Defendant arranged for transfer of property to another in a canvas bag, likely to hide it from the police. That person then consented to a search of the bag. He gave her physical control over the bag and assumed the risk of her consent. United States v. Beasley, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36079 (E.D. Mo. April 1, 2011).*

Analyzing the facts, defendant’s arrest for disorderly conduct was valid, so the search incident of his person was valid. United States v. Nelson, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36483 (S.D. N.Y. March 30, 2011).*

When officers stopped defendant’s vehicle with probable cause under the automobile exception, they found a taped shut eyeglasses case under the car held there by a magnet. That was hardly an innocuous object, and they could search it. United States v. Schanon, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36273 (D. Minn. April 4, 2011),* R&R 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142489 (D. Minn. December 27, 2010).*

Controlled access to neighborhoods, permitted under Puerto Rican law, that had the effect of excluding Jehovah’s Witnesses from entering neighborhoods did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Denial of access was not the same as a seizure. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y. v. De Jesús, 634 F.3d 3 (1st Cir. 2011):

To abate crime, Puerto Rico adopted a Controlled Access Law, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 23, §§ 64-64h (2008), allowing local entities (called “urbanizations”), organized by the community but approved by the municipality, to control street access to areas within towns that have voted in favor of such plans. Appellants are two corporations operated by the Governing Body of Jehovah’s Witnesses 1 that challenged in federal district court both the statute and its application.

. . .

The statute, as currently amended, authorizes municipalities to grant permits to neighborhood homeowners’ associations called urbanizations to control vehicular and pedestrian access to the public residential streets within the urbanization (the term referring either to the association or to the controlled area). In such cases, the area is enclosed with fencing or other barriers and with one or more entry and exit gates for pedestrians and vehicles. P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 23, § 64. Some of the gates are manned by security guards paid by the association; others are unmanned and opened by a key or by an electric signal operated by a buzzer linked to the residences within the urbanization.

In some respects, the controlled access regime is a counterpart to the private “gated” residential communities that have developed elsewhere; but in Puerto Rico the streets within the area were and remain public property, and the municipality is closely involved in authorizing the urbanization. To obtain a permit, the residential community must create a residents’ association; propose a plan describing the permanent barriers and access arrangements; file a petition supported by at least three-quarters of the residential homeowners; and assume the costs of installing and operating the plan. P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 23, § 64a.

. . .

Turning now to the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ Fourth Amendment challenge, they say that they are subject to an unlawful “seizure” when they are brought to a halt at access points set up around the enclosures. The Fourth Amendment applies to Puerto Rico through the Fourteenth Amendment. Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263, 270 n.2 (1st Cir. 2009). As already explained, the use of nominally private guards does not avoid the issue because the urbanizations and their guards qualify as state actors under the public function test. See also Romanski v. Detroit Entm’t, LLC, 428 F.3d 629, 636-38 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 946, 127 S. Ct. 209, 166 L. Ed. 2d 257 (2006) (applying the public function test to private guards).

In ordinary usage, no seizure occurs at the barrier; one denied access to a government building, for example, can hardly claim to be “seized.” See Sheppard v. Beerman, 18 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 816, 115 S. Ct. 73, 130 L. Ed. 2d 28 (1994) (excluded visitor not “seized” where “‘free to go anywhere else that he desired,’ with the exception of [the judge’s] chambers and the court house”). The Jehovah’s Witnesses, in response, rely mainly on cases involving police roadblocks of vehicles, but these cases say or assume that detention–at least temporary detention–is the design or effect.

On Wikinews this evening: ACLU, EFF challenging US ‘secret’ court orders seeking Twitter data, a part of the Wikileaks investigation:

Late last month, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) filed objections to the United States Government’s ‘secret’ attempts to obtain Twitter account information relating to WikiLeaks. The ACLU and EFF cite First and Fourth amendment issues as overriding reasons to overturn government attempts to keep their investigation secret; and, that with Birgitta Jonsdottir being an Icelandic Parliamentarian, the issue has serious international implications.

