Peoples world: Ellsberg warns of “surveillance state” by A.B. Wilkinson:

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Court order for DNA on less than probable cause violates Fourth Amendment. United States v. Martinez, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144499 (E.D. Pa. October 7, 2013):

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Politico: Surveillance panel shut down by Josh Gerstein and Mike Allen:

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NYT: Drug Testing in Schools Divides North Jersey District by Daniel E. Slotnik:

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Defendant was brought in to talk about her husband’s arrest for drug activity off-base. She was not the focus of the investigation. “One of the AFOSI agents took the smoke break with the appellant. He testified, ‘I told her that it’s just a consent to search her house; we weren’t looking at her we were looking at her husband, and she didn’t have to sign it.’ He also told the appellant ‘if she hadn’t done anything wrong that [sic] she had nothing to worry about.’” She consented, and it was valid. United States v. Olson, 2013 CCA LEXIS 822 (A.F. C.C.A. September 11, 2013).*

Officers were inside by consent, and they were looking for somebody involved in a shooting. They told defendant to stand up and a gun was under where he was lying. That was in plain view. United States v. Antone-Herron, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142589 (N.D. Ala. September 20, 2013).*

Defense counsel was not ineffective for not challenging GPS on his car where Jones was decided two years after his conviction. It would have been overruled at the time and affirmed on appeal, and the good faith exception would have applied. Hutcherson v. United States, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143249 (N.D. Tex. July 19, 2013).

Use of a flash bang device as an excessive search requiring suppression of the search is rejected. “The primary case relied upon by Defendants is Boyd v. Benton Co., 374 F.3d 773 (9th Cir. 2004) which was a civil rights suit brought alleging excessive use of force by police officers. Though the Boyd court found that the use of the flash bang device was an excessive use of force, the question of admissibility of evidence in a criminal proceeding was not addressed.” United States v. Honeycutt, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143512 (N.D. Ga. October 3, 2013).

Defendant’s generalized motion to suppress on numerous grounds is denied for lack of specificity. He didn’t have the warrant affidavit when making the motion. United States v. Carraway, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143086 (S.D. Ill. October 3, 2013).*

Defendant was speeding 85 in a 55 and was stopped. He told the officer that there was an emergency at his home with his elderly mother, and the officer followed him there. There was exigent circumstances from the entry, and defendant never objected to the officer following him into the house. United States v. Ruppert, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144054 (W.D. N.Y. June 14, 2013).*

Co-conspirator told to drive somebody else’s car with drugs in it who had a duty to keep the car secure still did not have standing. United States v. Santos, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143489 (D. Utah October 3, 2013):

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There is no reasonable expectation of privacy in historical cell site location data. In any event, the good faith exception would apply. United States v. Moreno-Nevarez, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143900 (S.D. Cal. October 1, 2013):

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Emergency entry is based on what’s supposedly happening in the home, not outside it. State v. Bland, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 12427 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi – Edinburg October 3, 2013):

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Requesting identification of everybody in a parked car was not an investigative detention under Hiibel. Commonwealth v. Au, 615 Pa. 330, 42 A.3d 1002 (2012) (dissent).

Error in the body of the affidavit that included another person [apparently from the computer cut and paste] was a mere “scrivener’s error.” One could tell who was the target of the search from the totality of the affidavit. United States v. De La Torre, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58884 (E.D. Okla. February 16, 2012).

There was a swearing match as to whether a particular controlled buy occurred before a search warrant was issued, and the district court found that it did. That was enough for a search warrant to issue, and the district court’s determination was binding. The officer omitted some information from the affidavit about the CI’s credibility, but, if it was included, the warrant would have issued anyway. Finally, there was probable cause and the good faith exception applied. United States v. Richardson, 478 Fed. Appx. 82 (5th Cir. 2012).*

Anticipatory search warrant failed here because there was no probability that the drugs would be found in a particular place. Commonwealth v. Wallace, 615 Pa. 395, 42 A.3d 1040 (2012):

As the parties recognize, the United States Supreme Court, in Grubbs, established two requirements which an affidavit of probable cause in support of an anticipatory search warrant must meet under the Fourth Amendment: (1) “there is probable cause to believe the triggering condition will occur;” and (2) “if the triggering condition occurs ‘there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.'” Grubbs, 547 U.S. at 96-97 (emphasis omitted). The high Court also held that “[t]he supporting affidavit must provide the magistrate with sufficient information to evaluate both aspects of the probable-cause determination.” Id. at 97.

