When an officer stops a motorist for a taillight lens being broken out, the motorist’s request to see it because he thought it was only cracked didn’t justify a patdown. State v. Cunningham, 2014 Ind. App. LEXIS 81 (February 27, 2014):

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The first question is whether there was a seizure; the second is whether it was justified. First, here there was a seizure by an unmarked car parking behind defendant in his driveway with flashing lights. Five officers were on the scene and two came to his window to talk to him. Second, there was no reasonable suspicion from a bicyclist pulling up next to defendant’s car at a street light, they talked, and then the car stopped and the bicyclist got in the car and they talked some more. There was nothing indicating that this was a hand to hand drug deal. The finding of cocaine should have been suppressed. Reversed. State v. Robinson, 2014 La. App. LEXIS 488 (La. App. 5 Cir. February 26, 2014).

Defendant was first handcuffed and then unhandcuffed and came in to give a statement on an execution style murder. The officers retained his cell phone. He filled out an information sheet and talked with the officers. As his phone rang, one officer wrote down the numbers calling but didn’t answer the phone or search it. Then the police got his phone records from the number he gave. That led to the police finding things, and it was all reasonably done. The seizure of the cell phone was not unreasonable because it wasn’t searched. Williams v. State, 2014 Md. App. LEXIS 14 (February 26, 2014) (another colorful Moylan opinion; and, considering how it starts, you get the drift of where it’s going):

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Bailbondsmen were in defendant’s house to pick him up when they discovered a grow operation, and they called the police. The defendant consented to a search. There was probable cause for issuance of a warrant and the investigation was inevitably going to lead to a search warrant if he didn’t consent. The consent was valid by inevitable discovery. Rodriguez v. State, 129 So. 3d 1135 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013).

A propane truck driver making a delivery saw a grow operation with bright lights and all, and he reported it to the police [a citizen informer]. The affidavit for the search warrant based on his representation was issued with probable cause. Even if it wasn’t [there was], the good faith exception would save it because it wasn’t so lacking in probable cause it couldn’t be relied upon. State v. Elliott, 2013-Ohio-5753, 2013 Ohio App. LEXIS 6029 (5th Dist. December 23, 2013).* [This could have been a lot simpler: Look, the truck driver is a citizen informant, and his report is not subject to close scrutiny. He said he saw a grow, and the police took that to get a search warrant. How is that not PC?]

The government sought a search warrant to hack a computer believed to be used to commit bank fraud. The USMJ concludes that the proposed search would violate the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment. In re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at Premises Unknown, 958 F. Supp. 2d 753 (S.D. Tex. 2013):

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Officers searched two apartments in a warrant for one, and the good faith exception could not be applied. All factors pointed to upstairs Apt. 2, the purported residence of the defendant by all accounts. After officers got there, it turned out defendant was really living in downstairs Apt. 1. Clearly, the USMJ only authorized a search of Apt. 2. On a cost-benefits analysis of the benefits of suppression v. social costs, the balance favors suppression of the child pornography. United States v. Bershchansky, 958 F. Supp. 2d 354 (E.D. N.Y. 2013).

The owner of an iPhone who loaned it to the defendant had apparent authority to consent to its search after it was taken off defendant. United States v. Mitchell, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102092 (M.D. Fla. July 22, 2013), prior opinion 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188717 (M.D. Fla. August 21, 2012).

Consent was voluntary on totality: “Most significant, however, is Salcedo’s admission that he allowed the agents to search his apartment because he thought that if they failed to find the evidence, then he ‘would be home free.’” United States v. Salcedo, 533 Fed. Appx. 796 (9th Cir. 2013).

The state failed to establish that the defendants were operating their drug business from an abandoned building. The police entered without a warrant. State v. Brown, 216 N.J. 508, 83 A.3d 45 (2014), Syllabus:

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Defendant Lopez arrived at the drug house just before the police, so could show no standing to challenge the search warrant. A search warrant for the premises authorizes a search of the person of anybody found there. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981); Tindle v. Enochs, 420 Fed.Appx. 561 (6th Cir. 2011). United States v. Pineda, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19089 (M.D. Tenn. February 13, 2014).

Defense counsel was not ineffective for not raising recantation of statement used for probable cause that came after the motion to suppress hearing–-it did not undermine the probable cause at the time. It was the witness’s false statement; not that of the police. Moreover, there was ample probable cause that the gun was there even without her recanted statement. Commonwealth v. Wadlington, 467 Mass. 192 (February 14, 2014) [analogized to the lying CI not being a Franks violation].

A search warrant required for historical cell site location information data in Massachusetts. Commonwealth v. Augustine, 467 Mass. 230 (February 18, 2014):

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Anonymous tip of possession of a gun at school was sufficient under T.L.O. for search of a book bag in school. A loaded gun was found. K.P. v. State, 129 So. 3d 1121 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013):

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Police had an anonymous tip that defendant was selling drugs out of his house, so they go there for a knock-and-talk. They encounter his brother coming out of the house and talk to him. He keeps work tools there in a room, and he can come and go. They ask permission to do a walk through to see if anybody is home, and he consents. Inside they see a bedroom that wasn’t his and the room with his tools. In a hallway closet in plain view is crack and marijuana. The brother had actual authority to consent to the mere entry to look around, and the plain view was valid. Niles v. State, 2014 Ga. App. LEXIS 36 (January 24, 2014).*

“Consequently, the delay in bringing the drug-detection dog to the scene of the traffic stop, if any, constituted a ‘modest incremental delay for a person already lawfully arrested,’ which did not unreasonably prolong the traffic stop.” United States v. Guidry, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184171 (E.D. Wis. December 30, 2013).*

