CA7: Consent to seize “whatever documents or items of property whatsoever they deem pertinent to their investigation” is what defendant was told

A broad consent form authorized the police to seize “whatever documents or items of property whatsoever they deem pertinent to their investigation” has to be read in light of what the officers were investigating and the interactions between the suspect and the police. Police questioned defendant over his relationship with a 16 year old girl he’d been communicating with on the internet. It was limited enough in execution and did not lead to an overbroad seizure. United States v. Anderson, 533 Fed. Appx. 668 (7th Cir. 2013):

The consent form authorized the police to seize “whatever documents or items of property whatsoever they deem pertinent to their investigation.” Broad language in a standardized consent form, like that here, must be read in the context of the interactions between the suspect and police that surrounded the execution of the form. See United States v. Breit, 429 F.3d 725, 729-30 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Lemmons, 282 F.3d 920, 924 (7th Cir. 2002). The scope of consent is measured objectively, with a focus on the object of the search as represented to the suspect. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991); United States v. Jackson, 598 F.3d 340, 348 (7th Cir. 2010).

There wasn’t any testimony at the evidentiary hearing, nor has Anderson ever contended, that he or the police officers expressly narrowed the scope of the writing. The officers did not, for instance, tell Anderson they were searching only for specific evidence. See Lemmons, 282 F.3d at 924 (limiting scope of consent when police told suspect they were looking for camera or recordings of neighbor’s window). Still, before the officers presented him with the form, they had been questioning Anderson exclusively about his sexual relationship with the girl. One might think that if Anderson signed the consent, the police would search only for evidence reasonably related to the sexual assault being investigated. United States v. Coleman, 588 F.3d 816, 820 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that crime being investigated, a shooting, was relevant in determining scope of consent); United States v. Turner, 169 F.3d 84, 87-89 (1st Cir. 1999) (same for assault investigation); LaFave, supra, § 8.1(c) at 26 (“[G]eneral consent is constrained by the bounds of reasonableness ….”). Even the government accepts that the written consent could not have been unlimited.