The high Court has made abundantly plain that the triggering event itself must be probable, and thus that an anticipatory search warrant for a search of a person’s home may not be issued solely upon a claim that fruits of a crime will be found inside if a triggering event, such as delivery of contraband to the home, takes place and the warrant is executed. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in Grubbs, explicitly and aptly cautioned in this regard: “If that were the extent of the probability determination, an anticipatory warrant could be issued for every house in the country, authorizing search and seizure if contraband should be delivered — though for any single location there is no likelihood that contraband will be delivered.” Id. at 96 (parentheses and emphasis omitted).

. . .

Likewise, this affidavit of probable cause contained a paucity of information concerning the basis of knowledge for the informant’s assertion that he could purchase drugs at Appellant’s home at the time and date specified in the affidavit. The means by which the confidential informant learned of “Greg’s” cocaine sales and the use of his car to deliver narcotics was not set forth in the affidavit, and there was no other evidence provided in the affidavit which would tend to corroborate the truth of these allegations. There was no factual basis in the affidavit which established that the confidential informant had any past relationship with “Greg,” ever witnessed “Greg” in possession of drugs, or, critically, had been inside of Appellant’s home recently and observed drugs stored there. Furthermore, there were no facts in the affidavit which suggested that the confidential informant had, at any time, personally purchased drugs from “Greg,” or witnessed “Greg” selling drugs at any location, let alone at Appellant’s home. In short, the affidavit contained only the informant’s bare assertion that he could effectuate a controlled purchase at Appellant’s home at a particular time.

Jardines does not apply to an apartment building’s common area. Alternatively, the landlord gave explicit license for them to be there. United States v. Penaloza-Romero, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142810 (D. Minn. July 25, 2013):

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NPR: When Should Police Use Deadly Force?

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WaPo: Secret NSA documents show campaign against Tor encrypted network by Barton Gellman, Craig Timberg, and Steven Rich:

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Franks violation proved, and search suppressed: The officer had 11 days to prepare the search warrant and reckless or worse put in false facts, and the court decides that rehabilitation of the affidavit would be unwise and encourage Franks violations. Reevaluation with other inculpatory and omitted exculpatory evidence leaves it wanting. United States v. Gaines, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143853 (D. Nev. October 4, 2013), R&R 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143849 (D. Nev. June 19, 2013):

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In a sex assault on a minor case, the court erroneously puts the burden on the defendant to show that the third party consenter didn’t consent rather than on the state where it belongs under the Fourth Amendment. Brown v. State, 119 So. 3d 1079 (Miss. App. 2013):

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Continuing defendant’s open container stop for a beer can because he was nervous was unreasonable. “[L]ights and sirens at three o’clock in the morning could make a saint nervous without shedding any light at all on whether there was alcohol in the can.” United States v. Hemingway, 930 F. Supp. 2d 11 (D. D.C. 2013).*

Defendant straddled the center line rather than pull over for a police car on the shoulder of the highway, and that justified the stop. The smell of marijuana justified extending it. United States v. Beard, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145329 (E.D. Ark. October 26, 2010).*

Avoidance of an immigration checkpoint by turning around was not illegal nor reasonable suspicion. Articulable facts for reasonable suspicion must also be present. Motion to suppress granted. United States v. Castro, 929 F. Supp. 2d 1140 (D. N.M. 2013).*

Officers saw defendant 2-3 steps outside his front door, and they approached to arrest him. They announced who they were and came through a wrought iron gate. They didn’t violate curtilage by entering the gate in the city, and defendant failed on that burden. They lacked, however, probable cause. But, defendant doesn’t win his suppression motion because he can’t show standing in the place the police entered. After a long discussion of what there was to show a reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises, the court concludes defendant fails on standing. United States v. Johnson, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186865 (D. Nev. December 26, 2012).*

The consent officers sought was limited to a cursory review, and then they went way beyond that thinking they had complete consent. They didn’t, and the motion to suppress is granted. United States v. Canine, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186867 (D. Ariz. July 2, 2012).*

Plaintiff’s 1983 claim of the police using her as sexual bait to arrest a police officer and failure to protect fails on qualified immunity. Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631 (5th Cir. 2013)*:

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