The case, titled “In the Matter of the 2703(d) Order Relating to Twitter Accounts: Wikileaks, Rop_G, IOERROR; and BirgittaJ“, has been in the EFF’s sights since late last year when they became aware of the US government’s attempts to investigate WikiLeaks-related communications using the popular microblogging service.

A Bowling Green University Police Department officer saw smoke on the balcony of a fraternity house, and he used an electronic pass key to get into the building. He came to the balcony and found defendants smoking marijuana. They all had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the frat house because they were like roommates. Any authority of the campus police to enter was limited to emergencies and not law enforcement investigation. State v. Miller, 2011 Ohio 1545, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 1361 (6th Dist. March 31, 2011):

[*P20] [Defendants] request the court to follow the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Reardon v. Wroan (7th C.A. 1987), 811 F.2d 1025, and rule that a fraternity house is to be treated the same as a home for purposes of Fourth Amendment rights:

[*P21] “[I]t is necessary to address briefly whether the fraternity residence is afforded the same Fourth Amendment status as a home under the protections of Payton. More specifically, there is some question as to whether the hallway to the fraternity house where the plaintiffs were arrested is comparable, under a Fourth Amendment analysis, to the common areas of apartment buildings where the cases have held that privacy interests are not protected under Payton. *** Although there are certain similarities to the apartment building cases, fraternity residents clearly have a greater expectation of privacy in the common areas of their residence than do tenants of an apartment building. As the district court noted, fraternity members could best be characterized as ‘roommates in the same house,’ not simply co-tenants sharing certain common areas. Moreover, a fraternity, by definition, is intended to be something of an exclusive living arrangement with the goal of maximizing the privacy of its affairs.” Id. at 1028, fn. 2 (Citations omitted.)

[*P22] At the time of the search, Delta Tau Delta fraternity house provided residence for six or seven students with access to the building by the public restricted at all times. We agree with the Reardon court that the shared living arrangement at a fraternity house supports treating residents as “roommates in the same house.” We conclude that appellants met their burden of showing a reasonable expectation of privacy throughout the house and that the fraternity house should be treated as a home for purposes of Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures by law enforcement officials.

. . .

[*P29] Even if Officer Pearcy’s observations from outside the building presented probable cause to believe that appellants were smoking marijuana, the exigent circumstances exception would not apply to support a warrantless search. Possession of marijuana, a violation of R.C. 2925.11(C)(3)(a), is a minor misdemeanor. Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution prohibits warrantless arrests for minor misdemeanors absent special circumstances and also prohibits searches incident to such arrests. State v. Brown, 99 Ohio St.3d 323, 2003-Ohio-3931, ¶25. This court has held that the exigent circumstances exception to the presumption of unreasonableness of warrantless home entries is not applicable to misdemeanor offenses. State v. Christian, 6th Dist. No. F-04-003, 2004-Ohio-3000, ¶ 11; State v. Scott [M.] (1999), 135 Ohio App.3d 253, 258.

[Note: Accord: United States v. Werra from the First Circuit posted 3/25 finding a REP as to the common areas in a rooming house as to a man on the third floor.]

Defendant who, according to his motion, merely worked “at various times” in a warehouse lacked standing to challenge its search. It was legally possible for a mere employee to have had standing, but he filed no affidavit showing a sufficient link to the property [as required in the S.D. N.Y.]. United States v. Saleh, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34212 (S.D. N.Y. March 14, 2011):

Although the expectation of privacy in commercial property is not as great as for residential property, New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 700 (1987), it is “well-settled” that, under certain circumstances, an employee may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his workplace and may challenge a search of its premises. United States v. Chuang, 897 F.2d 646, 649 (2d Cir. 1990). To show a legitimate expectation of privacy, an employee must have a “possessory or proprietary interest in the area searched.” Id. Additionally, the employee must show “a sufficient ‘nexus between the area searched and [his own] work space.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Britt, 508 F.2d 1052, 1056 (5th Cir. 1975)). While the presence of these factors must be determined on a case-by-case basis, Id. at 649-50, prior decisions provide some guidance:

Generally, courts tend to find that these elements are sufficiently established when the area searched is set aside for the defendant’s exclusive use, such as an individual office. However, courts are more skeptical of standing claims when the defendant only occasionally used the area searched, The greater the degree of exclusivity and control over a work area, and the more time a defendant spends there, the more likely standing is to be found. By contrast, the less private a work area—and the less control a defendant has over that work area—the less likely standing is to be found.

United States v. Tranquillo, 606 F. Supp. 2d 370, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (quoting United States v. Hamdan, 891 F. Supp. 88, 94-95 (E.D.N.Y. 1995)).

Here, however, Saleh has not put forth any facts in his motion indicating a possessory or a proprietary interest in the Warehouse. See id. at 378 (finding no legitimate expectation of privacy where defendant failed to put forth in a sworn affidavit any facts indicating a possessory interest). An affidavit by Selah’s attorney merely states that Saleh worked on the premises “at various times” for Rock Import Export Inc. Saleh has not claimed any ownership interest in the premises nor stated any facts indicating his exclusive use and control over the area searched. Cf. Leventhal v. Knapek, 266 F.3d 64, 73 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that an employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of his office computer where he had a private office and had exclusive use of the desk, filing cabinet, and computer in his office).

ICE officers were somehow drawn to watch a “quick turn” flight from California to a Dekalb County, Georgia airport. Their investigation revealed the pilot had been involved in multiple similar quick turn flights. Surveillance was set up at the airport, and duffle bags were removed from the airplane and put into a vehicle. A stop of the vehicle was conducted. After recounting all of the investigation and the surveillance, it was apparent there was reasonable suspicion for the stop of the vehicle. United States v. Goldenshtein, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35262 (N.D. Ga. February 22, 2011)*:

In short, although the government concedes that the U-turn was not in fact illegal, the stop of defendants’ vehicle was justified by reasonable suspicion based on information obtained through the agents’ collective investigation and surveillance. The investigating agents and officers assembled numerous objective facts and circumstances that, taken together, created more than a mere hunch that the defendants were smuggling contraband. Goldenshtein, who had made at least one recent “quick turn” flight, was flying an aircraft rented from a group with a prior history of supplying airplanes that had been interdicted, from California to Atlanta along a known smuggling route, landed at night near or after the time the flight line was due to close, did not allow ramp agents to touch his bags, which were too bulky, heavy, and numerous to appear to be a normal pilot’s luggage, and loaded those bags into a car driven by Akselrod, which appeared minutes after Goldenshtein landed and made a phone call. Once Officer Laird had stopped the defendants, Akselrod’s inability to provide his address or describe his Atlanta residence, despite his claim to have lived there for six months, provided additional justification for extending the detention for the purpose of conducting further investigation. This further investigation took place promptly, as Officer Summe and Rocky were at the scene of the stop, and the entire encounter, from traffic stop to the discovery of the marijuana and the defendants’ arrest, took place in less than ten minutes. All of the law enforcement conduct was well within the boundaries of the Fourth Amendment, and therefore defendants’ motions to suppress are due to be denied.

Orin Kerr on the Volokh Conspiracy: Applying the Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment to Disclosure of Stored Records, posted April 5th:

I’ve blogged a few times about United States v. Maynard, the controversial D.C. Circuit case holding that over time, GPS surveillance begins to be a search that requires a warrant. Maynard introduced a novel mosaic theory of the Fourth Amendment: Although individual moments of surveillance were not searches, when you added up the surveillance over time, all the non-searches taken together amounted to a search. The obvious question is, just how much is enough to trigger a search? At what point does the Constitution require the police to get a warrant?

