Property lawfully seized by an IRS search warrant is subject to return under Rule 41(g). Defendant was indicted in W.D. Tex. and sued in W.D. Ky. The government did not satisfy its burden that the information qualified as “return information.” The government is ordered to produce in 14 days or show why it shouldn’t in 5 days. In re 1015 E. Cliff Drive (Gourmet Express, LLC v. United States), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146343 (N.D. Cal. October 9, 2013):

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The Guardian: Demands on Lavabit violated Fourth Amendment, lawyers say by Dominic Rushe:

Edward Snowden’s email provider argues government order to hand over encryption keys jeopardised clients’ personal details

WaPo: Try as it might, anti-surveillance group can’t avoid Washington by Craig Timberg:

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Washington City Paper: Five Cab Drivers Sue D.C. Over New Modernization Rules by Perry Stein:

Five taxicab drivers filed a class action suit in U.S. District Court against Taxicab Commission Chair Ron Linton Wednesday, claiming the commission’s cab modernization requirements are discriminatory and a violation of the drivers’ constitutional rights.

The rule also require GPS on cabs. The Southern District of New York upheld this six years ago.

A high school football coach who said he’d been threatened by defendant who was carrying a gun at the school stadium to shoot the coach after the game was credible enough for a stop. Defendant was frisked and found with a gun and charged with possession in a school zone. The stop was valid. People v. Turner, 219 Cal. App. 4th 151, 161 Cal. Rptr. 3d 567 (6th Dist. 2013).*

Defendant’s stop was justified because the vehicle matched a BOLO, but the LP was missing, and a paper license was there instead. The BOLO included “armed and dangerous.” Defendant was exceedingly nervous during the stop, and he consented to a search of the car. The smell of marijuana would have justified it. United States v. Johns, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123332 (W.D. La. August 7, 2013).*

After an in camera review of the proceedings before the state judge issuing the search warrant, the court concludes there was probable cause for its issuance. United States v. Jones, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189001 (W.D. N.Y. January 17, 2012).*

A bankruptcy adversary proceeding was instituted to get return of imported lamps with counterfeit Underwriters Laboratory stickers on them. They were seized because of the labels, and a federal prosecution started. The bankruptcy court has no jurisdiction over them because of the criminal case, and the remedy is in that court. In re Guildmaster, Inc., 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 1241 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. March 29, 2013).

The standard for detention for Miranda purposes isn’t the same as for Fourth Amendment purposes. Here, the suppression order of defendant’s statement is set aside because he could not have understood he was in custody for Miranda purposes. People v. Pleshakov, 2013 CO 18, 298 P.3d 228 (2013).*

Disputed facts underlying a Fourth Amendment qualified immunity appeal means no appellate jurisdiction. Hernandez v. Grant, 520 Fed. Appx. 668 (10th Cir. 2013).*

Firing a Taser at somebody doesn’t make a constitutional violation without hitting him. The shooting of plaintiff’s decedent during a dynamic entry was entitled to qualified immunity. The planning session before the entry showed that the police considered alternatives. “The aim of the plan was to surprise and subdue Gandy before he could harm himself or others. There was nothing before the district court to suggest that Sergeant Pittman knew or should have known that the course of action he chose would in fact lead to the use of deadly force against Gandy. In sum, we conclude that this theory was properly rejected at the summary judgment stage.” Gandy v. Robey, 520 Fed. Appx. 134 (4th Cir. 2013).*

[Note: Twice I’ve seen files over SWAT team assaults on buildings. Both were rejected. One led to a near mortal wounding when the sniper’s target shot a hostage when the target wasn’t killed because the bullet deflected going through a window. The other led to the almost new house burning down from a teargas cannister left inside when the police never moved in to clear the house after firing it inside, and they weren’t even sure the suspect was still there. It is almost impossible to make a case against a SWAT Team that is merely negligent, even if they were. In the examples above, the sniper wasn’t negligent. In the second, who ever decided to fire in the teargas cannister, knowing it could burn down the house without intending to go in after it, was negligent. But negligence doesn’t state a § 1983 claim.]

