Officers pulled guns on defendants and ordered them to sit down, and this was with reasonable suspicion somebody in the group was armed. The district court erred in suppressing the frisk. United States v. Lewis, 674 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012):

As the Supreme Court emphasized in Terry itself, a brief stop-and-frisk is permissible, even absent probable cause to arrest, “for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual.” 392 U.S. at 27 (emphasis added). In fact, the very rationale underpinning Terry — the protection of officer safety and the safety of others nearby, especially from the dangers posed by firearms — is presented by the facts of this case. We add that the detention took place at night in a high crime area, which, while surely not dispositive, is still another relevant consideration in the Terry calculus. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124; United States v. Gordon, 231 F.3d 750, 755-56 (11th Cir. 2000). And we further emphasize that, as in Clark, the defendant here was not some “unrelated bystander,” Clark, 337 F.3d at 1288, but rather “an associate of [the] persons being investigated for criminal activities,” id.

In short, under the totality of the circumstances of this case, the officers were entitled to control the scene and exercise command over the situation in the course of briefly detaining McRae for further investigation. A brief detention of all four associated individuals was reasonable, in light of the substantial risks to the officers’ safety. Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court’s order granting Lewis’s motion to suppress, and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Randolph requires the objecting defendant be actually present. Objecting elsewhere not enough. The court thus joins CA7 and CA8. United States v. Shrader, 675 F.3d 300 (4th Cir. 2012)

Shrader urges us, however, to expand the holding of Randolph and conclude that his earlier refusal vitiates his aunt’s later consent, even though he was absent from the premises. Physical presence may not be dismissed as a mere function of the facts of Randolph, however. That presence reflected the “widely shared social expectations” that informed the Court’s ruling. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 111. The Court noted that “a caller standing at the door of shared premises would have no confidence that one occupant’s invitation was a sufficiently good reason to enter when a fellow tenant stood there saying, ‘stay out.'” Id. at 113; see also id. at 114 (“[T]he co-tenant wishing to open the door to a third party has no recognized authority in law or social practice to prevail over a present and objecting co-tenant.”) The Court plainly gave careful thought to the scope of the physical presence requirement that it articulated:

[W]e are drawing a fine line; if a potential defendant with self-interest in objecting is in fact at the door and objects, the co-tenant’s permission does not suffice for a reasonable search, whereas the potential objector, nearby but not invited to take part in the threshold colloquy, loses out. This is the line we draw, and we think the formalism is justified. Id. at 121.

This case falls squarely on the permissible side of the line. Because Shrader was absent from the premises, and there was no evidence that he was arrested for the purpose of nullifying his refusal to consent to the search, his aunt’s consent provided adequate permission for the police to search the house, notwithstanding his earlier objection.

In so holding, we join the Seventh and Eighth Circuits in adhering to the clearly drawn rule of Randolph and giving effect to the Supreme Court’s explicit requirement that the defendant be physically present to dispute his cotenant’s consent. See United States v. Henderson, 536 F.3d 776 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Hudspeth, 518 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc). We decline to adopt the more expansive view of the Ninth Circuit which permits a defendant’s refusal to operate indefinitely, “barring some objective manifestation that he has changed his position and no longer objects.” United States v. Murphy, 516 F.3d 1117, 1125 (9th Cir. 2008). This latter approach raises practical problems. How broadly is constructive knowledge of a suspect’s prior refusal to consent to be imputed to other officers? Must a suspect expressly indicate that he has changed his mind in the future, or may that be assessed from the totality of the circumstances? Is there some point at which the passage of time renders a prior objection inoperative? The Murphy interpretation of Randolph would involve courts in such questions, diverting attention from the basic social expectations that underlie not only the opinion in Randolph, but the larger corpus of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Careful observance of the requirement that an objecting cotenant be physically present thus not only shows fealty to the Supreme Court’s precedent, but also focuses police and courts on the customary norms that form the basis for this area of law.

A stop of a car can be justified by at least reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking, not just a traffic offense. Here, the officer had probable cause, and that also justified a search of the car, not just by defendant’s consent. United States v. Deras, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5258 (D. Me. January 17, 2012).

