A shrug is not a “‘clear indication’ of consent to a search.” State v. Leaton, 836 N.W.2d 673 (Iowa App. 2013):

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Backscatter technology no longer “generat[es] revealing images,” so case is moot. Redfern v. Napolitano, 727 F.3d 77 (1st Cir. 2013):

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Philadelphia officers on a pickpocket detail encountered defendant, who had been arrested by this officer for this same thing eight times before. After watching him, the officer talked to him in a mere “encounter.” Despite having been arrested by this officer before, defendant gave a false name. He had a shopping bag in hand, and the officer saw a credit card receipt inside on top which he pulled out, saw that the purchase was with a credit card, and he asked to see the credit card. Defendant said he had no credit card. Later he produced a credit card in somebody else’s name, and he was arrested. “This Court notes that considering the totality of the circumstances, supra, Appellant did not necessarily have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the shopping bag.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 2013 PA Super 172, 73 A.3d 609 (2013).*

Attempted murder victim found among six dead ID’d defendant as the assailant. That was probable cause for arrest. State v. Dotson, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 584 (June 25, 2013).*

Using flashbang devices during a search for weapons and drugs was not unreasonable. Even if it was, it doesn’t require suppression because it deals with the manner of entry, not whether it should have occurred. United States v. Honeycutt, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147705 (N.D. Ga. March 29, 2013):

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WaPo: NSA gathering contact lists from e-mails, chats by Barton Gellman and Ashkan Soltani:

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Police entry onto the curtilage to seize trash from defendant’s property violated the Fourth Amendment. Commonwealth v. Ousley, 393 S.W.3d 15 (Ky. 2013).*

Defense counsel was not ineffective for not challenging the probable cause for his arrest in an effort to suppress his booking photograph used in a photo array because there was probable cause, and it was found at his first appearance. United States v. Stubblefield, 931 F. Supp. 2d 118 (D. D.C. 2013).*

Defendant’s Fourth Amendment claim, if there was one, was procedurally defaulted by his plea where he affirmed his lawyer did a good job. There is no showing of cause and prejudice. Jones v. United States, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37864 (D. Md. March 15, 2013).*

Defendant’s erratic behavior when stopped justified a Long weapons search of the car even though defendant was in the back of a police car at the time. He would soon be released, and the officer didn’t want him arming himself if he could. State v. Cordell, 2013 Ohio 3009, 2013 Ohio App. LEXIS 3056 (10th Dist. July 11, 2013).*

During a valid stop the officer saw marijuana in plain view on the passenger floorboard, and that justified a search of the car under the automobile exception. When searching, a gun was also in plain view. The trial court erred in suppressing. State v. Bazrawi, 2013 Ohio 3015, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 5501 (10th Dist. July 11, 2012).*

The CI met face-to-face with the police and said he bought drugs from the defendant. That was an admission against penal interest, and it showed probable cause. Also, there were about 20 purchases between December and January 23, and the information was not stale on January 27 when the warrant was issued. State v. Flores, 144 Conn. App. 308, 72 A.3d 1202 (2013).*

Noting a conflict in the circuits on the scope of Randolph, this court holds that a tenant’s refusal to consent is binding on the co-tenant, and he can leave voluntarily without having to stay there to insure the police don’t shop for consent with another. United States v. Phillips, 931 F. Supp. 2d 783 (E.D. Mich. 2013):

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There were three occupants of a wrecked vehicle, two unconscious. Without determining who was the driver, the police ordered a blood draw. There was no probable cause as to the defendant being determined to be the driver before the blood draw, and that violated the state statute, Fourth Amendment, and the state constitution. State v. Weber, 120 So. 3d 328 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2013).

There was probable cause to arrest defendant for aggravated assault, and that justified a search of the car under the automobile exception. The trial court erred in finding otherwise. State v. McIntosh, 2013 Fla. App. LEXIS 10292 (Fla. 5th DCA June 28, 2013).*

Staying only periodically as an overnight guest with one’s girlfriend does not create standing. Here, he was last there overnight four days before the search which occurred after a shooting out front. Inside, the police found a gun and belongings of defendant, and he was convicted of felon in possession. State v. Brown, 2013 Ohio 2720, 2013 Ohio App. LEXIS 2781 (1st Dist. June 28, 2013).*

NY Post: Cops ‘lied’ to reach arrest quotas by Tara Palmeri and Kirstan Conley:

A former city prosecutor wants the Bronx district attorney to probe a team of narcotics cops he says lied on the stand and helped put away innocent people to meet quotas.

