The state failed to establish that the defendants were operating their drug business from an abandoned building. The police entered without a warrant. State v. Brown, 216 N.J. 508, 83 A.3d 45 (2014), Syllabus:
The State did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that 820 Line Street in the City of Camden, although in decrepit condition, was abandoned or that defendants were trespassers, thus failing to justify the warrantless search of the property.
1. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution both guarantee “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their … houses … against unreasonable searches and seizures.” There is a clear preference for police officers to secure a warrant before entering and searching a home; warrantless searches are presumptively invalid. However, under both Article I, Paragraph 7 and the Fourth Amendment, a defendant has no standing to challenge the warrantless search of abandoned property, and to that extent, abandoned property falls within an exception to the warrant requirement.
2. Defendants do not have standing to object to the warrantless search of the property if the building was abandoned or, alternatively, if they were trespassers; they would not have the requisite possessory or proprietary interest in the property to object to the search. However, the State bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the building is abandoned or defendants are trespassers. The proper test for abandonment remains, for Fourth Amendment purposes, whether a defendant “retains a reasonable expectation of privacy in the property alleged to be abandoned,” United States v. Stevenson, 396 F.3d 538, 546 (4th Cir.), and, for Article I, Paragraph 7 purposes, whether a defendant “retain[s] a proprietary, possessory, or participatory interest” in the property, State v. Johnson, 193 N.J. 528 (2008). The test must be one of objective reasonableness; the subjective belief of the officer is not a relevant consideration. In short, “[t]here simply is no ‘trashy house exception’ to the warrant requirement,” and therefore “[i]t is unreasonable to assume that a poorly maintained home is an abandoned home.” United States v. Harrison, 689 F.3d 301, 311 (3d Cir. 2012). This case was decided under the New Jersey Constitution.
3. Under Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution, there are a number of factors to be considered in determining whether, in light of the totality of the circumstances, a police officer has an objectively reasonable basis to believe a building is abandoned, thus justifying a warrantless entry and search. No one factor is necessarily dispositive, and the weight to be given to any factor will depend on the particular circumstances confronting the officer. If obtaining a warrant is impracticable, and exigent circumstances demand swift action because of the threatened destruction of drugs inside a residence, then a warrantless entry may be justifiable.
4. Just as a defendant will have no standing to challenge a search of abandoned property, he will have no standing to challenge a search if an officer had an objectively reasonable basis to believe he was a trespasser. A trespasser does not have a possessory or proprietary interest in property where he does not belong. The State bears the burden of showing that the police officer had an objectively reasonable basis to believe a person was a trespasser, justifying a warrantless search of a home. Ultimately, the focus must be whether, in light of the totality of the circumstances, a police officer had an objectively reasonable basis to conclude that a building was abandoned or a defendant was a trespasser before the officer entered or searched the home.
5. It can hardly be disputed that Trooper Kennedy had probable cause to believe that drug dealing was occurring at 820 Line Street. The issue, however, is whether the troopers had a reason to bypass the warrant requirement. The troopers did not know whether the defendants resided there in the evenings, whether they had an ownership interest in the property, or whether they had permission of the owner to use the property. There is no suggestion in the record that evidence inside the building was in danger of destruction or that obtaining a warrant was impracticable due to some other exigency. The question to be answered is not whether the police have a subjective, good-faith belief that a building is abandoned, but whether they have an objectively reasonable basis to believe so. The Court has no reason to substitute its judgment for the judgment properly and fairly exercised by the trial court. The State did not establish that the property, although in decrepit condition, was abandoned or that defendants were trespassers.
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by John Wesley Hall
Criminal Defense Lawyer and
Search and seizure law consultant
Little Rock, Arkansas
Contact: forhall @ aol.com / The Book www.johnwesleyhall.com
"If it was easy, everybody would be doing it. It isn't, and they don't." —Me
"Life is not a matter of holding good cards, but of playing a poor hand well." –Josh Billings (pseudonym of Henry Wheeler Shaw), Josh Billings on Ice, and Other Things (1868) (erroneously attributed to Robert Louis Stevenson, among others)
“I am still learning.” —Domenico Giuntalodi (but misattributed to Michelangelo Buonarroti (common phrase throughout 1500's)).
"Love work; hate mastery over others; and avoid intimacy with the government."
—Shemaya, in the Thalmud
"It is a pleasant world we live in, sir, a very pleasant world. There are bad people in it, Mr. Richard, but if there were no bad people, there would be no good lawyers."
—Charles Dickens, “The Old Curiosity Shop ... With a Frontispiece. From a Painting by Geo. Cattermole, Etc.” 255 (1848)
"A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect results, especially if one's attention is confined to the particular case at bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced."
—Williams
v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold,
J.), rev'd Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).
"The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws,
or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." —Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
"Any costs the exclusionary rule are costs imposed directly by the Fourth Amendment."
—Yale Kamisar, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 36 n. 151 (1987).
"There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that
bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the
police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater
than it is today."
— Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their
property."
—Entick
v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)
"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have
frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And
so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his
case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth
Amendment."
—United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated
here, has not–to put it mildly–run smooth."
—Chapman
v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the
bottom of a turntable."
—Arizona
v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)
"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in
an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."
—Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)
“Experience should teach us to be most on guard to
protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born
to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded
rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men
of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.”
—United
States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
“Liberty—the freedom from unwarranted
intrusion by government—is as easily lost through insistent nibbles by
government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose
it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark.”
—United
States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)
"You can't always get what you want /
But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need."
—Mick Jagger & Keith Richards
"In Germany, they first came for the communists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for
the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Catholic. Then they came
for me–and by that time there was nobody left to speak up."
—Martin Niemöller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration
camp]
“You know, most men would get discouraged by
now. Fortunately for you, I am not most men!”
---Pepé Le Pew
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers,
is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which
reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that
those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting
out crime."
—Johnson
v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)