While the officers’ testimony was somewhat conflicting on the details of all the circumstances of the search, it still didn’t undermine the district court’s conclusion that defendant was cooperative and consented to the search. United States v. Ortiz, 455 Fed. Appx. 669, 2012 FED App. 0052N (6th Cir. 2012) (unpublished).*

Defendant fled from police and dropped a baggy of cocaine, and this was not the result of any illegal police conduct and constituted abandonment. United States v. Patton, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6096 (D. Kan. January 18, 2012).*

Defendant was charged with worker’s compensation fraud after bank records were subpoenaed to the administrative hearing. State statute did not create a reasonable expectation of privacy from a subpoena instead of a search warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate. State v. Hammer, 2010 ND 152, 787 N.W.2d 716 (2010).

In a traffic stop, defendant had both hands out the window as the officer approached, and there was a gun on the dashboard. The officer did not have to consider the situation safe and could frisk the car for more weapons. State v. King, 206 N.C. App. 585, 696 S.E.2d 913 (2010).*

Defendant was stopped on a citizen informant’s tip, and they are sufficient in themselves to create reasonable suspicion. Hadley v. State, 2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 12184 (Fla. 3DCA August 18, 2010).*

The issue of the duration of the stop making it unreasonable was not litigated in the trial court, so it was waived. State v. Hudson, 206 N.C. App. 482, 696 S.E.2d 577 (2010).*

Officers had repeated drug complaints at defendant’s apartment, and they came to do a knock and talk. The person answering the door let the officer in, but it was quickly determined that she was only a visitor. Before he could ask for consent, the officer heard others, so he walked further in to see who he was dealing with, described as a protective sweep, and he saw drug paraphernalia at defendant’s feet, which were propped up on a table. The officer’s search of defendant was justified, and it produced a Dilaudid tablet. State v. Kinsell, 2010 Ohio 3854, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 3254 (9th Dist. August 18, 2010).*

Defendant was in a car that was stopped and the police had probable cause. They made her leave her purse behind. When the warrant issued, the purse could be searched because it was with the car, for which there was probable cause. State v. Campbell, 166 Wn. App. 464, 272 P.3d 859 (2011), Order Granting Motion to Publish 165 Wn. App. 1021, 2011 Wash. App. LEXIS 2915 (Wash. Ct. App., Dec. 29, 2011):

Circumstances can exist where probable cause may exist for a search of an individual’s property even though officers do not have equivalent probable cause that the owner of the property is involved in crime. Cf. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 556-57, 98 S. Ct. 1970, 56 L. Ed. 2d 525 (1978) (Fourth Amendment does not prevent issuance of a warrant to search property simply because the owner or possessor is not reasonably suspected of criminal involvement); see also 2 Wayne R. Lafave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 4.10(b) at 747-48 (4th ed. 2004) (distinguishing entitlement to search a visitor’s belongings where police have grounds to believe items sought in the warrant might be concealed there). Both Worth and Hill implicitly recognize that personal property belonging to someone other than the owner of premises can be subject to a warrant for a premises search where probable cause exists and the scope of a warrant is accordingly broad: Worth’s holding depends on its reasoning that no probable cause brought Worth’s purse within the scope of the warrant. Hill’s holding that “generally officers have no authority under a premises warrant to search personal effects an individual is wearing or holding” implies that sometimes they do. 123 Wn.2d at 644 (emphasis added).

Arrest of capital murder suspect on an outstanding traffic warrant was valid, and pretext was not a valid argument. Johnson v. State, 2012 OK CR 5, 272 P.3d 720 (2012):