NYT: Privacy Fears Grow as Cities Increase Surveillance by Somini Sengupta:

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An arrest warrant carries with it the implicit authority to enter to arrest. The police have to have probable cause to believe defendant was home to make the entry, however, and here they had it. United States v. Jefferson, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146102 (D. Neb. September 16, 2013).

Defense counsel wasn’t deficient during the suppression hearing for not calling defendant based on the strength of the government’s case. Lucas v. United States, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147426 (W.D. N.C. October 10, 2013).*

Defendant’s jail calls were recorded, and they are not a fruit of his allegedly unlawful arrest, even if it was. United States v. Houston, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147454 (E.D. Tenn. September 4, 2013).*

Defendant was stopped on the B-W Parkway in Maryland for suspicion of DWI and was taken to the hospital for an involuntary blood draw. McNeely was decided after it happened, and it is found retroactive to pending cases. This case is controlled by McNeely. Because no court applied Davis good faith to McNeely’s case, this court wouldn’t here. Motion to suppress the blood test is granted. United States v. Brown, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147352 (D. Md. October 11, 2013):

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Defense counsel was not ineffective for not moving to suppress a thumb drive taken off his person during execution of the search warrant in this case for computer media in the house since he was in the house at the time. It was fairly within the warrant. United States v. Orr, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51686 (S.D. Ala. January 23, 2013).*

Officers had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant’s vehicle for resembling one involved in a cluster of bank robberies in the area. When stopped, defendant consented to a search of the vehicle more than once. Search warrants for his house were based on probable cause. Defendant’s later confession he robbed banks sealed the deal. United States v. Wetsch, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51682 (D. Minn. February 8, 2013).*

The search incident of defendant’s car in this forfeiture case was based on probable cause contraband was in the car [sounds more like automobile exception]. United States v. Cunningham, 520 Fed. Appx. 413 (6th Cir. 2013).*

Affidavit for the search warrant for a gang bandana in a house was issued with probable cause and wasn’t stale. United States v. Garcia, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51339 (D. Kan. April 10, 2013).*

Defendant was not seized when the officer rapped on the window to get defendant to roll it down and defendant ignored him and tried to dispose of evidence. United States v. Brissey, 520 Fed. Appx. 481 (7th Cir. 2013):

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New Law Review Article: Binary Searches and the Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment by Lawrence Rosenthal in William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal, Forthcoming

Abstract:

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WaPo: Effort underway to declassify document that is legal foundation for NSA phone program by Ellen Nakashima and Carol D. Leonnig:

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NYT: N.S.A. Director Firmly Defends Surveillance Efforts by David E. Sanger and Thom Shanker:

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Defendant was the passenger in a car stopped for having stolen license plates. When she was ordered out of the car, her purse was placed on the ground next to the car. She was handcuffed and placed in a patrol car. The search of her purse after that violated the search incident doctrine and Chimel because she was incapable of accessing the purse at the time of the search to destroy evidence or get a weapon. State v. Byrd, 162 Wn. App. 612, 258 P.3d 686 (2011) (with dissent), reversed in State v. Byrd, 2013 Wash. LEXIS 852 (October 10, 2013) (posted here):

¶9 In short, the test announced in Smith and applied in Johnson is based on a rejected interpretation of Belton; an interpretation that Gant overruled. We are bound by Gant’s interpretation of Belton. Valdez, 167 Wn.2d at 780 (Johnson, J., concurring). And, while the State argues that Gant should not apply because it involved the search of a vehicle incident to arrest, Gant and Belton simply applied the general rules of the search incident to arrest exception set out in Chimel to the automobile context. A search incident to an arrest is a search incident to an arrest whether the object searched is a car or a purse.

¶10 Chimel did not involve the search of a vehicle. And it “continues to define the boundaries of the [search incident to arrest] exception, ensures that the scope of a search incident to arrest is commensurate with its purposes of protecting arresting officers and safeguarding any evidence of the offense of arrest that an arrestee might conceal or destroy.” Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1716.

¶11 Under Chimel, then, the search incident to arrest exception permits an officer to perform a warrantless search of an arrestee and the area within his or her immediate control when an arrest is made. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762-63. This type of warrantless search is justified only by interests in officer safety and the preservation of evidence. Id. But such a search is unreasonable where the interests justifying it are absent. Id. at 768. That is, an officer may not, without a warrant, search an object that the arrestee cannot reach at the time of the search. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719; Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763-64, 768.

The government doesn’t have to comply with Daubert in an affidavit for search warrant to show that investigative procedures in a child pornography case were reliable. United States v. Pirosko, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146754 (N.D. Ohio October 10, 2013):

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