A warrant’s “catch-all provision” that on its face makes a search warrant overbroad is severable from the warrant under Andresen. “Accordingly, the warrant was not so facially deficient that the executing officers could not have reasonably presumed it was valid.” Therefore, the good faith exception applies. United States v. Carson, 520 Fed. Appx. 874 (11th Cir. 2013).*

Walking away from an officer is not a submission to authority. There was reasonable suspicion for defendant’s stop. United States v. Jones, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76505 (E.D. N.C. May 29, 2013).*

Review of the affidavit for search warrant on a motion to suppress is not de novo: is there a substantial basis for believing PC? United States v. Deprow, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76811 (E.D. Mo. May 3, 2013).*

Wyoming concludes that a telephonic or other remotely applied for search warrant [via Skype, for example?] is valid if there is a recording made that can be transcribed for preservation of the showing of probable cause. Smith v. State, 2013 WY 122, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 127 (October 4, 2013):

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Surveillance video showed that the police were unjustifiably on the curtilage when they made the observations at issue, and that made the entry unreasonable. State v. Stacey, 2013 Ohio 4422, 2013 Ohio App. LEXIS 4678 (6th Dist. September 27, 2013).*

While the statute doesn’t say it, it implies that an administrative inspection warrant may issue only on probable cause to believe the inspection is necessary. Therefore, the housing inspection warrant ordinance is valid. Kaim Props. v. City of Mentor, 2013 Ohio 4291, 2013 Ohio App. LEXIS 4695 (11th Dist. October 8, 2013).*

Even assuming the search of defendant’s trash was unlawful because of where it was and it was included in an alleged Franks violation, there was still probable cause on the remainder of what was submitted to the magistrate. United States v. Maguire, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145175 (D. S.D. October 1, 2013).*

A search warrant to search all persons at a rave party was unreasonable without probable cause as to any specific person swept up in it. State v. Light, 2013-NMCA-075, 306 P.3d 534 (2013):

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Google’s capturing URLs during user searches is not “content” under the wiretapping act. In re Google Inc., Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litigation, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145727 (D. Del. October 9, 2013):

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I just spent 100 hours or so on responding to a motion to dismiss in my one civil case.

I’ve decided that murderers are a better class of people than corporate lawyers. Once they’re arrested, they at least have some sense they did something wrong.

Atlantic: The Single Best Overview of What the Surveillance State Does With Our Private Data by Conor Friedersdorf

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Defendant was stopped driving a stolen car, and his bag was searched. The court rejects the state’s invitation to overrule automatic standing which was adopted before Salvucci. Jarnig v. State, 2013 Alas. App. LEXIS 96 (September 27, 2013):

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Defendant’s offer to let the officer “check” for anything illegal was countered with “drugs or guns” was the subject of this search, and defendant agreed. That was a consent to a complete search. Betancourt v. State, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 479 (June 12, 2013).*

The product of an allegedly invalid protective sweep did not affect the decision to grant a search warrant. What omissions there were were immaterial to the probable cause determation. United States v. Munteanu, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83346 (E.D. N.Y. June 12, 2013).*

In Oregon, reasonable suspicion is required to run wants or warrants. State v. Dierks, 257 Ore. App. 88, 306 P.3d 653 (2013)*:

In sum, we conclude that, given the totality of the circumstances that existed when Barrett returned to his patrol car after obtaining the passenger’s driver’s license and a name from defendant, a reasonable person in defendant’s circumstances would have believed that Barrett was running a warrants check on the name she had given him and that, given his other inquiries, she was the subject of a criminal investigation and was not free to walk or drive away. The state does not contend either that Barrett had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before he checked LEDS or that the evidence that defendant sought to suppress was not discovered as a result of the unjustified stop. Accordingly, the trial court erred when it denied defendant’s motion to suppress.

Politico: California driving Internet privacy policy by Michelle Quinn:

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Michigan Capitol Confidential: State Tax Chief Encourages Inspectors To Enter Homes; Refusal Could Lead To Higher Assessment by Anne Schieber:

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