[*P12] Appellant first asserts that his arrest on outstanding warrants was illegal because it was solely a pretext to hold him for questioning about the homicides. However, if police have a valid right to arrest an individual for one crime, it does not matter if their subjective intent is in reality to collect information concerning another crime. Bland v. State, 2000 OK CR 11, ¶ 48, 4 P.3d 702, 718. “Whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred, ‘turns on an objective assessment of the officer’s actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time, … and not on the officer’s actual state of mind at the time the challenged action was taken.'” Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470-71, 105 S.Ct. 2778, 2783, 86 L.Ed.2d 370 (1985) quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 136-39 n. 13, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 1722, 1724 n. 13, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978). See also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812-13, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1774, 135 L.Ed.2d 89, 98 (1996) (Supreme Court reiterated its position that it was unwilling to entertain Fourth Amendment challenges based upon the actual motivations of individual officers); Phillips v. State, 1999 OK CR 38, ¶ 41, 989 P.2d 1017, 1031. If the police action could have been taken against an individual “even absent the ‘underlying intent or motivation,’ there is no conduct which ought to have been deterred and thus no reason to bring the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule into play for purposes of deterrence.” See 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 1.4(e) (4th ed. 2004). In other words, if the alleged pretextual arrest could have taken place absent police suspicion of Appellant’s involvement in another crime, then the arrest is lawful. In the present case, Appellant was arrested on outstanding warrants which were issued before the murders occurred. The officers legally executed the valid arrest warrants and their subjective intent does not make this otherwise lawful conduct illegal or unconstitutional.

I wouldn’t have raised this argument, but it’s a capital case and defense counsel has to pursue issues that seem weak anyway. At least in my state we can raise it in trial court and not bother to argue it on appeal, but, by rule and statute, the issue is deemed decided on the merits for post-conviction purposes without cluttering the appeal with what seems to be a frivolous issue.

Police with information that a suicidal person is driving to a location to kill himself can stop the car. State v. Dunn, 2012 Ohio 1008, 131 Ohio St. 3d 325, 964 N.E.2d 1037 (2012):

[*P22] Thus, we hold that the community-caretaking/emergency-aid exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement allows police officers to stop a person to render aid if they reasonably believe that there is an immediate need for their assistance to protect life or prevent serious injury.

[*P23] In this case, officers received a dispatch regarding an allegedly armed and suicidal person with an imminent plan to kill himself upon reaching a certain destination. Given that stopping a person on the street is “considerably less intrusive than police entry into the home itself, Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001), the officers’ effecting a traffic stop to prevent Dunn from harming himself was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Thus, the community-caretaking/emergency-aid exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement allows police officers to stop a driver based on a dispatch that the driver is armed and plans to kill himself.

Defendant’s pre-Gant search was with good faith under Davis. Artis v. Commonwealth, 360 S.W.3d 771 (Ky. App. 2012).*

The brief wait for a drug dog was not unreasonable. Defendant waived the PC issue by not raising it below. State v. Jefferson, 2012 Ohio 148, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 118 (5th Dist. January 17, 2012).*

Renewed motion to suppress rental car search is denied. The officer’s testimony that one taillight did not work was “unimpeached” by repair records from Enterprise that all the lights worked and no repairs had been done. The existence of the rental agreement doesn’t really matter because the validity and continuation of the stop had nothing to do with the rental agreement. United States v. McGee, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6415 (S.D. W.Va. January 18, 2012).*

Officers went to defendant’s property to conduct a knock-and-talk suspecting a commercial marijuana grow operation. After smelling growing marijuana and actually seeing it, one officer left to get a search warrant. While they were waiting, defendant came home and seemingly but equivocally consented, but the consent came into dispute. In the meantime, the search warrant issued, and this was an independent basis for the search. Starkey v. State, 272 P.3d 347 (Alas. App. 2012):

This distinction is explained by Professor LaFave: “[T]he inevitable discovery [doctrine] is hypothetical in nature, [and] it does not apply if [an] alternative, legitimate source is actually used to seize the evidence”. Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment (4th ed. 2004), § 11.4(a), Vol. 6, p. 265, n. 55. 1 This distinction was also addressed by the Alaska Supreme Court in Smith v. State, 948 P.2d 473 (Alaska 1997):

[P]roperly applied, the “independent source” exception [to the exclusionary rule] allows the prosecution to use evidence only if it was, in fact, obtained by fully lawful means. … The “inevitable discovery” exception … differs in one key respect[:] … the [challenged] evidence … [was] not actually … obtained from an independent source, but rather would have been discovered as a matter of course if independent investigations [had been] allowed to proceed.

