Police on DUI patrol saw defendant cross the centerline twice in a mile. They followed. He pulled into his driveway then garage and the door was closing. Officers slipped under the door to arrest him. They did not have probable cause for DUI yet, and the entry was an entry into the home in violation of Payton. This was not hot pursuit. State v. Foster, 392 S.W.3d 576 (Mo. App. 2013):

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A Minnesota school district violated the First and Fourth Amendment by forcing a student to give up the student’s Facebook password so the school officials could search the Facebook account for messages they didn’t like. The right was clearly established, and there is no qualified immunity. R.S. v. Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, MINNESOTA, 894 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (D. Minn. 2012):

Such cases demonstrate that the existence of the narrow exceptions recognized in D.J.M. does not render unclear the established general rule against school regulation of merely inappropriate or offensive out-of-school speech.

The standard for showing a clearly established right is certainly stringent, but that standard has been met here thus far. Several high-profile Supreme Court cases have distinguished between regulation of in-school speech and out-of-school speech. Recent cases approving of school regulation of particularly violent and threatening out-of-school speech have little applicability here and do not cast doubt on the general rule which, assuming the veracity of the facts alleged in the complaint, controls here. The facts alleged in Plaintiffs’ complaint place R.S.’s speech in the heartland of protected nonviolent and nondisruptive out-of-school speech. The Court concludes that a reasonable official would understand that punishing such speech would transgress R.S.’s right to free speech. As R.S.’s right to speak as alleged without school interference was clearly established, the Court will deny the school defendants’ motion for qualified immunity at this early stage.

. . .

Based on Plaintiffs’ complaint, at least some of the information and messages accessed by the school officials were in R.S.’s exclusive possession, protected by her Facebook password. R.S. controlled those items until she involuntarily relinquished her password. As with a private letter, the content of R.S.’s electronic correspondence was available only to her and her correspondent. The Court concludes, based on established Fourth Amendment precedent, that R.S. had a reasonable expectation of privacy to her private Facebook information and messages.

ii. Nature of the Search

The facts in the complaint allege that the school officials conducted an exhaustive search of R.S.’s Facebook account, and possibly her personal email account. There is no indication at this stage that they tailored their search in any way. It would have been difficult for them to tailor their search in pursuit of a legitimate government interest because, as discussed below, such an interest appears to have been lacking.

iii. Government Interest in the Search

The school defendants assert that since the reasonable search analysis requires a complicated and fact-intensive balancing of interests, the Court cannot conclude that their alleged behavior violated R.S.’s clearly established rights. Plaintiffs respond that the search was clearly unreasonable because one of the interests to be balanced—a legitimate school interest motivating the search—is completely absent.

Defendant was stopped essentially because the officer wanted to see what he was doing. There was no crime report, no suspicious activity. The stop was unreasonable. State v. Browning, 2012 Ohio 4026, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 3543 (9th Dist. September 5, 2012).*

Officers had reasonable suspicion to stop a red sedan with four men in it after a report of four men in a red sedan allegedly committing a burglary. It was the only vehicle matching the description. State v. Pressley, 2012 Ohio 4083, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 3591 (2d Dist. September 7, 2012).*

In a detailed analysis of the issues, a pre-Jones installation of a GPS device would not be suppressed because it was installed in good faith reliance on the lack of law against it. United States v. Lopez, 895 F. Supp. 2d 592 (D. Del. 2012).*

Search of a black bag in defendant’s possession at the time of his arrest was valid as a search incident because it could have contained evidence or weapons. A later search of the bag was valid. United States v. Gordon, 895 F. Supp. 2d 1011 (D. Haw. 2012):

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Drug testing as a condition of receiving public assistance in Florida violates the Fourth Amendment. The state’s proffer on “special needs” exception as justification woefully fails. Lebron v. Secretary, Florida Department of Children and Families, 710 F.3d 1202 (11th Cir. 2013):

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A GPS was installed on defendant’s car, and then Jones was decided. The Davis good faith exception applies to save this search. How close does the binding precedent have to be? Not too, apparently. United States v. Sparks, 711 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 2013):

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On a OUI2, a condition of bail of alcohol testing and treatment was a reasonable condition of bail and did not violate the Fourth Amendment under the special needs doctrine. State v. Wilcenski, 2013 WI App 21, 346 Wis. 2d 145, 827 N.W.2d 642 (2013):

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The court of appeals looks at the photographs of defendant’s car and concludes the window tint justification for the stop was objectively unreasonable, and the motion to suppress should have been granted. Sanders v. State, 981 N.E.2d 616 (Ind. App. 2013).*

Defendant was arrested for OWI, but the officer knew defendant and that he was a suspect in several burglaries. On this record, there was a fair probability defendant had evidence of burglaries in the car. Thus, Gant was no impediment to searching the trunk. State v. Lefler, 2013 WI App 22, 346 Wis. 2d 220, 827 N.W.2d 650 (2013).*