This issue recently came up in a court order application before Magistrate Judge James Orenstein in Brooklyn seeking historical cell-site location for two cell phones used by a particular suspect. Regular readers will be familiar with Judge Orenstein: He is a very civil libertarian judge who has a strong sense of his own role, and he has concluded that Maynard is correct. In the most recent case, In the Matter of an Application of the United States of America for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Information, 2011 WL 679925 (Feb 16, 2011), Judge Orenstein tries to apply Maynard to determine if a particular discosure of information is protected by the Fourth Amendment under the Maynard mosaic theory. In the case, the government sought a court order under 18 U.S.C. 2703(d) for the cell-site records of two phones used by the same person. For one phone, the records were sought for one three-day period and a separate six-day period weeks later, and for the second phone, the records were sought for a twelve-day period several months later. The question was, did these records, viewed collectively, create a mosaic that triggers the Fourth Amendment?

USDA Forest Service employees who handle at-risk youth in residential Job Corps Civilian Conservation Centers are subject to government imposed random drug testing. They work in the field, and they are a long way away from hospitals if help is needed because somebody got hurt. Nat’l Fedn. of Fed. Employees-IAM v. Vilsack, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37033 (D. D.C. April 6, 2011):

b. “Operational Realities” of JCCCC Employees

The Court next evaluates whether JCCCC employees have a diminished expectation of privacy given the nature of their employment. The Supreme Court has made clear that the “operational realities of the workplace may render entirely reasonable certain work-related intrusions by supervisors and co-workers that might be viewed as unreasonable in other contexts.” Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 671. Thus, “it is plain that certain forms of public employment may diminish privacy expectations even with respect to [] personal searches.” Id. Courts have held, for example, that employees’ “expectation of privacy is lessened [when they] occupy positions that require stringent background checks,” Stigile, 110 F.3d at 804; see also Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 677; Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. U.S. Customs Service, 27 F.3d 623, 629, 307 U.S. App. D.C. 173 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Furthermore, although courts have recognized that incumbent employees’ “privacy interests are greater than applicants,” see Transp. Inst. v. U.S. Coast Guard, 727 F. Supp. 648, 655 (D.D.C. 1989), such privacy expectations are lessened when employees had advance notice of possible testing. Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. v. Dole, 670 F. Supp. 445, 447-48 (D.D.C. 1987); see also Aubrey v. Sch. Bd. of Lafayette Parish, 148 F.3d 559, 564 (5th Cir. 1998) (plaintiff had “notice that his position as a custodian was specifically designated as safety sensitive and that he would be subject to random testing. …”); Krieg v. Seybold, 427 F. Supp. 2d 842, 856 (N.D. Ind. 2006) (employees had “diminished expectation of privacy because random drug testing was one of the bargained-for provisions in the 2003-2004 CBA.”).

The defendants cite five key factors for their position that JCCCC employees have a reduced expectation of privacy. First, it is an operational reality that these employees work with at-risk youth in residential settings and are responsible for the students’ safety and welfare. Defs’ Mem., at 18-20. Second, the JCCCC employees must help maintain and enforce a zero tolerance drug environment for the students, and this policy requires no drug use among either the students or the staff, no matter the position. Id. at 12-15, 18-19. Third, the JCCCCs are located in rural or remote areas and employees must therefore be able to drive students or staff to services located elsewhere, including in emergency situations. Id. at 22. Fourth, the JCCCC employees have voluntarily submitted to rigorous background checks before employment and undergo periodic re-investigations. Id. at 16. Finally, the defendants maintain that employees have been on notice of testing since 1996, when the USDA first designated them for testing; and the new NFFE-USDA Collective Bargaining Agreement provided further notice of impending drug-testing provisions. Id.

A total of 30 minutes of testimony and 30 minutes of argument on making a record on some things. The rest was watching adult DVDs from 8:30-5:40. One more witness and DVD today. The jury instructions haven’t been settled yet because there are no model instructions on the subject. That will be interesting argument, too.