Smith, 948 P.2d at 479-480 (emphasis added, and citations omitted).

One further aspect of the “independent source” doctrine must be emphasized: the doctrine applies to situations like the one in Starkey’s case — situations where the police initially discover the evidence unlawfully, but ultimately take possession of the evidence through a lawful means that is untainted by the prior illegality. …

Defendant was accused of domestic battery while on a diplomatic mission in Africa. Defendant’s wife consented to a search of the house, and the seizure of a doll house that was used as a weapon was by her consent. United States v. Makalou, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142538 (E.D. Va. December 12, 2011).*

Defendant’s traffic stop was based on PC an offense occurred, and the defendant consented to a search of the vehicle thereafter. United States v. Crump, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142363 (N.D. Ga. December 12, 2011), R&R 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142778 (N.D. Ga. November 21, 2011).*

While the state trooper was going to issue a warning ticket, he still went though the criminal history checks, and that was not unreasonable. In the course of that, the occupant’s travel plans became inconsistent, and that led to a valid request for consent. United States v. Buenrostro, 454 Fed. Appx. 523 (8th Cir. 2011) (unpublished).*

Officers responded to a shots fired call and encountered a man who wore an eyepatch and moved slowly carrying a stick as a cane. “Miedzianowski radioed Officer Jeremy McGraw for assistance and stepped out of his car to speak with Scozzari. Miedzianowski asked Scozzari to drop the stick and to come closer, but Scozzari responded, ‘Fuck you, boy’ and continued walking. This reaction caused Miedzianowski to wonder if Scozzari was the armed person who had fired gunshots in the park.” After a couple of “fuck you”s, the man reached to his waistband for what the officer thought was a knife. Witnesses disputed the officers’ version. The man also found a hatchet and advanced on the officer who backed up and tripped dropping his gun. Ultimately he shot the man. After the shooting, the officers did nothing to aid the man while they waited for paramedics, and he died. Summary judgment on qualified immunity was denied as to excessive force and deliberate indifference. Scozzari v. Miedzianowski, 454 Fed. Appx. 455, 2012 FED App. 0004N (6th Cir. 2012) (unpublished)*:

Defendants argue that, like the officers in Chappell, they had probable cause to believe that Scozzari posed an imminent threat of serious physical harm. However, the differences between Chappell and this case are significant. Viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the evidence indicates that the Officers were standing 15 to 20 feet from Scozzari when they shot him. Further, Scozzari was 51 years old, 5’3′ and 133 pounds, blind in one eye and hardly physically intimidating. Additionally, there are genuine issues of material fact whether Scozzari was wielding a knife and hatchet over his head. Further, there is evidence that Scozzari was moving slowly. According to Miedzianowski, Scozzari walked or took “a couple steps” in McGraw’s direction; other witnesses recalled Scozzari moving slowly or not at all. In contrast to Chappell, the circumstances here present a genuine question whether the situation compelled a split-second decision to use lethal force. See Estate of Kirby, 530 F.3d at 482-83 (affirming denial of qualified immunity where, under plaintiff’s version of the facts, defendant officers were not in harm’s way “and critically, defendants had sufficient time … to assess the situation before firing several rounds at” the decedent); cf. Garner, 471 U.S. at 11 (“Where the suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer and no threat to others, the harm resulting from failing to apprehend him does not justify the use of deadly force to do so.”). Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying Defendant Officers qualified immunity with respect to Plaintiff’s excessive-force claim.

In the instant case, Defendants knew that the likely cause of Scozzari’s collapse was one or more gunshot wounds. Furthermore, as they waited to ensure that Scozzari was not faking injury, the Officers observed a large pool of blood near his neck and heard gurgling sounds coming from his mouth. Lastly, when McGraw felt Scozzari for a pulse, he found none. A layperson under these circumstances would immediately recognize that Scozzari risked serious harm unless given immediate medical attention. Therefore, the questions to resolve are whether medical treatment was unreasonably delayed for non-medical reasons and whether this delay was due to deliberate indifference on the Officers’ part. See Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 899.