Defendant was carrying a gun in his waistband at a racetrack. Security there was provided by private security and sheriff’s deputies. A tipster told a security officer that defendant had a gun, and defendant was near a bathroom near a large crowd including children. “Mr. Johnson walked by Mayes and intentionally gave him a ‘shoulder bump,’ allowing him to feel a gun in Mayes’s front waistband. Based on his experience searching for weapons at night clubs, Mr. Johnson felt what he believed to be an automatic. He proceeded to move Mayes away from the bathroom, search him, secure the loaded gun, and place Mayes in handcuffs.” Defendant was taken to a sheriff’s deputy and turned over. He was a felon in possession, and this was purely a private search. United States v. Mayes, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9471 (D. S.C. January 24, 2013).*

Officers lacked exigent circumstances for a warrantless entry. They created the exigency by this knock and talk. Defendant’s failure to come to the door timely did not support exigency. Commonwealth v. Waddell, 2012 PA Super 252, 61 A.3d 196 (2012):

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Defendant was subjected to a state probation search in 2005 for child pornography on a computer and it was suppressed because of a lack of a search warrant for the computers. The same happened here again. He was subject to probation searches of his person, vehicle, and residence, but he was never told that his computers were subject to probation searches. While there was reasonable suspicion for a probation search, the computer required a warrant, and the motion to suppress is granted. While the court is loath to suppress because the suppression should be the exception rather than the rule, it has to here because they violated his Fourth Amendment rights again. United States v. Swearingen, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7473 (D. Mont. January 8, 2013). [Note: At least in my federal district, the J&C in federal sex offenses includes a provision for supervised release that the computer is, in fact, subject to warrantless search by the USPO.]

Manner and place of travel can be suspicious very near the border, for instance, on a road only locals should be on. “Although there were no objective measures offered to evaluate these assertions, this factor does deserve significant weight given Sasabe’s proximity to the border and the amount and frequency of alien and drug smuggling activity in the area.” United States v. Rodriguez, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184699 (D. Ariz. October 18, 2012).

Where two of three bulbs in a taillight were working, it was “in good working order” and the stop was unjustified. Post-conviction relief granted. State v. Brown, 2013 WI App 17, 346 Wis. 2d 98, 827 N.W.2d 903 (2013).*

Withdrawing the motion to suppress makes it moot. United States v. Forrest, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184615 (D. Nev. October 31, 2012).*

DART transit operators called central control that two men got on a train wearing bandanas over their faces. Customers were fearful of a robbery. A transit police officer swept the train finding them, and they had reasonable suspicion for a frisk when the defendants were found. The call was not treated as an anonymous call, and the choice of wearing a bandana over one’s face justified the officer’s actions. The district court was not clearly wrong. While defendant claimed it was cold, video of the stop and frisk showed officers in short sleeves. United States v. Roberson, 496 Fed. Appx. 390 (5th Cir. 2012):

Third, Roberson argues that his attire–that is, the bandana covering his face–was not a legitimate basis for reasonable suspicion. He does not cite any case law holding that attire is an inherently inappropriate factor for a reasonable suspicion calculus. Roberson’s principal contention regarding his attire is that there are reasons other than robbery that he might have been wearing a bandana, namely that it was cold. During the suppression hearing, Roberson presented evidence that a cold front had developed in Dallas that evening, and that at the time he boarded the DART train, the temperature was possibly 40 degrees Fahrenheit with wind chill, and that the inside temperature of the train was roughly similar. On the other hand, the train conductor and Officer Ibarra testified that it was not that cold on the train and that the train had a heater. The Government also presented video evidence that while some officers were wearing jackets on the scene, others were wearing short sleeves. This conflicting evidence does not clearly support Roberson’s portrayal of the events, and thus we defer to the district court’s resolution of the facts, since the court was uniquely situated to determine the credibility and reliability of the testimony. The district court did not clearly err in finding that Roberson was wearing the bandana for reasons unrelated to the weather.

Plaintiffs were detained for five hours and interrogated as witnesses after a shooting, and they stated a claim that the detention was unreasonable. The decedent’s estate also had a claim under the “danger creation” doctrine because the officers at the scene refused to let the ambulance leave timely, and that led to the death from lack of hospital care. Maxwell v. County of San Diego, 708 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 2013) (on rehearing from 697 F.3d 941):

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The exclusionary rule does not apply in SVP proceedings. Here, the DA acquired boxes of information about the defendant years after the conviction and even proceeded in court for authority to open the boxes and whether defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy. This is not a criminal proceeding, and the need to deter is gone. People v. Landau, 214 Cal. App. 4th 1, 154 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1 (4th Dist. 2013):

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The automobile exception applies to vehicles, not their occupants, and the state confesses error based on United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 586-87 (1948). State v. Freeman, 253 Ore. App. 472, 290 P.3d 908 (2012).