There are about 40 cases backed up to be read and commented on. The postings on past material will be spread out from Saturday to Monday so each day’s posts can stay a reasonable length. Then there’s also the cases coming in Saturday through Monday…

Update: Friday evening: NG, all three counts.

On CNET.com: Justice Department opposes digital privacy reforms by Declan McCullagh

The U.S. Justice Department today offered what amounts to a frontal attack on proposals to amend federal law to better protect Americans’ privacy.

James Baker, the associate deputy attorney general, warned that rewriting a 1986 privacy law to grant cloud computing users more privacy protections and to require court approval before tracking Americans’ cell phones would hinder police investigations.

This appears the first time that the Justice Department has publicly responded to a set of digital privacy proposals unveiled last year by a coalition of businesses and advocacy groups including AT&T, Google, Microsoft, eBay, the American Civil Liberties Union, and Americans for Tax Reform.

. . .

The question at hand is rewriting the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, or ECPA, which was enacted in the pre-Internet era of telephone modems and is so notoriously convoluted, it’s difficult even for judges to follow.

The Digital Due Process coalition hopes to simplify the wording while requiring police to obtain a search warrant to access private communications and the locations of mobile devices–which is not always the case today. Under current law, Internet users enjoy more privacy rights if they store data locally, a legal hiccup that could slow the shift to cloud-based services unless it’s changed.

The Supreme Court granted cert yesterday in Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders (10-945)

The decision below is 621 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 2010), posted here.

Question presented:

Whether the Fourth Amendment permits a jail to conduct a suspicionless strip search of every individual arrested for any minor offense no matter what the circumstances.

SCOTUSBlog is here.

On SSRN: What is Probable Cause, and Why Should We Care? The Costs, Benefits, and Meaning of Individualized Suspicion by Andrew E. Taslitz, forthcoming in Law & Contemporary Problems.

Abstract:

The United States Supreme Court has often declared individualized suspicion to be at the heart of probable cause. Yet critics see this as a commitment in word more than deed.Other critics, primarily philosophers, so no real conceptual difference between generalized and individualized suspicion. Moreover, no one has seriously tried to define the term. This article seeks first to fill this definitional gap, second to argue that the philosophers are wrong, and third to catalogue the social benefits and costs of an individualized suspicion requirement, suggesting a more structured way to choose among types of individualized suspicion and when, if ever, to jettison all those types entirely. The article draws on philosophy, psychology, and a branch of behavioral economics–fair price theory–to make its point.

Under Ohio law, an unmarked police car can make a traffic stop. And, it’s not like defendant didn’t know because the car had lights and siren and the officers were in uniform and he stopped. State v. Taylor, 2011 Ohio 1554, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 1346 (8th Dist. March 31, 2011).*

The mere fact defense counsel allegedly failed to look at the search warrant and make a determination whether it was defective is not itself IAC. Defendant showed no prejudice that any suppression motion would have been resolved in his favor. State v. Lenard, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 1350 (8th Dist. March 31, 2011).*

The gun seen in defendant’s back seat was in plain view with a flashlight. State v. Jimenez, 2011 Ohio 1572, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 1327 (8th Dist. March 31, 2011).*

The government showed probable cause for taking defendant’s DNA to connect him to clothing that was found related to a crime. United States v. Willis, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30142 (D. Minn. March 14, 2011).*

Knights requires at least reasonable suspicion for a probation search, and they had it here. State v. Bennett, 2011 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 211 (March 22, 2011).*

The issue: “In her appellate brief, Bryant asserts that the Superior Court erred in considering evidence obtained when government officials entered the property where she was staying because that evidence was obtained in violation of her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Bryant also asserts that the Superior Court violated her substantive and procedural due process rights in granting temporary custody to DHS because the evidence did not establish probable cause that her children were in imminent danger of serious injury.” However, the court lacked a final order. Bryant v. People of the Virgin Islands, 53 V.I. 395, 2010 V.I. Supreme LEXIS 1 (January 15, 2010).*

I’m in the Memphis airport, and going from Terminal B to A takes you past security. A pilot is sitting down, shoes off, getting the blue glove treatment: a search of his bag and an ion scan of his computer for explosives. Three TSA employees, at least two of which were apparently supervisors (TSA logos on their black shirts, but khaki pants, one with a radio in hand) watching intently, like this pilot was a danger to society.