Following CA7 (United States v. Reed, 539 F.3d 595 (7th Cir. 2008)) and CA8 (United States v. Hudspeth, 518 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc)) and not CA9 (United States v. Murphy, 516 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2008)), CA5 finds that an absent cotenant who refuses to consent is not what was contemplated in Randolph. Defendant was in jail and refused to consent, so officers went to his house and got it anyway. [There is also a curtilage issue under Dunn.] United States v. Cooke, 674 F.3d 491 (5th Cir. 2012):

We agree with the Seventh and Eighth Circuits that the objection of an absent cotenant does not vitiate the consent of a physically present cotenant under Randolph. First, as both courts noted, Randolph self-consciously emphasized the importance of Randolph’s presence by repeatedly noting it when declaring and reiterating the holding. See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 106, 114, 121, 122, 123. Justice Breyer’s concurrence confirms the importance of physical presence. Id. at 126 (Breyer, J., concurring). Second, the Randolph Court seemed to have structured the holding as an exception to the general rule of Rodriguez and Matlock that a cotenant may consent to the search of a residence, id. at 106, and that this exception was narrowly drawn along a “fine line.” Id. at 121-22. Third, although it is a close question, social convention normally allows for a visitor to feel invited into a home when invited by a physically-present resident, even if an absent cotenant objects to it, rather than the visitor’s assuming he is verboten forever until the objector consents.

A consent to search for firearms includes checking clothing hanging in a closet. The consent was obtained for a parole search. United States v. Anderson, 674 F.3d 821 (8th Cir. 2012)*:

Even assuming a reasonable officer would have interpreted the consent as limited in scope to a search for firearms, the search was within the scope of such consent. United States v. Dinwiddie, 618 F.3d 821, 831 (8th Cir. 2010) (“The scope of consent for a search is limited to what a reasonable person would have understood by the exchange between the investigating officer and the person to be searched.”). Firearms easily could be located in clothing hanging in a closet, particularly in outerwear such as a coat, jacket, or vest, and most particularly in a blaze orange hunting vest. See United States v. Lopez-Mendoza, 601 F.3d 861, 867 (8th Cir. 2010) (“The scope of a search is generally defined by its expressed object …”). Further, the testimony supports the conclusion that the searching officer identified the ammunition without delving into spaces, pockets, or containers smaller than might hold a firearm.

The request for buccal samples for DNA testing requires either consent or a search warrant. The request for a court order is denied without prejudice since the People failed to show a factual basis for the request. They can, however, apply for a search warrant. People v. Hardcastle, 55 V.I. 93 (Super. Ct. 2011):

In its request for saliva buccal samples from the defendants, the People in following the Supreme Court’s instructions in Schmerber are required to provide sufficient evidentiary support for the Court to find probable cause that the saliva specimens could link C. Hardcastle and O. Hardcastle to the drug or firearm charges filed against them. Even though the People obviously failed to apply for a search warrant, in considering the People’s motion to compel saliva specimens from defendant as an application for a search warrant, the Court finds that the People have failed to articulate a single fact to support a finding that the saliva specimens requested could link either of the defendants to the drug or firearm charges against them. Accordingly, it is clear that failing to provide such essential evidentiary nexus the People have failed to meet its probable cause burden under the Fourth Amendment.

Defendant was arrested in Mississippi for possession of a murder victim’s missing car. When he was searched, the victim’s credit cards were found on him. Seizure of the clothing for DNA testing was not unreasonable. State v. Santini, 64 So. 3d 790 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2011).*

Defendant’s stop was justified, but merely possessing a gun was not probable cause to believe that those in the car were committing a crime. The arrest for the gun before determining whether it was lawfully or unlawfully possessed was unreasonable. People v. Matthew, 55 V.I. 380 (2011)*:

In conclusion, this Court holds, consistent with the Third Circuit’s decision in U.S. v. Ubiles, and Title 23 Section 488 of the Virgin Islands Code, that the warrantless arrest of defendants—without probable cause that the weapons were unlawfully possessed or without any other evidence to support probable cause that other criminal activity was afoot—was unreasonable under the totality of the circumstances and that the weapons and ammunition and all other evidence uncovered subsequent to the unlawful arrest are hereby suppressed.

