Defendant’s argument traffic statute was unconstitutionally vague did not overcome de facto good faith exception of Krull v. Illinois

Defendant’s argument that the state traffic law on readability of license plates that was used for his stop was so vague as to be unconstitutional and that officers could arbitrarily arrest did not have any effect on the legality of his stop and search under the Fourth Amendment. The question under Krull v. Illinois is whether the officers acted in good faith reliance on the statute. United States v. Cardenas-Alatorre, 485 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2007):

The Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed that the exclusionary rule ought not to be deployed when officers act in good faith–that is, in “objectively reasonable reliance” upon a statute–even though the statute ultimately may be found unconstitutional. Krull, 480 U.S. at 355; see also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). The rationale animating the good faith exception is, we are told, in harmony with the underlying purpose of the exclusionary rule, for if “the officer is acting as a reasonable officer would and should act in similar circumstances[, e]xcluding the evidence can in no way affect his future conduct unless it is to make him less willing to do his duty.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 920 (internal quotation omitted).

We find this exception applicable and dispositive here. Even assuming (without deciding) that Mr. Cardenas-Alatorre is correct that the New Mexico statute is unconstitutional as applied to him, we are unable to conclude that Deputy Roth acted in an objectively unreasonable manner. …

Defendant was driving a convertible with the top down on a cold December day and he accelerated away from the police officer as he passed him. Various other factors led to reasonable suspicion. Morris v. Dean, 223 Fed. Appx. 937 (11th Cir. 2007)* (unpublished).

Plaintiffs’ motion for new trial in an illegal search case is granted because of likely jury confusion on the instructions concerning the search of plaintiffs’ home. Reasonableness of the method of search did not equate with whether it was reasonable at its inception. Goff v. Carpenter, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33178 (W.D. Ark. May 4, 2007)*:

Given the pervasive focus on reasonableness in the Instructions, the Court agrees with plaintiffs that Instruction 10a had the potential to create confusion in the minds of the jurors. The only liability issue in the Interrogatories on the Verdict was whether the defendants violated the right to be secure against “unreasonable searches.” Instruction 10 told the jury that plaintiffs had the burden of proving that a search of their home occurred, but also stated that it was not plaintiffs’ burden to prove that any such search was unreasonable–because the search of a person’s home without a warrant is presumed to be unreasonable. Thus, Instruction 10 incorporated a legal proposition based on what the evidence indisputably showed–that there was no warrant associated with the events alleged by plaintiffs to have constituted a search of their home.

The immediately following Instruction 10a then told the jury that there were things they could not consider when deciding whether the defendants’ conduct was reasonable. This instruction could reasonably have implied to the jury–or permitted them to reasonably infer–that in determining whether a search of plaintiffs’ home had occurred, they should evaluate the reasonableness of defendants’ actions at the time of the alleged search. Such an implication and/or inference would be erroneous and could be unfairly prejudicial to plaintiffs.