All the claimants lack standing to challenge the breaking into a safe that they claimed no interest in or even knew about until the money was found. United States v. $2,599.00 in United States Currency, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59227 (E.D. N.C. April 25, 2013).*

The information in the affidavit provided “‘a fair probability that contraband or evidence of crime [would] be found in a particular place.’ Gates, 462 U.S. at 238.” United States v. Applewhite, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59396 (E.D. Mo. April 8, 2013).*

Defense counsel not ineffective for not challenging police entry into defendant’s house to question him about child pornography. Defendant acknowledged throughout, until now, that he was cooperative and talked to them about it, now claiming that the officers got entry by subterfuge. That is a fact dispute, and the court finds any suppression motion would have been denied. United States v. Smith, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187819 (N.D. Fla. October 30, 2012).*

“No trespassing” signs alone not enough to create any protection against a knock-and-talk at the front porch. United States v. Dry, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59406 (E.D. Okla. March 21, 2013):

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Ancillary jurisdiction for return of property under Rule 41(g) is exercised with great restraint. Here, there is a remedy in the criminal case. United States v. Huggins, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59773 (S.D. N.Y. March 22, 2013):

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Defendant was stopped for a turn signal violation after the officer saw a hand-to-hand transaction of some kind. Instead of performing a patdown, the officer went right to a pants pocket and searched it. That violated Terry, and there was no reasonable suspicion based on what little the officer saw. People v. Trisby, 2013 IL App (1st) 112552, 2013 Ill. App. LEXIS 250 (April 24, 2013).*

Defendant’s stop was justified because he was driving on the wrong side of the road. State v. Keck, 2013 Ind. App. LEXIS 188 (April 24, 2013).*

Defendant did not have standing in another person’s cell phone records, and even his own that were obtained by a court order from the provider. State v. Crawford, 2013 Ohio 1659, 2013 Ohio App. LEXIS 1550 (8th Dist. April 25, 2013).*

Window tint and weaving justified the stop, and the officer could smell marijuana. State v. Knox, 2013 Ohio 1662, 2013 Ohio App. LEXIS 1561 (8th Dist. April 25, 2013).*

Defendant was arrested for drug offenses, and a jailer told him “he needed ‘to submit to a UA.’ As Jennings was getting the cup for the urine sample out, and without any Miranda advisement, Brown said, ‘My piss is going to melt right through that cup.’ … Brown provided a sample and it tested positive for methamphetamine, amphetamine and cannabinoids.” The UA was valid as a search incident. United States v. Brown, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58791 (D. S.D. February 15, 2013):

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While statute requires a blood draw from a “qualified technician,” there is no statutory exclusionary remedy for a failure. Alternatively, this blood draw was not otherwise unreasonable to justify exclusion. State v. Coxwell, 2012 Ohio 6215, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 5428 (11th Dist. December 31, 2012).*

The suppression motion wasn’t timely, and the state was offered a continuance to prepare, which it declined. It can’t claim prejudice merely from the untimely motion that was granted. There was a violation of state statute in the taking of urine for a BAC, but the statute does not provide for suppression as a remedy. Under state law, if the statutory violation equates with a constitutional violation, suppression would be a valid remedy. Here there was also consent. The trial court found that the defendant consented, but there was no finding on voluntariness of consent. The judgment is reversed and remanded for a new suppression hearing where the trial court will make findings on voluntariness. State v. Starkey, 2012 Ohio 6219, 985 N.E.2d 295 (11th Dist. 2012).*

Defendant’s detention was held in a prior appeal in 2010 to be valid, so it couldn’t be relitigated. The affidavit for the search warrant was not deceptively false under Franks. The statement was a reasonable conclusion based on the evidence available to the officer, which is permitted. State v. Mendenhall, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1 (January 2, 2013).* [Not yet on court’s website]

Defendant’s stop for texting while driving was reasonable. People v. Corrales, 213 Cal. App. 4th 696, 152 Cal. Rptr. 3d 667 (2d Dist. 2013).*

The trial court suppressed a search of defendant’s house, but the appellate court held that the CI’s statement about drugs being sold there was corroborated by a visitor exiting who had drugs on him and lied about where he’d been. State v. Holden, 60 A.3d 1110 (Del. 2013).*

Defendant was walking away from officers ignoring them at first, so he was not seized (Hodari D.). Finally, he stopped and turned and made an exaggerated motion with his arms tossing the gun. It was lawfully seized. United States v. Davis, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6420 (E.D. Mich. January 16, 2013).*

There was no indication from the officer’s testimony that defendant saw the police car and continued to drive, was attempting to evade the police, or otherwise acted in a furtive manner. Therefore, the motion to suppress should have been granted. People v. Petty, 2012 IL App (2d) 110974, 981 N.E.2d 1157 (2012).*

The trial court’s findings of consent are supported by the record. Defense counsel’s state constitutional argument would fail if it had been made. State v. Kiche, 826 N.W.2d 516 (Iowa App. 2012).*

Defendant was charged with false pretenses and false identity for holding himself out as a lawyer to get money from somebody to represent them in a criminal case. He was pro se at trial, and his Fourth Amendment claim is waived for not presenting it to the circuit court first. Patton v. State, 109 So. 3d 66 (Miss. 2012).*

There was a robbery of a cab driver outside a hotel, and the suspect fled into the hotel. Hotel security could see him go to the fifth floor and followed. On the fifth floor, he wasn’t seen, but two men were talking loudly in a room and hotel security knocked. Nobody came to the door and it got quiet. The security person returned to the lobby. When police arrived, he took them to the room. The police entry into the room, while a close question, was with exigent circumstances because of the possibility that he holed up in a room of somebody else and had them hostage. He wasn’t the renter of the room. Finally, to be an abandonment, disclaiming ownership of property seized by the government has to occur before the search not after. United States v. Ojonugwa, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57777 (N.D. Tex. April 23, 2013):

