 2010 Ohio 3560, 188 Ohio App. 3d 842, 937 N.E.2d 149 (12th Dist. 2010).*