D. Kan. [surprisingly] finds no cause for a stop and no reasonable suspicion for any detention / Buyer in good faith of a stolen vehicle had standing

Court finds that, after agonizing somewhat, that reasonable suspicion did not exist for a traffic stop after the lengthy observation of the activities of the defendant at a motel where he paid in cash. Mindful that Arvizu cautioned against a “divide and conquer” analysis, the court went through every factor asserted as reasonable suspicion and found each was consistent with innocent activity, and, added up, did not amount to much. United States v. Lopez, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34173 (D. Kan. April 30, 2007)*:

In this case, unlike the cases cited above, the factors relied on by the government in addition to the exchange are simply not enough, even when viewed in totality, to support a finding of reasonable suspicion. Even when considering that Mr. Lopez was from Texas, had a brief stay at the hotel, paid in cash and waited in the parking lot, there is nothing articulable to indicate that criminal activity might be afoot. There is nothing in the record, such as presence in a high crime area, known criminal history, or an informant’s tip, to take the exchange of the cooler out of the realm of innocent activity. In other words, the court finds no “concrete reasons” supporting an interpretation that the innocent factors in this case amounted to a “suspicious conglomeration.” Thus, the court is not satisfied that, at the time the troopers stopped Mr. Lopez, they had developed a reasonable suspicion rather than mere “inchoate suspicions and unparticularized hunches” to link the cooler or Mr. Lopez to criminal activity. Accordingly, because the traffic stop was not justified at its inception as required under Terry, the court grants Mr. Lopez’s motion to suppress.

Comment: The District of Kansas is always a source of drug courier stops, and this is the first suppression motion I’ve seen granted from there in a long time. Maybe there has been another, but I don’t remember one. Since a warrantless search gets de novo review, we can expect the government to appeal.

Defendant driving a stolen vehicle was found to have standing. He testified at the suppression hearing that he bought the vehicle just before he was arrested and had paperwork to prove it, including the payment book of the original owner. He did not have to transfer ownership with DMV immediately to have standing. United States v. Garcia-Robledo, 488 F. Supp. 2d 50 (D. P.R. 2007):

Thus, in view of the above, Garcia-Robledo had a legitimate presence in the vehicle, had prior use of the vehicle, was in control of the Ford F-250 the day of the incident, was in possession of the vehicle, and had the ability to exclude others’ use of the property.

In turn, the government contends the vehicle in question was reported stolen in April 2006 and, thus, Garcia-Robledo had no reasonable expectation of privacy. Nonetheless, no credible evidence was presented that Garcia-Robledo had any knowledge at the time he purchased the vehicle that the Ford F-250 vehicle was stolen.

Although the manner in which Garcia-Robledo bought the car may be unconventional, inasmuch as the vehicle’s registration was not promptly transferred to his name, Garcia-Robledo provided a credible explanation as to why this was not done. Garcia-Robledo explained he would not qualify for a loan of the Ford F-250 vehicle or to assume the lease because his credit was not enough. …

Defendant’s effort to conceal a box during a traffic stop justified a patdown. United States v. Valdivia, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34187 (D. Neb. May 9, 2007).*