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One defendant subjected to a government recording of his call with a consenting person has standing to challenge the voluntariness of consent of the other person. United States v. Hawkins, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187767 (W.D. Mo. October 18, 2012):

While the Corona-Chavez case does not address the issues of standing or the voluntariness of a consent, numerous other cases have found that defendants, such as defendant Hawkins, do have standing to challenge the voluntariness of another’s consent to the recording of a phone conversation with them. In United States v. Hodge, 539 F.2d 898, 900 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1091, 97 S. Ct. 1100, 51 L. Ed. 2d 536 (1977), a government informant (Mondaine) consented to the recording of telephone conversations between himself and defendant Hodge. Defendant Hodge argued that admission of the conversations into evidence violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the United States Constitution and 18 U.S.C. § 2511. Id. The court found: [¶] … A person may challenge government evidence on the ground that it was seized by electronic surveillance violative of his Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures if the person was a party to the conversation ….

While the Eighth Circuit hasn’t ruled, the significant weight of authority says that a search incident of a cell phone is permissible in a search incident (citing lots of cases), particularly where the phone is directly linked to the offense. Here, it was soliciting a 15 year old prostitute and the meeting was arranged by text message and calls to and from cell phones. United States v. Nyuon, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56916 (D. S.D. March 7, 2013).*

A notebook was seized from defendant’s vehicle in a credit card fraud case, and there was probable cause to believe it contained evidence of the crime. United States v. Harris, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56130 (N.D. Ind. April 18, 2013).*

Defendant is accused of campaign finance violations in a Senate race in Nevada. His company fired him, and 81 boxes of information was turned over to its lawyers. The lawyers searched the boxes and found sufficient evidence to turn over to the FBI. This was a private search because there was no prior or contemporaneous government involvement. United States v. Whittemore, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57198 (D. Nev. April 18, 2013).*

Reason.com: 3 Reasons the Boston Bombing Case Should Not Change Our Attitudes About Privacy / And one reason why it should by Brian Doherty:

The rapid identification and tracking of the Boston bombing suspects has made many Americans contemplate the benefits of a world where everything and everyone is watched and recorded, every electronic signal analyzed and traced. Figures ranging from Rep. Peter King to Tom Brokaw have called for more surveillance. New York Mayor Bloomberg, always eager to make himself a walking caricature of modern managerial liberalism, is urging us to change “our laws and our interpretation of the Constitution.”

Defendant was stopped for a traffic violation and the officer was going to give a warning. After the computer checks came back clean and a drug dog who had been immediately called for went around the vehicle and did not alert, the officers were stymied and conversed about how to get consent. The stop was unreasonably long [and only by two minutes] because the officers didn’t let him go. Instead, they sought consent which was coerced “to make sure there were no drugs in the van.” United States v. Rodriguez, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56456 (D. Utah April 15, 2013):

After telling Defendants he wanted to make sure there were no drugs or weapons in the van and asking Defendants to exit the van, Nazer asked for consent to search. At that time, Defendants were moved away from the van and each placed with one of the other officers. There were three officers total and a canine at the scene. It was the middle of the night on a dark and secluded street. The officers were all in uniform, armed, and providing the only real light at the scene by holding flashlights. The officer gave no indication that Defendants could refuse consent and, in fact, had prefaced his request by stating that he wanted to make sure Herrada had given a truthful response. Under the circumstances, the court finds that no reasonable person would have felt free to refuse the officer’s request to search. Therefore, the court concludes that Herrada’s consent to the search was not freely given and the search violated Defendants’ Fourth Amendment rights. Accordingly, the court suppresses all evidence seized in the search.

The Eighth Circuit doesn’t follow Ninth on bad faith equaling an “egregious” Fourth Amendment violation warranting the exclusionary remedy in an alien removal case. They have a damages remedy [ha!]. Carcamo v. Holder, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 7841 (8th Cir. April 19, 2013):

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When defendant answered his door, the police said they were there to arrest him, and he stepped back, the police did not have a right to enter under Payton. The plain view on the sweep thereafter was suppressed. State v. Maddox, 2013 Ohio 1544, 2013 Ohio App. LEXIS 1424 (8th Dist. April 18, 2013):

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Google Scholar‘s home page changed today. Click on “Legal Documents” and a button comes up for “Federal Cases” and your state cases or select court. One can do a significant amount of research on Google Scholar, still not as good as Westlaw or Lexis, but it will now be more focused.

Now online: The Champion: Litigating the Fourth Amendment After Jones by Jim Harper:

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Answering door at a knock-and-talk smoking a joint creates cause for entry. State v. Walker, 2013 N.J. LEXIS 355 (April 10, 2013).

A cursory visual search through the windows of a car does not dissipate probable cause. A judge issuing a search warrant doesn’t need to know that already happened, and failure to put it in the affidavit is not a Franks violation. United States v. Johnson, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55907 (W.D. Pa. April 15, 2013).*

After the hearing on the motions to suppress, the court asked for briefing, and the defendants didn’t file any. That means the motions are withdrawn. “In addition to be subject to denial for having been withdrawn, the motions lack merit.” United States v. Gutierrez-Martinez, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55323 (N.D. Ga. March 22, 2013).*

A probationer’s computer is subject to search on reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing. If necessary, it includes moving it elsewhere for forensic testing. United States v. Miller, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55906 (D. Mont. April 17, 2013):

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