Defendant’s son called the police to tell them that defendant was a convicted felon with firearms, was off his medication, and had be acting erratically and assaulted someone. He said he lived at the house with his father. He consented to a search, and the consent was with objective reliance on apparent authority. Defendant credibly argued, the court’s view, that he had kicked his son out of the house before that, and he had obtained an order of protection to keep his son away. He argued that the order of protection was served on the Sheriff’s Office and that was “collective knowledge” imputed to all the Sheriff’s Department that the son had no actual authority. While the argument had some limited force, the USMJ cannot find as a matter of fact that the document was actually served on Sheriff’s Department before the consent to search to give it any strength. United States v. Cribbs, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116742 (W.D. Tenn. February 11, 2011)*, adopted in part 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112559 (W.D. Tenn. September 29, 2011).*

How the War on Drugs Distorts Privacy Law by Jane Yakowitz Bambauer, 64 Stan. L. Rev. Online 131:

The U.S. Supreme Court will soon determine whether a trained narcotics dog’s sniff at the front door of a home constitutes a Fourth Amendment search. Jardines, 132 S. Ct. 995 (No. 11-564), 2011 WL 5254666. The case, Florida v. Jardines, has privacy scholars abuzz because it presents two possible shifts in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. First, the Court might expand the physical spaces rationale from Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in United States v. Jones.

A favorable outcome for Mr. Jardines could reinforce that the home is a formidable privacy fortress, protecting all information from government detection unless that information is visible to the human eye.

Alternatively, and more sensibly, the Court may choose to revisit its previous dog sniff cases, United States v. Place and Illinois v. Caballes. This precedent has shielded dog sniffs from constitutional scrutiny by finding that sniffs of luggage and a car, respectively, did not constitute searches. Their logic is straightforward: since a sniff “discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item,”Id. at 409 (quoting Place, 462 U.S. at 707), a search incident to a dog’s alert cannot offend reasonable expectations of privacy. Of course, the logical flaw is equally obvious: police dogs often alert when drugs are not present, resulting in unnecessary suspicionless searches. See id. at 411-12 (Souter, J., dissenting). See also Florida v. Harris, 71 So. 3d 756 (Fla. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 1796 (2012).

Curiously missing from any Supreme Court opinion is a reflection on how contraband-detecting dogs fundamentally change law enforcement. Police dogs are old technology, but their widespread use ushers in a new model of policing. Like pattern-based data mining, dog sniffs produce tradeoffs inherent in dragnet-style law enforcement. They redistribute the burden of unproductive searches from the few-but-stereotypically “suspicious” to the entire population.

This Essay presents new qualitative research based on the facts of Florida v. Jardines. …

New Yorker: Here’s Looking at You; Should we worry about the rise of the drone? by Nick Paumgarten:

ABSTRACT: THE WORLD OF SURVEILLANCE about drones. The prospect of unmanned flight has been around—depending on your definition—since Archytas of Tarentum reputedly designed a steam-powered mechanical pigeon, in the fourth century B.C., or since Nikola Tesla, in 1898, demonstrated a radio-controlled motorboat at an exposition in Madison Square Garden. By the sixties the Air Force was deploying unmanned reconnaissance jets over Southeast Asia. Still, it was the advent, in the mid-nineties, of the Global Positioning System, along with advances in microcomputing, that ushered in the possibility of automated unmanned flight. The Department of Defense, meanwhile, developed a keen interest. With the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and manhunts in places like Yemen, the military applications, and the corporations devoted to serving them (Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman), came to dominate the skyscape. Many of these manufacturers had one client: the Department of Defense. In 2001, the military had just a few Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (U.A.V.s). Now it has more than ten thousand. Later this month, the F.A.A. will present a regulatory regimen enabling law-enforcement departments to fly small drones, and the military contractors will suddenly have some eighteen thousand potential new customers. As of now, only a tiny percentage of municipal and state police departments have any air presence, because most can’t afford helicopters or planes. Small camera-loaded U.A.V.s are much cheaper. The public proposition, at this point, anyway, is not that drones will subjugate or assassinate unwitting citizens but that they will conduct search-and-rescue operations, fight fires, catch bad guys, inspect pipelines, spray crops, count nesting cranes and migrating caribou, and measure weather data and algae growth. For these and other tasks, they are useful and well suited. Of course, they are especially well suited, and heretofore have been most frequently deployed, for surveillance.

