NJ civil eviction process led to reasonable entry for eviction

Defendant lived in New Jersey public housing with his mother, and she died. He was not a tenant on the lease. A couple of months later, the Housing Authority initiated eviction proceedings and served an eviction warrant by sliding it under the door, giving anybody inside four days to clear out or apply to a court for relief. After the four days, the Housing Authority entered and found drugs in an open shoebox on the bed. The entry was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and the N.J. Constitution, and he lost his reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises by not moving to protect it when the court ordered eviction notice was served, and he failed to counter it. State v. Hinton, 216 N.J. 211, 78 A.3d 553 (2013). Syllabus:

HELD: Where, as here, an eviction proceeding has advanced to the point that a warrant of removal has been executed, a tenant does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises. Therefore, the police action in Hinton’s apartment was not a “search” under either the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution or Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution.

1. New Jersey’s Anti-Eviction Act authorizes removal of tenants from property for reasons including nonpayment of rent, and, along with the Tenant Hardship Act, establishes the steps for removal. The first step requires issuance of a warrant of removal no earlier than three days following entry of a judgment for possession. In accordance with the Fair Eviction Notice Act, the warrant must provide notice of the tenant’s right to apply for a stay, the method for execution of the warrant, and the procedures under which the landlord may remove the tenant’s property. Once the warrant is issued, it may not be executed for another three days. After expiration of this second three-day period, a court officer may remove the tenant and any other persons from the premises. Where, as here, a warrant of removal is issued for nonpayment of rent, the tenant is on notice during the second three-day period that dispossession, including a lockout, may be imminent. Although the Special Civil Part retains jurisdiction for ten days to hear any application by the tenant for lawful relief, the tenant’s status has fundamentally changed once this pivotal stage in the process is reached. (pp. 16-21)

2. When the Court reviews a ruling applying legal principles to factual findings, it defers to the factual findings but reviews de novo application of the legal principles. Turning first to the question of whether Hinton’s rights were violated under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the Court notes that consideration of an objection to the admission of evidence obtained by a search or seizure requires a threshold determination of whether the challenged search or seizure violated the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy. To that end, the United States Supreme Court dispensed with a separate standing inquiry and implemented a two-pronged inquiry regarding the extent of a defendant’s rights under the Fourth Amendment, asking whether: (1) the defendant manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the search; and (2) the expectation of privacy was reasonable. A tenant’s reasonable expectation of privacy can hinge on his or her legal status following an eviction. Here, assuming defendant satisfies the first prong, he fails to make a showing on the second prong. When Hinton left the apartment on April 13, 2009, he was on notice that a court officer could enter, restore control of the premises to the landlord, and prohibit Hinton’s access. Thus, any reasonable expectation of privacy Hinton may have had in the apartment was terminated at this stage of the eviction proceeding. (pp. 21-28)

3. Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution similarly protects individuals from warrantless searches of homes. Unlike federal law, New Jersey law confers automatic standing on a defendant to object to the admission of seized evidence where, as here, the defendant is charged with an offense in which possession is an essential element of guilt. However, Hinton’s automatic standing to file a suppression motion does not necessarily equate to a finding that he had a substantive right of privacy which would mandate grant of his motion. Rather, since the merits of the motion rest on whether Hinton possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises, that issue must be addressed as part of the substantive constitutional analysis. (pp. 28-33)

4. Unlike the federal two-pronged test, New Jersey law only requires that the expectation of privacy be reasonable. New Jersey courts have found that the reasonableness of a defendant’s expectation of privacy in a particular premises turns in large part on his or her legal right to occupy it. Here, as of the date of the search, Hinton had been on notice for a week that an eviction proceeding was pending and had reached a pivotal stage. During that time, he never sought court intervention. At that point, any expectation of privacy on Hinton’s part was unreasonable. Thus, under the particular circumstances of this case, the police action was not a search for purposes of the federal or State constitution. However, because this conclusion does not entirely resolve the question of whether the trial court properly denied Hinton’s motion to suppress, the matter must be remanded to the Appellate Division for consideration of Hinton’s challenge with respect to the seizure of the disputed evidence, as well as the other issues that were not previously addressed by the Appellate Division. (pp. 33-40)