Defendant was stopped for overtinting, and he was found to have consented to a patdown and search of his vehicle. In the patdown they found an unusual object in his groin area. His DL check showed he was on probation, so they Mirandized him, and then he admitted to possessing marijuana. They took him to the front of the car and had him undo his pants, and the marijuana was retrieved. At the jail, a more thorough search produced a bag of crack. The searches were all reasonable. James v. State, 129 So. 3d 1206 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014).*

New Law Review Article: The Due Process Exclusionary Rule by Richard M. Re in the Harvard Law Review (to be discussed this week on Volokh Conspiracy and in WaPo):

Abstract:

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PoliceOne.com: Why SCOTUS’ ‘qualified immunity’ decision is huge for cops by Joanne Eldridge about Plumhoff v. Rickard:

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A dog sniff outside a commercial storage unit does not violate any reasonable expectation of privacy. State v. Johnson, 2014-Ohio-671, 2014 Ohio App. LEXIS 655 (10th Dist. February 25, 2014).

Protective sweep argument was waived by not including it in the motion to suppress. United States v. Aguilar, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 3590 (8th Cir. February 26, 2014).*

Based on witness reports, the officers had probable cause to detain defendant. United States v. Cook, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24034 (N.D. Iowa February 25, 2014).*

The state offered two justifications for the defendant’s stop for suspicion of DWI, but the trial court suppressed considering only one. Remanded. State v. Horvath, 2014-Ohio-641, 2014 Ohio App. LEXIS 633 (9th Dist. February 24, 2014).*

ICE officers spent a year collecting a list of Philadelphia taxicab drivers they determined were illegal aliens and ran a sting to get them to come in for a “refund” and detain them. Those who were citizens were still detained for hours so they couldn’t alert others to the sting. They stated a claim for relief they were unlawfully detained under the Fourth Amendment. Lawal v. McDonald, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 25203 (3d Cir. December 19, 2013), later opinion 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 3652 (3d Cir. February 26, 2014).

Defendant’s 2255 claim that defense counsel didn’t file a motion to suppress that was meritorious was not prejudicial even if it was. All that were found were identification documents of the defendant, and that wasn’t even an issue at trial. Therefore, no Strickland prejudice. Sillah v. United States, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177577 (S.D. N.Y. December 17, 2013).*

Defendant’s 2255 here is nothing more than an effort to relitigate his motion to suppress. Davis v. United States, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177410 (M.D. Fla. December 18, 2013).*

Continuing defendant’s stop long enough to call his PO to ask whether she wanted a probation search of him for drugs was based on reasonable suspicion. Adepoju v. State, 2014 Alas. App. LEXIS 16 (February 26, 2014).

Defendant was arrested for criminal trespassing in an apartment building when police were there looking for two Latino males but this was a Latino male and female. Her purse was handed over and it was searched, but there was admittedly no exigency. The fact a purse is a little heavy doesn’t mean it contains weapons or destructible evidence. Suppressed. People v. Jimenez, 2014 NY Slip Op 1262, 2014 N.Y. LEXIS 383 (February 25, 2014).

Defendant was a known drug dealer, and he left his house to go to the deals, and that showed nexus to his house being the place where drugs would be kept. A couple of day delay didn’t make the warrant application stale. United States v. Thornton, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 3473 (3d Cir. February 25, 2014).*

Probable cause existed for a search warrant for defendant’s Facebook account because of various facts known to the police, the fact three “cell phone tower dumps” in the vicinity and at the time of burglaries put defendant in the vicinity, and, finally, defendant’s Facebook account referred to “robbing” and showed piles of cash. In Interest of D.O. v. D.O., 2013 ND 247, 2013 N.D. LEXIS 246 (December 19, 2013).

“Faint odor” of raw cannabis is probable cause. It wasn’t disputed that it could be smelled; the whole argument was whether it mattered it was “faint.” Faint odor is still odor. People v. Weaver, 2013 IL App (3d) 130054, 2 N.E.3d 621 (2013).

A general search issue in a 2255 fails without specifying what happened or how or who messed up. United States v. Wilcox, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179218 (D. Minn. December 19, 2013).*

A CI told the Troy NY police that he bought dope from “Stink” at 396 First Street. The CI couldn’t be corroborated, and the officer obtaining the warrant didn’t tell the issuing magistrate that surveillance of plaintiff’s house showed no criminal activity. A no-knock warrant was obtained and the police broke into the innocent plaintiff’s house with a flash-bang grenade. Plaintiff sued under § 1983, and the officers were denied qualified immunity for not corroborating the snitch and raiding the house of an innocent person. McColley v. County of Rensselaer, 740 F.3d 817 (2d Cir. 2014):

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Defendant’s handcuffing was with reasonable suspicion and proportionate to the risk to officer safety. Then his arrest was with probable cause. United States v. Hunter, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23515 (S.D. Ala. February 25, 2014)*:

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Officers were called to a house where an estate sale (sounded like a yard sale) was going on in the yard and the house because there were reports of a man overdosed in the living room and nobody else attending to the estate sale. They found the overdosed man with his needles and drugs. They heard the sound of a person snoring and they went to investigate. The bedroom door was ajar less than an inch and they couldn’t see in, but they went in and pulled the covers off the sleeping defendant (who didn’t live there). They saw drugs in plain view. The entry into the bedroom was unjustified by the emergency or its implied authority. State v. Danielson, 260 Ore. App. 601, 2014 Ore. App. LEXIS 92 (January 23, 2014):

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