Officers responding to a DV call did not have exigent circumstances or a reason to believe that defendant was in need of aid inside to justify an entry. United States v. Ladeaux, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64302 (D. S.D. May 8, 2012), reconsideration denied 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64830 (D. S.D. May 9, 2012)*:

Similarly, the court finds a reasonable, experienced officer with knowledge of the facts of this case would not have a legitimate concern for the safety of Mr. LaDeaux. There is no evidence he was injured or was a threat to himself. See Uscanga-Ramirez, 475 F.3d at 1029 (finding exigent circumstances were present when defendant’s wife told officers defendant locked himself in the bedroom with a gun and was very upset). The government also argued Officer Ten Fingers was justified in entering the residence to protect his safety in the event Mr. LaDeaux used a firearm or other weapon. However, there is no evidence Mr. LaDeaux owned a firearm or, if he owned one, would use a firearm against anyone, much less law enforcement. See United States v. Church, No. 1:06:CR:292, 2007 WL 689890 at *2, (W.D. Mich. March 2, 2007) (noting “[t]he presence of a weapon creates an exigent circumstance, provided the government is able to prove they possessed information that the suspect was armed and likely to use a weapon or become violent”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The government presented no evidence Mr. LaDeaux ever used any kind of weapon, whether a firearm, a knife, or his fists, against Ms. Belt, a police officer, or anyone else. Further, no shots were heard or reported on September 5, 2011, nor did anyone (a neighbor, a caller to police dispatch, or Ms. Belt herself) inform the police they saw or knew of a firearm in the residence or they saw Mr. LaDeaux brandishing a firearm. There is no evidence Mr. LaDeaux ever physically assaulted anyone, used a weapon against anyone, or threatened to use a weapon against anyone, whether on September 5, 2011, or any other time. There is no evidence Officer Ten Fingers observed wounds, blood, scratch marks, or any signs of violence on Ms. Belt as she fled the residence. This is not a situation where Officer Ten Fingers asked Mr. LaDeaux to exit the residence and Mr. LaDeaux threatened to use a weapon to harm himself or Officer Ten Fingers. Nor is this a situation where Officer Ten Fingers observed through a window Mr. LaDeaux pick up a weapon. In such situations, warrantless entry into a residence may be justified.

If there was any danger to Officer Ten Fingers, it was the result of his own actions, that is, his entry into the residence without backup and without knowing the situation. …

The fact there were innocent explanations for what was described in the application for the search warrant does not undermine probable cause. The showing as to one of the searches was not supported and was thus waived. United States v. Durham, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65126 (S.D. Ind. May 9, 2012):

Mr. Durham’s motion also purports to challenge the fruits of a search warrant issued in Ohio. [See dkt. 153 at 1.] He has not provided the Court with a copy of that warrant, its application, or with any argument specifically addressing the legal and factual circumstances for that warrant (including, for example, an explanation of the extent of his reasonable expectation of privacy there). Those failures constitute a waiver of any argument that he may have had, for lack of cogent development. E.g., Kawasaki Heavy Indus. v. Bombardier Rec. Prods., 660 F.3d 988, 994 n.3 (7th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).

Inmate telephone calls out of a federal prison are recorded, and recording and listening to one is not an illegal search. United States v. Bassett, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65068 (E.D. Mo. April 13, 2012).*

In the process of renewing this website until 2017 yesterday, some electronic switch was thrown that put us out of commission for about 24 hours. Then, only some people could see it not others. I was one of those who couldn’t. I couldn’t see it until about 5 pm central.

The Internet may seem to operate seamlessly, but it really is subject to individual failures. Anything subject to human intervention is prone to be screwed up.