Defendant was seized by being ordered by loudspeaker to come out of the house, but there was probable cause to believe that he was involved in crime because the house was a murder scene, police knew an unidentified man was in there, and he wasn’t answering the telephone when they called the house. State v. Hudson, 253 Ore. App. 327, 290 P.3d 868 (2012).*

Defendant was lawfully stopped for blocking the street, and the officer could order defendant out of the vehicle, and that revealed a gun in plain view. State v. Kinard, 105 So. 3d 974 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2012).*

Officers had reasonable cause under Payton to believe that defendant was hiding in his own house. The SWAT team showed up for a misdemeanor arrest because of defendant’s 100 prior arrests and numerous convictions for violent crime. After a lot of looking, he was found hiding in a return air duct under the house. A gun was found similarly hidden. United States v. Hall, 495 Fed. Appx. 319 (4th Cir. 2012):

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Defendant was accused of transporting a juvenile for prostitution. An undercover officer saw the screen of his Blackberry and saw a reference to “bring[ing] condoms.” There was probable cause to seize the cell phone incident to his arrest. The cell phone was later searched with a warrant. United States v. Nyoun, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45260 (D. S.D. March 29, 2013).*

Indiana requires reasonable suspicion for a trash search, and the detail of the anonymous tip here showed that it had to come from personal observation inside defendant’s house. Fuqua v. State, 984 N.E.2d 709 (Ind. App. 2013).*

Trial court erroneously used “nexus” for probable cause and standing. “Nexus” is reserved for search warrant questions and whether the PC relates to the place to be searched. Nevertheless, the point being: what was the connection between the defendant and the drugs? That’s a question of standing and probable cause to arrest. Here, defendant didn’t have standing, and the police had probable cause. State v. Johnson, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 275 (March 26, 2013).*

In Florida, there is no way for an innocent owner to report a color change of a vehicle. The fact of a color change is innocent and alone cannot be reasonable suspicion. “We reverse the trial court’s denial of appellant’s motion to suppress and certify conflict with the Fourth District’s opinion Aders v. State, 67 So. 3d 368 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011).” Van Teamer v. State, 108 So. 3d 664 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012):

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NYTimes Op-Ed Columnist: Erasing History by Bill Keller:

Lorraine Martin, a nurse in Greenwich, was arrested in 2010 with her two grown sons when police raided her home and found a small stash of marijuana, scales and plastic bags. The case against her was tossed out when she agreed to take some drug classes, and the official record was automatically purged. It was, the law seemed to assure her, as if it had never happened.

But Martin found that when she applied for jobs that should have been well within her reach, she got the cold shoulder. She Googled herself and discovered what any vigilant employer would have seen: stories still sitting in online news archives with headlines like “Mother and sons charged with drug offenses.”

NACDL opens its Domestic Drone Information Center. From its press release (online later today):

Washington, DC (April 30, 2013) – NACDL is today excited to announce the launch of its online Domestic Drone Information Center (DDIC). While drones (or Unmanned Aerial Vehicles) are most commonly known for their use in U.S. counterterrorism strategy, their presence inside the U.S. has become an important and growing concern in recent months.

NACDL President Steven D. Benjamin said, “NACDL’s Domestic Drone Information Center will serve as a comprehensive source of cutting-edge information on the proliferation of drones.” Benjamin sees the DDIC as filling a critical public need: “At the moment, people’s concerns about how drones will be used domestically are increasing, but information online remains scattered. The Domestic Drone Information Center aims to put everything in one place.”

To that end, the Domestic Drone Information Center aggregates news from leading publications across the nation. It features a comprehensive listing of legislative developments – federally, in each of the 50 states, and in select municipalities. It contains sections devoted to relevant case law, scholarship, upcoming events, and data on drone usage. The DDIC also aggregates existing material, providing the public with a launching pad to additional information on domestic drones. For example, the DDIC features links to other leaders in this field, such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation and the documents it has compiled through an aggressive Freedom of Information Act lawsuit. As the status of domestic drones in America changes and new resources become available, the DDIC will continually offer the latest updates.

Defendant owed parking tickets, and the PD issued an order to stop and arrest people with unpaid parking tickets. That does not justify a stop and detention under Ohio law, and “the protections guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment cannot be altered by means of an Executive Order issued to police department personnel.” Motion to suppress granted. State v. Dukes, 2013 Ohio 1691, 2013 Ohio App. LEXIS 1578 (2d Dist. April 26, 2013).

Defendant was arrested in Dayton by officers from an adjoining city, and his car was impounded. A search warrant was obtained for the car, and that cured any jurisdictional ills there might have been. State v. Walker, 2013 Ohio 1687, 2013 Ohio App. LEXIS 1580 (2d Dist. April 26, 2013)

The police had probable cause, and the search of his car was justified either by the automobile exception or the search incident doctrine. United States v. Rousseau, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60176 (D. Minn. April 26, 2013).*