It appears he apparently refused to go through the backscatter scanner, which MEM now has. If his bag and computer went through x-ray, what was the point of searching everything else? Retaliation for insisting on not being overradiated?

Is a request to not be overradiated these days a reasonable request when food from Japan arriving here has unacceptable levels of radiation in it, and airplanes landing from Japanese airports have increased levels of radiation?

Defendant’s consent to a search of the car at the conclusion of a traffic stop was voluntary and not coerced. United States v. Morelos-Ayala, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30365 (M.D. Ala. January 28, 2011).* Interesting is the fairly intense series of questions, none of which revealed any real reasonable suspicion, which would only be directed at somebody the officer suspected was hauling drugs:

The tape shows that when defendant Morelos, the driver of the Accord, stopped his vehicle, Autery approached the passenger side and obtained Morelos’ license and registration, explained why he had stopped the car, and told Morelos that he was going to write him a warning ticket. Autery instructed Morelos to come back with him to the patrol car so he could get some information, and Morelos complied. Both Autery and Morelos seated themselves in the patrol car. While Autery ran a check of the license and registration and prepared the warning ticket, he engaged Morelos in conversation, asking him a number of questions. These included, inter alia, the following:

Where you headed to?
Where you live at?
How long have you had that car?
Where’s your cousin live?
Where’s your wife staying in Montgomery?
How long has she been there?
Do you work?
What kind of work do you do?
You don’t have a car?
How long has your cousin lived in Houston?
What’s his name?
What kind of work does he do?
How many times have you been to Montgomery?
You don’t remember what part of town they stay at?
Does your wife work? Has she got family in Montgomery?
Is that who she’s staying with?
What’s his name?
What’s he do?
You ever gotten tickets before?
You ever been arrested?
Does [your brother] go to Mexico much?
When’s the last time you’ve been to Mexico?
How long of a trip is it from Houston up here?

Morelos responded to each of the questions. When the license and registration check concluded, Autery gave Morelos back his license and registration and handed him the warning ticket. He asked Morelos, “Have you got everything? You get your license and all?” When Morelos responded in the affirmative, Autery said, “Let me ask you this. While I’m out enforcing the traffic laws of Alabama I’m also out looking for any type of contraband. Do you know what I mean by contraband?” When Morelos did not immediately reply, Autery inquired more specifically whether there were any weapons or drugs in the car. He asked, “No marijuana? No cocaine? No clavos?1” Morelos answered in the negative.

1 Clavos, which is Spanish for nails, is also a slang term for secret compartment.

Tackling is a seizure. Here, it was with reasonable suspicion. United States v. Guardado, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30973 (D. Utah March 22, 2011).*

The police did not violate the terms of an anticipatory warrant by waiting two hours to execute the warrant. The box had been delivered to the house and had not been opened (according to its signal), and defendant was seen leaving the house without it, so it was reasonable to conclude the package was still there. United States v. Lawson, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30948 (D. Alaska March 22, 2011).*

Defendant’s first motion to suppress argued that officers had her lift her shirt to reveal drugs, but she amended the motion to say that the drugs fell out when she got out of the car. The court finds probable cause for the stop of the car. United States v. Lighten, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30796 (W.D. N.Y. January 26, 2011).*

A guy named Inmon rented a motel room for one night for one person and then left. Motel security noticed three people separately go to the room carrying bags. The police were called, and Inmon was arrested for no DL when he showed back up at the motel. Motel security then told the police the rest were trespassers and evict them. Nobody would answer the door, so motel security said to break in. Three people were inside with drugs. As trespassers, they had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the room. United States v. Bohmont, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 6287 (8th Cir. March 25, 2011) (unpublished):

We address Inmon’s and Bohmont’s Fourth Amendment challenges separately, as each can rely only on his own expectation of privacy. Inmon rented the room that the officers searched, giving him a reasonable expectation of privacy in the room. See Conner, 127 F.3d at 666. However, once he was arrested and the officers told the hotel security guard they were taking Inmon to jail, the security guard asked the officers to remove all other guests from Inmon’s room, as he considered them to be trespassers with no legitimate basis for being in the room. The officers took Inmon to the room with them when they went to evict the other occupants at Mr. Bastean’s request, and Inmon was present when the officers knocked on the door and told the occupants they had to leave because they were trespassing. Even though Mr. Bastean did not explicitly tell Inmon that he had been evicted from the hotel, we believe these facts are sufficient to establish that Inmon had in fact been evicted. Missouri law allows a hotel to eject a person if the hotel operator “reasonably believes that the individual is using the premises for an unlawful purpose.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 315.075(3). Mr. Bastean called the police because of concerns that the room was being used to traffic drugs. The officers’ discovery of drug paraphernalia on Inmon’s person was sufficient to justify Mr. Bastean’s concern that there were illegal drugs in the room and allow him to eject Inmon when the officers arrested him and told Mr. Bastean they were taking Inmon to jail. Under our precedent, once an individual is lawfully ejected from a hotel, the rental period terminates and “control over the hotel room revert[s] to the management.” United States v. Rambo, 789 F.2d 1289, 1295-96 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that a hotel occupant who was asked to leave by police officers acting on behalf of hotel management who complained of defendant’s disorderly behavior was justifiably ejected under state law and no longer had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the hotel room); see also Young v. Harrison, 284 F.3d 863, 869 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that defendant “was justifiably evicted from the hotel because his friends created a disturbance” despite absence of any state statute addressing evictions from a hotel, such that “the control over the hotel room reverted to the management and [the defendant] ‘[could] not assert an expectation of being free from police intrusion upon his solitude and privacy in a place from which he has been justifiably expelled’” (quoting Rambo, 789 F.2d at 1296)). Thus, at the time the officers forcibly entered the hotel room at Mr. Bastean’s request, Inmon had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the hotel room, and the subsequent search of the room did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights.

Bohmont’s expectation of privacy in Inmon’s hotel room is even more attenuated. Bohmont did not rent the room, and the district court determined that he was not Inmon’s overnight guest but rather was nothing “more than [a] ‘mere visitor[] in the room.’” (R&R at 14.) …

Bloomberg News: Duke Lacrosse Players’ Suit Over False Rape Claim May Proceed, Judge Says:

Three former Duke University lacrosse players, falsely accused of rape in a case that cost a district attorney his law license, can move forward with part of their claims against the former prosecutor and the city of Durham, North Carolina, a judge ruled.

U.S. District Judge James A. Beaty Jr., in a ruling today, refused to dismiss the former students’ claims that their constitutional rights were violated through malicious prosecution, concealment of evidence and fabrication of false evidence. The judge dismissed their separate conspiracy claim and their intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.

“The intentional use of false or misleading evidence before a grand jury to obtain an indictment and arrest without probable cause is exactly the type of unreasonable search and seizure that the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect against,” the judge said.

McFadyen v. Duke Univ., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34839 (M.D. N.C. March 31, 2011).

Fourth Amendment reasonableness? NYT: Girl, 11, Sues the Police, Claiming She Was Handcuffed:

An 11-year-old Bronx girl has sued New York City, claiming that police officers overreacted last spring, handcuffing her after a fight with a third-grade classmate and denying her mother’s request to be present when they interviewed her.